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INTRODUCTIONa 
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 20 
The Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts (the 
Committee) is a joint effort of the Courts and Bar of Maryland to 
examine whether gender bias is affecting participants in the judicial 
system.b When the Committee was created in early 1987, Chief Judge 
Robert C. Murphy charged it: 
• The Report on Gender Bias in the Courts is an official report of the Maryland 
Special Joint Committee, which was published as a separate bound volume in 
May, 1989. The University of Baltimore Law Review is publishing the text of 
the Report essentially unedited. The Law Review corrected several minor errors 
and has supplemented and updated footnotes to identify the sources of statements 
in the Report. In addition, the Law Review has changed footnotes to conform 
to the Uniform System of Citation (Fourteenth Edition). The Executive Summary 
which accompanies the bound version of the Report has been omitted. Quotations 
often are attributed to "Survey Respondent." This was done to protect the 
anonymity of those judges, attorneys, and court personnel who responded to 
the survey. 
b Many people contributed their valuable time and services to the Special Joint 
Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts [hereinafter the Committee]. The Com-
mittee would like to pay a special tribute to several individuals whose assistance 
was greatly appreciated. 
Professor Karen Czapanskiy, as Reporter for the Committee, wrote the Report, 
with the exception of chapter S. She developed the hypothetical problems and 
served on the subcommittee to develop questionnaires for judges, attorneys, and 
court employees. Professor Czapanskiy spent many hours conducting research and 
reviewing transcripts. 
Tricia D. O'Neill, Esquire, as Reporter for the Committee, wrote chapter 5 
of the Report. In addition, she assisted the Committee at hearings and meetings. 
She did legal research, reviewed hearing transcripts, investigated case references 
from testimony, and assisted in the development of the hypothetical problems. 
Cheryl Kaplowitz, Sc.D., a special consultant to the Committee, assisted in 
questionnaire development. She conducted questionnaire pretests, reported on the 
results, and suggested improvements to the survey instruments. She also spent time 
helping with methodological and statistical support. Dr. Kaplowitz provided valuable 
assistance to the Committee by consulting on data analysis and interpretation. 
The public relations firm of Mitchell and Associates, Inc., under the direction 
of Ron Mitchell, advised the Committee on media relations. Mr. Mitchell and his 
staff wrote press releases and planned press conferences. 
The Women Judges Fund for Justice and its Executive Director, Marilyn 
Nejelski, volunteered both time and services to the Committee. 
Linda McKnight drew the cover design and prepared the cover for printing. 
Most of all, the Committee would like to pay a special tribute to the 133 
individuals who testified at the public hearings. The Committee also would like to 
thank the countless number of people who wrote letters to the Committee providing 
case materials and transcripts. Without these individuals, this Report would not 
have been complete. 
The Committee also wishes to express its gratitude to the following people 
and organizations for their help. Without their willingness to share time and skill 
and their generosity with resources, the Committee's surveys, hearings, investigation, 
and report would not have been possible. 
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2. To examine the extent to which gender bias, if it exists, 
affects participants in the court system, such as judges, 
attorneys, litigants, jurors, witnesses and court employees 
and members of the public who come into contact with the 
courts of Maryland. 
3. If gender bias exists, to recommend means to eliminate 
its effect in the Maryland judicial system. c 
After a two-year investigation, the Committee's answer is yes: gender 
bias exists in the courts of Maryland, and it affects decision-making 
as well as participants.d 
The Committee's investigation addressed the following areas: 
Domestic Violence (Chapter 1); Child Custody and Visitation (Chap-
ter 2); Child Support (Chapter 3); Alimony; Property Disposition 
and Litigation Expenses (Chapter 4); Court Treatment of Personnel 
(Chapter 5); Selection of Judges (Chapter 6); and Women in the 
Courtroom: Treatment of Women Parties, Witnesses, Jurors, and 
Lawyers (Chapter 7) .. 
Public Relations: 
Mitchell and Associates, Inc. 
Recording and Transcribing the Committee's Hearings: 
Maryland Shorthand Reporters Association and its Pro Bono Committee 
Montgomery County: Bossard Associates, Inc. - Dennis Bossard 
Eastern Shore - Easton: Capital-Shore Reporting Co. - Pamela L. Garland 
Prince George's County - Upper Marlboro: Gore Reporting Company - Karen 
Morganelli 
Western Maryland - Hagerstown: Barclay Adams Business Services - Usa R. 
Thomas 
Baltimore City: Betz & Strouse, Inc. - Alfred A. Betz 
Anne Arundel and Howard Counties: Susan Barthol Felkoski 
Baltimore, Carroll, and Harford Counties: Walls Reporting, Inc. - Sara A. Cissin. 
< See infra exhibit A. 
d While the Committee's mandate was to investigate gender bias, evidence of 
racial bias also came to the attention of the Committee. Recent reports have 
shown that gender and racial bias persist in the legal system and that both must 
be addressed. See G. HOFFER & J. MACLEOD, A 1988 PILOT RESEARCH STUDY 
OF How ATTORNEYS IN LAW FIRMS IN MARYLAND'S MAJOR URBAN AREAS VIEW 
THE QUALITY OF THEIR PROFESSIONAL LrvES AND ISSUES FACING THE PROFESSION 
10, 45-48 (1988) (majority of lawyers interviewed believe there continues to be 
discrimination in the legal profession on the basis of sex, race, religion, disability, 
and national origin, both within firms and in the courtroom); Maryland State 
Bar Ass'n Conf. on Minorities in the Legal Prof., Report and Recommendations 
6-8 (1987) (minority lawyers experience discrimination in many aspects of the 
practice of law, including judicial selection); Burleigh, Black Women Lawyers, 
74 A.B.A. J., June 1, 1988, at 64 (black female attorneys continue to experience 
double discrimination in the legal profession). 
< The Committee intended to report as well on the treatment of victims of sexual 
assaults and on the outcome of personal injury claims by women, but the 
investigation did not disclose sufficient information on which to base a report 
at this time. 
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The Committee was given a year to do its work. Because of the 
vast scope of the investigation, the deadline was extended an addi-
tional year. The Committee used a press conference, press releases, 
print and broadcast interviews, and other publicity to notify people 
throughout the State of its interest in receiving pertinent information 
and testimony on the question of gender bias in the courts. Several 
community-based groups, including local Commissions for Women 
and the National Congress for Men, volunteered to assist the Com-
mittee in obtaining a full representation on views, issues, and expe-
riences at the Committee's hearings. During its seven hearings 
throughout the State, the Committee heard testimony from 133 
witnesses. r The Committee also sought information by asking a group 
of judges and masters to respond to hypothetical problems on subjects 
including alimony and child custody.8 Many groups and individuals 
submitted reports and statements. Where appropriate, members of 
the Committee reviewed court files and transcripts. 
In an effort to gather the fullest possible information, the 
Committee conducted surveys of judges, lawyers, and court person-
nel. The Committee was assisted in preparing the three questionnaires, 
in devising an appropriate methodology for distributing the ques-
tionnaires, and in interpreting the data which was collected by Dr. 
Cheryl Kaplowitz, Sue Dowden, and the Survey Research Center and 
Institute for Governmental Services of the University of Maryland. 
A report on the survey methodology prepared by Ms. Dowden 
appears in the appendix as exhibit E-1.h As Ms. Dowden's report 
explains, the surveys were mailed to all of the judges, of whom 80070 
responded, and to all of the court personnel, of whom 49% re-
sponded. The surveys were mailed to randomly selected groups of 
male and female attorneys, of whom 54% and 49%, respectively, 
responded. Given the professional survey research techniques which 
were employed in the development and distribution of the surveys, 
the high response rates which were achieved to mail-out survey 
instruments, and the similarities between the characteristics of the 
respondents and the population as a whole, the Committee has great 
confidence in the results of the surveys. 
The Committee has defined gender bias as it affects the judicial 
system to include four aspects. i Gender bias exists when people are 
f For a list of the hearing locations, see infra exhibit C. 
• For a copy of the hypothetical problems and an explanatory note on development 
and distribution of the problems, see infra exhibit D. 
h For a copy of the questionnaires, see infra exhibits E-2(a), (b), and (c). For the 
results of the surveys in tabular form, see infra exhibit E-3. 
; See generally Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Gender Bias Study of the 
Supreme Judicial Court: Status Report 1 (1988); New York Task Force on 
Women in the Courts, Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the 
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denied rights or burdened with responsibilities solely on the basis of 
gender. Gender bias exists when people are subjected to stereotypes 
about the proper behavior of men and women which ignore their 
individual situations. Gender bias exists when people are treated 
differently on the basis of gender in situations where gender should 
make no difference. Finally, gender bias exists when men or women 
as a group can be subjected to a legal rule, policy, or practice which 
produces worse results for them than for the other group. 
It is clear to all of the Committee's members that gender bias 
in all of its forms is found within the judicial system of this State. 
The two-year investigation which led us to this conclusion is reported 
in detail in the pages which follow. We have concluded that elimi-
nating gender bias must become and remain a priority for the legal 
community, and the Report contains numerous recommendations for 
beginning that process. 
Two preliminary points need to be made. First, the mandate of 
the Committee was to investigate gender bias, regardless of the sex 
of the person who experiences the harm. Taking this mandate seri-
ously, the Committee carefully investigated allegations of bias from 
men and from women, and it found that gender bias affects both 
sexes. At the same time, the Committee's investigation demonstrates 
that women are harmed by gender bias in more ways than men. As 
the Report explains, women's negative experiences cover the range 
from the aggravating to the life-threatening: a woman attorney may 
appear before a judge who assumes that she is not an attorney; a 
victim of domestic violence may be denied effective protection from 
a violent husband. Women experience different treatment in each of 
the substantive areas investigated by the Committee, as well as in 
each of the procedural areas, and their experiences are neither trivial 
nor infrequent. The information before the Committee indicated that 
men's negative experiences are clustered around relationships with 
children, in areas such as child custody problems and parental leave. 
The second preliminary point concerns finger-pointing. Focusing 
on what is right in the judicial system is needed even when one's 
mandate is to identify what is wrong. The Committee wants to 
emphasize, therefore, its belief, based on its investigation, that eve-
ryone in the judicial system will read this Report in good faith and 
with the intention of improving the system as a whole. Indeed, many 
participants in the judicial system have demonstrated that they are 
sensitive to the existence of gender bias. Their awareness and efforts 
Courts, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 11, 16 (1986-87); Rhode Island Committee on 
Women in the Courts, Final Report i (June 1987) (on file with Committee); 
New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts, The First 
Year Report, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 129 (1986). 
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already have fostered positive change. Many incidents deScribed in 
this Report may have been the result of inadvertent behavior or a 
lack of sensitivity about the impact of particular behaviors on people 
who perceived the conduct as biased. The Committee further recog-
nizes that satisfying every litigant of the gender-neutrality of the 
decision in his or her case can be difficult because some cases are 
close. That is one reason the Committee has been careful to review 
court records, including transcripts, concerning a number of inci-
dents. Most important, the Committee's purpose is not to single out 
individuals or call into question their decisions. Instead, the Com-
mittee's goals are to make people aware of the many ways in which 
gender bias can affect decision-making and the outcome of litigation, 
and to recommend ways to eliminate it from the judicial system. 
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CHAPTER 1: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
The most compelling and moving testimony which the Special 
Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts (the Committee) 
received during its hearings throughout the State concerned domestic 
violence. Victims, friends of victims, and advocates for victims 
repeatedly impressed the Committee members with the severity and 
pervasiveness of the problem of domestic violence and the critical 
need to find and enforce effective remedies. 
During the last decade, efforts have been made in the State of 
Maryland to address the violence committed against women) by their 
husbands and other intimate partners. New programs have been 
established and new legal protections have been fashioned. 2 The 
Committee nonetheless heard that many women seeking civil and 
criminal relief against their batterers still face barriers from within 
the judicial system. Information was gathered at hearings, from 
people writing to the Committee and from surveys of judges and 
lawyers. The Committee found that, while progress was notable in 
some areas, problems are plentiful at all levels. 
I. Victims of Domestic Violence: Treatment by Courts and Court 
Personnel 
Studies show that at least 1.8 million women are battered every 
year in this country, approximately one woman every eighteen sec-
onds.3 Every day, four are beaten to death.4 During 1988, at least 
1. The overwhelming majority of the adult victims of domestic violence are 
women. The Maryland State Police, for example, reports that 88070 of spousal 
assault victims are female. HOUSE OF RUTH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGAL CLINIC, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: SKILLS AND STRATEGIES 1 (1987) [hereinafter HOUSE 
OF RUTH] (published by the Maryland Institute for Continuing Professional 
Education for Lawyers, Inc. (MICPEL». According to the United States 
Department of Justice, 95% of spousal assaults committed between 1973 and 
1977 were committed by men. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION 
ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 21 (1983). According to the information 
before the Committee, including testimony, surveys, and letters and reports 
submitted by victims, friends of victims, and advocates for victims, problems 
facing female victims are severe. No data was received showing any problems 
experienced by male victims. Nonetheless, it is clear that changes which will 
benefit female victims often will assist male victims as well. 
2. These programs allow victims to petition for relief from abuse, and to obtain 
temporary ex parte and protective orders which may, among other things, 
direct the alleged abuser to vacate the family home, direct the alleged abuser 
to participate in a professionally supervised program, and award temporary 
custody of minor children. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 4-501 to 4-510 
(1991). 
3. R. GELLES & M. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 99 (1988); Kantrowitz, And 
Thousands More, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 12, 1988, at 58-59. See generally R. DOBASH 
& R. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES (1979); L. WALKER, THE BATTERED 
WOMAN SYNDROME (1984). 
4. Kantrowitz, supra note 3, at 58. 
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nineteen women in Maryland died in what were reported to be 
incidents of domestic violence. 5 The former husband of one of the 
Committee's witnesses, Zitta Friedlander,6 stands accused of her 
homicide. 7 
Over 4,500 petitions for emergency civil protection from domestic 
violence were filed in the District Court of Maryland in fiscal year 
1987-1988.8 In addition, the District Court heard thousands of crim-
inal cases involving domestic violence, and circuit courts heard both 
criminal and domestic relations cases.9 The Committee learned that 
the most pervasive and difficult problems for the victims are the 
attitudes and lack of understanding of judges and court personnel 
about domestic violence.1O 
Although it is well established and should be well known that 
violence against women by their husbands and mates is serious and 
can be deadly, the Committee found substantial evidence that many 
officials of the Maryland judicial system lack an understanding of 
domestic violence and therefore treat it as a trivial matter. A witness 
before the Committee's hearings spoke of her attempts to get help 
after her husband had threatened to kill her' with his gun: 
The thing that has never left my mind from that point to 
now is what the judge said to me. He took a few minutes 
to decide on the matter and he looked at me and he said, 
"I don't believe anything that you're saying." He said, 
"The reason I don't believe it is because I don't believe 
that anything like this could happen to me. If I was you 
and someone had threatened me with a gun, there is no 
way that I would continue to stay with them. There is no 
way that I could take that kind of abuse from them. 
Therefore, since I would not let that happen to me, I can't 
believe that it happened to you." I have just never forgotten 
those words .... When I left the courtroom that day, I felt 
very defeated, very defenseless, and very powerless and very 
hopeless, because not only had I gone through an experience 
5. Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence Newsletter, Fall/Winter 1988-
89. 
6. Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts Public Hearing 139-44 
(Sept. 30, 1987) (Prince George's County) [hereinafter Prince George's County 
Hearing] (testimony of Zitta Friedlander). 
7. See Commonwealth v. Friedlander, No. Cr. 58917 (Fairfax County, Va. Cir. 
Ct., Jan. 1, 1989 (before grand jury». 
8. 1987-1988 MD. JUDICIARY ANN. REP. at 86. 
9. [d. 
10. The Committee's investigation addressed the conduct of judges and court 
personnel. Victims also may experience problems with prosecutors and police, 
who are not the focus of this Report. 
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which I found to be very overwhelming, very trying and 
almost cost me my life, but to sit up in court and make 
myself open up and recount all my feelings and fear and 
then have it thrown back in my face as being totally untrue 
just because this big man would . not allow anyone to do 
this to him, placed me in a state of shock which probably 
hasn't left me yet. II 
Victims of domestic violence report that their testimony is given 
little credibility. An advocate for battered women told the Committee 
about a judge who wanted to know whether counseling programs 
for families involved with violence are able to "flush out 'all these 
women who are lying." '12 This advocate expressed her dismay at the 
skepticism of the judge, since she saw no reason for judges to believe 
that victims of domestic violence are manipulating the system. In her 
view, "[f]ar from overusing, abusing and manipulating the court 
system, women are, by and large, intimidated by the system and are 
underutilizing it in vast numbers. "13 
Nonetheless, suspicion may greet a victim of domestic violence 
at the courthouse door. One judge informed an advocate of his belief 
that women use the civil protection system to get the family home 
before a divorce. As an example, he described a case in which the 
husband hit the wife after she was "up in his face" about another 
woman. 14 Another judge denied an application for a protective order 
because he did not believe that the husband would behave in the 
manner the wife had described because the husband was a doctor .IS 
In another case, the judge did not believe the victim had been beaten 
because she did not have any bruises. The victim told the Committee 
that the judge told her that she had to go back and get beaten up 
11. Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts Public Hearing" 97-98 
(Sept. 16, 1987) (Montgomery County) [hereinafter Montgomery County Hear-
ing] (testimony of Roslyn Smith). Another witness told the Committee about 
another judge who could not put himself in the shoes of the victim. The judge 
thought it humorous that a victim would be afraid of her husband coming 
after her with a pillow as if to smother her, he could not understand how a 
woman might be afraid of a pillow. [d. at 48-49 (testimony of 10 Benson 
Fogel, Esquire). 
12. Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts Public Hearing 2 (Oct. 
26, 1987) (Baltimore County) [hereinafter Baltimore County Hearing] (testimony 
of Sheila P. Litzky, Coordinator, Baltimore County Family Violence Interven-
tion Project). 
13. [d. at 3. 
14. Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts Public Hearing 31 (Oct. 
7, 1987) (Washington County) [hereinafter Washington County Hearing] (tes-
timony of Connie Koenig, Heartly House, Inc., Frederick County). 
15. [d. at 30. 
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and have bruises to get a civil protective order. 16 In one particularly 
egregious case, the judge called the victim "one hell of an actress," 
despite clear and consistent testimony by the victim and a witness 
that her husband had beaten her frequently.n The testimony was 
given during her husband's trial on assault and battery charges in 
which the wife, who had had a mastectomy, testified that abuse 
inflicted by her husband had dislodged her silicone breast implant 
and that it had to be reinserted surgically. 18 One woman was beaten 
by her husband over the weekend between two court hearings, and 
she appeared at the second hearing wearing a neck brace because of 
the injuries he inflicted. The judge's response to her injuries was 
that "anyone could put on a neck brace just to make him think 
something had happened." 19 
Witnesses reported that cases involving domestic violence are 
regarded as trivial and unimportant, even though human life can be 
at issue. One witness said: 
I have heard of resentment on the part of circuit court 
judges at having to be involved with issuing protection from 
domestic violence orders for battered women. The sentiment 
is that such relatively "unimportant" work is more appro-
priate to the judges of the district court. 20 
Another witness advised the Committee that: 
Statements are often made from the bench that make light 
of these very serious cases, which can often lead to homicide. 
Our local papers are filled each week with stories of domestic 
fatalities often after [the victims] turning to the courts for 
help and assistance, and not having been believed when they 
described their abuse and their fear of death . .. [C]ourt 
officers use terms such as Punch and Judy cases .... 21 
16. Letter from Joan Purdy to the Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the 
Courts (June 6, 1987) (on file with Committee). Special Joint Committee on 
Gender Bias in the Courts Public Hearing 35 (Sept. 22, 1987) (Eastern Shore) 
[hereinafter Eastern Shore Hearing) (testimony of Deborah Paparella, Clinical 
Director, Life Crisis Center, Salisbury). 
17. Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts Public Hearing 1-66 
(Oct. 20, 1987) (Anne Arundel County) [hereinafter Anne Arundel County 
Hearing) (testimony of Dorothy Burchette). 
18. State v. Burchette, No. Cr. 623419A6 (Anne Arundel County, Md. Dist. Ct., 
July 1, 1987) (tape recording of proceedings). See Montgomery County Hearing, 
supra note 11, at 66 (testimony of J. Klapac). 
19. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 6 (testimony of Barbara 
Miller, Prince George's County Commission for Women). 
20. Baltimore County Hearing, supra note 12, at 3 (testimony of Sheila P. Litzky). 
21. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 5-6 (testimony of Barbara 
Miller). 
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An assistant state's attorney testified that: 
[Vol. 20 
We've noticed that there is a prevalent judicial attitude that 
these types of cases [assault, battery, robbery, etc., where 
the complaining witness and the defendant have or had a 
relationship] are a waste of time, that they're not serious, 
that they belong in domestic relations court. They do not 
belong in the criminal justice system.22 
The same assistant state's attorney provided two examples. The first 
was a criminal case in which the victim was choked by her boyfriend 
until she almost passed out. When the victim testified that she had 
attempted a reconciliation with the defendant after the incident, the 
judge told the prosecutor that the case was "garbage," and that "he 
didn't know what this case was doing there in the criminal justice 
system. "23 In the trial on these charges, the defendant was convicted 
of assault in a bench trial before another judge.24 In another case, 
the husband was charged with kidnapping his wife, hitting her with 
a stun gun, and threatening her with death by gasoline fire. While 
he was out on bond, he followed and harassed the victim continually. 
Revocation of bond was denied because the judge said the defendant 
was permitted to follow the victim in order to gather evidence for 
the divorce. Furthermore, the judge thought the victim was "being 
a fretful woman for worrying about that sort of thing because it was 
obvious [the defendant] would not hurt her."2s 
Victims reported to the Committee that many judges and court 
personnel do not understand the experiences of victims of domestic 
violence. Domestic violence has been studied extensively and it is 
important that judges and court personnel be aware of certain basic 
data.26 The victims of domestic violence overwhelmingly are female: 
eighty-eight percent of spousal assaults reported to the Maryland 
State Police involve a female victimY Typically, the violence is not 
triggered by psychosis or mental illness; instead it occurs when the 
22. [d. at 13 (testimony of Diane Atkins, assistant state's attorney). 
23. [d. at 15. 
24. [d. 
25. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 16-17 (testimony of Diane 
Atkins). The Committee was told of another case in which the husband was 
charged with assault after dragging his wife from her car, hitting her against 
the car, and attempting to force her into his own car. His defense was that 
he was making a citizen's arrest because she had taken some of his personal 
property after she moved out of their residence. The judge dismissed the case 
as a "domestic dispute." Survey Respondent. 
26. See R. GELLES & M. STRAUS, supra note 3, at 249-62; HOUSE OF RUTH, supra 
note 1, at 2-5; Kantrowitz, supra note 3, at 56-61. See generally R. DOBASH & 
R. DOBASH, supra note 3; I. WALKER, supra note 3. 
27. See HOUSE OF RUTH, supra note 1, at 1. 
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assailant experiences a loss of control over the victim.28 Treating the 
violence as a marital dispute does not make it end. Change is more 
likely to occur when domestic violence is treated as a serious criminal 
act. 
Batterers share many characteristics. Often, they learned to use 
violence as young boys in families where violence was common;29 
their education is reinforced by social acceptance of violence by men 
against women. 30 Batterers often are insecure and possessive men, 
dependent on partners whom they feel the need to control through 
methods such as battering and abuse. 31 They may feel remorse about 
the battering after the incident and promise never to repeat it; 
however, studies are clear about the repetitive nature of the conduct.32 
The victims of domestic violence also have some things in 
common. Often, they are women who were raised with traditional 
values about the woman's responsibility to make things right within 
the relationship.33 A victim may think her conduct can change her 
partner's violence, or that his lack of change is her fault. 34 She is 
likely to be financially dependent on him, both because of the 
problems women experience in the labor market and because his 
violence toward her may have affected her employability. 35 Also, she 
may be socially isolated due to his jealous or possessive behavior. 
Generally, she will have low self-esteem. Because of her economic, 
psychological, and social circumstances and her socialization, staying 
in an abusive situation may seem preferable to leaving. Finally, even 
if she does leave, he may continue to pursue and abuse her. Over a 
quarter of reported assault cases involving domestic violence involved 
couples who were divorced or separated. Based on the experiences 
of her friends or neighbors, she may have little confidence that the 
courts or the police will protect her. 
Domestic violence often involves a cyclical pattern of three 
phases: the tension-building phase, the acute battering phase, and 
the "honeymoon" phase.36 During the first phase, the violence may 
be relatively minor, but the batterer's tension and the victim's efforts 
28. [d. at 2. 
29. In a sample of 180 battering men, 71070 had witnessed violence in their families, 
and 49070 had been abused as children. [d. Parents who were abused as children 
are six times as likely to abuse their own children. Kantrowitz, supra note 3, 
at 59. 
30. HOUSE OF RUTH, supra note 1, at 1-2. 
31. [d. at 2. 
32. [d. at 4-5. 
33. [d. at 3. 
34. [d. 
35. [d. at 3-4. 
36. [d. at 4. 
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to placate him intensify. 37 During the second phase, he is likely to 
be violent and may use weapons.38 He is likely to try to deflect his 
responsibility for his actions by blaming her for provoking him.39 In 
the third phase, he will be repentant and promise to end his violence. 
He may appeal to her not to leave him or prosecute him, and may 
threaten suicide if she persists in her efforts to end the violence. 40 If 
he can persuade her not to leave him or take other action during 
this phase, and no intervention occurs, phase one will begin again 
in most cases. 41 
Some judges, commissioners, and other court personnel fail to 
understand why a victim of domestic violence might return to the 
home she shares with the batterer. They do not inquire about whether 
her assailant might be pressuring her to return through economic 
coercion, further violence, or threats about her custody of the chil-
dren. They do not take into account the victim's economic or 
emotional dependency, or why, because of her socialization, she 
might feel responsible for the violence.42 They may not understand 
that the "honeymoon" phase of the domestic violence cycle has 
begun, and the batterer is acting contrite and promising to end the 
violence. Instead, they see the victim's decision to return home or 
to reconcile as proof that the violence never happened or that her 
report was exaggerated.43 They grow impatient with her coming back 
into court several times for relief. Witnesses reported that commis-
sioners and district court judges said things such as "Oh, it's you 
again," or "How long are you going to stay this time," or "You 




40. Id. at 4-5. 
41. Id. 
42. One judge reportedly scoffed at the idea that the victim might have economic 
problems if she left her abuser because she had access to numerous "giveaway 
programs." Courtroom observations of University of Maryland School of Law 
students, in Baltimore, Md. (Feb. 2-18, 1986) [hereinafter Courtroom Obser-
vations) (on file with Committee). 
43. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note II, at 48 (testimony of Jo Benson 
Fogel, Esquire); id. at 50-51 (testimony of Hannah Sassoon, Abused Persons 
Program). 
44. Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 23 (testimony of M. Franzella 
Hayward-Starkey, Esquire, Legal Aid, Eastern Shore). Many similar statements 
were reported, such as "Why do you remain with him when he treats you this 
way," "Why do you keep coming back here," "Why don't you go to a lawyer 
for a separation," "Three times is enough for him to use you as a punching 
bag, and for you to take it. You have to protect yourself and your children." 
Courtroom Observations, supra note 42. 
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[f]requently women are humiliated while on the witness 
stand with comments asking why do they put up with it, or 
why they waited so long to file charges, or even statements 
which infer that if the abuse had really been bad, they 
would have done something about it before now. 45 
17 
Some judges are reported to have threatened the victim with sanctions 
for the repeated use of the courts: "Three years is long enough for 
the court to put up with both of you. This will be the last time, or 
both of you will go to jail."46 
Victims who attempt to file criminal assault and battery charges 
with court commissioners report getting the same response: 
[Commissioners] also say, "Have you filed charges before?" 
"Have you ever dropped charges before?" If the answer is 
yes, then they say they don't think that the person is a 
good candidate for filing charges again. Or they will tell 
the person they have a year in which they can file the 
charges, so they should go home and think about it. And 
if the women come back in a few days after that to file 
charges, then they are asked why they waited so long to 
file. 47 
Lack of understanding about domestic violence also leads judges 
and other court personnel to believe that the best solution to the 
problems of the victim is for the parties to separate, because then 
the violence will stop. Unfortunately, separation without legal pro-
tection does not stop the violence in all cases, and, in some cases, 
the violence worsens because the abuser is angered at losing control 
over the victim.48 Nonetheless, the Committee learned of cases where 
judges delayed, trivialized or dismissed criminal cases involving se-
rious injuries to the victim because they believed a divorce was the 
appropriate and sufficient remedy. One case involved a victim who 
had been hit so much that she had gone to an emergency room for 
treatment of a misaligned jaw and had mouth plates inserted because 
of her injuries. The judge dismissed criminal charges with the fol-
lowing comment: "We have a situation here which basically is one 
45. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 6 (testimony of Barbara 
Miller). 
46. Courtroom Observations, supra note 42. 
47. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 8-9 (testimony of Barbara 
Miller). See id. at 108-12 (testimony of loella Braun); Special Joint Committee 
on Gender Bias in the Courts Public Hearing 30 (Oct. 13, 1987) (Baltimore 
City) [hereinafter Baltimore City Hearing) (testimony of Marla Hollandsworth, 
Esquire). 
48. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 7 (testimony of Barbara 
Miller). 
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arising out of a very heated and difficult domestic problem. It's not 
a case that belongs in this court. . . . I think both people suffered 
some slight physical injury and perhaps in [wife's name] case, some-
what more than slight physical injury. "49 In a case involving a wife 
who was "severely pummelled" and had her arm in a sling for three 
weeks, a judge said: 
This matter is now really a domestic case. There may have 
been some injuries on both sides, but the point is that these 
people are no longer living together, and if you insist upon 
trying these charges, all you're going to do is exacerbate an 
already bad situation. I've seen it happen hundreds of times. 
There's just no point in it. Unless there's a serious perma-
nent injury that resulted in this case, I could encourage you 
both to consider agreeing not to prosecute each other and 
let the matter be resolved as a divorce case. 50 
Judges and other court personnel often suggest that the victim 
of domestic violence has control over her victimization. If she would 
stop provoking her assailant, they believe, she would not get hit. 
This analysis overlooks the research showing that the assailant often 
is using violence to assert control over the victim, and that the victim 
cannot divert him from his goal by "behaving. "51 Even if her conduct 
is not exemplary in the judge's eyes, furthermore, that is not legal 
justification for her to be assaulted and battered. Nonetheless, the 
Committee learned of cases where the victim's conduct was con-
demned as much as or more heavily than her assailant's, and where 
she was said to be the agent of her own misery. 52 
The most notorious case involves Charlotte and John Fedders. 
At the divorce trial, the testimony showed that John had subjected 
Charlotte to frequent and severe violence throughout their marriage, 
including throwing her over a bannister and breaking her ear drum. 
He testified that he was violent because of her conduct: she did not 
give him help when he suffered from depression and she "made 
references not only to the defendant but also to his mother." Based 
on all the testimony, the master concluded that: "Overall the circum-
stances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties has got 
to be on an equal basis. There is no question that the plaintiff 
suffered physical abuse but that in and of itself was not what brought 
49. Women's Law Center of Baltimore, Subcommittee Report: Gender Bias in the 
Courts 51 (Jan. 1988) (on file with Committee). 
50. [d. at 45. 
51. See supra note 3. 
52. See, e.g., infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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about the estrangement of the parties. "S3 In another case involving 
criminal charges, the husband was acquitted despite testimony from 
the victim and a neighbor and medical records documenting the 
wife's injuries. The husband had testified that he beat the wife in 
self-defense, to protect himself from being "henpecked. "S4 
Cases such as these should not occur in courtrooms and court-
houses where judges and court personnel understand the dynamics 
of domestic violence and can appreciate the situation of the victim. 
The victim is a person in need of help. The fact that she knows or 
lives with the person who has done her harm does not justify a court 
or court personnel denying her that help. She is entitled to the same 
degree of credibility, seriousness, understanding, and assistance as 
any other petitioner in a civil matter and complainant in a criminal 
matter. Until courts ensure that she receives the same treatment, 
gender bias will not be eradicated. 
II. Judicial Procedures Involving Domestic Violence 
A victim of domestic violence may seek judicial assistance by 
petitioning for an emergency order known as a civil protective order, 
by suing for a limited or absolute divorce, or by initiating criminal 
proceedings for assault and battery. In addition, a victim may be 
before the court because she is charged with a crime against the 
batterer. In each context, the victim faces different procedures and 
difficulties. The following sections explore the civil and criminal 
processes separately. 
A. Civil Protective Order 
Under Maryland law, an adult victim of abuse can petition the 
court to provide protection from further abuse.ss Abuse is defined 
53. Fedders v. Fedders, Equity No. 84618, master's report at 10 (Montgomery 
County, Md. Cir. Ct., Oct. 16, 1987). This part of the master's report was 
not made part of the judgment of the circuit court. Fedders v. Fedders, Equity 
No. 84618 (Montgomery County, Md. Cir. Ct., judgment of absolute divorce, 
Feb. 17, 1988). 
54. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 66 (testimony of J. Klapac). 
The Committee also heard reports of court personnel who expressed greater 
concern about the problems of the abusing husband than the needs of the 
victim. Commissioners were reported to have discouraged women from filing 
complaints against their husbands, for example, on the rationale that the 
husbands should not be "given" a criminal record or spend time in jail. Prince 
George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 8-9 (testimony of Barbara Miller). 
See id. at 108-10 (testimony of Joella Braun); Baltimore City Hearing, supra 
note 47, at 30 (testimony of Marla Hollandsworth, Esquire); Letter to Director 
of Community Crisis & Referral Center, Inc. from Volunteer Coordinator of 
Community Crisis & Referral Center, Inc., Waldorf, Md. (Dec. 10, 1985) (on 
file with Committee). 
55. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-504 (1991). 
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as "an act that causes serious bodily harm" or "an act that places 
another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm. "56 The court can 
order that the abuse stop, that the petitioner have exclusive use of 
the family home for up to thirty days and temporary custody of 
minor children, that household members enter counseling, and "any 
other relief as necessary."S7 A violation of the order may result in a 
finding of contempt or criminal prosecution.s8 Upon conviction, the 
court may impose imprisonment, a fine, or both.s9 While the order 
can be entered by either the district or a circuit court, almost all the 
petitions are brought in and heard by the district court, where filing 
fees are lower and procedures easier for unrepresented parties. The 
civil protective order procedure is designed to be temporary and 
quick; an initial order for relief lasting five days can be issued upon 
the sworn statement of the victim alone (ex parte order),60 and the 
hearing on the thirty-day protective order is held immediately upon 
the expiration of the initial ex parte order. 61 
The Committee heard a number of complaints about barriers 
facing victims who attempt to petition for a civil protective order. 
It was reported that in one county, clerks sometimes refused to give 
victims the forms used for filing petitions.62 In another county, there 
had been a practice of scheduling hearings on the petitions behind 
closed doors and at specific times. When these practices were aban-
doned, victims were required to testify in public. In addition, they 
suffered because unpredictable delays preceded their hearings. This 
caused problems with child care and employment, and witnesses and 
family members could not remain in court to help the victim.63 
Serious complaints reached the Committee about the decision to 
award a civil protective order. Although most judges appreciate the 
need for an order when they find that the victim has suffered serious 
bodily harm and when she is in fear of imminent serious bodily 
harm, some still find it difficult to make the finding because they 
fail to give the victim's testimony appropriate weight and credibility.64 
56. [d. at § 4-501(b). 
57. [d. at § 4-506. 
58. [d. at § 4-507. 
59. [d. 
60. [d. at § 4-505. 
61. [d. at § 4-506. 
62. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 114-16 (testimony of Joella 
Braun); Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 29 (testimony of M. Franzella 
Hayward-Starkey, Esquire). 
63. Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 36-37 (testimony of Deborah Papa-
rella). 
64. See, e.g., Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 51 (testimony of 
Hannah Sassoon) (petitioner disbelieved because she did not leave abuser after 
first beating); id. at 48 (testimony of Jo Benson Fogel, Esquire) (no threat of 
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This problem was discussed at length earlier in this Report. 65 In 
circumstances where such attitudes are not a problem, it appears that 
judges are prepared to grant civil protection to victims of domestic 
violence under the statutory standards, that is, when victims have 
suffered injuries already or are fearful of imminent bodily injury. 
This perception was verified by the Committee's survey of judges 
and lawyers, which asked whether "[c]ivil orders of protection ... 
are granted when petitioners are in fear of serious bodily harm."66 
Over 800/0 of judges and 70% of male lawyers expressing an opinion 
thought the statement is always or often true.67 Female lawyers 
expressing an opinion were somewhat more skeptical, but over half 
(52%) agreed that the statement is always or often true,68 and another 
37% believed the statement is sometimes true.69 
A serious problem facing a victim of domestic violence who 
wants to put a halt to the abuse is how she will pay the rent and 
buy food during a separation from the batterer. In most situations, 
the victim has a lower income than the batterer, 70 and she may have 
children whose care she cannot manage alone. The baUerer's financial 
superiority and control may make it impossible for the victim to 
demand that he leave, unless he is ordered to provide support during 
the separation. 
serious bodily harm found when husband came at wife with a pillow as if to 
smother her); id. at 97-98 (testimony of Roslyn Smith) (judge did not believe 
she was abused because he would not have permitted anyone to threaten his 
life with a gun in the way she said her husband threatened her life); Anne 
Arundel County Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-66 (testimony of Dorothy 
Burchette) (judge not sympathetic to middle-aged petitioner, his sympathy is 
"with young women with infant babies and she is married to a brute who is 
knocking her all over the landscape and she has no resources"); Prince George's 
County Hearing, supra note 6, at 120 (testimony of Hon. Theresa Nolan) 
(tying wife to the bed is "just kinky sex," not abuse); Eastern Shore Hearing, 
supra note 16, at 35 (testimony of Deborah Paparella) (bruises are not sufficient 
bodily harm to constitute abuse); Washington County Hearing, supra note 14, 
at 30 (testimony of Connie Koenig) (petitioner not believed because, according 
to the judge, "a professional doctor" would not commit abuse); Letter from 
Joan Purdy, supra note 16 (bruises are insufficient proof of abuse); supra 
notes 11-25 and accompanying text. As was discussed earlier in this Report, 
cases such as these illustrate the need to educate and sensitize judges, masters, 
and commissioners about the characteristics of both the batterer and the victim 
involved in domestic violence. See supra text accompanying notes 26-54. 
65. See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text. 
66. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 34 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires) . 
67. For survey results of question 34, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (judges: always-40ClJo, often-43%; male attorneys: always-21 %, 
often-52%). 
68. [d. (always-12%; often-40%). 
69. [d. 
70. B. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 119-45 (1986). 
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While the civil protection statute does not provide explicitly for 
monetary relief, it may be read to authorize that monetary relief be 
granted.71 The Committee found, however, that monetary relief is 
difficult to get. In its survey, the Committee asked judges and lawyers 
whether "[w]hen granting civil orders of protection, the courts issue 
support awards for dependents."72 Over half of judges (580/0) and 
female lawyers (74%) and nearly half of male lawyers (48%) express-
ing an opinion report that the statement is rarely or never true. 73 
The Committee was advised that victims of domestic violence 
are concerned that some courts find that the civil protective order 
expires and all relief ceases at the end of thirty days.74 The law 
authorizes the petitioner to be awarded exclusive use of the family 
home for thirty days;7S it also permits orders on matters such as 
custody and counseling to be entered, and does not specify a dura-
tional limit. 76 According to an opinion of the Attorney General of 
Maryland, civil protective order relief is "subject only to such dur-
ational limits as the court, in its discretion, imposes;" no durational 
limits are imposed by the statute.77 No counseling program is likely 
to end within thirty days, nor does the need for a custody order 
terminate in a month if the victim does not reconcile with the abusing 
spouse or partner. Therefore, it is questionable to interpret the statute 
71. The court is empowered to award "any other relief as necessary." MD. FAM. 
LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(e)(5) (1991). The court sitting in equity has the power 
to enter an order providing for monetary relief, such as child and spousal 
support. Id. § 1-201(a). In granting monetary relief, a circuit court is exercising 
its equity jurisdiction. Id. § 4-506(e)(5). While it does not otherwise have equity 
jurisdiction, the district court is granted the same equity powers as a circuit 
court when it is hearing a petition for civil protection. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE ANN. § 4-404 (1989). 
72. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 35 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires) . 
73. For survey results of question 35, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (judges: rarely-190J0, never-39%; female attorneys: rarely-
53%, never-21 %; male attorneys: rarely-37%, never-ll %). Some lawyers (38% 
of males and 18% of females) and judges (29070) report that monetary relief 
sometimes is granted. Id. These respondents may be referring to circuit court 
proceedings, since the question did not specify district court proceedings. Even 
if these respondents are correct that monetary relief sometimes is granted by 
the district court, they agree that most petitioners will not receive such an 
award. Unless a victim of domestic violence can be assured of financial security, 
she may not be in a position to demand that her abuser leave the home. If 
most victims are denied relief, no such assurance is possible. 
74. See, e.g., Survey Respondent; Washington County Hearing, supra note 14, at 
8-10 (testimony of Elizabeth Renuart, Legal Aid Bureau). 
75. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-506(e)(2) (1991). 
76. Id. § 4-506(e)(3), (4). 
77. 72 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-009 (Feb. 18, 1987). 
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as limiting the duration of the relief under those sections where the 
legislature has not provided limits. 
The civil protective order procedure, like any other judicial 
remedy, is most effective if the court routinely sanctions violators of 
the order. Although both contempt and criminal sanctions are avail-
able under the statute, victims reported to the Committee that some 
courts fail to invoke these procedures expeditiously and effectively.78 
Unless sanctions are certain and effective, the court's order will be 
meaningless, and the abuser will learn that he need not change his 
conduct because it is not taken seriously. 
B. Separation, Divorce, and Custody Proceedings 
The goal of many victims of domestic violence is not to separate 
from or divorce the batterer; it is to have the violence end. In some 
cases, however, divorce or separation is the only recourse. These 
procedures are not without difficulties, however. 
A major question for a victim of domestic violence seeking a 
separation or divorce is her personal safety, because often the violence 
escalates after the victim attempts to loosen the batterer's control 
over her. When victims apply for a civil protective order in a circuit 
court proceeding, however, the response is not certain. According to 
the Committee's survey, as many as ten percent of judges believe 
that petitions for civil protective orders always or often are rejected 
when other domestic relations cases are pending.79 Another thirty 
percent believe that to be true sometimes.80 For the victim, this means 
that the beginning of divorce proceedings may be the end of protec-
tion by court order against further abuse by her husband. At the 
same time, she may be unable to secure an emergency hearing from 
the circuit court hearing .her divorce on her petition for use and 
possession of the family home, custody of the children, or temporary 
78. See, e.g., Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 49 (testimony of 
Maria Wonders) (court order for treatment not enforced); id. at 6 (testimony 
of Barbara Miller) (victim told by judge that her only remedy for an incident 
of abuse which occurred after a civil protective order had been issued was to 
apply for a new civil protective order); Baltimore County Hearing, supra note 
12, at 32-36 (testimony of Louise Hirschy) (although wife awarded use and 
possession of home, husband kept forcing his way onto property, assaulting 
wife and daughter, and destroying personal property. Husband found in 
contempt and ordered to stay away over 78 times in an eight-month period; 
wife eventually was forced to move out of state). 
79. For survey results of question 36, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (always-30J0, often-7olo). 
80. [d. 
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spousal and child support. 81 Thus, she can be left without judicial 
assistance for basic needs and protection from violence until a hearing 
is scheduled in the ordinary course of business by the court handling 
the divorce. This may take many months. 
An additional problem arises if the victim is in a county which 
offers a mediation program for custody disputes.82 While there is no 
disagreement that abused women should not be forced to mediate 
on any subject with their abusers, there may be problems in identi-
fying victims and diverting them from mediation before the first 
appointment.83 This creates two problems. First, the victim may be 
in the mediation situation before the identification occurs, thereby 
terminating mediation. Second, if mediators receive no training about 
domestic violence, or fail to understand how to identify cases in-
volving violence, they will be unaware of the need to divert such 
couples from mediation. 
As will be discussed in the chapter on child custody, the violence 
of one parent against the other is relevant to the custody decision. 84 
Domestic violence is also pertinent to visitation orders, because a 
batterer can use visitation periods for physical or verbal abuse of 
the victim.85 Supervised visitation often is required to protect the 
victim's physical safety and security; suitable orders should be avail-
able to battered women. 
C. Criminal Procedure 
When violence occurs within a marriage or other intimate rela-
tionship, the victim may press criminal charges against the aggressor. 
If the case is one. involving relatively less serious injuries, the pro-
cedure may begin with the police arresting the defendant and filing 
a charge or it may begin with the victim filing a charge with a court 
commissioner. The defendant typically will be charged with a crime 
such as assault or battery that may be tried in district court. Cases 
81. Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 112-13 (testimony of Shellie Frank-
ford, Esquire); Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 117-18 (testi-
mony of Zoe Ann Gill); id. at 119-20, 124-27 (testimony of Hon. Rita 
Rosenkrantz); Baltimore County Hearing, supra note 12, at 12-13 (testimony 
of Phyllis Martin); Women's Law Center of Baltimore, supra note 49, at 7-
10. 
82. MD. R. S73A (effective July I, 1988). Every circuit court is authorized to 
implement a custody mediation program. [d. 
83. [d. (court may not order mediation in any case where "there is a genuine issue 
of physical or sexual abuse of the party or the child"); Baltimore City Hearing, 
supra note 47, at 38-39 (testimony of Marla Hollandsworth, Esquire); id. at 
62-63 (testimony of Judy Wolfer, Esquire). 
84. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text. 
85. Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at lSI (testimony of Lisa Ann Fuller); 
id. at 57-58, 64 (testimony of Judy Wolfer, Esquire). 
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involving serious injuries or death will be brought before a circuit 
court grand jury. 
The Committee learned that many victims believe that crimes 
involving domestic violence are not treated the same way as crimes 
in which the complaining party and the defendant do not know each 
other. The Committee attempted to test this belief in its survey of 
judges and lawyers by asking whether they believed that courts do 
not treat domestic violence as a crime.86 Nearly 100/0 of the judges 
who responded said that the statement is always true, and another 
14% said that the statement is often true. 87 Among the lawyers, 33% 
of female attorneys and 12% of male attorneys thought the statement 
is always or often true. 88 Interestingly, over half of male attorneys 
(510/0) and female attorneys (68%) who have a substantial domestic 
relations practice thought the statement is always, often, or sometimes 
true.89 
One reason that judges fail to give domestic violence serious 
criminal treatment may be their misperceptions about the different 
roles of civil and criminal procedures. Judges may insist that victims 
choose their remedy, allowing a victim to pursue only a divorce or 
only a criminal action, but not both. Or they may believe that a 
victim is invoking the criminal process only to gain an advantage in 
the civil divorce case, rather than to have the defendant punished. 
Or, most simply, they may believe that any violence between family 
members is purely a domestic situation and does not belong in the 
criminal court. 
That women's choices are limited by judicial bias is shown by 
the responses to a question on the Committee's survey of judges and 
lawyers. Respondents were asked to evaluate the statement, "[a]ssault 
charges are not treated seriously when domestic relations cases are 
pending."90 Ten percent of judges thought the statement is always 
or often true;91 28% thought the statement is true sometimes;92 and 
62% thought the statement is rarely or never true. 93 By contrast, 
86. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 38 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires). 
87. For survey results of question 38, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3. 
88. [d. (female attorneys: always-60Jo, often-27%; male attorneys: always-I %, 
often-II %). 
89. [d. (male domestic relations attorneys: always-2%, often-I7%, sometimes-32%; 
female domestic relations attorneys: always-8%, often-3I %, sometimes-29%). 
90. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 39 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires). 
91. For survey results of question 39, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (always-l %, often-9%). 
92. [d. 
93. /d. (rarely-30%, never-32%). 
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25070 of male attorneys thought the statement is always or often 
true,94 37% thought it true sometimes,9s and 38% thought it rarely 
or never true. 96 Female attorneys were more certain that the problem 
exists: 48% thought the statement is always or often true,97 32% 
thought the statement sometimes true,98 and only 21 % thought the 
statement to be rarely or never true. 99 Domestic relations practitioners, 
whether male or female, indicated similar certainty: 58% of females 
and 40% of males believed the statement is always or often true. tOO 
The criminal procedure should be available if a woman who has 
been injured wants to have the state impose a punishment and use 
the criminal sanction to deter future violence. The civil procedure 
should be available if a woman who has been subject to violence or 
threatened with violence wants to separate, temporarily or perma-
nently, from the aggressor. Some women have both goals, and both 
goals are legitimate. If a woman invokes both processes, however, 
she runs the risk that the criminal charge will not be taken seriously. 
The judicial system should not require her to make that choice, 
especially when it has been shown that the criminal process is the 
most effective one for controlling and changing the batterer's violent 
conduct. 
Commencing the case also can be a problem for victims of 
domestic violence. As was shown in Section 1 of this chapter, court 
commissioners have been known to treat domestic violence complaints 
as frivolous and unimportant. Commissioners are court-appointed 
officers who, in some cases, make the decision whether a criminal 
charge should be brought. Witnesses reported to the Committee that 
commissioners sometimes encourage the victim to not press a charge, 
berate her for dropping prior charges or for not leaving the abuser, 
or refuse to file charges altogether .101 One witness reported the 
94. [d. (always-l 070 , often-240J0). 
95. For survey results of question 39, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3. 
96. [d. (rarely-30%, never-80J0). 
97. [d. (always-8%, often-4007o). 
9S. [d. 
99. For survey results of question 39, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (rarely-1S0J0, never-30J0). 
100. [d. (female domestic relations attorneys: always-120J0, often-460J0; male domestic 
relations attorneys: always-2%, often-3S0J0). 
101. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at lOS (testimony of Joella 
Braun) (commissioner does not process assault and battery charges if woman 
has filed more than two charges); id. at 10 (testimony of Barbara Miller) 
(commissioner expressed disgust with women who press charges and then drop 
them); id. at S-9 (testimony of Barbara Miller) (commissioners tell women: 
"You know you'll be giving him a criminal record for the rest of his life?" 
"You know he can be in jail for twenty years?"; also, commissioners discourage 
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following incident, which she observed when accompanying a victim 
to a commissioner's office: 
[The commissioner] cautioned [the victim] that once she 
signs the document she would not be able to nullify it. He 
also shook his finger at her and warned her that he better 
not be called in the middle of the night to drop the charges. 
Commissioner . . . also sternly told [the victim] that the 
charges she was bringing against her husband were very 
serious and she should think twice before signing the warrant 
since she would "probably be severely beaten" once [the 
attacker] found out. [The victim] asked commissioner ... 
if he would please put a condition on the warrant stating 
that [the attacker] not come near her, since prior to that 
date he had broken down the door and severely beat her. 
Commissioner ... told us "that would come later in court." 
[The victim] was upset since she anticipated him coming 
back as the commissioner had pointed out. 102 
All of these actions communicate a failure to understand the dynamics 
of domestic violence, and they have the consequence of discouraging 
the victim from trying to improve her situation or get out. 
The Committee also heard that some commissioners issue doc-
uments charging the victim with assault where it is clear that she was 
merely defending herself against an attack and no prima facie showing 
is made that an offense occurred. 103 In some cases, the commissioner 
is not in a position to know the circumstances of the offense and 
issuing a charge is not a biased decision. In other circumstances, 
however, it should be clear to the commissioner that the batterer is 
seeking to use the criminal process to manipulate his victim into 
dropping charges. Retaliatory charges require the victim to defend 
herself in court. They also divert attention from what should be the 
issue: the batterer's conduct. 
D. Battered Women Who Kill 
In some extreme circumstances, victims of domestic violence kill 
their abusers. Many states in the last decade have recognized that, 
multiple charges by same victim); Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 
29-31 (testimony of Marla Hollandsworth, Esquire) (commissioners discourage 
victims from filing because victim caused violence, because husband should 
not be given criminal record, because victim should file civilly instead, and 
because victim who has been beaten before cannot be believed). 
102. Letter from Moira M. McDonald, Volunteer Coordinator to Community Crisis 
and Referral Center, Inc., Waldorf, Md. (Dec. 10, 1985). 
103. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 108-09 (testimony of 10ella 
Braun); Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 33 (testimony of Marla 
Hollandsworth, Esquire); Washington County Hearing, supra note 14, at 26-
27 (testimony of Susan Elgin, Esquire). 
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because of her victimization, the situation of a battered woman is 
different from that of some other killers. A defense based on the 
research into the lives and circumstances of battered women has been 
recognized, called the battered woman syndrome defense, with the 
result that women may be found culpable of a crime less than first 
degree murder or may be found nonculpable altogether. 104 
Progress in Maryland toward developing the battered woman 
syndrome defense has been slow. lOS Although some prosecutors now 
recognize the victimization of battered women and enter into plea 
bargains at a low level of culpability, battered women continue to 
be convicted of first and second degree murder in cases which would 
be treated with greater compassion, leniency, and fairness in other 
states. 106 
FINDINGS 
1. Many judges and court employees lack understanding about and 
sensitivity to the dynamics of domestic violence and the circumstances 
of the victim and the batterer. 
2. Criminal and civil domestic violence cases are too often treated 
as trivial and unimportant, and the testimony of victims dismissed 
as incredible. 
3. Emergency civil procedures are only partially successful in pro-
viding the victim with protection from further violence and with 
other relief that is needed for her protection. 
4. Civil divorce and custody procedures lack sufficient emergency 
mechanisms to meet the needs of battered women. 
5. Mediation programs may not adequately protect battered women. 
6. Judges often lack sufficient information about the need to pursue 
criminal charges against batterers. 
7. Commissioners sometimes fail to charge batterers in appropriate 
cases and sometimes charge the victims in inappropriate cases. 
8. The battered women syndrome defense is insufficiently accepted. 
104. See, e.g., C. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KnL 51·60 (1987); Schneider, 
Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of 
Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195, 197 n.7 (1986). 
105. See, e.g., Friend v. State, No. 88-483 (Md. App. Dec. 12, 1988); Kriscumas 
v. State, No. 86-1072 (Md. App. July 9, 1987) (excluding expert evidence 
regarding the battered spouse syndrome). 
106. Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 99-100 (testimony of Mary Joel 
Davis, New Directions for Women). An additional problem for an abused 
woman is that her own victimization may be ignored if her assailant also harms 
or kills a child in the household. The battered woman may be treated as 
equally culpable with her abuser by the criminal or the juvenile court system. 
[d. at 69-71 (testimony of Sherry I Statland). 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
For Court Administration and the Judiciary 
1. Take necessary steps to assure that judges, masters, commission-
ers, court clerks, and security personnel are familiar with the nature 
of domestic violence, the characteristics of domestic violence victims 
and offenders, and the impact of adult domestic violence on children 
in the home, including: 
a. The battered women syndrome. 
b. The need for calendar preferences for violation of order of 
protection cases. 
c. The powers of criminal courts in cases of domestic violence 
and harassment. 
d. The efficacy of educational or therapeutic programs for those 
found to have been violent toward members of their families. 
e. The effectiveness of ordering those found to have committed 
family offenses to vacate the family home. 
r. The appropriateness of jail for those found to have violated 
protective orders issued by the courts. 
g. The relevance of the battered woman syndrome and the 
importance of expert testimony in cases involving women who kill 
men who have abused them. 
h. Characteristics of batterers. 
i. Advisability and acceptability of simultaneous civil and crim-
inal proceedings. 
j. The importance of treating the assault of a spouse or intimate 
friend as a crime just as the assault of a stranger would be a crime. 
k. The relationship between spouse battering and child custody 
and visitation. 
1. The harm of dissuading domestic violence victims from seek-
ing all the civil and criminal relief that is available to them under 
the law. 
m. The availability of a protective order where there is evidence 
not only of physical abuse, but also where there is fear of imminent 
bodily harm. 
n. The inappropriateness of routinely issuing retaliatory crimi-
nal charges. 
2. Initiate studies by the Judicial Conference's Committee on Ju-
venile and Family Law and Procedure on the problems of domestic 
violence in order to develop legislation and court rules designed to 
resolve them. Multiprofessional consultations with psychologists, so-
cial workers, and others are needed as well as experimentation with 
new programs, the results of which must be carefully monitored. 
3. In Montgomery County, initiate a pilot program permitting mas-
ters of the circuit court to hear civil protective orders with immediate 
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orders being issued. The program should be evaluated to determine 
victim satisfaction, speed, cost, and effectiveness of sanctions. 
4. Evaluate court-sponsored mediation programs (0 determine im-
pact on victims of domestic violence. 
S. Evaluate judges, masters, and commissioners on a regular basis, 
taking into account gender neutrality on issues relating to domestic 
violence. 
6. Establish uniform procedures for handling domestic violence 
cases, including scheduling and calendar preferences. 
7. Make the system for obtaining civil protection from domestic 
violence easier to understand and less intimidating by means of a 
booklet which includes the necessary forms and information. 
8. Develop annually informational material to inform judges about 
the incidence and prevalence of domestic violence in Maryland. 
9. Regardless of whether self-defense is at issue, expert testimony 
about the battered woman syndrome should be admissible. 
For the Legislature 
Enact legislation that: 
1. Provides that access to the courts for protective orders be avail-
able seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day. 
2. Provides that adjournments in criminal cases in contemplation 
of dismissal may be conditioned upon the defendant's attendance at 
education and counseling programs for those charged with family 
violence. 
3. Provides that abuse by one parent of the other is evidence of 
parental unfitness for custody and a basis for termination of visitation 
or a requirement of supervised visitation. 
4. Provides for studies on the feasibility and advantages of a full 
service family court. In conjunction with the study, a pilot project 
with full services should be undertaken to serve as the basis for a 
longitudinal study. 
S. Clarifies that, in proceedings for civil protective orders, monetary 
relief such as spousal and child support can be awarded by the 
district court and only the order to vacate the family home has a 
time limit. 
6. Specifically sanctions the use of civil protective orders when a 
divorce is pending and simplifies obtaining injunctive relief as part 
of a domestic case. 
7. Establishes that a victim of the battered woman syndrome may 
use evidence of victimization and expert testimony to show that the 
murder or attempted murder was committed in self-defense. 
For Stale's Attorneys 
1. Establish domestic violence prosecution units in those jurisdic-
tions with sufficient volume to justify one. In jurisdictions with fewer 
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cases, direct all domestiC violence prosecutions to one assistant state's 
attorney. 
2. Ensure that all assistant state's attorneys receive training as to 
the nature of domestic violence, the characteristics of domestic vio-
lence victims and offenders, and the impact of adult domestic violence 
on children in the home, including the same topics recommended for 
judges and court personnel. 
3. Provide for paralegal and social work support for domestic 
violence victims or link to existing services in the community to 
assure that the safety and social service needs of the victims are met. 
4. Request protection for the victim as a routine condition of bail 
and probation when the defendant is alleged to be involved with 
domestic violence. 
For Bar Associations (including State, Local and Specialty Bar 
Associations) 
1. Recognize the need for social work and other support services 
for clients who are victims of domestic violence; become knowledge-
able about the availability of community resources. 
2. Start a domestic violence task force in the community if none 
exists, including as members all agencies dealing with domestic vio-
lence, including state's attorneys, commissioners, police, health serv-
ices, county legislative bodies, chief executives, courts, bar associations, 
etc. 
3. Prepare a brochure for domestic violence victims so they know 
what is available to them, what they can expect, where they can 
secure services, etc. 
4. Create a vehicle to publicize the existence of services for victims, 
particularly where a diverse ethnic population makes pUblicity essen-
tial. 
5. Establish a bench-bar committee to consider establishing state-
wide standards for the district court concerning civil protective cases, 
including matters such as the availability of forms, scheduling of 
hearings, and enforcement of orders. 
For Domestic Violence Task Forces 
1. Develop educational materials in addition to this Report and 
present them in seminars attended by lawyers, judges, masters, and 
commissioners, and in the law schools. Teachers' outlines should be 
developed for use in law school professional responsibility and clinical 
courses and in precollegiate schools. 
2. Work for improved service of civil protective orders where this 
is a problem. 
3. Study whether criminal assault cases involving family members 
are treated similarly to or differently from assault cases involving 
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non family members with respect to such matters as degree of cul-
pability and severity of sentence. 
4. Evaluate need for victim's assistance program. 
5. Increase publicity about programs and services already available. 
For the Law Schools 
Include information on domestic violence in appropriate courses 
which address the issues specified as the basis for education for the 
courts. 
For Judicial Nominating Commissions 
1. Make available to all members information concerning the nature 
of domestic -violence, the characteristics of domestic violence victims 
and offenders, and the impact of adult domestic violence on children 
in the home, covering the same topics recommended above for judges 
and court personnel. 
2. Encourage members to investigate the conduct and attitudes of 
all applicants with respect to domestic violence. Members may, for 
example, attend court sessions of those judges and masters applying 
to move up within the system when matters involving domestic 
violence are being heard. In the case of attorney applicants, the views 
of clients, witnesses, and other counsel in such cases may be sought. 
CHAPTER 2: CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
I. Child Custody 
The Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts (the 
Committee) received numerous complaints from women and men 
that they were disadvantaged in custody disputes because of gender 
or because of expectations associated with gender. The Committee's 
investigation indicates that troubling incidents of gender bias in 
custody disputes occur in the courts. of Maryland. At the same time, 
the Committee's investigation indicates that most cases are resolved 
at the trial level in conformity with a child-oriented approach which 
is gender neutral in practice: custody of a child usually is awarded 
to the parent who is providing care at the time of the custody 
decision if the child is faring reasonably well in the care of that 
parent. 
Even though gender bias in the award of custody was not found 
to be a widespread problem, all incidents, however few, are serious 
and important to the parents and the child. The problem is equally 
important to the bench, the bar, and the state. When gender bias 
affects the outcome of a custody case, a decision vital to the 
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upbringing of a young person has been made on an illegal basis: 
discrimination on the basis of sex in custody decisions is violative of 
the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment. 107 Even if a particular 
gender-based decision is not detrimental to a particular child, unlaw-
ful decision-making promotes disrespect for the law. 
The Committee's investigation included gathering information at 
its hearings, asking judges and domestic relations masters to respond 
to a hypothetical concerning a custody dispute, surveying lawyers 
and judges about custody, reviewing letters and other materials sent 
to Committee members and staff, and reviewing court files about 
cases identified to the Committee by name, court, or docket number. 
A. Perceptions of Unfairness Toward Fathers 
Fathers and advocates for fathers told the Committee that fathers 
were denied custody because judges refused to see them as capable 
custodial parents. One witness told the Committee that he perceived 
an "a priori belief running through the court system that men are 
not suitable for custody of children, particularly female children." 108 
An advocate for fathers stated that judges demonstrate that they 
look at fathers and mothers differently by failing to look at financial 
statements and by denying witnesses a chance to be heard. 109 A 
witness for a father in a custody trial wrote to the Committee that, 
in her view, "[the decision was] based purely on gender and not the 
facts involved. . . . [T]he outcome ... was based on old-fashioned 
ideas and the actual case was, in fact, never actually heard." 110 An 
advocate for fathers described the bias as inherent in the family law 
system: "Mothers are presumed to be the only logical custodian of 
minor children." III 
Fathers and their advocates also told the Committee that judges 
see the father's role only in terms of providing money. If a father 
107. "Equality of rights shall not be abridged or denied because of sex." MD. 
CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 46. When a court awards custody, "[n]either parent 
is presumed to have any right to custody that is superior to the right of the 
other parent." MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-203(c)(2) (1991). 
108. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note II, at 132 (testimony of Frank 
Gambino). 
109. [d. at 79 (testimony of Bruce Burrows, Equal Rights Foundation, Fathers 
United). 
110. Letter from Diane D. Bauer to Deborah Unitus (Nov. 2, 1987) (on file with 
Committee). 
Ill. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note II, at 71 (testimony of Bruce 
Burrows). See also id. at 59-60 (testimony of David Harris); Anne Arundel 
County Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-79 (testimony of "John Doe"); id. at 1-
90 (testimony of Roger Perkins, Esquire). 
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also wants to provide direct care, he is deemed unnatural. 112 As one 
witness put it, judges believe that a father who "did too much" 
should not have custody. 113 
The maternal preference in custody disputes was the law in 
Maryland until 1974.114 The fifteen years that have elapsed since the 
preference was abolished may not have been enough time to erase 
its impact on the judicial system. IIS The Committee's survey of judges 
and lawyers included questions about biases in custody disputes. To 
test the assertion that fathers are disadvantaged in custody disputes 
because of a sub silentio maternal preference, the Committee's survey 
asked judges and lawyers to state whether "[c]ustody awards to 
mothers are apparently based on the assumption that children belong 
with their mothers."116 Of those with an opinion on the question, 
roughly half of judges (49070) said the statement is always, often, or 
sometimes true,117 while the other half thought the statement was 
rarely or never true. l1S Many more lawyers than judges were convinced 
that custody awards were tilted toward mothers: 81 % of female 
attorneys and 95% of male attorneys said the statement is always, 
often, or sometimes true. 119 While the answers to this question could 
be seen as convincing evidence that anti-father bias is rampant in 
the judicial system, answers to another of the Committee's survey 
questions tilt in the opposite direction. The Committee asked judges 
and lawyers whether "[t]he courts give fair and serious consideration 
to fathers who actively seek custody. "120 Of those with an opinion 
on the question, 95% of judges, 83070 of female attorneys and 72% 
of male attorneys said the statement is always, often, or sometimes 
true. 121 
112. Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-76 to -77 (testimony of 
"John Doe"); Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 80 (testimony of 
Michael Sanow); Montgomery County Hearing, supra note II, at 59-63 (tes-
timony of David Harris). 
113. Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-76 to -77 (testimony of 
"John Doe"). 
114. McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. I, 5, 382 A.2d 1081, 1084 (1978). 
Maryland law was changed by the enactment of MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. 
§ 5-203 (1991). See supra note 107. 
115. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. at 4-9, 382 A.2d at 1084-86. 
116. See infra exhibits E-2(a} and (b) (Question 28 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires). 
117. For survey results of question 28, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (always-l %, often-13Olo, sometimes-35Olo}. 
118. Id. (rarely-18Olo, never-34Olo). 
119. Id. (female attorneys: always-2O/o, often-33Olo, sometimes-46Olo; male attorneys: 
always-5Olo, often-57Olo, sometimes-33Olo). 
120. See infra exhibits E-2(a} and (b) (Question 29 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires). 
121. For survey results of question 29, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
1990] Gender Bias Report 35 
The responses to the two questions appear contradictory: giving 
fathers fair consideration by definition requires courts not to apply 
a maternal preference. One way to reconcile the apparently contra-
dictory results is to consider the fact that not many fathers seek 
custody, so the perception of anti-father bias may reflect a societal 
bias against fathers seeking custody, rather than a judicial bias against 
courts awarding them custody. In addition, lawyers for fathers may 
discourage them from seeking custody.122 Once the fathers overcome 
inhibitions against seeking custody and present their cases in court, 
generally they seem to receive a fair and serious hearing. 
B. Perceptions of Unfairness Toward Mothers 
Mothers and advocates for mothers also brought their concerns 
to the Committee. They contended that mothers are denied custody 
because judges held mothers to different and sometimes higher stan-
dards than those applied to fathers. One witness told the Committee 
that the judge in her case said, "A boy needs his father." 123 
Mothers and their advocates reported that judges condemned 
sexual activity by mothers, while ignoring sexual activity by fathers. 
According to one advocate, "adulterous behavior on the part of 
males has no legal consequences but the same behavior on the part 
of females results in punitive decisions regarding loss of custody." 124 
One judge was reported to have told a mother who had a boyfriend 
that she "should have revolving doors on her home." 125 Another 
witness reported that she was denied custody because of her sexual 
activity, and that the father to whom custody was awarded had been 
jailed for abusing a child, beating the mother, and being involved in 
a theft ring.126 One witness summed up: "I think there is a terrible 
double standard that goes on. If she is an adulteress, God forbid. 
infra exhibit E-3 (judges: always-45!IJo, often-36%, sometimes-14%; female 
attorneys: always-8%, often-41 %, sometimes-34%; male attorneys: always-5%, 
often-22%, sometimes-45%). 
122. See I. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 237-44 (1985). 
123. Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 54 (testimony of Dorothy Carpenter). 
124. Baltimore County Hearing, supra note 12, at 3 (testimony of Sheila P. Litzky, 
Coordinator, Baltimore County Family Violence Intervention Project). 
125. Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 94 (testimony of "Ms. Kay"). 
126. Washington County Hearing, supra note 14,. at 60-61 (testimony of Carolyn 
Roof); see id. at 39-44 (testimony of Kay Bleesz); Eastern Shore Hearing, supra 
note 16, at 77-79 (testimony of Laura Norris); Baltimore County Hearing, 
supra note 12, App. 3 at 3 (testimony of Sheila P. Litzky); Bleesz v. Bleesz, 
Equity No. 35080 (Washington County Cir. Ct. memo op. July 20, 1984); 
Survey Respondent. 
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If he is an adulterer, it's, oh, come on, let's talk about that impact 
on the children. It just isn't even handed. "127 
A number of complaints raised the specter of double standards. 
One advocate described a case in which a father who had been 
completely uninvolved with his children sought to deprive the mother 
of sole custody. According to this advocate, 
[T]his is the guy whom she had to beg to stick around, who 
she has to beg to just watch her son's soccer practice just 
once, could you please. He would leave town and the way 
that she would know this is that there would be a note on 
the kitchen table saying, "I will be back in five days." No 
address. No telephone number. No way in which to get in 
touch with him .... I would suggest to you all, have that 
woman pull that stunt once and . . . [s]he would have lost 
custody of her kids. What kind of a mother would go out 
and do something like that, leaving no place she could be 
reached in an emergency. 128 
A mother who testified before the Committee had lost pendente lite 
custody when she had denied the father visitation one weekend on 
the advice of a lawyer who thought that would make the father 
contribute to the children's support. The mother had always been 
the primary care provider for the children prior to the custody 
order .129 According to witnesses before the Committee, a mother has 
to be "perfect" to win a custody fight. As one woman put it: 
It seems the mother has to be completely perfect and [if] 
the father, as my ex-husband did, spent a little bit of extra 
time with his son, it made him seem like God and [that] he 
was a more worthy parent for custody when I thought of 
everything I possibly could in the best interest of my child, 
yet that wasn't enough.130 
Of particular concern to mothers and advocates for mothers was 
the perception that a father's violence against the mother and children 
127. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 161 (testimony of Ann Sundt, 
Esquire). The presumption that a mother who has committed adultery is unfit 
for custody was abolished only 12 years ago. Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 
127, 372 A.2d 231, 235 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1978). It may 
continue to have an impact on courts today. 
128. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 160-61 (testimony of Ann 
Sundt, Esquire). 
129. [d. at 34 (testimony of Carol Haverstadt). 
130. Washington County Hearing, supra note 14, at 47 (testimony of Kay Bleesz); 
see Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 63-64 (testimony of Judy Wolfer, 
Esquire). 
1990] Gender Bias Report 37 
is disregarded in custody decisions. 131 A female lawyer reported that 
"most lawyers want to disregard a husband's violence in the marriage 
because they don't want 'everyone to get angry all over again. "'132 
A male lawyer agreed: "There is a general failure to protect children 
and women from violent fathers or husbands."133 The Committee 
was told of a judge who deemed the father's violence less harmful 
to the children than the mother's decision to report the father to 
authorities. Although the father was found to have sexually abused 
his two preteen daughters, the judge denied the mother custody 
because her reporting him "showed [that] her hatred for the father 
took precedence over the children's need to hold a high image of 
their father." 134 
Mothers and advocates for mothers also advised the Committee 
of their concern that judges sometimes equate financial superiority 
with the best interests of the child. Since most mothers have less 
income than most fathers, mothers will be disadvantaged in a custody 
fight that turns on financial resources. 13S Stereotypes about mothers 
having less income than fathers can also have an adverse impact. In 
one case a judge's assumption that the mother had a lower income 
was used as a part of the rationale to award custody to the father, 
although the evidence of their respective salaries was, at best, un-
clear. 136 
To test the perception that mo"thers are disadvantaged in custody 
disputes because of judicial attitudes about women's financial situa-
tions and about how women should behave, the Committee's survey 
asked lawyers and judges whether "[t]he courts favor the parent in 
the stronger financial position when awarding custody." 137 Of those 
with an opinion on the question, 39"70 of judges, 450/0 of male 
attorneys, and 57"70 of female attorneys said the statement is always, 
often, or sometimes true. 138 The Committee also asked lawyers and 
131. Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 63-64 (testimony of Judy Wolfer, 
Esquire). 
132. Survey Respondent. See Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 91 (testimony 
of "Ms. Kay"). 
133. Survey Respondent. 
134. Survey Respondent. 
135. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 8-10 (testimony of Sylvia 
Becker, Esquire); B. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCY OF WOMEN 250 
(1986); I. WEITZMAN, supra note 122, at 240-43. 
136. Bleesz v. Bleesz, No. 84-1563 (Md. App. June 6, 1985). 
137. Question 30 of Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires. See infra exhibits E-2(a) 
and (b). While the question is phrased in gender-neutral terms, respondents 
fairly can be assumed to be indicating bias against mothers, since mothers in 
nearly every case are the economically less advantaged parents. See supra text 
accompanying note 135. 
138. For survey results of question 30, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
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judges whether "[m]others are denied custody because of employment 
outside the home." 139 Of those with an opinion on the question, 
170/0 of judges, 14% of male attorneys, and 35% of female attorneys 
said the statement is always, often, or sometimes true. l40 
On the issue of violence by fathers against mothers, lawyers and 
judges were asked whether "[c]hild custody awards disregard father's 
violence against mother." 141 Over half (63%) of judges thought the 
statement was rarely or never true,142 indicating their belief that the 
father's violence against mothers usually is or should be a consid-
eration in child custody determinations. Their opinion was shared by 
roughly the same percentage of male attorneys (64%), but by less 
than half of female attorneys (40%).143 
It should be noted that male and female respondents (whether 
judges or lawyers) have relatively similar opinions on the existence 
and effect of anti-father bias in custody disputes. On the other hand, 
they have substantially different perceptions on two of the questions 
which concern anti-mother bias. It is possible that some female 
lawyers, including those employed by the Legal Aid Bureau, represent 
more female clients, and, as a result, are more aware of the possi-
bilities of anti-mother bias in custody decisions than are their male 
colleagues. In addition, because of personal experiences, they may 
be more sensitive to the types of biases which mothers report in 
custody disputes. 
C. Bias in the Resolution oj Custody Disputes 
The Committee attempted to determine whether gender bias 
affects the outcome of custody disputes in two ways: (1) asking 
judges and domestic relations masters to respond to hypothetical 
problems concerning custody, 144 and (2) reviewing specific cases which 
were brought to the Committee's attention. 
infra exhibit E-3 (judges: always-OOlo, often-4Olo, sometimes-35Olo; male attor-
neys: always-OOlo, often-7Olo, sometimes-38Olo; female attorneys: always-107o, 
often-140J0, sometimes-42OJo). 
139. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 32 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires). 
140. For survey results of question 32, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (judges: always-2Olo, often-OOlo, sometimes-15OJo; male attor-
neys: always-OOlo, often-207o, sometimes-12Olo; female attorneys: always-OOJo, 
often-6Olo, sometimes-29OJo). 
141. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 31 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires). 
142. For survey results of question 31, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (rare1y-280J0, never-35Olo). 
143. [d. (male attorneys: rarely-500Jo, never-14OJo; female attorneys: rarely-320J0, 
never -807o). 
144. For the four versions of the hypothetical problem along with an explanatory 
note about methodology, see infra exhibit D. 
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1. Hypothetical Custody Dispute 
The hypothetical custody dispute involved a ten-year-old child 
whose parents were both employed. In two of the four versions of 
the story, the child was male, and in the other two, female. In two 
versions the father was the primary caretaker of the child before the 
separation and continued in that role after the separation, and his 
income was approximately half the mother's income. In the other 
two the mother fulfilled the caretaking roles and had an income 
approximately half that of the father's. After the separation, the 
noncaretaking parent visited the child regularly and paid a reasonable 
amount of child support. The child's postseparation adjustment was 
satisfactory. 
Each judge and master was asked to respond to questions about 
a randomly selected version of the hypothetical case. 14S The first 
question asked who would be awarded custody. In every case, res-
pondents awarded custody to the parent who was providing care to 
the child at the time of the decision: no distinctions were made 
between the father and the mother. 
The respondents were asked to rank a number of factors which 
could have affected the decision. Overwhelmingly, the factor consid-
ered most important by both judges and masters was the child's 
postseparation adjustment. l46 The second most important factor was 
the amount of time the child spent with each parent. 147 The impor-
tance of these factors did not vary according to the gender of the 
parent to whom the award was being made. 
Respondents were asked if evidence that the father had beaten 
the mother before the separation would change their decisions. l48 The 
responses were about evenly split: eleven of nineteen judges (58%) 
and three of eight masters (380/0) replied that the father's violence 
toward the mother would change their decisions. 149 To test whether 
a mother's sexual conduct is judged differently from a father's, 
respondents also were asked if the presence of a paramour in either 
the mother's or the father's household would change the decision. ISO 
Both judges and masters found the presence of a paramour to be of 
little concern, regardless of the sex of the parent. lSI 
Given the relatively large number of respondents and the nearly 
complete unanimity of their responses, the Committee concluded 
145. See infra exhibit D (explanatory note about methodology). 
146. All of the responses to the hypotheticals are on file with the Committee. 
147. [d. 
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that, in most instances, judges and masters do not apply gender-
biased standards to resolve custody disputes. ls2 The Committee was 
impressed that the standard applied by the respondents is not gender-
biased because it is not parent-oriented: it is a child-oriented standard 
premised on a belief that a child's present adjustment is the best 
evidence of what is in the child's best interests. If the mother is 
providing the environment in which the child is thriving, then the 
mother is awarded custody; if it is the father, he is awarded custody. 
A parent's superior economic position did not give him or her an 
advantage, nor did an accusation of sexual activity. 
Evidence of gender bias seems evident in the responses to the 
hypothetical problem in only one element, the impact of family 
violence on the custody decision. Half of the respondents would have 
changed custody upon hearing evidence that the father was violent 
to the mother .IS3 The other half of respondents would not change 
custodY,ls4 but what is unknown is what weight they would give to 
the evidence of violence. 
Violence directed at the spouse can have an adverse impact on 
the mental and sometimes physical health of the child, whether or 
not the child witnesses any violence. ISS Therefore, judges who exclude 
or downplay such evidence are overlooking information of vital 
importance to the child's future. Since women are most often the 
victims of domestic violence, excluding or downplaying evidence of 
violence will do women more harm than men, both at the time of 
the custody decision, and later, when they attempt to arrange visi-
tation with a father who has victimized them during the marriage. 
2. Individual Case Review 
The Committee also undertook to investigate allegations of bi-
ased custody decisions by reviewing the records in cases brought to 
the Committee's attention. Since judges typically do not reveal biased 
assumptions or grounds when announcing a decision, determining 
whether gender bias affected the cases reviewed by the Committee 
was not simple. The Committee's review identified several instances 
in which it appeared that the father seeking custody was required to 
152. This conclusion was seconded by lawyers, both male and female, who testified 
at the Committee's hearings that both parents usually want the mother to take 
custody because she is doing the job satisfactorily already, not because she is 
female. In the few cases where the father was doing the job, he was reported 
to have been awarded custody. See, e.g., Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 
16, at 166 (testimony of James Almand, Esquire); Anne Arundel County 
Hearing, supra note 17, at 120 (testimony of Jerry Solomon, Esquire). 
153. All of the responses to the hypotheticals are on file with the Committee. 
154. [d. 
155. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
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make a stronger showing than the mother. In other courts, the 
mother's burden appeared to be heavier and her conduct judged 
more harshly. 
To determine how widespread and deep the problems might be, 
the Committee sought a standard against which to measure the cases 
that the Committee investigated. One way of testing whether gender 
bias is present in any particular decision is to test whether it varies 
from an acceptable gender-neutral standard and, if so, whether the 
variance is explainable by any factor other than gender bias. One 
widely accepted gender-neutral standard is the one applied by all the 
judges and masters who responded to the Committee's hypothetical 
problems: when a child is doing well in the home of one parent, a 
change of physical custody should not be made. Under this standard, 
to determine whether gender bias is present in any particular case, 
one looks to see if the gender-neutral outcome was reached. If it 
was not, was the outcome explainable on a gender-neutral basis? 
Thus, for example, if a child who is doing well in his or her present 
care arrangement is moved to the physical custody of the other 
parent, one should ask whether the unusual result is the product of 
gender bias or the product of some other factor not touched by 
gender considerations . 
. Nearly all of the complaints from fathers and some from mothers 
involved a decision to leave a child in the care of the parent who 
had been providing care before the decision. ls6 In most of those 
instances, it appeared to the Committee that the decision was gender-
neutral in that the record review indicated that the child was doing 
reasonably well where he or she was. IS' To decide not to move such 
a child is not the same as saying that the other parent cannot be a 
good parent; it is instead a statement that one should not take a risk 
with the child's future, and a move places the child at risk. 
The Committee found some evidence that decisions not to change 
a child's physical custody involved a higher evidentiary standard 
being placed on fathers to show that a child is not doing well in the 
mother's care. While rare, these cases should not be overlooked: the 
maternal preference was abolished over a decade ago, and decisions 
like these indicate that it still has weight. 158 
Both fathers and mothers complained about decisions to change 
a child's care from one parent to the other. The Committee concluded 
that several decisions involved biased attitudes about what is proper 
behavior for men and women as parents. Expectations about men 
156. Usually these cases involved an initial custody decision, so change of custody 
language is not appropriate. 
157. See, e.g., Foe v. Foe (on file with Committee). 
158. See supra text accompanying note 114; Coe v. Coe (on file with Committee). 
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are that they should not be too involved with their children. ls9 Women 
are subject to contradictory preconceptions that mothers should not 
be employed outside the home but, at the same time, children belong 
in the home of the wealthier parent. Further, women are expected 
not to engage in sexual activity. 
The Committee identified cases involving mothers who, after 
separating from their husbands, had sexual relations with another 
man and lost custody solely or primarily for that reason. l60 Under 
Maryland law, a parent's sexual activity is pertinent to the custody 
determination if it affects the child adversely, but it is not presumptive 
evidence of the parent's unfitness. 161 In none of these cases was an 
adverse impact on the child's development or postseparation adjust-
ment demonstrated. In one instance, the court of special appeals 
vacated the trial court's award of custody to the father because it 
found that the court "ignored" case law "requiring it to weigh the 
impact of the mother's adultery upon the child" and "[i]nstead ... 
substituted its own moral judgment." 162 
The Committee also found instances where a custody decision 
turned on the father's superior economic position.'63 While the benefit 
to a child of an improved economic position is clear, the question 
is how to achieve it. Two choices exist: place the child in the home 
of the wealthier parent,l64 or evaluate the best interests of the child 
without regard to economic resources and, if a custody award to the 
poorer parent is proper, provide adequate child support to provide 
for the child. The former route is problematic for the child because 
it gives unwarranted weight to one factor, the parents' economic 
circumstances, over all the other pertinent factors, such as the par-
ents' childrearing contributions and abilities .. That route also leads 
to gender-biased decision-making, because the favored factor is one 
159. Doe v. Doe (on file with Committee). 
160. See, e.g., Bleesz v. Bleesz, No. 84-1563 (Md. App. June 6, 1985). 
161. Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 127,372 A.2d 231, 235 (1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 939 (1978). 
162. Bleesz, No. 84-1563, slip op. at 2 (emphasis in original). 
163. See Campbell v. Campbell, No. 84-739, slip op. at 6-7 (Md. App. Feb. I, 
1985). 
164. In Montgomery County Dep't 0/ Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 
381 A.2d 1154 (1978), the court of special appeals noted that the "material 
opportunit[ies] affecting the future life of the child" is an appropriate factor 
to consider in a child custody determination. [d. at 420, 381 A.2d at 1163. To 
say that material opportunities constitute one factor among many, however, is 
different from saying that economic superiority of one parent over the other 
is, or should be, determinative of custody, particularly when the provision of 
adequate child support can ensure that the child's economic security will be 
maintained. In Sanders, child support was not a factor because of the circum-
stances of the parties. 
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where men will succeed most often and women will fail, since men 
in this society generally have higher incomes than women do. 
Custody decisions also turned on judges giving substantial weight 
to caretaking activity on the part of fathers, while at the same time 
giving little weight to the caretaking work of mothers. 16s In one 
instance, a judge was criticized by the court of special appeals. for 
overemphasizing the father's "quality time" with the child while 
failing to credit the mother for the contributions she made to the 
child's wellbeing during the four years when the child lived with her 
after the separation. l66 Underlying such decisions may be a biased 
attitude that a mother's caretaking is not important because mothers 
"just naturally" provide care to children, while fathers who do so 
are special. 
3. Conclusion 
The Committee attempted to determine whether the perception 
that bias affects custody determinations was supported by evidence 
of judicial conduct. The Committee's investigation indicates that, 
indeed, judges need to examine their attitudes about both mothers 
and fathers in custody disputes. Both parents can be disadvantaged 
by judges who hold biased attitudes about the proper roles of men 
and women in society and families. When these attitudes are the 
bases for deciding cases and become a substitute for an individualized 
examination of the evidence in a particular case, a judge will bring 
gender bias into decision-making about custody. 
Gender bias also can affect custody determinations when the 
substantive criteria which are used favor one parent over another in 
ways that advantage a parent because of his or her sex. The Com-
mittee found that this occurs, for example, when the determinative 
factor in a custody determination is which parent can provide the 
economically more advantaged home or whether a parent's sexual 
mores are unacceptable to the court. Both factors result in a pref-
erence for fathers over mothers, while neither, in and of itself, 
promises a better outcome for the child. 
The most troublesome issue disclosed by the Committee's inves-
tigation is that some judges refuse to consider at all or give too little 
weight to violence which a mother has suffered at the hands of the 
father unless the child has been a victim as well or has witnessed the 
violence. Ignoring or diminishing the importance of domestic violence 
has two consequences. First, the court will not understand the en-
vironment in which the mother has been living, and will not be able 
165. Bleesz, No. 84-1563, slip op. at 3; Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 
63 (testimony of Judy Wolfer, Esquire). 
166. Bleesz v. Bleesz, No. 86-7, slip op. at 5 (Md. App. Sept. 29, 1986). 
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to evaluate properly her circumstances. As was discussed in greater 
detail in the earlier chapter on domestic violence, a victim of domestic 
violence is likely to experience social, economic, and psychological 
difficulties because of her victimization. 167 As a result, she may be 
at an economic and emotional disadvantage in a custody dispute 
compared to her former partner. To ignore her circumstances only 
continues her victimization. The other adverse consequence falls on 
the child, who may be harmed by domestic violence whether or not 
he or she was the intended victim or ever witnessed the abuse. Studies 
are clear that children whose mothers have been abused by their 
fathers can experience severe psychological and emotional prob-
lems. 168 Because of the violence in their homes, they may learn to 
use violence to resolve problems. As they mature, they may repeat 
their parents' patterns and either become violent toward their partners 
or the victims of their partners. If a court ignores the violence which 
the mother has suffered and which has been part of the child's home 
environment, the court may make a custody determination which is 
detrimental to the child as well as the mother. 
II. GENDER BIAS IN VISITATION DISPUTES 
When one parent is awarded sole custody of a child, the other 
parent ordinarily is provided with access to the child that is called 
visitation. Both mothers and fathers expressed concerns to the Com-
.mittee that visitation enforcement was affected by gender bias. Since 
most sole custodial parents are mothers, complaints from fathers 
focused on difficulties they experienced in enforcing visitation or-
ders.169 Mothers, on the other hand, were concerned with problems 
which arise when the noncustodial parent fails to visit. Serious 
concerns were expressed as well about unsupervised visitation by a 
noncustodial parent who is violent or abusive to the child or the 
167. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
168. See, e.g., L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 57-66 (1984); J. 
WALLERSTEIN & S. BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES 113-25 (1989); Giles-Sims, A 
Longitudinal Study oj Battered Children oj Battered Wives, 34 FAM. REL. 205, 
207 (1985); Hershorn & Rosenbaum, Children oj Marital Violence: A Closer 
Look at the Unintended Victims, Children in a Battered Women's Shelter: A 
Preliminary Investigation, 53 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 525, 525-26 (1983). 
169. Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 17, at 81-86 (testimony of Randy 
Farmer); Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 61-62 (testimony 
of David Levy); Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 88-100 (testimony 
of Charles Pelesky, President, Children Unlimited); Eastern Shore Hearing, 
supra note 16, at 85 (testimony of Brent Ashley, Fathers United for Equal 
Rights, Lower Eastern Shore Chapter). 
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mother .170 Mothers also asserted that courts are punitive to those 
who deny visitation. Finally, noncustodial mothers reported that their 
visitation rights were not vigorously protected by the courts. 171 
Few specific incidents involving visitation problems were brought 
to the Committee's attention and no questions on visitation were 
included in the Committee's survey, so the Committee has little data 
on which to determine whether gender bias is a problem in the 
granting or enforcing of visitation. The Committee's limited infor-
mation, however, suggests that serious problems may exist. Children 
ordinarily should not be denied access to either parent, and both 
parents have responsibilities to the child in this regard. The courts 
should be available to assist parents in fulfilling their responsibilities 
toward their children and in providing that access occurs in safe and 
appropriate ways. If the courts are not fulfilling this role, it should 
be determined why that is happening and remedies should be for-
mulated. 
III. JOINT CUSTODY 
Joint custody is a type of custody award under which the parents 
share responsibility for the child. The shared responsibility may be 
limited to decision-making about long-range issues such as the child's 
education, religion, and medical care, or it may extend to sharing 
the duty of providing a home and day-to-day care for the child. The 
former is called joint legal custody, while the latter is called joint 
physical custody. 172 
In Taylor v. Taylorl73 the court of appeals confirmed that 
Maryland courts are empowered to award both joint legal and joint 
physical custody, even over the objection of one parent. 174 The court 
also provided a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered when a 
170. One parent reported, for example, that a court required that she reveal the 
location of a shelter for battered women, where she had taken refuge because 
of her husband's violence, so that he could visit the children. Baltimore City 
Hearing, supra note 47, at 150 (testimony of Lisa Ann Fuller). A safer solution 
in such situations is supervised visitation at a neutral location. 
171. Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-109 (testimony of Sallie 
White-Bishton); Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 50 (testimony 
of Maria Wonders); Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 58, 64-65 
(testimony of Judy Wolfer, Esquire); Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 
11, at 30 (testimony of Jean Karol); id. at 51-54 (testimony of Hannah Sassoon); 
id. at 34 (testimony of Carol Haverstadt). 
172. Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 295-97, 508 A.2d 964, 966-67 (1986); MD. 
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-203(c)(1) (1991). 
173. 306 Md. 290, 508 A.2d 964 (1986). 
174. [d. at 298, 508 A.2d at 968. See Singer & Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint 
Custody, 47 MD. L. REv. 497, 498 (1988). 
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joint custody is requested by a party. 17S The most important factor 
is the capacity of the parents to communicate and reach shared 
decisions about the child's welfare. 176 Other factors include the will-
ingness of the parents to share custody; the relationship between the 
child and each parent; the child's preference; the geographic prox-
imity of parental homes; the demands of parental employment; the 
age and number of the children; the sincerity of the parents' request; 
the financial status of the parents; the impact on state or federal 
assistance; and the benefits to the parents. 177 
Some fathers and advocates for fathers told the Committee that 
joint custody is desirable because it provides support for both parents 
in the parenting process.178 They complained, however, that judges 
refused to consider joint custody because of bias against fathers. 
One witness said that two masters have "stated publicly and una-
pologetically that joint custody will not be entertained as an option 
in the courtroom." 179 Another witness complained that in one county, 
joint custody is never granted over the objections of a parent. ISO 
Mothers and advocates for mothers had different problems with 
joint custody. While acknowledging that joint custody can be an 
appropriate award in the right circumstances, they expressed concern 
about situations where the father had been violent to the mother 
before the separation. The occasions when the parents have to meet 
to transfer the children provide the abuser with further opportunities 
for abuse, and joint decision-making without intimidation is nearly 
impossible. 181 
The Committee sought information about joint custody awards 
in its survey of judges and lawyers, who were asked whether "[jJoint 
custody is ordered over the objections of one or both parents." 182 
Seven percent of judges believe the statement to be always or often 
true, and over a third (35"10) believe that it is sometimes true.l 83 Nine 
percent of male lawyers and 11 % of female lawyers agree that the 
175. Taylor, 306 Md. at 304-11, 508 A.2d at 971-74. 
176. [d. at 304, 508 A.2d at 971. 
177. [d. at 307-11, 508 A.2d at 972-74. 
178. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 59 (testimony of David 
Levy). 
179. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 71 (testimony of Bruce 
Burrows). See also Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 85 (testimony of 
Brent Ashley). 
180. Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 85 (testimony of Brent Ashley). 
181. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 9 (testimony of Barbara 
Miller). 
182. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 33 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires). 
183. For survey results of question 33, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (always-lOJo; often-60J0). 
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statement is always or often true. IS4 About a third (34%) of male 
lawyers think the statement is sometimes true, while nearly half 
(45010) of female lawyers think so. ISS 
The Committee was not provided with sufficient specific infor-
mation to permit an investigation into the allegations that some 
judges and masters will not consider a joint custody request. If that 
is the case, that may be evidence of gender bias against fathers. 
Since Taylor, Maryland law has been clear in requiring a court to 
give serious consideration to a joint custody request, although it far 
from guarantees that joint custody will be awarded. 
The Taylor decision also provides guidance in cases involving a 
parent who opposes a joint custody request because of her fear of 
violence. Two of the Taylor factors are central: the capacity of the 
parents to communicate and the willingness of the parents to share 
custody. The first factor involves, according to the court, mutual 
respect on the part of the parents, flexibility, and their Willingness 
to relinquish control. IS6 Such characteristics do not typify a relation-
ship affected by the violence of one parent against the other. 
The second Taylor factor, the willingness of the parents to share 
custody, if properly interpreted, should provide protection for a 
battered woman who does not want to share custody with her 
batterer. As the Taylor court said of this factor: "Generally, the 
parents should be willing to undertake joint custody or it should not 
be ordered."187 Only rarely would a battered spouse be willing to 
share the custody of a child with a battering spouse, so typically it 
should not be ordered in such a case. 
Based on the results of the Committee's survey, however, it 
appears that trial courts too often order joint custody over parental 
objection. As discussed earlier, 188 judges and lawyers agreed that such 
an order is always, often, or sometimes entered approximately half 
the time. Because of this data, the Committee is concerned that joint 
custody may be ordered with some frequency over the objections of 
battered women, contrary to the language of Taylor, and that such 
orders expose these women to intimidation and violence at the hands 
of their former spouses. 
FINDINGS 
1. Gender bias affects the award of custody in some cases. 
2. Some judges believe that men are unfit for custody because of 
their sex and that men should not become too involved with their 
children. These biased attitudes disadvantage men. 
184. [d. (male attorneys: always-lO/o, often-8%; female attorneys: always-O%, of ten-
11%). 
185. [d. 
186. Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 306, 508 A.2d 964, 972 (1986). 
187. [d. at 307, 508 A.2d at 972. 
188. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
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3. Some judges believe women are unfit for custody if they engage 
in sexual conduct, are economically inferior to the father, work 
outside the home, or do not fulfill the judge's concept of a perfect 
mother. These biased attitudes disadvantage women. 
4. Men's violence toward women and children is given insufficient 
weight in custody decisions. 
S. J oint custody is an option available to parents in appropriate 
circumstances. 
6. Joint custody is an inappropriate option where one parent has 
been violent toward the other parent. 
7. The unwillingness of the parents to share custody sometimes is 
given insufficient weight by trial courts considering joint custody 
requests. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
For Court Administration and the Judiciary 
1. Educate judges and masters as to the gender bias implications 
of considering the following factors in deciding child custody cases: 
a. relative wealth and employment obligations of the parents. 
b. stereotypes about the behavior of men and women as par-
ents, such as the invalidity of the maternal preference. 
c. sexual activity on the part of the mother. 
d. spousal abuse. 
2. Recognize that withholding visitation is only a factor in awarding 
custody and is not determinative. 
3. Recognize the importance to a child of continuing to live with a 
parent who has provided adequate and appropriate care. 
4. Consider the cost of child care to the custodial parent when the 
noncustodial parent fails to exercise visitation. 
S. Consider spousal abuse in determining child custody cases. 
6. Evaluate judges and masters on a regular basis, taking into 
account gender neutrality on issues relating to child custody. 
For the Legislature 
Remove relative wealth of parents as factor in custody disputes. 
For Bar Associations (including State, Local and Specialty Bar 
Associations) 
Continue to support committees engaged in the analysis of 
problems in the law of custody with a view toward eliminating the 
problems rooted in the gender bias de~cribed in this Report. 
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For Law Schools 
Include in family law courses information about the psycholog-
ical consequences of divorce for children, the impact of spousal abuse 
on children, and the way in which stereotypes about women and 
men influence custody decisions. 
CHAPTER 3: CHILD SUPPORT 
Awarding and enforcing child support can be an area where 
gender bias affects the outcome of cases because nearly all the payees 
are women, while nearly all the payors are men who are noncustodial 
parents. The Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts 
(the Committee) collected information on the problems by way of 
testimony at its hearings, letters sent to the Committee, and questions 
on the Committee's survey of judges and lawyers. 
I. Amount of Award 
Under the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment, both parents are 
responsible for providing for the support of their child. 189 The court 
of appeals ruled in Rand v. Rand: 
[W]e hold that the parental obligation for child support is 
not primarily an obligation of the father but is one shared 
by both parents .... The common law rule [that only the 
father is responsible] " . cannot be reconciled with our 
commitment to equality of the sexes. Sex of the parent in 
matters of child support cannot be a factor in allocating 
this responsibility. Child support awards must be made on 
a sexless basis. 190 
The Rand court was considering a case in which the father was 
to pay more than a proportional share of support, while the mother 
was to pay none. Based on the information before it, the Committee 
believes that the question now, over a decade later, is whether mothers 
are being made to pay more than a proportional share of support. 
If that is the case, the Rand mandate is not being implemented. 
The controlling factors in determining child support are the 
needs of the children and the financial abilities of the parents. 191 
Maryland law does not require that each parent provide an equal 
amount of money to meet the child's needs; instead, the duty to 
IS9. Rand v. Rand, 2S0 Md. 50S, 517, 374 A.2d 900, 905 (1977); MD. CONST. 
DECL. OF RTS. art. 46. 
190. Rand, 2S0 Md. at 516, 374 A.2d at 904-05. 
191. German v. German, 37 Md. App. 120, 121-22, 376 A.2d 115, 117 (1977). 
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provide for the child is apportioned according to the ability of each 
parent to pay.192 Thus, what should happen in a particular case is 
that the child's needs are assessed, the financial resources of each 
parent are assessed, and the responsibility to meet the child's needs 
is allocated between the parents according to their relative ability to 
pay. A judgment requiring the payment of his or her allocated 
support is entered against the noncustodial parent; this is called the 
child support award. No judgment is entered requiring a payment 
by the custodial parent; the assumption is that he or she provides 
the allocated share to the child in the usual course of providing for 
the child's household. Thus, each time the custodial parent buys 
groceries, pays for rent, purchases clothing, gives the child an allow-
ance, etc., the custodial parent is meeting her or his responsibility 
to provide child support. 193 
The Rand mandate is implicated in this process if either parent 
is required to provide for the child in an amount greater than a 
fairly allocated share. For example, if the child's needs are calculated 
to be $600 a month, the custodial parent has available economic 
resources of $1000 a month, and the noncustodial parent has available 
economic resources of $2000 a month, a proportional allocation of 
support would require the custodial parent to pay $200 and the 
noncustodial parent to pay $400. If the custodial parent in this case 
is required to pay only $100, the Rand mandate is violated, because 
the remaining $500 will be paid by the noncustodial parent, and that 
is a higher percentage of the child's needs than he or she should 
pay. At the same time, if the noncustodial parent is required to pay 
only $300, the Rand mandate is violated, because the remaining $300 
will be paid by the custodial parent, and that is a higher percentage 
of the child's needs than he or she should pay. 
It is difficult to assess whether the Rand mandate is respected 
or ignored in most cases, because judges typically do not state their 
findings about the exact amount of the child's needs, the financial 
resources of both parties, the allocation system being applied, and 
the amount of support the noncustodial parent is expected to provide. 
Instead, judges typically enter an order requiring the noncustodial 
parent to pay a certain amount without providing the underlying 
data. What the Committee sought in the data it collected, therefore, 
was evidence as to whether judges go through the entire process 
without articulating it, or whether child support is determined by 
other methods. Where alternative methods are used, do they result 
in burdening one party or the other with an inappropriate level of 
responsibility for child support? 
192. Rand, 280 Md. at 517, 374 A.2d at 905; German, 37 Md. App. at 121-22, 376 
A.2d at 117. 
193. Rand, 280 Md. at 517, 374 A.2d at 905. 
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According to the witnesses who appeared at the Committee's 
hearings, courts do a number of things which suggest that the Rand 
mandate is not always followed. First, witnesses stated that noncus-
todial parents are ordered to pay unfairly low amounts of child 
support. l94 One witness noted that $25 a week is a common figure 
for child support in one county.195 Another witness told the Com-
mittee about a noncustodial parent who could afford a car payment 
of $1000 a month being ordered to pay only $400 in child support. l96 
Another noncustodial parent paid less for child support than he paid 
the servants who cleaned his house. 197 Second, the Committee was 
told that judges give great or exclusive weight to the noncustodial 
father's income when determining child support, and little or no 
weight to the child's needs or the custodial mother's income. 198 
The Committee's surveys of judges and lawyers included a 
number of questions about child support. To determine whether the 
child's needs are appropriately addressed, the Committee asked whether 
"[ c] hild support a wards adequately reflect a realistic understanding 
of the local costs of child raising." 199 Of those expressing an opinion, 
270/0 of judges thought the statement is always true. 2OO They were 
joined by only 1 % of female attorneys and 3% of male attorneys.201 
Nearly half of the judges (44%) thought the statement is often true. 202 
On this they were joined by 29% of male attorneys, but by only 8% 
of female attorneys. The differences between the perceptions of 
judges and female attorneys on the question is notable: 9% of all 
female attorneys and 15% of female domestic relations specialists 
thought the statement is never true, while only 3% of judges thought 
SO.203 
194. One witness noted that, according to a Texas study, noncustodial fathers pay 
more than noncustodial mothers.Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 
17, at 1-83 (testimony of Randy Farmer). Whether this is true in Maryland is 
unknown to the Committee, although one witness said he knew of only one 
case in which a noncustodial mother was ordered to pay child support. Id. at 
l-1I8 (testimony of Jerry Solomon, Esquire). 
195. Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 75 (testimony of Anne Ogletree, 
Esquire). 
196. Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 1I7 (testimony of Shellie Frankford, 
Esquire). 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 59 (testimony of Judy Wolfer, Esquire); id. at 1I6 (testimony of Shellie 
Frankford, Esquire). 
199. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 21 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires). 
200. For survey results of question 21, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. For survey results of question 21, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3. 
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Judges and lawyers also were aSked whether "[c]hild support 
awards reflect a realistic understanding of a particular child's needs."204 
Of those expressing an opinion, 25070 of judges thought the statement 
is always true.20S They were joined by only 3% of male lawyers and 
by no female lawyers. 206 Again, nearly half of judges (43%) thought 
the statement is often true.207 They were joined by 27% of male 
lawyers but by only 9% of female lawyers. 208 The women had the 
strongest negative reaction: 8% of all female attorneys and 12% of 
female domestic relations specialists thought the statement is never 
true. 209 
On the issue of the parents' economic resources, judges and 
lawyers were asked if "[c]hild support awards adequately reflect the 
earning capacity of the (a) noncustodial and (b) custodial parent."210 
There was remarkable uniformity in the responses about both parents. 
Over 90% of judges believe the statement is always, often, or 
sometimes true for both noncustodial and custodial parents.2I\ Over 
70% of male attorneys agree. 212 Female attorneys are much less sure: 
only approximately 55% agree the statement is always, often, or 
sometimes true.213 Nearly half think the earning capacity of both 
parents is rarely or never adequately reflected in the award. 214 
If the judges are correct in their assessment of the child support 
system, Rand compliance may not be a problem because child support 
awards adequately reflect the child's needs and the parents' resources. 
The only question would be whether the parents' obligations are 
allocated proportionately, and that cannot be assessed based on these 
survey questions. The lawyers' responses, however, give reason to 
doubt the accuracy of the judges' assessment of the system. According 
to both male and female lawyers, problems exist in assessing the 
204. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 22 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires). 
205. For survey results of question 22, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 




209. For survey results of question 22, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires. see 
infra exhibit E-3. 
210~ See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 23 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires) . 
211. For survey results of question 23. Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (noncustodial parent: always-32OJo, often-460J0, sometimes-
16070; custodial parent: always-31 0J0. often-420J0. sometimes-2007o). 
212. [d. (noncustodial parent: always-40J0, often-41 070, sometimes-360J0; custodial 
parent: always-20J0, often-290J0, sometimes-42OJo). 
213. [d. (noncustodial parent: always-l 070, often-180J0, sometimes-380J0; custodial 
parent: always-20J0, often-170J0, sometimes-37OJo). 
214. [d. 
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child's needs: between a quarter and a half of the lawyers who 
responded believe that child support awards rarely or never "reflect 
a realistic understanding of a particular child's needs. "21S If the 
child's needs are not accurately determined, the court cannot accu-
rately determine how much each parent should provide. 216 Underes-
timating expenses attributable to a child's needs is more likely to 
occur than overestimating, so the result of inaccurate determinations 
will be to overburden the custodial parent with uncompensated 
expenses for the child.217 Since most custodial parents are women, 
overburdening the custodial parent means requiring women to pay 
an unfair amount of child support, in contravention of Rand. 
The survey indicates that many lawyers, in particular female 
lawyers, believe that support awards fail to reflect the earning ca-
pacity of the parents.218 While the survey did not attempt to parse 
this question further, the most likely interpretation of these responses 
is that awards reflect an earning capacity on the part of the custodial 
parent which is higher than the reality, and that the converse is true 
for the noncustodial parent. As the result of these skewed perceptions, 
the custodial parent will be responsible for a higher amount of 
support than the noncustodial parent. Again, the Rand equality 
principle is undermined when the parent with less ability to pay is 
required to be responsible for a disproportionately high amount of 
support. 
215. For survey results of question 22, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (female attorneys: rarely-420Jo, never-8%; male attorneys: 
rarely-25 % , never-2%). 
216. T. ESPENSHADE, INVESTING IN CHILDREN (1984). See also Polikoff, Looking 
for the Policy Choices Within an Economic Methodology: A Critique of the 
Income Shares Model, in ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES DEVEL-
OPMENT: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 29 (1986). 
217. The difficulty of accurately calculating the costs properly attributable to a 
particular child is well known to family law practitioners, who find that even 
custodial parents typically understate costs. See, e.g., N. HIROWITZ, SUPPORT 
PRACTICE HANDBOOK 108-39 (1985); Williams, Child Support Guidelines: Ec-
onomic Basis and Analysis of Alternative Approaches, in American Bar As-
sociation, Improving Child Support Practice 1-5 (1986); Bruch, Developing 
Standards for Child Support Payments: A Critique of Current Practice, 16 
V.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 54-56 (1982). 
218. For survey results of question 23, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3. Nearly a fifth (19%) of male attorneys expressing an opinion 
believe that child support awards rarely or never reflect the earning capacity 
of noncustodial parents (rarely-18%, never-l%); 27% believe that the awards 
rarely or never reflect the earning capacity of custodial parents (rarely-24%, 
never-3%). 
Nearly half of female attorneys believe that child support awards rarely or 
never reflect the earning capacity of noncustodial parents (rarely-40%, never-
4%) and custodial parents (rarely-41 %, never-4%). 
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The overall inequity in child support awards is reflected in the 
national statistics which indicate that over a third of female-headed 
households live in poverty.219 If the Rand principles were followed 
in every case, some of this inequity would be resolved. Inappropriate 
factors would no longer have great weight in the determination of 
support, and overall levels of support would increase. Further, with 
this increase, the unfair impoverishment of custodial mothers' house-
holds relative to the households of noncustodial fathers would de-
cline. 
II. ENFORCEMENT 
The Committee heard numerous complaints that child support 
awards are not enforced quickly, effectively, and inexpensively. The 
contempt procedure, unless followed by a credible promise of im-
prisonment for continued nonpayment, was not deemed helpful, 
because it was time-consuming and ineffective.220 Enforcement by 
attaching wages was deemed much more effective, but problems were 
noted even there, despite changes in Maryland law making it possible 
to obtain an earnings withholding order once the obligor is in arrears 
for more than thirty days' support. 221 
The Committee's survey of judges and lawyers confirmed the 
perceptions of the witnesses. While over half (51070) of the judges 
believed that earnings withholding orders are always or often entered 
at the earliest possible moment, only 9% of female attorneys and 
13% of male attorneys agreed with them.222 Over half of both groups 
219. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note II, at 9 (testimony of Sylvia Becker, 
Esquire, Women's Defense Fund, Washington, D.C.) (according to 1984 Census 
Bureau statistics, poverty rate of female-headed households was 34.5070); see 
also Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 44 (testimony of Jill Coleman, 
Esquire) (average woman in Maryland earns $13,000, only 55% of that earned 
by the average man ($24,000». 
220. Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-104 to -108 (testimony of 
Bessie Neal); Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 157 (testimony 
of Veronica Davis); Washington County Hearing, supra note 14, at 56 (testi-
mony of Mary Anne Day, assistant state's attorney, Washington County); 
Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 87-88 (testimony of Joan Bossman, 
assistant state's attorney, Baltimore City); id. at 118 (testimony of Shellie 
Frankford, Esquire). 
221. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 10-120 (1991); see also Montgomery County 
Hearing, supra note 11, at III (testimony of Zoe Ann Gill); id. at 90 (testimony 
of Joan Ury); Baltimore County Hearing, supra note 12, at 10-12 (testimony 
of Mercedes Samborski, Esquire). 
222. For survey results of question 27, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 Uudges: always-7%, often-44%; female attorneys: always-O%, 
often-9%; male attorneys: always-2%, often -II %). 
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of lawyers (62% females, 56070 males) believed that the statement is 
rarely or never true.223 
Enforcement problems result in gender bias because the obligees 
of support awards are custodial parents, usually mothers. When they 
are denied access to the child support which has been ordered, they 
will provide whatever support they can afford out of other resources, 
which results in their further impoverishment. At the same time, 
noncustodial parents, usually fathers, are allowed to retain resources 
which properly belong to the child's household. The father is, in 
effect, unjustly enriched at the expense of both the child and the 
mother. 
III. PROCEDURE 
Witnesses at the Committee's hearings were adamant that women 
are harmed in the child support process by procedural problems such 
as the failure· to award adequate attorney's fees and delaying pendente 
lite hearings for a long time. One witness reported that the standard 
court-ordered attorney's fee in her county for a pendente lite child 
support hearing is $150, which is so low that attorneys cannot afford 
to accept a case in which the custodial mother lacks the resources to 
pay a fee. 224 
Long and seemingly unwarranted delays in scheduling hearings 
on child support matters were reported to the Committee by several 
witnesses. In one county, six to eight weeks was the standard delay 
between filing and a hearing before a master;225 in another, the delay 
was reported to be between sixty and ninety days;226 in a third, it 
was reported to be "many months. "227 Witnesses were uniformly in 
agreement that, no matter what the delay period, retroactive support 
back to the date the motion for support was filed is rarely or never 
granted.228 The net result is that the custodial parent is left to be the 
223. Id. (female attorneys: rarely-48C1fo, never-14%; male attorneys: rarely-47 % , 
never-9%). 
224. Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 74 (testimony of Anne Ogletree, 
Esquire); Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 13 (testimony of 
Sylvia Becker, Esquire). 
225. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 122-25 (testimony of Master 
Rita Rosenkrantz). Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-41 
(testimony of Michael Loney, Esquire). 
226. Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 169 (testimony of James W. Almand). 
227. Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 115 (testimony of ShelIie Frankford, 
Esquire). 
228. The court is authorized to order that the support begin as of the date the 
motion for support was filed. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-101 (1991). 
Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 112, 115 (testimony of ShelIie 
Frankford, Esquire); Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 169 (testimony 
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sole support of the child during the time she is waiting for the 
hearing, and she cannot look forward to reimbursement for any of 
her expenses on behalf of the child during that period. 
One witness, a custodial parent of three children whose husband 
is the vice-president of a company, described her predicament when 
her husband refused to pay enough support voluntarily, the hearing 
to establish a support order was delayed for four months, and 
vigorous enforcement efforts produced little result. 
As all this time passed, my children and I were falling 
further and further into debt. . . . In the past year I had 
my phone disconnected twice for nonpayment, my electric 
has been turned off, my water has been cut off, I had no 
heat last winter when we had almost two feet of snow on 
the ground. My house has already gone for tax auction .... 
[M]y husband is $6,000 in arrears in child support and still 
I am waiting for another court date.229 
Responses to the Committee's survey of judges and lawyers 
confirm the perceptions of the witnesses about delay. The survey 
sought opinions about the statement that "[p]endente lite awards of 
child support are made within 60 days of filing the motion. "230 While 
7011,10 of judges believed the statement to be always or often true, 
only 38% of male lawyers and 18% of female lawyers agreed with 
them.231 
A system which delays child support hearings and denies the 
custodial parent retroactive support for the period of the delay 
effectively discriminates against women because, as custodial parents, 
they are left to provide for the child alone out of their own resources 
during the prehearing period. They spend whatever is necessary for 
the child, while the child's father is allowed to spend all of his 
resources however he wishes. Often, the prehearing period leaves the 
custodial mother in debt, and she gets no assistance from the father 
for repayment through the child support system, even though a 
of James Almand, Esquire); Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 
122-25 (testimony of Hon. Rita Rosenkrantz); Baltimore County Hearing, 
supra note 12, at 12-13 (testimony of Phyllis Martin); Women's Law Center 
of Baltimore, Subcommittee Report: Gender Bias in the Courts 8 (Jan. 1988) 
(on file with Committee). 
229. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 114-15 (testimony of Zoe Ann 
Gill). 
230. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 26 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires) . 
231. For survey results of question 26, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (judges: always-13OJo, often-57%; male attorneys: always-4%, 
often-34%; female attorneys: always-l %, often-17%). 
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portion of the child's expenses are his responsibility.232 Further, the 
mother's prehearing impoverishment may push her into settling with 
the father for an amount of child support which is lower than she 
would be awarded by a court, simply because she cannot afford to 
wait for a court hearing. Her continued impoverishment also gives 
the father a reason to further delay the hearing, because he can use 
her household's reduced circumstances as evidence of their child 
having reduced needs. 233 
FINDINGS 
1. Child support awards often are inequitable to the custodial 
parent, usually the child's mother, because they do not reflect a fair 
assessment of the child's needs and a division of the financial 
responsibility to the child which is proportional to the parents' 
incomes. 
2. Enforcement of child support awards is inadequate to ensure 
that the custodial parent, usually the mother, has the resources 
necessary to meet the child's needs. 
3. Delays in awarding child support, denial of retroactive support 
awards, and denial of adequate attorney's fees contribute to the 
impoverishment of custodial parents, usually mothers, and their 
children. 
232. A separate contract or necessaries suit may be possible, but each involves 
additional delay and expense. Both the contract and the suit could be avoided 
by making a child support award date back to the date the petition was filed. 
233. Two additional problems about child support enforcement were uncovered by 
the Committee's survey, which asked about the impact of visitation and custody 
problems on the enforcement of child support. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and 
(b) (Question 24 of Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires). Although the issues 
should be entirely separate under Maryland law, 39010 of female attorneys, 
20% of male attorneys, and 16010 of judges thought that visitation problems 
always, often, or sometimes result in the denial of child support enforcement. 
For survey results of question 24, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (female attorneys: always-O%, often-7%, sometimes-32%; 
male attorneys: always-O%, often-6%, sometimes-14%; judges: always-O%, 
often-2%, sometimes-14%). Sixty-four percent of female attorneys, 45% of 
male attorneys, and 29% of judges thought that a counterclaim for custody 
would delay the enforcement of child support. See infra exhibit E-3 (Question 
25 of Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires) (female attorneys: always-O%, 
often-22%, sometimes-42%; male attorneys: always-2%, often-l2%, sometimes-
31 %; judges: always-O%, often-6%, sometimes-23%). In both situations the 
custodial mother will be harmed because her claim for child support will be 
delayed or denied altogether. In the meantime she will be providing support 
for the child by herself, and the father will be permitted to retain for his own 
use the resources which should have been provided for the child's support. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
For Court Administration and Judiciary 
1. Take necessary steps to assure that judges and masters are 
familiar with: 
a. Current, accurate information about the costs of raising a 
child, the costs and availability of child care, and other statistical 
and social data essential to making realistic child support awards. 
b. The economic consequences of divorce from the standpoint of 
ensuring that parents' financial contributions to child support are 
proportional to each party's economic resources. 
c. All available enforcement mechanisms and the importance of 
utilizing them to the fullest extent of the law. 
2. Establish enforcement by a computerized system for the collection 
of child support which can collect and provide data to enable effective 
monitoring of child support cases. 
3. Provide routinely for child support payments to be made through 
the courts. 
4. Establish a system for rapid determination and enforcement of 
pendente lite awards. 
5. Make awards retroactive to the date of the filing of the motion 
for support in the absence of compelling reason to do otherwise. 
6. Award to the economically dependent parent, attorney's fees that 
accurately reflect the value of the work of the attorney. 
7. Evaluate judges and masters on a regular basis, taking into 
account gender neutrality on issues relating to child support. 
For the Legislature 
Enact legislation that: 
1. Makes child support available until emancipation or age 21, 
whichever first occurs. 
2. Makes child support awards retroactive to the date of the filing 
of the motion, unless that would be unconscionable. 
3. Makes earnings withholding orders automatic at the time the 
support order is entered. 
For Bar Associations (including State, Local and Specialty Bar 
Associations) 
Establish a bench-bar committee to study the appropriateness, 
fairness, and effectiveness of child support guidelines and to rec-
ommend changes as required. 
For Law Schools 
Family law courses should include information about (1) the 
award and enforcement of child support, similar to that recommended 
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for judges and masters; and (2) the hardship to children and custodial 
parents when child support awards are insufficient and unenforced. 
CHAPTER 4: ALIMONY; PROPERTY DISPOSITION AND 
LITIGATION EXPENSES 
The Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts (the 
Committee) perceived the allocation of economic resources at the 
time of divorce as an occasion when judicial gender bias might 
surface. Information on the subject was collected four ways: ques-
tions were included in the survey administered to the bench and bar; 
judges and masters were asked to respond to a hypothetical problem 
involving alimony; witnesses testified at the public hearings; and 
people sent written complaints to the Committee. Three major prob-
lem areas were identified with respect to alimony: the amount of 
alimony awarded, the duration of the alimony award, and the deci-
sion whether to award alimony. The major difficulties in the area of 
property disposition are procedural and often involve payment for 
litigation expenses. 
I. ALIMONY 
Maryland law requires judges to consider eleven factors when 
deciding whether to award alimony and what amount to award. 
These include the ability of the applicant spouse to be self-supporting; 
what period of time may be needed for him or her to achieve self-
sufficiency; the standard of living of the parties during the marriage; 
the parties' contributions to the family's well-being; the circumstances 
behind the separation of the parties; any agreement between the 
parties; the duration of the marriage; the personal characteristics of 
the parties, including age and physical and mental condition; and 
the relative needs and resources of each party. 234 Alimony typically 
is awarded for a limited period of time during which the economically 
dependent spouse is provided with the opportunity to obtain reha-
bilitative education and training. Indefinite alimony can be awarded 
instead if the court finds that one of two situations exists: (1) the 
party seeking alimony is unable to become self-supporting due to 
age, illness, infirmity, or disability; or (2) the standard of living of 
the former spouses will be unconscionably disparate even after the 
applicant spouse has made as much progress as possible toward self-
sufficiency.235 
234. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-I06(b) (1991). 
235. [d. at § ll-106(c). 
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A. The Amount oj the Alimony Award 
J. Inconsistency oj Alimony A wards 
A fact known to practitioners and documented by the Commit-
tee's research is that alimony awards vary tremendously from one 
case to another, even where the circumstances of the parties are 
similar. The Committee found evidence of inconsistency in the res-
ponses of thirty-four judges and domestic relations masters to a 
hypothetical problem involving the award of alimony. 236 In the hy-
pothetical problem, the parties, both middle-aged, had been married 
twenty-two years. The economically independent spouse had an after-
tax income of $35,000 a year, or $2917 a month; the economically 
dependent spouse had an after-tax income of $5200 a year, or $433 
a month. The amounts of alimony awarded in this hypothetical 
ranged from $1500 a month to $1 a month. Five awards were for 
$1000 or more; nineteen were above $400 and below $1,000; and ten 
were for $400 or less. The average award was $602. The typical 
award, made in eight instances, was $500. 
Given the many factors which must be taken into account when 
determining alimony and the differences in cost of living from one 
county to another, it would be unreasonable to expect an identical 
result in every case, no matter how close the facts. One should be 
able to expect that awards in similar cases would have some relative 
relationship to one another, however. The thirty-four awards made 
in response to the Committee's hypothetical problem cannot be said 
to have any approximate relationship to one another. There is a 
$1499 difference between the highest ($1500) and the lowest ($1) 
award. There is a spread of $1000 between the highest award and 
the typical award of $500; a spread of $499 between the lowest 
award and the typical award. 
Both spouses in an alimony contest may be disadvantaged by 
inconsistent awards because unpredictability makes planning for the 
post-divorce period impossible. Further, it is possible that the awards 
at both ends of the spectrum are unfair, either to the payor spouse 
or the payee spouse. The economically dependent spouse, usually the 
wife, will suffer more from this inconsistency, however. First, in the 
hypothetical, the most extreme variations from the average award 
were at the lower end, not the higher end. This indicates that 
variability is more likely to result in an award that is too low, not 
one that is too high. Second, the uncertainty of outcome makes a 
236. For the four versions of hypothetical problem number 3, along with an 
Explanatory Note on methodology, see infra exhibit D. The responses of the 
judges and masters are on file with the Committee. 
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judicial determination of the award attractive to the economically 
independent spouse. The economically dependent spouse will have 
fewer resources to use in a trial, however, and may be forced to 
settle for a lower award rather than risk the unpredictability of a 
trial. 
2. The Amount oj the A ward 
The amount of alimony awards is a matter of concern, partic-
ularly in situations where the post-divorce standards of living of the 
former spouses are significantly different. A good example of this 
situation is provided by the responses to the Committee's hypothetical 
problem just discussed. The typical award made by the judges and 
masters responding to the hypothetical case is $500. After it is paid, 
the economically independent spouse will have a monthly income of 
$2417; the economically dependent spouse will have a monthly income 
of $933.237 Thus, the paying spouse would enjoy a per capita monthly 
income approximately two and a half times higher than that of the 
payee spouse. Prior to the divorce, when presumably the couple 
pooled their joint resources of $3350 a month, their per capita income 
was $1675. After the divorce, and after the alimony award has been 
paid, the payor spouse has increased his or her share of the pre-
divorce resources by $742, while the payee spouse's resources have 
decreased by exactly the same amount, $742. 
One goal of alimony is to have the parties share fairly in the 
reduction in their standard of living that will follow the divorce. The 
typical award of $500 fails to meet this goal for both spouses. The 
payor spouse has improved his or her standard of living by approx-
imately 440/0, while the payee spouse has suffered a decline of 
approximately 44%. An award of approximately $1200 would provide 
the payor and payee spouses with approximately equal incomes.238 
Two responses to the hypothetical cases made an award of $1200. 
Only one award was for more than $1200 ($1500). All the other 
awards were below $1200. Even before tax adjustments,239 in 910/0 
of the cases, the award meant that the payee spouse would suffer a 
much greater decline in his or her per capita income. The decline 
ranged from $242 a month (14%) to $1241 a month (74%), with the 
237. Since alimony is deductible to the payor and taxable to the payee, the paying 
spouse would have access to a somewhat higher amount of money and the 
payee spouse would have access to a somewhat lower amount. 
238. While an award of $1200 approximately equalizes the parties' incomes, it does 
not equalize their post tax standard of living because the paying spouse benefits 
from being allowed to deduct the alimony payment, which is taxable to the 
payee spouse. An alimony award of approximately $1600 is necessary to achieve 
post-tax parity. 
239. See supra note 238. 
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average being $640 a month (38070). The payor spouse enjoyed an 
increase in his or her per capita income ranging from $1241 (74%) 
to $242 (14%). The average increase was $640 (38%). 
The Committee's findings were confirmed by a study of alimony 
awards made in Montgomery County during 1986. These alimony 
awards resulted in the mean per capita income of the economically 
independent spouse increasing by 55%, while that of the economically 
dependent spouse in a custodial household declined by 37%.240 
During its hearings, the Committee received further confirmatory 
information on the inequities in alimony awards. In one case, the 
former husband earned between $75,000 and $80,000 a year, which 
roughly equals $6000 a month. The alimony award to the former 
wife, who had been a homemaker at the husband's request during 
their 25-year marriage, was $250 a month. Prior to the divorce, each 
spouse enjoyed a per capita monthly income of approximately $3000. 
After the divorce, his per capita monthly income rose to approxi-
mately $5750, while hers declined to $250.241 
In another case, the wife, divorced after 35 years of marriage, 
was awarded $12,000 a year in alimony. Her former husband earned 
$90,000 a year. Even with her investment income of $7000 a year, 
her income was approximately a quarter of her former spouse's.242 
Another case involved a middle-aged woman with six children, three 
of whom still lived at home. She was awarded $1300 a month for 
the support of herself and the three dependent children. The com-
bination of the alimony, child support, and her annual earnings of 
$16,000 meant that the resources available to her and the couple's 
children amounted to just over half of the resources available to the 
children's father. 243 
The Committee's research identified two important factors which 
help to explain low alimony awards. 244 The first is that the temporary 
alimony award made for the purpose of providing support to the 
economically dependent spouse during litigation is used as the basis 
for the alimony award made at the time of the divorce. The second 
factor is that the economically independent spouse is not required to 
pay alimony in an amount which would result in diminishing his or 
her standard of living. 
240. Bell, Alimony and the Financially Dependent Spouse in Montgomery County, 
Maryland, 22 FAM. L.Q. 228, 284 (1989) [hereinafter Bell Study]. Where the 
divorcing couple had children, the per capita income of the children decreased 
by an even larger percentage. [d. 
241. Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 100 (testimony of Joanne Shearin). 
242. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 86-87 (testimony of Joan Ury). 
243. [d. at 87. 
244. See infra notes 245-63 and accompanying text. 
1990) Gender Bias Report 63 
Q. Effect of Pendente Lite A ward 
The Committee learned that a major limitation on the alimony 
award in the divorce decree is the alimony award made for the 
support of the economically dependent spouse during the course of 
the litigation (alimony pendente lite).24s Unfortunately, these awards 
are often very low. According to one circuit court judge, pendente 
lite awards are governed by "the sentiment" that the dependent 
spouse should have "just enough to get by on. "246 Once the dependent 
spouse has reduced her lifestyle to one she can afford on her pendente 
lite award, the other spouse will contend that she "needs" no more 
for the permanent award, and often he will prevaiJ.247 
In the survey, the Committee sought the opinion of judges and 
lawyers about the impact of the pendente lite award on the divorce 
alimony award. 248 Forty-nine percent of the judges, 62070 of the male 
lawyers, and 50070 of the female lawyers who had an opinion on the 
question responded that the alimony award at the time of divorce is 
always or often close to or the same as the pendente lite award. 249 
Another 45% of the judges, 39% of the female lawyers, and 35% 
of the male lawyers who had an opinion on the question responded 
that the divorce alimony award sometimes is close to or the same as 
the pendente lite award.2so Over 60% of male and female lawyers 
engaged largely in domestic relations practice agreed that the pendente 
lite award and the divorce award are always or often close or the 
same.2S1 
Under Maryland law, a court is empowered to award alimony 
pendente lite.2s2 The court is not required to undertake a complex 
evaluation of the parties' needs or resources before awarding alimony 
pendente lite; the award is made to provide the economically de-
pendent spouse with some resources during the course of the litiga-
tion. As the court of special appeals has noted,2S3 a pendente lite 
245. Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-41 to -42 (testimony of 
Michael Loney, Esquire). 
246. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 163 (testimony of Hon. James 
McAuliffe). 
247. [d. 
248. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 20 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires). 
249. For survey results of question 20, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (judges: always-) 0/0, often-48%; male attorneys: always-2%, 
often-60%; female attorneys: always-7%, often-43%). 
250. [d. 
251. [d. (male domestic relations specialists: always-3%, often-63%; female domestic 
relations specialists: always-IO%, often-53%). 
252. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-102 (1991). 
253. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. 487, 497 A.2d 485, cerl. denied, 305 
Md. 107, 501 A.2d 845 (1985). 
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award is not indicative of the total needs of the economically de-
pendent spouse; it is indicative "only of [the payor spouse's] ability 
to pay that amount as alimony following a divorce. "254 The amount 
of the pendente lite award is not one of the factors which judges 
are required to assess when awarding permanent alimony. 255 
Overuse of the pendente lite award to determine the amount of 
the divorce award harms wives more than husbands, since wives are 
more likely to be in the position of economically dependent spouses. 
Using the pendente lite award as the basis for the divorce award will 
hurt the wife because the divorce award will be lower than it might 
have been upon full consideration of all the factors that should be 
considered.256 In addition, she may have to wait longer to obtain a 
divorce award because the court's reliance on the pendente lite award 
as a criterion gives the husband an incentive to delay the decision. 
The longer the husband can delay, the more likely it is that he will 
be able to argue persuasively that his wife has successfully supported 
herself on the pendente lite award and, therefore, has no need for a 
higher divorce award. To counter this argument, she may have to 
show that, because of the meagerness of the pendente lite award, 
she has gone into debt, postponed certain expenses, or delayed 
payment on others.257 Establishing what would have been her legiti-
mate level of support at the time of the separation becomes, as a 
result, much more complex and difficult. 
b. Impact of the Financially Independent Spouse's Lifestyle on 
Size of A ward 
Another factor which can unfairly depress the amount of the 
alimony award is judicial reluctance to require a financially inde-
pendent spouse to reduce his or her258 lifestyle to support the finan-
cially dependent spouse. The Committee's survey asked respondents 
whether they believed that "[a] wife's alimony award is based on 
how much the husband can give her without diminishing his current 
life style."259 Of those expressing an opinion, 13070 of judges, 20% 
of male attorneys, and 44% of female attorneys expressed the belief 
254. [d. at 534-35, 497 A.2d at 509. 
255. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § ll-106(b) (1991). 
256. See id. 
257. See Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. at 533-37, 497 A.2d at 508-10. 
258. In half of the versions of the Committee's hypothetical, the economically 
independent spouse was the wife and in the other half, the husband. See infra 
exhibit D. In most cases, the judge or master allowed the economically 
independent spouse to maintain his or her lifestyle. 
259. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 17 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires). 
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that the alimony award always or often has such a basis.260 Approx-
imately the same percentages of domestic relations practitioners ex-
pressing an opinion share the same belief (220/0 of the male attorneys 
and 50% of the female attorneys).261 An additional 17% of the 
judges, 33% of female lawyers, and 26% of male lawyers agreed 
that the husband's lifestyle sometimes affected the alimony award.262 
Under the law, the court is required to consider the financial 
needs and resources of both parties when determining alimony. 263 To 
the extent that the needs of the economically independent spouse are 
given priority over those of the economically dependent spouse, the 
statutory mandate is being abrogated. The result is more detrimental 
to women than to men because the dependent spouse typically is the 
wife. 
B. Duration of Alimony A ward 
The Committee learned through surveys, testimony, and other 
materials that the duration of the alimony award is often a problem. 
Most of the women who asserted that their requests for alimony for 
an indefinite term were improperly denied were displaced homemak-
ers, whose divorces occurred after many years of marriage.264 During 
their marriages, their participation in the paid labor force was min-
imal because they and their spouses believed that the care of their 
families and homes was their full-time job. Under Maryland law, 
displaced homemakers often should qualify for alimony for an in-
definite term;26S indeed, it may be argued that a denial of indefinite 
alimony to the homemaker spouse after many years of marriage 
should be a fairly rare event, assuming that the other spouse has 
income-producing capability. 
The general belief among attorneys and judges appears to be 
that displaced homemakers are awarded indefinite alimony after long-
term marriages. In response to a question in the Committee's survey, 
only 7% of judges and 13% of male attorneys believed that displaced 
homemakers are denied indefinite alimony. 266 Skepticism was some-
260. For survey results of question 17, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (judges: always-3OJo, often-IO%; male attorneys: always-l %, 
often-19%; female attorneys: always-7%, often-37%). 
261. [d. (male attorneys: always-O%, often-22%; female attorneys: always-12%, 
often-38%). 
262. [d. 
263. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-106(b)(9), (II) (1991). 
264. See infra notes 269-73 and accompanying text. 
265. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-106(b) (1991). 
266. For survey results of question 18, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (judges: rarely-4%, never-3%; male attorneys: rarely-II %, 
never-2%). 
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what higher among female attorneys, especially those who are do-
mestic relations practitioners: 26% of female attorneys and 33"70 of 
female domestic relations practitioners believed that displaced home-
makers rarely or never are awarded indefinite alimony.267 
The testimony received by the Committee and the response to 
its hypothetical alimony problem indicate that the skepticism of the 
female lawyers is not without basis. Witnesses told the Committee 
of frequent cases where indefinite alimony is denied to economically 
dependent spouses who met the statutory guidelines. These women 
were either unable to become self-supporting or were unable to earn 
enough money to bring them close to the standard of living of their 
former spouses. 
Examples included the case of a woman who was divorced after 
an eighteen-year marriage. Although trained as a nurse, she had little 
prospect of returning to her profession because of the long break in 
service which occurred after her marriage and because she had 
experienced two hospitalizations for mental disorders. Her former 
husband earned approximately $200,000 a year. The judge awarded 
short-term alimony on the theory that the wife had an earning 
potential of $20,000 a year. 268 Another case involved a middle-aged 
woman with five children, four of them minors at the time of the 
hearing. The judge, although finding the wife "used up, physically 
[and] mentally," awarded her alimony in the amount of $250 a 
month for six months, then reduced it to $100 a month for a limited 
term. In the judge's view, "it is a good calculated risk that you, 
young lady, will be able to do some work ... [b]ecause you are 
asking for this divorce as well, and you are getting it. "269 Another 
case involved a middle-aged woman who had not worked for pay 
during her twenty-six years of marriage and was caring for a blind 
child. Alimony was awarded for only five years, although the court 
found that she would never be able to support herself at the level 
enjoyed during the marriage.21o Yet another case involved a seventeen-
year marriage. The wife was mentally ill and unable to work; the 
husband earned $95,000 a year. Alimony was awarded for three 
years. 271 
267. Id. (female attorneys: rarely-240Jo, never-20J0; female domestic relations attor-
neys: rarely-290J0, never-40J0) (Statistics are of those expressing an opinion.). 
268. Statement of Stewart B. Oneglia, Esquire, before the Maryland House of 
Delegates, in Annapolis, Md. 2 (Feb. 26, 1988) [hereinafter Statement of 
Stewart B. Oneglia) (on file with Committee). 
269. Tayman v. Tayman, Equity No. DR 79-4466 (Prince George's County, Md. 
Cir. Ct. Nov. 21, 1980) (on file with Committee). 
270. Statement of Stewart B. Oneglia, supra note 268, at 2. 
271. Id. 
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Practitioners report that, in many counties, short-term alimony 
is the rule. An award of indefinite alimony is extremely rare. 272 
Practitioners expressed frustration about the situation because of 
their belief that the Maryland Code permits the awarding of indefinite 
alimony in many cases in which it is denied. As a result, women 
who are eligible for indefinite alimony awards are left impoverished 
shortly after the divorce. This result, practitioners contend, is con-
trary to what the legislature intended when enacting the changes in 
the alimony law providing for short-term and indefinite alimony.273 
The Committee's hypothetical problem on alimony involved a 
middle-aged couple divorced after a twenty-two-year marriage.274 The 
economically dependent spouse had been a homemaker throughout 
the marriage, had a back injury causing lower back pain, and held 
only a part-time job, earning $5200 a year after taxes. The econom-
ically independent spouse had worked full-time for pay throughout 
the marriage and at the time of divorce earned $35,000 a year after 
taxes. Although the hypothetical case was designed in such a way as 
to satisfy the statutory requisites for an award of indefinite alimony, 
only fifty percent (twenty-one) of the judges and masters awarded 
indefinite alimony.275 The remaining fifty percent awarded alimony 
only for a limited term.276 
One reason many displaced homemakers are denied alimony may 
be that judges are assuming that any displaced homemaker readily 
can train herself in a marketable skill and find suitable work, so 
that indefinite alimony is not needed.277 Because of this assumption, 
the judges do not require evidence in each case that a particular 
applicant spouse has the skills and personal attributes required to 
take advantage of employment opportunities in her or his locale. 278 
272. Id. at 2-3; Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 139 (testimony of 
James Nolan, Esquire); Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, 123-24 (testimony 
of Jane Tolar O'Connor, Esquire); Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 
17, at 1-43 (testimony of Michael Loney, Esquire); id. at 1-93 (testimony of 
Roger Perkins, Esquire); Bell Study, supra note 240, at 278. 
273. Statement of Stewart B. Oneglia, supra note 268; Montgomery County Hearing, 
supra note 240, at 86-88 (testimony of Joan Ury); id. at 139-41 (testimony of 
James Nolan, Esquire). 
274. See infra exhibit D. 
275. All of the responses to the hypotheticals are on file with the Committee. 
276. Id. 
277. Bell Study, supra note 240, at 279. 
278. The statute does not specify where the burden of proof should rest in a case 
involving the income-earning capacity of the dependent spouse. In Zorich v. 
Zorich, 63 Md. App. 710, 493 A.2d 1096 (1985), the trial court implied that 
it rests on the economically independent spouse. In that case, an indefinite 
award was upheld for a wife in her fifties after a 30-year marriage in which 
she had been a homemaker. After the separation, she became employed, earning 
$10,000 a year, while the husband made $50,000 per year. The trial court 
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Thus, judges may assume that many employment opportunities are 
open to a middle-aged job seeker, even though she may bring 
outdated skills to the job market and may face job discrimination 
because of her age. 
An additional reason that displaced homemakers are denied 
indefinite alimony may be that judges give less weight to their non-
monetary contributions to the family than they do to the career 
spouses' monetary contributions. Rather than crediting a wife's hom-
emaking work as an important contribution to a husband's success, 
judges may view a request for alimony as an unwarranted demand 
for the money earned "solely" by the career spouse.279 
A practice of denying indefinite alimony to displaced homemak-
ers will harm women more than men because, traditionally, women 
dedicated themselves to the needs of family and home and did not 
develop a career. People who are divorcing in the 1980's after long 
marriages did not have the same assumptions about equal wage-
earning roles within marriage as many people have today. Further, 
despite advances in their legal rights since the 1970's, middle-aged 
women continue to face employment discrimination on the basis of 
stated in its decision that there was "no real solid evidence that she is able to 
gain much of an education to better herself," evidence which, the trial court 
implied, the husband should have provided. Zorich, 63 Md. App. at 717, 493 
A.2d at llOO. Placing the burden on the spouse who is contending that the 
other spouse can become economically independent is consistent with general 
principles on allocation of the burden of proof. See L. McLAIN, 5 MARYLAND 
PRACTICE: MARYLAND EVIDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL 131-50 (1987). But see 
Thomasian v. Thomasian, 79 Md. App. 188, 195, 556 A.2d 675, 678 (1989) 
(holding that burden of proof is upon "the economically dependent spouse 
who seeks alimony for an indefinite period"). 
279. A similar problem affects how judges determine the equitable adjustment of 
marital property by way of the monetary award. Under MD. FAM. LAW CODE 
ANN. § 8-205(b) (1991), the factors to be considered include the "contributions, 
monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family." 
/d. at § 8-205(b)(1). The Committee's survey of judges and lawyers asked 
whether, "[wJhere a wife's primary contribution is as a homemaker, the 
monetary award reflects a judicial attitude that the husband's income producing 
contribution entitles him to a larger share of the marital estate." See infra 
exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 13, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires). 
Of those expressing an opinion, affirmative answers were given by 790/0 of 
female attorneys with a specialty in domestic relations practice and by 39% of 
similarly specializing male attorneys. Sixteen percent of judges agreed. For 
survey results of question 13, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see infra 
exhibit E-3 (female domestic relations attorneys: always-IO%, often-41 %, some-
times-28%; male domestic relations attorneys: always-O%, often-14%, some-
times-25%; judges: always-l%, often-6%, sometimes-9%). These answers suggest 
strongly that, despite the equivalent standing which the statute gives to monetary 
and nonmonetary contributions, the monetary contributions are still more 
important in too many cases. 
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gender which may be compounded by age discrimination. Thus, they 
are more likely to be the needy spouse than their former husbands. 
c. The Decision to Award Alimony 
The Committee received information suggesting that three groups 
of economically dependent spouses routinely are being denied alimony 
on any basis although the Maryland statute permits an award of 
alimony. The groups are: (1) women who have some income but 
whose former spouses have incomes that are considerably greater, 
(2) women who left paid work in order to care for young children, 
and (3) women who have been accused of marital misconduct. 
1. Impact of Wife'S Earnings on Award of Alimony 
Some spouses are awarded no alimony because they have some 
income and, as a result, are deemed self-supporting. The Montgomery 
County study of alimony awards made in 1986, for example, found 
that a woman earning $20,000 a year rarely is awarded alimony, 
even if her predivorce standard of living was significantly higher and 
her former spouse earns considerably more than $20,000 a year. 280 
The Committee heard testimony about one woman with a part-time 
job who was denied alimony and advised by the judge to "put this 
behind you, get on with your life. "281 
The law does not bar an award of alimony to applicants with 
some income; instead, it requires judges to evaluate a party's ability 
to be "self-supporting. "282 What "self-supporting" means should be 
determined in each case. In some situations, a spouse earning $20,000 
a year will be able to provide adequately for herself or himself. In 
others, the amount will be inadequate because it is far less than the 
resources available to the spouse during the marriage or it is less 
than the amount needed for the location where the spouse lives. It 
may be argued that "self-supporting" is a relative term, not an 
amount which is determined according to a standard external to the 
case at hand. The law also requires the court to consider the relative 
financial positions of the parties.283 Thus, a case in which both 
spouses earn $12,000 is quite different from one in which the appli-
cant spouse earns $12,000 and the other spouse earns $120,000. 
Denying alimony to applicant spouses who earn a relatively small 
amount of money will harm women more than men because the 
280. Bell Study, supra note 240, at 276-78. 
281. Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 45 (testimony of Jill Coleman, 
Director, Fair Family Law Association). 
282. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-106(b) (1991). 
283. [d. at § 1l-106(b)(1l). 
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economically dependent spouse is usually the woman. In addition, 
denying alimony in this situation unfairly benefits relatively wealthy 
, men, because it disregards the mandate in the statute that financial 
needs and resources of both parties be considered. Denying women 
alimony because they have a relatively small income effectively per-
mits a higher-earning man to retain a larger share of his income 
than the legislature appears to have intended. 
2. The Custodial Parent 
Another group of economically dependent spouses who are de-
nied alimony are those who stopped working for pay in order to 
care for the couple's children and whose children are still young at 
the time of the divorce. 284 One woman testified that she was awarded 
no alimony when her fifteen-year marriage ended, although she had 
stopped working for pay when the first of her three children was 
born. At the time of the divorce, the children were nine, seven, and 
four. The logic of the master's decision to deny alimony was that 
the woman could immediately get a full-time job earning what she 
had earned ten years earlier, before the birth of the children. 285 
Although it is perhaps less true now than in years past, many 
families having children decide that the mother rather than the father 
should leave paid labor or reduce her labor force participation when 
children are born. Typically, time out of the paid labor force on 
either a full-time or a part-time basis results in a reduction of one's 
employment-related skills and desirability to employers. As a result, 
employers are reluctant to employ a mother returning to full-time 
paid labor at the same level of salary she earned before the hiatus. 
In addition, the demands of child rearing increase in intensity when· 
the parents separate and divorce. For a mother in these circumstances 
to make a commitment to participate in the paid labor force equiv-
alent to what she made when she was not solely responsible for the 
care of children is difficult indeed. Nonetheless, the Committee was 
advised that many women in these circumstances were not awarded 
alimony, even for a short term. 
One reason judges may deny alimony to mothers of young 
children is that they do not have a realistic grasp of the inability of 
these women to be wholly or partly self-supporting. They may assume 
that, since most mothers work, these mothers should be able to 
quickly find full-time and appropriate work. In making this assump-
tion, judges may be overlooking the difficulties that accompany all 
workers who return to the paid labor force after several years of 
284. See Bell Study, supra note 240, at 300-06. 
285. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 54-55 (testimony of "Mary 
Smith"). 
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absence, such as employer resistance, a degradation of skills or a 
need for retraining in one's specialty. Second, mothers with sole 
custody or sole physical custody who are separating or divorcing are 
not in the same circumstances as married mothers who worked 
throughout their children's younger years. They have sole responsi-
bility for the children, and those children are going through the 
emotional and physical changes and difficulties that accompany their 
parents' separation. Third, day care is a costly, scarce, and unsatis-
factory commodity in many communities, and mothers may have 
difficulty locating an appropriate placement for a child. As a result, 
a mother's return to paid labor can be delayed or impeded. 
Under the law, a decision to award alimony can turn on the 
difficulties facing a custodial parent who is returning to paid labor 
after a hiatus spent caring for children.286 In appropriate cases, such 
a parent can be found to be unable to be fully self-supporting 
because of the demands of the children. In addition, that parent may 
need a period of time for education or training because of his or 
her time away from paid labor. If these factors are ignored, many 
parents who need alimony to make the transition from the life of 
the married parent to the life of the single custodial parent will be 
denied the resources they need and which, under the sta.tute, they 
can be awarded. 
Denying alimony to the custodial parent harms women more 
than men because approximately ninety percent of custodial parents 
are women.287 Most of these women become custodial parents by 
agreement with their former spouses, who, as a result, do not face 
the same challenges in the marketplace as a single custodial parent. 288 
3. The Wrongdoer Spouse 
Finally, the Committee was told that in order to be awarded 
alimony, women must be free of fault at the time of divorce. 289 This 
286. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-I06(b)(I),(2) (1991). 
287. See Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody A wards: Legal Standards and Empirical 
Patterns for Child Custody, Support and Visitation after Divorce, 12 U.c. 
DAVIS L. REV. 473, 484 (1979). 
288. Weitzman, Judicial Perceptions and Perceptions of Judges: The Divorce Law 
Revolution in Practice, in WOMEN, THE COURTS AND EQUALITY 76, 87-88 (L. 
Crites & W. Hepper eds. 1987). 
As was noted in Chapter 2, the mother seeking custody in a contested case 
may be faced with conflicting expectations: (I) a good mother should stay home 
with her children, but (2) custody should go to the parent who is wealthier. 
See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text. Her difficult position in the 
custody contest worsens when she is denied alimony because her economic 
position suffers in comparison to the father's position. 
289. Baltimore County Hearing, supra note 12 (testimony of Sheila P. Litzsky). 
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perception was verified by a study of alimony awards in Montgomery 
County, which found that, in the cases studied, no wife who was at 
fault was awarded alimony.290 
Under the law, one of the factors which the court considers 
when deciding whether to award alimony is "the circumstances that 
contributed to the estrangement of the parties. "291 Adultery and other 
forms of marital wrongdoing can be such circumstances. For marital 
wrongdoing to be the only factor considered, however, is not con-
sistent with the mandate that the court consider "all the factors 
necessary for a fair and equitable award," including the eleven that 
are specified.292 
If judges are erroneously giving too much weight to marital 
wrongdoing when determining whether to award alimony, women 
are going to be harmed more than men because women are more 
likely to be economically dependent and therefore in need of alimony. 
II. PROPERTY DISPOSITION AND LITIGATION EXPENSES 
When a couple has real or personal property to divide at the 
time of divorce and cannot agree on how that is to occur, the court 
may intervene to ensure equitable division by making a monetary 
award.293 Before a monetary award can be determined, the assets 
which qualify as marital property that is subject to an award must 
be identified and valued. This can be a difficult undertaking, because 
not everything each member of the couple has an ownership interest 
in may be marital property, and, furthermore, not all assets have an 
obvious value. Often, the assistance of experts is required. 
Because the wife is often the economically dependent spouse in 
the marriage, she is likely to find it more difficult to afford the 
expenses of legal and other expert assistance in a conflict over marital 
290. Bell Study, supra note 240, at 289; Baltimore County Hearing, supra note 12 
(testimony of Sheila P. Litzky, Coordinator, Baltimore County Family Violence 
Intervention Project). While there is little evidence on the subject, it is possible 
that the "adultery" disqualification may not operate against men seeking 
alimony. While the Committee did not hear from any men seeking (or paying) 
alimony, a woman who was ordered to pay alimony pendente lite to her former 
husband brought her situation to the Committee's attention. The master found 
that her husband was living with a woman, but his report contained no mention 
of adultery. Letter from Nyal D. Conger to Deborah A. Unitus, Staff Director 
for Gender Discrimination Study (Oct. 6, 1987) (on file with Committee). 
While the case suggests that different standards may be applied to men and 
women, it is not directly comparable with the Montgomery County study 
because the alimony award was pendente lite only, and the Montgomery County 
study addressed final divorce decree awards exclusively. 
291. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § ll-106(b)(6) (1991). 
292. [d. at § ll-106(b). 
293. [d. at §§ 8-201 to 8-213. 
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property and a monetary award. Furthermore, in the case of an 
economically dependent spouse, the assets are more likely to be in 
her husband's hands or under his control. To determine whether 
economically dependent wives are disadvantaged in the ways marital 
property disputes are managed by the courts, the Committee asked 
judges and lawyers whether "[c]ourts award counsel and expert fees 
to the economically dependent spouse sufficient to allow that spouse 
to effectively pursue the litigation. "294 Ofthose expressing an opinion, 
790/0 of female lawyers with a domestic relations specialty gave a 
negative response (rarely or never).29S They were joined by 45% of 
their male colleagues. 296 Judges, however, seem to believe that ade-
quate fees are awarded: 93% said that fee awards are always, often, 
or sometimes sufficient. 297 
A second area of disadvantage may appear if the husband has 
control of the property and disposes of it before the marital property 
dispute is decided. The Committee asked whether "[e]ffective in-
junctive relief is granted where necessary to maintain the status quo 
until monetary awards are made. "298 Of those expressing an opinion, 
63% of female attorneys with a domestic relations specialty gave a 
negative response, along with 33% of their male colleagues. Judges 
again did not agree: 34% believe that effective injunctive relief is 
always granted, and 54% believe it is often or sometimes granted. 299 
Almost all judges (90%) also believe they impose meaningful sanc-
tions if an injunction is violated. 3°O Only 27% of female domestic 
relations practitioners and 45% of male domestic relations practi-
tioners agree. 301 
294. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 14 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires). The court may order that fees and costs be paid by either 
party, depending on their financial resources and needs and on the justifiability 
of the Party's position in the proceeding. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § ll-
llO (1991). See Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. 487, S37-39, 497 A.2d 
48S, SIO-ll, cert. denied, 30S Md. 107, SOl A.2d 84S (198S) (award of fees 
and costs is within sound discretion of trial court). 
29S. For survey results of question 14, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (female domestic relations attorneys: rarely-6007o, never-19OJo). 
296. Id. (male domestic relations attorneys: rarely-37%, never-8%). 
297. Id. (always-32070, often-30%, sometimes-3 I 070). 
298. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question IS of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires). 
299. For survey results of question IS, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (female domestic relations attorneys: rarely-480Jo, never-IS%; 
male domestic relations attorneys: rarely-28 % , never-SOlo; judges: often-28%, 
sometimes-26% ). 
300. For survey results of question 16, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (always-27070, often-38%, sometimes-2S07o). 
301. Id. (female domestic relations attorneys: always-2070, often-8070, sometimes-
l7%; male domestic relations attorneys: always-2070, often-14070, sometimes-
29%). 
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Procedural problems such as fees for experts and injunctions 
against the dissipation of property can make it impossible for an 
economically dependent spouse to obtain the equitable division of 
marital property for which the law provides through the monetary 
award. Lawyers with specialized experience in domestic relations 
practice reported to the Committee that these problems can be so 
difficult that economically dependent spouses sometimes cannot make 
their case.302 Permitting these procedural problems to undermine the 
statutory scheme is not what the legislature intended, and it is not a 
fair outcome for the parties involved. 
FINDINGS 
1. Inconsistency in alimony awards results in unpredictable and 
unfair awards. 
2. Many alimony awards are too low. 
3. Indefinite alimony often is inappropriately denied to homemaker 
wives after long marriages. 
4. Alimony may be denied improperly in cases involving mothers 
of young children, women with relatively small incomes, and women 
found to blame for causing the marriage to end. 
RECOMMENDA TIONS 
For Court Administration, the Judiciary and Masters 
1. Ensure speedier awards of alimony pendente lite. 
2. Adopt guidelines for judges and masters in awarding alimony 
and support that are area-specific and include limitations on the 
overuse of rehabilitative alimony. 
3. Provide education on the issue of the impact of marital miscon-
duct on the alimony award. 
4. Provide education on issues concerning wage-earning potential 
of middle-aged women who have been economically dependent during 
a long marriage. 
5. Take necessary steps to ensure that judges and masters are 
familiar with the statutory provisions governing, and with materials 
relating to the social and economic considerations relevant to mon-
etary awards and the award of expenses. These materials include 
studies, statistics, and scholarly commentary on the economic con-
302. Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-88, 1-89 (testimony of 
Roger Perkins, Esquire); Montgomery County Hearing, supra note II, at 120, 
121 (testimony of Hon. Rita Rosenkrantz); id. at 8 (testimony of Sylvia Becker, 
Esquire); Baltimore County Hearing, supra note 12, at 36-38 (testimony of 
Louise Hirschy). 
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sequences of divorce, women's employment opportunities and pay 
potential, and the costs of child rearing. 
6. Include, where appropriate, masters in the educational segment 
of the new judges' orientation program. 
7. Evaluate judges and masters on a regular basis, taking into 
account gender neutrality on issues relating to alimony and property 
disposition. 
For the Legislature 
Enact legislation that: 
1. Makes the homemaker's lifetime reduced earning capacity an 
express factor to be considered in connection with alimony. 
2. Provides that a spouse's indirect contribution to the appreciation 
of nonmarital property (e.g., for maintenance of family or through 
homemaker's services) causes that property, to the extent of appre-
ciation, to become marital property. 
3. Requires the court to assume a more effective role in the iden-
tification and valuation of marital property through appointment of 
special masters or through required compensation of necessary experts 
from marital assets. 
4. Clarifies that the standard of living of the parties during the 
marriage is the standard by which the adequacy of the alimony award 
should be judged and, if a reduction in living standard is required, 
it should be equally shared by both parties. 
5. Provides for mandatory pendente lite awards of counsel fees and 
costs of experts and investigators appropriate to the duration and 
complexity of the case and sufficient to enable both parties to pursue 
litigation. 
6. Establishes a standard that pendente lite alimony and child 
support should maintain the status quo of the parties to the extent 
feasible. 
7. Clarifies that indefinite alimony is mandatory in appropriate 
circumstances. 
8. Makes alimony retroactive to the date of the motion unless that 
would be unconscionable. 
For Bar Associations (including State, Local, and Specialty Bar 
Associations) 
1. Develop informational materials through family law sections 
about the social and economic considerations relevant to alimony 
and equitable distribution and litigation expense awards. These ma-
terials should include studies, statistics, and scholarly commentary 
on the economic consequences of divorce, women's employment 
opportunities and pay potential, and the costs of child rearing. These 
materials should be made available to lawyers for use in submissions 
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to courts considering petitions for alimony, property disposition and 
litigation expense awards. 
2. On a cost of materials basis, invite judges and masters to join 
in continuing legal education programs concerning property disposi-
tion. 
CHAPTER 5: COURT TREATMENT OF PERSONNEL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts (the 
Committee) mandate also directed that it investigate what effect, if 
any, gender bias has upon the employees of the Maryland court 
system. In an effort to ascertain the attitudes, perceptions, and actual 
experiences of court employees, the Committee sought data from a 
variety of sources. Court employees had the opportunity to testify 
at each of the seven public hearings conducted by the Committee 
throughout the state in the Fall of 1987. In addition, information 
concerning the salary classifications of state court employees was 
provided by George E. Lyons, Jr. of the State Department of 
Personnel and information concerning state leave policies was pro-
vided by Ernest F. Bailey, Jr., of the Administrative Office of the 
Courts.303 A confidential survey questionnaire was also sent to 2411 
employees of the Maryland court system. 
The survey questions fell into two primary categories: descrip-
tions of the employees' own experiences, and employees' perceptions 
of the employment experiences of others. Some of the substantive 
areas addressed by the survey included: job responsibilities; job 
satisfaction; job training; opportunities for advancement within the 
court system; leave policies; and the employees' perceptions of how 
employees, witnesses, litigants, and attorneys are treated with regard 
to courtroom interaction and credibility. The survey also sought to 
elicit information regarding incidents of verbal or physical sexual 
harassment as well as general demographic information. Most of the 
questions either asked for a simple affirmative or negative response 
or allowed the employee to choose among six alternative responses: 
"always," "often," "sometimes," "rarely," "never," and "don't 
303. The information provided by Mr. Bailey pertains chiefly to employees of the 
Administrative Office of the Courts and related units. Somewhat different rules 
may apply to employees of the district court and to the clerks of the circuit 
courts. Still other rules govern county employees of the circuit courts. 
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know."304 Some of the questions also provided the employees with 
an opportunity to supply open-ended responses. 
Completed questionnaires were returned by 1187 employees, or 
49% of those surveyed. Responses to the demographic questions 
indicate that 84070 of the male and 97% of the female employees 
who responded work in full-time positions. 30s Almost three-quarters 
of the employees who responded are female (74%),306 and 19% of 
the respondents stated that they are members of a racial minority 
group.307 Approximately three-quarters of the male employees (72%) 
and one-half of the female employees (44%) had some education 
beyond the high school levep08 and four-fifths had some work 
experience309 before becoming employees of the court system. Sixteen 
percent of the employees said that their job duties required that they 
be in the courtroom more than half the time.310 The responses to 
questions concerning length of employment, educational levels, prior 
job experience, salary, and leave come from only those employees 
who work full-time. The percentages indicated for the remaining 
questions reflect the responses from all of the employees who returned 
the questionnaire. 311 
II. ECONOMICS 
Examination of the relevant economic positions of male and 
female employees suggests that female employees suffer three forms 
of economic discrimination:312 (1) female employees are paid less 
304. In order to clarify the significance of the data and to simplify its reporting in 
this chapter, affirmative responses to the first three categories ("always," 
"often," and "sometimes") are added together to reflect the percentages 
indicated. For the full tables, see infra exhibit E-3. 
305. For survey suits of question 58A of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
306. For survey results of question 56 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
307. For survey results of question 57 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3 (males: black-15%, other-2O/o; females: black-2070). 
308. For survey results of question 22 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3 (males: some college-3 I 070, college graduate-24070, post-graduate 
work-17070; females: some college-29 070 , college graduate-II07o, post-graduate 
work-4070). 
309. For survey results of question 21 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3 (female: 83070; male: 87070). 
310. See generally infra Sections III and IV. 
311. Not all employees answered every question. Accordingly, the percentages in-
dicated do not reflect the whole population but rather the subgroup of 
employees who responded to each individual question. 
312. The Committee recognizes that the limited scope of the questionnaire prevents 
full analysis of these issues and it acknowledges that a more detailed inquiry 
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overall, despite having backgrounds similar to those of male em-
ployees; (2) female employees are not promoted in proportion to 
their numbers; and (3) certain low-paying job classifications within 
the court system are categorized as "female jobs." Examples of each 
form of discrimination are set out below. 
Despite the fact that female employees outnumber male employ-
ees six to one in the circuit courts and three to one in the district 
court, the average income for female employees in the district court 
is $4282 less than that of male employees. 313 One employee who 
testified at a public hearing summed up the bleak picture afforded 
female employees by stating that "women in the state courts and 
local courts are locked into salary ghettos. "314 Examination of the 
salaries of the survey respondents confirms the existence of "salary 
ghettoizing." Over one-half (640/0) of the female employees are 
congregated in the $10,000 to $19,999 salary range, compared with 
only one-third (350/0) of the male employees.31S This fact, when 
contrasted with the fact that the over $40,000 salary range is occupied 
by 8% of the males as compared with less than 1 % of the females,316 
demonstrates that the majority of female employees occupy the lowest 
end of the salary scale. This is true despite the similar backgrounds 
of the two groups. Eighty-seven percent of the male employees 
reported having prior work experience before being hired by the 
courts compared with 83% of the female employees.3\7 Forty-four 
percent of the female employees and 72% of the male employees 
reported that they had some college education or had graduated from 
college (including post-graduate work) prior to being hired by the 
courts.318 Sixty-seven percent of the female employees and 59% of 
the male employees reported having been employed by the court 
system for between one and ten years.3\9 
is required. A similar conclusion was reached in the State of Maryland 
Comparable Worth Study released in February 1986. A discussion of the study 
results and of the topic of comparable worth is contained in Comment, 
Comparative Worth and the Maryland ERA, 47 MD. L. REV. 1129 (1988) 
(authored by Awilda R. Marquez). 
313. No corresponding data was available for the circuit courts. 
314. Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-4 (testimony of Ellen 
Marshall). 
315. For survey results of question 25 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
316. [d. (males: $40,000-$44,999-4070, $45,000-$49,999-3%, $55,OOO-$59,999-less than 
1%, $60,000 or more-I%; females: $40,OOO-$44,999-less than 1%). 
317. For survey results of question 21 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
318. For survey results of question 22 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
319. For survey results of question 19 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
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Salary differentials such as these also indicate that female em-
ployees remain in lower salaried positions for longer periods of time 
than male employees; that is, only male employees survived the 
"thinning of the ranks." For example, 37 male and 106 female 
employees statewide are classified Circuit Court Specialist II (job 
#7668) and earn between $15,958 and $20,902. Yet, seven grades 
higher at the Deputy Clerk V level (job #7675), there are ten male 
employees and only three females each earning between $26,763 and 
$35,153. Additionally, although 98070 of the female employees and 
90% of the male employees reported that their salary when hired 
was less than $20,000,320comparison of current salary levels demon-
strates that almost 30% more female than male employees reported 
currently earning less than $20,000 (66% females; 37% males).321 By 
contrast, 11070 more male employees reported currently earning $30,000 . 
or more (4% females; 15% males).322 
One employee suggested that the reason female employees' sal-
aries are low is that "historically, women occupied positions which 
are paid on a lower scale than those positions occupied by men. "323 
This phenomenon would seem to remain true today. Female employ-
ees' lack of advancement and overrepresentation in the lowest salary 
brackets are indicative of a philosophy that entry level, low-paying, 
nonmanagerial positions are "female positions." 
The inequalities of the compensation structure do not go un-
noticed by employees: 13% of the female employees felt that male 
employees were paid more for performing the same duties. 324 One 
female employee asserted that "two male-occupied positions [with 
the same job title as hers] are reimbursed at higher grade levels. "32S 
Other open-ended responses showed that the perceptions concerning 
differing treatment are not limited to salary alone. One employee 
commented, "Women are supposed to be meek and follow orders 
without questioning or suggesting other methods. If a woman is 
assertive, in my opinion, she will be denied advancement. "326 
320. For survey results of question 24 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3 (females: $1,000-$5,000-9%, $5,000-$10,000-45070, $10,000-$19,999-
44%; males: $1,000-$5,000-11%, $5,000-$10,000-39%, $10,000-$19,999-40%). 
321. For survey results of Question 25 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3 (females: $5,000-$10,000-2%, $10,000-$19,999-64%; males: $5,000-
$10,000-2%, $10,000-$19,999-35%). 
322. Id. (females: $30,000-$34,999-2%, $35,000-$39,999-2%, $40,000 or more-less 
than 1 %; males: $30,000-$34,999-6%, $35,000-$39,999-1 %, $40,000-$44,999-
4%, $45,000-$49,999-3%, $55,000-$59,999-1ess than 1%, $60,000 or more-I%). 
323. Survey Respondent. 
324. For survey results of question 43 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
325. Survey Respondent. 
326. Survey Respondent. 
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The impact of the lower salaries earned by female employees is 
perhaps felt hardest by those women who head the family house-
hold.327 Not only does a more limited income make paying for quality 
child care more difficult,328 a single parent generally cannot use his 
or her limited income to buy services which would save time and 
allow the purchase of services. For the employed single parent, a 
child's periodic minor illnesses can turn an already difficult life into 
a nightmare, causing loss of pay and possibly the loss of a job, 
depending on the availability of leave.329 In order to improve the 
quality of life for these women, it is imperative that they be paid 
the same salaries as male employees and that they be provided the 
same opportunities for advancement. 
Although it is impossible, based upon the data collected, to link 
phenomena such as "salary ghettoing," "female jobs," and the 
failure of female employees to survive the "thinning of the ranks" 
to one causal factor, it does appear that when knowledge, skill, and 
ability are equal, salaries often are not. The Maryland court system 
should be concerned that despite similar educational and employment 
backgrounds, proportionately more male employees occupy higher 
salaried positions than female employees. In addition, the employees' 
perception that persons of the opposite gender are not paid equally 
for performing the same tasks has a deleterious effect upon moti-
vation, morale, and productivity. 
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
The most significant data concerning the existence of gender bias 
in the Maryland court system came from the employees' answers to 
survey questions concerning sexual harassment. In Meritor Savings 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson33o the United States Supreme Court categorized 
the types of conduct which are considered sexual harassment under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964331 in the following manner: 
327. One employee commented that "[mlen are considered head of household where 
single women are not." Nonetheless, in 1984, 23070 of families with children 
were maintained by women who did not have husbands living with them. B. 
BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 229 (1986). The 1980 Census 
identified 176,770 such families in Maryland. 
328. See infra note 418 and accompanying text. 
329. See infra notes 404-08 and accompanying text. 
330. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
331. Pub. L. No. 88-352, title VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended 
at 12 U.S.C. § 2000c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986». Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. 2000c-2(a)(I) (1982). The 
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(1) quid pro quo harassment where unwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of 
a sexual nature are directly linked to the grant or denial of economic 
benefits; and (2) non-quid pro quo, or "hostile environment," ha-
rassment, which has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering 
with an individual's work performance or the creation of an intim-
idating or offensive working environment. 332 
A. Quid Pro Quo Harassment 
When asked whether they knew of coworkers who experienced 
sexual advances in exchange for employment security, 490/0 of the 
female and 33% of the male employees who responded to the question 
answered yes. 333 Eight percent of the female and seven percent of 
the male employees reported that they had experienced this form of 
sexual harassment themselves: twenty-seven employees said they were 
harassed by coworkers; twenty said they were harassed by supervisors; 
eighteen said they were harassed by attorneys; and sixteen said the 
harassment came from judges.334 One employee, who felt that she 
had been denied a promotion because of gender, replied: 
At the time I was refused a promotion, I had filed sexual 
harassment charges against my supervisor. I eventually 
dropped the charges because my supervisor attempted or 
gestured at suicide. My supervisor continued to treat me 
with disregard .... I am still not treated the same as my 
male counterpart, i.e., all daylight opportunities to work 
are given to a male-lam given nighttime shifts only. 
Recently I requested two different times for vacation leave 
and was refused. 335 
individuals whose conduct is governed by Title VII include judges, supervisors, 
and coworkers. State law also provides protection from discriminatory practices. 
See, e.g., MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. ART. 46; MD. ANN. CODE ART. 49B, § 
7 (1986); Exec. Order, COMAR 01.01.1987.20, reprinted in 14:19 Md. Reg. 
2054 (1987) (establishing a Code of Fair Practices for State Employment) (as 
amended by COMAR 01.01.1988.05, reprinted in 15:7 Md. Reg. 825 (1988». 
332. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Forrester v. 
White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), also has implications in the area of redress for 
sexual harassment. In Forrester, the Court held that judges do not enjoy 
absolute immunity for administrative, legislative, or executive functions. Id. at 
224-30. Accordingly, employees who are sexually harassed by judges may now 
seek redress. 
333. For survey results of question 13 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
334. Id. 
335. Survey Respondent. 
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Approximately a third of the employees (32070) reported that they 
knew of other court employees who received unwelcome requests for 
sexual activity from either judges, attorneys, coworkers, supervisors, 
or the public.336 One employee perceived that a coworker was not 
promoted because "[s]he wasn't sleeping with the top boss. "337 
B. Hostile Work Environment Harassment 
Employees also reported experiencing non-quid pro quo, or 
"hostile work environment," harassment. A number of employees 
reported that they themselves had experienced unwelcome requests 
for sexual activity from judges,338 supervisors,339 and coworkers. 34O 
Over a quarter of the employees said that they knew of a coworker 
who had experienced unwelcome physical touching of a sexual nature 
from some source;341 approximately a tenth reported that they had 
experienced this behavior personally. 342 Victims of harassment said it 
came from judges (12% females, 5% males), supervisors (8% females, 
5% males), attorneys (11 % females, 8% males) and coworkers (18% 
females, 16% males).343 Of the subset of employees who spend more 
than half of their time in the courtroom,344 22% of the females and 
8% of the males said that female employees were subjected to 
unwelcome verbal or physical sexual advances from judges,34S and 
35% of the females and 20% of the males said that the advances 
came from coworkers. 346 More than a quarter of courtroom employees 
also reported that they had experienced harassing verbal behavior 
336. For survey results of question 14 of the Court Employees' Questionnaire, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (judges: male-29ClJo, female-39ClJo; attorneys: male-25ClJo, female-
32ClJo; coworkers: male-35ClJo, female-4IClJo; supervisors: male-32ClJo, female-33C1Jo; 
public: male-29ClJo, female-32ClJo). 
337. Survey Respondent. 
338. For survey results of question 14 of the Court Employees' Questionnaire, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (females-8ClJo, males-6ClJo). 
339. [d. (females-6ClJo, males-SClJo). 
340. [d. (females-15ClJo, males-llCIJo). 
341. For survey results of question IS of the Court Employees' Questionnaire, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (from judges: females-36ClJo, males-22ClJo; from attorneys: 
females-27ClJo, males-24ClJo; from coworkers: females-40CIJo, males-32ClJo; from 




344. See supra note 310. 
345. For survey results of question 8 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3 (females: always-I ClJo, often-3ClJo, sometimes-18ClJo; males: always-less 
than I ClJo, often-less than I ClJo, sometimes-8ClJo). 
346. [d. (females: always-2ClJo, often-6ClJo, sometimes-27ClJo; males: always-I ClJo, of ten-
4ClJo, sometimes-I 5 ClJo). 
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such as sexist jokes or comments.347 One female employee stated: 
I attended one of my first ... meeting[s], ready to work 
on problems and real issues, instead I was told there would 
be a luncheon for a clerk who was retiring. The entertain-
ment [was] ... a belly dancer. When I voiced my objections 
I was informed that if I was offended, I could of course 
leave.348 
83 
Conduct such as this is representative of hostile work environment 
harassment. As the Court pointed out in Meritor: 
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive en-
vironment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary 
barrier to sexual equality at the work place that racial 
harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that 
a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return 
for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living 
can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of 
racial epithets. 349 
C. Impact of Sexual Harassment 
There is compelling evidence that Maryland court system em-
ployees are subject to sexual harassment: 96 court employees reported 
experiencing unwelcome requests for sexual activity;350 81 employees 
reported experiencing sexual advances made in exchange for employ-
ment security/job opportunities;351 126 employees reported experienc-
ing physical touching of a sexual nature;352 and 869 employees reported 
experiencing harassing verbal behavior such as sexist jokes or com-
ments.353 
Although the total psychological impact upon the victim of 
sexual harassment is unknown, it is not unusual for female employees 
347. For survey results of question 16 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3 (from judges: females-25OJo, males-21 %; from attorneys: females-
32%, males-28; from coworkers: females-45%, males-44%; from supervisors: 
females-26%, males-25%; from the public: females-34%, males-33%). 
348. Survey Respondent. 
349. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson 
v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (lIth Cir. 1982». 
350. For survey results of question 14 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
351. For survey results of question 13 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
352. For survey results of question 15 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
353. For survey results of question 16 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
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who are subjected to this type of treatment to suffer from a dimin-
ished sense of self-esteem. One employee described her experience: 
The circuit court is very discriminating against female em-
ployees. I have had sexual harassment from my assistant 
supervisor, and when I reported it nothing was done to him 
or about the situation. I told my supervisor not to place 
me and my assistant supervisor together because I think he 
likes me. My supervisor laughed and the next day he stuck 
me and the assistant supervisor down in the basement to 
work. That was when he grabbed me and tried to kiss me. 
This is the worst part of the State of Maryland. 3s4 
A female employee's commitment to her job may also be ad-
versely affected if she perceives herself as being treated as a sexual 
object rather than as a professional. The message being sent to 
female employees who are subjected to sexually oriented verbal or 
physical acts as a condition of their employment is a chilling one; 
they are being singled out for disparate and discriminatory treatment 
solely because of their gender. The day-to-day effect of this enforced 
inequality is the creation of a hostile work environment which affects 
workplace productivity and morale as well as the psychological well-
being of the employees, both male and female. 
On a more basic level, it must be understood that treating 
employees differently simply on the basis of their gender is inappro-
priate. A system which focuses on gender rather than performance 
is not only inefficient and disruptive, it is illegal. By fostering, 
condoning, or, at a minimum, failing to discourage sexual harass-
ment, the Maryland court system has permitted a work environment 
to exist in which female employees are constantly reminded of their 
different and subordinate status. 
IV. WORK ENVIRONMENT, JOB TRAINING, AND 
ADVANCEMENT 
In the Court Interactions section of the survey, the employees 
were asked whether female employee~ are referred to or are treated 
differently from male employees. Of the subset of employees who 
spend more than half of their time in the courtroom,3SS 640/0 of 
females and 32% of males said that their coworkers made comments 
about the personal appearance of female employees when no such 
comments were made about males.3S6 Almost half (48%) of female 
354. Survey Respondent. 
355. See supra note 30S. 
356. For survey results of question 4 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3 (females: always-SOfo, often-23Ofo, sometimes-33Ofo; males: always-
lOfo, often-5Ofo, sometimes-26Ofo). 
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employees reported similar behavior by judges357 or attorneys.3S8 A 
similar percentage of female employees also reported that coworkers 
(49%),m attorneys (50070),360 and judges (43%)361 address women 
employees by first names or terms of endearment when men are 
addressed formally.362 One female employee responded that "[a]lthough 
I haven't experienced or observed sexist behavior in the form of 
physical or verbal sexual behavior, the women in the office are 
always referred to by the clerk, the judges, judge's secretaries, and 
the women themselves as 'girls."'363 
Overgeneralizations such as these reinforce the impression that 
employment decisions are based upon a person's gender rather than 
upon her or his individual capabilities and performance. Regardless 
of whether the discriminatory treatment is directed at male or female 
employees, the end result is that both groups suffer. Disparate 
treatment on the basis of gender demeans the employees and may 
affect the extent to which they feel employment opportunities are 
available to them. 
In response to questions concerning credibility, a higher per-
centage of female employees felt that their opinions were given 
different weight or importance than those of persons of the opposite 
sex (25% females, 16% males).364 In response to an open-ended 
question, a female employee stated: 
The job that I have rarely draws any male interest to apply 
for any positions. Therefore, the office is virtually all female 
with the exception of the judges and deputies. When a 
male's input is made into a certain duty or situation, there 
is a tendency for their opinion (at times) to carry more 
weight. 
More female employees also felt that there were job duties they 
were not allowed to perform because of their gender (14% females, 
6% males).365 As one stated: "Simply put, I believe men are asked 
357. Id. (always-6OJo, often-l3OJo, sometimes-29%). 
358. Id. (always-5070, often-14%, sometimes-29%). 
359. For survey results of question 2 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3 (always-9%, often-18%, sometimes-22%). 
360. Id. (always-5Olo, often-18%, sometimes-27%). 
361. Id. (always-7%, often-15%, sometimes-21%). 
362. Id. Many male employees agreed about the conduct of coworkers (30%) 
(always-3%, often-7%, sometimes-20%); attorneys (27%) (always-007o, of ten-
7%, sometimes-20%); and judges (23%) (always-O%, often-4%, sometimes-
19%). 
363. Survey Respondent. 
364. For survey results of question 29 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
365. For survey results of question 31 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
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to do harder tasks sometimes. >t366 A few employees also felt that 
their duties were reduced because of their gender (51170 females, 1 % 
males).367 One female employee commented that she felt that "women 
must excel to be considered average." Another simply said: "My 
duties are decreased only in that I am not requested to perform 
physical tasks (carrying briefcases) and if we travel together I am 
expected to sit in the back seat of the car." 
More female employees also perceived that their job opportu-
nities were limited because of their gender (26% females, 14% 
males):368 "When areas other than 'clerical' have opened-they have 
been given to males. "369 "I was told a man would be better-have 
more authority.' '370 Similarly, a slightly higher percentage of females 
also thought that members of one gender received preferential ap-
pointments to supervisory positions (29% females, 21 % males).371 
Some comments include: 
There are many men in administrative positions who get 
reclassified when they reach the top of a pay grade, whereas 
women (professional and clerical) reach the top of a grade 
and stay there.372 
Clerks of court offices are notorious for keeping women 
in assistant positions, working for men who assign them all 
of the work. I cite Baltimore City, Baltimore County, Anne 
Arundel County, P.O. County and Carroll County as offices 
I know firsthand this happens. In my immediate office most 
women are either clerical or mid-level professionals. Only 
female attorneys enter the higher level positions.373 
[I] was told the court commissioner would not· be a 
woman. 374 
My former supervisor had her title taken away because 
keeping it would have meant giving her a two grade pay 
raise.37S 
366. Survey Respondent. 
367. For survey results of question 27 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
368. For survey results of question 35 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
369. Survey Respondent. 
370. Survey Respondent. 
371. For survey results of question 38 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
372. Survey Respondent. 
373. Survey Respondent. 
374. Survey Respondent. 
375. Survey Respondent. 
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The complaints regarding preferential treatment on the basis of 
gender are not limited to its effect upon female employees. Comments 
from male employees included: 
A female administrative clerk in a suburban Washington 
[court] made it clear that she enjoyed not having men 
working in that court and said she intended to keep it that 
way. This comment was made during the interview of a 
prospective applicant for a position in that court. 376 
Court supervisory positions always go to women in our 
district (only one male), and sometimes it appears without 
proper procedures being followed. 377 
More male employees (170/0 females, 28% males) also felt that 
they were asked to perform duties that would not be asked of persons 
of the opposite gender378 and that their duties had been increased 
because of their gender (13% females, 18% males):379 
1 am a male and because of that 1 always have to retrieve 
heavier or higher up boxes even though there are ladders. 380 
The tough jobs, indelicate matters are usually given to 
the guys. [I] am told that if 1 can't handle the job they will 
, find a real man to do it. Asked to repair things, move 
equipment, etc. and am harassed if 1 don't. 381 
Females with less experience and length of service with 
the state have been given promotions and salary increases 
over myself. 1 have been asked to do everything from move 
furniture to sweep floors while female employees are "ex-
empt" and I'm asked to assist them in various areas while 
they are not required to do so for me. 382 
Female employees also identified areas where they felt they were 
singled out to perform certain tasks solely on the basis of their 
gender. Their open-ended survey responses included the following: 
[I] have had to do typing and errand running when male 
employees are never requested to do these same jobs despite 
the fact that they do extensive typing in their normal jobs. 
376. Survey Respondent. 
377. Survey Respondent. 
378. For survey results of question 30 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
379. For survey results of question 28 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
380. Survey Respondent. 
381. Survey Respondent. 
382. Survey Respondent. 
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They are also not expected to help clean the common kitchen 
or lounge areas. 383 
I am asked to perform personal and/or social duties 
because of my sex by my supervisors because many of them 
still feel that women are below men and should do these 
things as opposed to men.384 
I have been asked to repair the judge's robe. On another 
occasion, I have been asked to sew buttons on the judge's 
robe. 385 
It is also important to note that in addition to the perceptions 
concerning on-the-job treatment, both male and female employees 
perceive gender-based disparity with regard to job training and job 
advancement opportunities. Although the same percentage of male 
and female employees felt that they were denied a promotion because 
of their gender (6070),386 more females than males (13% females, 11 % 
males) felt that someone else was denied a promotion because of 
gender. 387 An illustrative comment is: "A woman that worked here 
for quite a while put in for assistant supervisor, a job that she was 
well qualified for and a young man got the position who was not as 
qualified. "388 
Disparate treatment was also reported with regard to job train-
ing. Seventeen percent more males thought they were permitted to 
attend job training programs (57070 females, 74070 males),389 and this 
perception was born out by reality: a higher percentage of males 
reported actually attending job training programs than females (36070 
females, 51070 males).390 One female employee explained why she had 
not attended any job training by stating: 
[The] [o]pportunity [is] not given to the best of my knowl-
edge. Many times the programs are all in Baltimore. If they 
are offered at all. Last time registration fees were not 
reimbursed and $25 is· a lot around the beginning of the 
383. Survey Respondent. 
384. Survey Respondent. 
385. Survey Respondent. 
386. For survey results of question 44 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E·3. 
387. For survey results of question 46 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. No data are available regarding the gender of the persons thought 
by court employees to have been denied a promotion. 
388. Survey Respondent. 
389. For survey results of question 34 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
390. For survey results of question 41 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
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school year with three children. Promotions are few so why 
bother wasting your time going?391 
89 
A higher percentage of male employees reported being reimbursed 
for registration fees (82070 females, 89% males)392 and mileage ex-
penses (83% females, 91 % males)393 than female employees. A higher 
percentage of female employees, however, reported being given ad-
ministrative leave to attend job training programs (93% females, 
87% males).394 
It is evident from the answers to these questions that both male 
and female employees of the Maryland court system feel that gender-
based stereotypes are used as a substitute for individual employment 
decisions. Certain state employees who have complaints concerning 
working conditions, classification, discipline, and other matters may 
take advantage of the judicial branch grievance procedure. 395 Of the 
thirty-one female employees and twelve male employees who reported 
filing a complaint involving gender bias on the job within the past 
two years, however, 70% of the females and 85% of the males felt 
that the complaint was not resolved to their satisfaction.396 One 
employee described her experience: 
I filed an E.E.O.C. charge against my office after being 
denied a new classification. Job duties were lessened in 
retaliation. When I received my current promotion, my 
office decided not to replace me, leaving vacant a profes-
sional position. That has resulted in significant responsibil-
ities being shifted to me and my all female staff. 397 
She further explained: "My E.E.O.C. charge was based on the fact 
that a male was compensated at a grade 19. For comparable duties 
I performed at a grade 13. "398 
v . MATERNITY AND FAMILY LEAVE 
In order to determine whether gender influenced the grant of 
maternity and family leave, the survey asked the court employees 
391. Survey Respondent. 




395. The grievance procedure excludes the clerks and chief deputy clerks of the 
courts of appeal, the state court administrator, the deputy state court admin-
istrator and any individual employed by the Administrative Office of the Courts 
in pay grade 16 or higher. 
396. For survey results of question 40A of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see 
infra exhibit E-3. 
397. Survey Respondent. 
398. Survey Respondent. 
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whether they had requested or received leave to: (1) recover from 
the medical difficulties accompanying pregnancy and child birth;399 
(2) care for an infant or adopted child;400 or (3) care for an elderly 
relative.401 
The Committee also obtained a copy of the state employees 
personnel leave policy in order to determine the range of leave options 
available to state-employed court employees. 402 That policy provides 
the following options with regard to employee leave time: 
(1) Sick leave is earned at the rate of 15 working days a 
year and may be accumulated without limit and is available 
at any time. It may be used only for illness, injury or 
disability; for medical, dental, health care appointments; or 
because of death or illness in the immediate family of the 
employee. 
(2) Advanced sick leave is available on a pro rata basis 
at the rate of 15 days for each year of completed State 
service up to a maximum of 60 days advance sick leave per 
year. 
(3) Extended sick leave with pay is leave that is granted 
to an employee who sustains an illness or injury which 
causes the employee to be absent from work provided that 
the employee has been in the State service for at least ten 
years and has used all available sick, annual and personal 
leave. 
(4) Personal leave is acquired at a rate of 3 days per year 
and may be used only with advanced permission of the 
supervisor and/or unit director. 
(5) Annual leave is leave earned on a pro rata basis 
according to the amount of hours the employee works and 
the length of service. An employee may not earn more than 
25 working days of leave a year and a maximum of 45 
work days may be carried into a new calendar year. 
399. See infra exhibit E-2(c) (Question 48 of Court Employees' Questionnaire). 
400. See infra exhibit E-2(c) (Question 49 of Court Employees' Questionnaire). 
401. See infra exhibit E-2(c) (Question 51 of Court Employees' Questionnaire). The 
Baltimore City Commission for Women recently published a report about 
Baltimore City personnel policies on leave, alternative work arrangements, 
flexible benefit plans, and dependent day care provisions. BALTIMORE CITY 
COMM'N FOR WOMEN, DIVERSE NEEDS, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: FAMILy-ORIENTED 
PERSONNEL POLICIES FOR BALTIMORE CITY GOVERNMENT (1988). A similar study, 
if undertaken in the state and county judicial systems, would be an important 
first step in resolving some of the issues raised in this section of the Report. 
402. See supra note 303 and accompanying text. The state employees personnel 
leave policy does not apply to the county employees of the circuit courts. No 
information was obtained concerning individual county leave programs. 
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(6) Seasonal or family leave without pay is leave which 
is available to any employee who needs to take time off 
from work to care for a newly born or adopted child, a 
foster child placed with the employee, a seriously ill child 
of the employee, a seriously ill spouse, parent or legal 
dependent of the employee, or school age children under 
the age of 14 during periods of school vacation. All benefits 
including health care are suspended for the period of sea-
sonal or family leave provided, however, that the employee 
may continue such benefits as permitted by law by paying 
the full cost. Approval of seasonal or family leave is at the 
discretion of the State Court Administrator, but an employee 
who is granted such leave has a guaranteed right to rein-
statement in the position occupied upon approval. Seasonal 
or family leave may be granted to an employee for a total 
combined period of not more than 12 weeks within any 12 
month period of time. 403 
(7) Leave of absence without pay may be granted for a 
period not to exceed one year. For grants exceeding 30 days, 
the State Court Administrator may require an employee to 
waive reinstatement rights and privileges with regard to the 
position vacated. 
91 
Thus, based upon the structure of the state employees personnel 
leave policy, it would appear that the amount of leave time available 
for maternity would depend upon the amount of sick leave (either 
regular or advanced) available or the availability of accrued annual 
or personal leave. The state-offered options for unpaid maternity 
leave or either seasonal or family leave, which does carry a job 
guarantee, or leave of -absence without pay, which if taken for more 
than thirty days may require a waiver of a right to reinstatement. 404 
The restrictive nature of the state leave policy places severe 
limitations upon female employees with regard to the physical de-
mands of pregnancy and child birth. Eighteen percent of the female 
employees reported asking for maternity leave,4Os and of those em-
403. Paragraph (6) of the leave policy came into effect July 1, 1988, after the 
questionnaires were returned and the public hearings conducted. Thus, there 
are no data on which to assess how that policy affects current decisions about 
leave. 
404. One obvious option that is missing from the state leave policy is short-term 
paid leave with a job guarantee. This form of leave could be provided for 
employees who have completed a specified term of service and would allow 
them to recuperate from the physical disabilities of child birth while retaining 
job benefits, compensation, and their jobs. 
405. For survey results of question 48 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
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ployees, seven percent reported having their request for leave de-
nied. 406 Almost all of the full-time female employees who reported 
taking maternity leave took three months or less of leave.407 It is not 
known how many of the female employees would have taken more 
time off had it been available. It is reasonable to assume, however, 
that the decisions of many of the seventy-six employees408 who took 
less than one month of l~ave were in part due to the limited nature 
of leave available. 
In situations where the medical disabilities that accompany preg-
nancy and child birth were not implicated, a pattern of discrimination 
on the basis of gender was evident. Similar percentages of males and 
females (9"10 females, 10% males) reported requesting leave to care 
for an infant or adopted child,409 but leave was more often granted 
to the female than the male (96% females, 81 % males).410 In addition, 
while similar percentages of males and females requested leave to 
care for elderly relatives (8% females, 11 % males)41l or dependent 
children (7% females, 8% males),412 female employees were more 
likely to have their requests granted than their male counterparts 
(elderly leave: 90% females, 84% males) (child leave: 95% females, 
79% males).413 
This disparate treatment of male employees with regard to leave 
is a form of gender bias which denies males coequal status with 
females as parents and caregivers. The preferential treatment of 
female employees with regard to leave is, in effect, a dual-edged 
sword which manifests itself as gender bias against females as well. 
A leave policy that is more liberally applied to females reinforces 
the concept that females are the primary caregivers in society. By 
refusing males leave, while granting it to females, the court system 
is implicitly stating that it is a female's "job" to care for children 
406. Id. 
407. Id. Seven of the 76 employees who took leave took less than 1 month leave, 
62 took 1 to 3 months leave, and 7 took 3 months or more of leave. 
408. Id. 
409. For survey results of question 49 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
410. Id. 
411. For survey results of question 51 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
412. For survey results of question 50 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
413. For survey results of question 51 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. It is not clear how many of the employees requesting leave under 
the circumstances were state employees who qualified for the seasonal or family 
leave program. Thus, it would be inaccurate to state that the policy has been 
applied in a biased manner. What is disturbing, however, is that the percentages 
seem to indicate that discretionary decisions to grant these forms of leave may 
be made based upon the gender of the person requesting leave. 
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and other family members. This policy also sends the subtle message 
that females in the work place are expendable and to some extent 
interchangeable since they often take leave and are replaced by other 
female employees. Disparate leave policies also tend to reinforce the 
stereotype that females are less committed to their job than their 
male counterparts since the females are the ones who take leave to 
care for their children. 
VI. CHILD CARE 
The acute need for adequate care for children of working parents 
was recognized by both male and female employees, although the 
percentage of females requiring day care for children under age 
twelve was somewhat higher than that of males (230/0 females, 16% 
males}.414 Nonetheless, only 1 % of the employees (male and female) 
responded that day care is currently available where they work. 415 Of 
those employees who indicated that they needed day care for children 
under twelve years of age, almost half of the female employees (46%) 
said that they would use day care at work if it were available.416 
The absence of adequate child care has a disproportionate effect 
upon female employees because they comprise 74% of the work 
force. 417 Further compounding the problem is the fact that 66% of 
the female employees earn $20,000 or less while 87% earn $25,000 
or less.418 
In addition, the increasing emergence of female-headed house-
holds means that many of these women are trying to support families 
on their incomes alone. Accordingly, it is hard to imagine how court 
employees can afford to pay for child care in order to work. 
FINDINGS 
1. A majority of female employees occupy the lowest end of the 
salary scale. 
2. Female employees remain in lower-salaried positions for longer 
periods of time than male employees. 
3. Proportionately more male employees occupy higher salaried 
positions than female employees. 
414. For survey results of question 52 of Court Employee's Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
415. For survey results of question 53 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
416. /d. 
417. For survey results of question 56 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
418. For survey results of question 25 of Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
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4. Employees of the Maryfand court system reported the following 
types of quid pro quo harassment from judges, supervisors, attorneys, 
co-workers, and the public: 
(a) unwelcome requests for sexual activity; and 
(b) sexual favors in exchange for employment security. 
5. Incidents of hostile work environment harassment were reported, 
such as: 
(a) unwelcome physical touching of a sexual nature; 
(b) unwelcome verbal or physical sexual advances; and 
(c) sexist remarks or jokes. 
6. Many court employees perceive that employment decisions are 
based upon gender-based stereotypes and that preferential treatment 
is accorded based upon gender. 
7. A higher percentage of male employees felt that they were 
permitted to attend job training, and more males than females 
reported actually attending job training programs. 
8. Male employees who attended job training were more often 
reimbursed for registration fees and mileage than female employees. 
9. The state leave policy is restrictive in that it does not provide 
employees paid leave and a job guarantee when they experience short-
term disabilities such as pregnancy. 
to. Male employees are more often denied paid family (nonmedi-
cally related) leave than female employees. 
11. A need exists for on-the-job and/or partially subsidized child 
care for working parents in the court system. 
RECOMMENDA TIONS 
For Court Administration and the Judiciary 
1. Implement the broadest possible recruitment effects for all po-
sitions on a continuing basis. 
2. Monitor the hiring of nonclassified personnel (i.e., those not 
selected from eligibility lists established by the Secretary of Personnel) 
to determine if women are part of the eligibility pool. 
3. Review qualification requirements and salary grades of all non-
judicial titled State and county employees in the judicial system. 
4. Review all job descriptions of nonjudicial titled State and county 
employees of the judiciary and establish that personal services and 
errands for supervisors are excluded from those job descriptions. 
5. Provide gender-neutral job descriptions and enforce job require-
ments without regard to gender. 
6. Set goals to increase the number of qualified women appointed 
by the circuit bench to the positions of master, commissioner, ex-
aminer, and auditor in each county. 
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7. Increase appointments of qualified women to all positions within 
the court system including those in the Administrative Office of the 
Courts, Court of Appeals Clerk's Office, Court of Special Appeals 
Clerk's Office, other court units under the direction of the Chief 
Judge of the Court of Appeals, circuit court clerks' offices and those 
positions within the supervision of the circuit court's bench, the 
Office of the Chief Clerk of the District Court and the district court 
clerks' offices. 
8. Monitor training programs to ensure equal access to male and 
female employees and equal treatment with regard to reimbursement 
of fees and expenses. 
9. Develop a system for job-related training of masters, examiners, 
auditors, commissioners, administrators, professional staff, and cler-
ical and technical personnel. 
10. Allocate training money from state and local sources to imple-
ment recommendation 9. 
11. Propose an appropriate implementation group, under the direc-
tion of the State Court Administrator, to ensure the necessary ad-
ministrative and fiscal support for this education system. 
12. Issue a directive defining the various types of sexual harassment 
and stating that this type of behavior is illegal, unacceptable, and 
grounds for termination. 
13. Establish a system for confidential reporting and investigating 
incidents of sexual harassment and monitor the outcome of those 
complaints. 
14. Develop education programs for all judicial and court support 
personnel which address issues of gender bias and sexual harassment. 
Such programs should include training in gender bias, neutral hiring 
procedures, equitable enforcement of gender-neutral personnel poli-
cies, and the adoption of gender-neutral management practices in all 
courts and court-related units. 
15. Provide training to all judicial and court support personnel in 
avoiding gender-biased verbal and nonverbal communications. This 
training should encompass internal as well as external communica-
tions. 
16. Issue a local administrative order in each appellate, circuit, and 
district court to mandate equal treatment of all persons in the 
courtroom. 
17. Assure that grievance procedures are available to all employees. 
18. Implement a short-term program which would provide paid 
leave and a job guarantee for employees who are temporarily unable 
to work as a result of disabilities such as those which accompany 
pregnancy and child birth. 
19. Develop a family leave policy with a strong statement on its 
importance and implementation. Issue a directive stating that deci-
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sions concerning family leave are to be made without regard to the 
gender of the person requesting the leave. 
20. Establish on-site child care or subsidize off-site child care pro-
grams. 
21. Appoint a permanent joint committee of judges and court 
personnel from all levels and geographic areas of court to encourage, 
monitor, evaluate, and report on the efforts undertaken to carry out 
the recommendations of this Report relating to court employees. 
For the Bar Association (including State, Local, and Specialty Bar 
Associations) 
Develop programs to sensitize lawyers to the needs of court 
personnel, especially women, for increased levels of respect and 
cooperation. 
CHAPTER 6. JUDICIAL SELECTION 
Determining whether gender bias affects judicial selection is 
important in two respects. The first is public perception about an 
unbiased judiciary. If judges are selected through a system which 
discriminates against lawyers who are women or members of a 
minority group, or both, women and minorities generally will be 
concerned about whether the State's system of justice takes into 
account their needs, experiences, and interests. Also, they may ques-
tion whether a biased judicial selection system produces judges who 
are unbiased. The second concern has to do with equality of oppor-
tunity for women lawyers. Elevation to the bench is a goal of many 
lawyers, and women should not be denied the equal opportunity of 
realizing the dream. 
The first woman appointed to the bench in Maryland was the 
Honorable Kathryn Lawlor Shook Dufour, who was appointed to 
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in 1955.419 The first and 
to date only black woman appointed to the bench, the Honorable 
Mabel H. Hubbard, was appointed to the District Court in Baltimore 
City in 1981 and the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in 1985.420 
The Honorable Rita C. Davidson became the first woman to serve 
on an appellate bench when she was appointed to the Court of 
Special Appeals in 1972.421 She was also the first, and remains the 
only, woman to have served on the Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
419. Thurlow, Profiles, 19 MD. B.J. 24,25 (June 1986). The preceding information 
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to which she was elevated in 1979.422 The second woman appointed 
to the Court of Special Appeals, the Honorable Rosalyn B. Bell, is 
the only woman serving on an appellate bench as of the date of this 
Report. 423 
As of January 30, 1989, 19 of the 222 judges on the bench were 
women (9070): 1 of the 20 appellate judges (5%); 10 of the 110 circuit 
court judges (9%); and 8 of the 92 district court judges (9%).424 As 
of that date, women have served on the circuit courts for Baltimore 
City and four counties (Baltimore, Frederick, Montgomery, and 
Prince George's). The remaining nineteen counties have never had a 
woman circuit court judge.- The district court has had women judges 
in Baltimore City and six counties (Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Fred-
erick, Howard, Montgomery, and Prince George's); none have been 
appointed in the remaining seventeen counties.42S 
Of the twenty-two judges appointed between May 1, 1986 and 
June 1, 1988, one is a woman.426 Given that most women lawyers 
have entered the profession only in the last twenty years, it is possible 
that few are old enough for appointment to the bench. An analysis 
of the ages of the judges appointed during this two-year period, 
however, suggests that there are sufficient numbers of women lawyers 
who are of an appropriate age for appointment to the bench. The 
average age of the judges at the time of appointment is forty-five. 
One was older than 65 (4.5%); three were between 55 and 64 (13.5%); 
eight were between 45 and 54 (36%); and 10 were between 35 and 
44 (45%). The largest group of appointees, nearly the majority, were 
between the ages of thirty-five and forty-four at the time of appoint-
ment. In its survey of lawyers, the Special Joint Committee on 
Gender Bias in the Courts (the Committee) sought information about 
the age of the respondents. Approximately the same percentages of 
female and male lawyers reported that they were between the ages 
of thirty-five and forty-four (35% females, 39% males).427 
422. [d. 
423. Thurlow, supra note 419, at 24. 
424. Table compiled by the Administrative Office of the Courts (on file with 
Committee). Between January 30 and March 15, 1989, an additional woman 
was appointed. [d. 
425. [d. Maryland's figures are comparable to other states for trial courts but not 
for appellate courts: 7.2070 of all state court judges are women, 6.8070 of judges 
on courts of last resort are women, and 6.5070 of intermediate appellate judges 
are women. A.B.A. Comm'n on Women in the Profession, Report to the 
House of Delegates 6 (June 1988) (on file with Committee). 
426. The Committee compiled information on the ages of all judges appointed 
during this two-year period. 
427. An additional measure of the pool of available candidates is the relative 
numbers of male and female lawyers who have a degree of legal experience 
similar to that of judicial appointees. A rough measure of legal experience is 
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To determine whether gender bias has affected the selection of 
judges, the Committee solicited information on the issue at its 
hearing, in private meetings, and by letter. In addition, questions 
were included in the Committee's survey of judges and lawyers. The 
Committee identified problems in the judicial selection process which 
may be attributable to gender bias and which result in few women 
being appointed to the bench. 
The judicial selection process in Maryland has two steps. For 
each judicial vacancy, a nominating commission screens candidates 
and develops a: list which is transmitted to the Governor. The current 
Governor has elected to make his appointments from such lists as 
augmented by lists of nominees submitted within a year of the 
occurrence of the existing vacancy. Under certain very limited cir-
cumstances, the Governor may ask the commission to develop a new 
list.428 
The Committee's survey asked judges and lawyers whether they 
were "aware of any instances of gender bias in the judicial selection 
process."429 Of those with an opinion, 13070 of male attorneys, 20% 
of female attorneys and 15 % of male judges said they were aware 
of instances of gender bias. Those women who had succeeded in the 
appointment process, women judges, had the strongest negative feel-
ings about it. An overwhelming 69% of female judges answered that 
they were aware of gender bias in the selection process. 430 
The surveys also invited respondents to provide open-ended 
responses about gender bias in the judicial selection process. Concerns 
were expressed in two directions: some respondents believe that 
nominating commissions discriminate against women, while others 
believe that women have been accorded special favorable treatment 
in the appointments process. 
Nominating commissions were criticized on two grounds: their 
composition and the criteria they apply. Each commission has attor-
reflected in the number of years between a person's admission to the bar and 
his or her appointment to the bench. Exactly half of the 22 judges appointed 
between May 1, 1986, and June I, 1988, had been admitted to practice for 
between 10 and 19 years at the time of their appointment. Of those who 
responded to the Committee's survey, 32070 of male lawyers and 16% of female 
lawyers had been admitted to practice for between 10 and 19 years. While the 
proportion of women in this group is smaller than the proportion of men, the 
data indicates that the pool of women with sufficient experience for appoint-
ment to the bench is adequate. 1987-1988 MD. JUDICIARY ANN. REP. (on file 
with the Committee). See infra exhibit E-1. 
428. Exec. Order, COMAR 01.01.1988.06 (1988), reprinted in 15:9 Md. Reg. 1099 
(1988). 
429. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Part VII of Judges' and Lawyers' Question-
naires). 
430. For survey results of part VII, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see infra 
exhibit E-3. 
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ney and lay members. While approximately two-fifths of the lay 
members are female, only about a tenth of the attorney members 
are female.43I This composition may influence the criteria applied by 
commissions to applicants. The Committee was told repeatedly that 
higher standards were applied to female applicants with respect to 
matters such as professional experience: 
It doesn't seem to matter how qualified the woman is, how 
many years she has had and the trials she has had, [the 
question is,] is it the woman's turn? And if a woman should 
get appointed, that ... doesn't mean a woman is qualified, 
after all, it was a political decision. And that woman judge 
again has to prove and reprove that she is a good judge 
and a good attorney. 432 
Women are still judged by stricter standards than male 
applicants for judicial appointments. 433 
Respondents and witnesses also reported that inappropriate cri-
teria are applied in the screening process, and that these criteria. 
disadvantage women. For example, public sector experience is given 
less weight than private sector experience, and fewer women appli-
cants come from the private sector.434 Experiences that male attorneys 
are more likely to have, such as numerous jury trials and criminal 
prosecution work, are highly valued by commission members. 435 Both 
relate to only a portion of a judge's job, however, and other equally 
important experiences, such as bench trials and domestic relations 
representation, are likely to be more prominent on a female candi-
date's resume.436 
Of equal significance are reports that members of nominating 
commissions hold and act on negative 'stereotypical views about 
women. For example, commissions were reported to be interested in 
irrelevant matters such as family responsibilities of female candidates, 
their spouses' occupations,437 and their need for the job. Questions 
431. As of February 1989, 38 of the 99 members of the commissions were female. 
Only 9 of the 85 attorney members were female. Letter from Deborah A. 
Unitus, Administrative Office of the Courts, [to Karen Czapanskiy, Reporter, 
Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts) (Feb. 13, 1989). 
432. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 86 (testimony of Roberta 
McCarthy, Esquire, Prince George's County Women's Lawyer Caucus). 
433. Survey Respondent. 
434. Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 132-35 (testimony of Albert Matri-
cianni, Esquire). Even matters as trivial as a female candidate's style of dressing 
may be reviewed and criticized harshly by commission members. [d. at 171 
(testimony of the Hon. Kathleen O'Ferrali Friedman). 
435. [d. at 132-35 (testimony of Albert Matricianni, Esquire). 
436. [d. 
437. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 73 (testimony of Gail Bagaria, 
Esquire, Prince George's County Women's Lawyer Caucus). 
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such as these arise from a traditional set of beliefs that women are 
always responsible for the care of children and that their careers and 
views are subordinate to those of their husbands. Because these 
stereotypes apply only to women, questions about child care and the 
like are not asked of male candidates. Commissioners also were 
reported to have questioned the ability of female candidates to control 
a courtroom because of their "small" voices and stature.438 
Members of the commission ask women applicants about 
their children, their husband's activities, their opinion on 
abortion and whether their spouse will be "sharing in the 
decision-making process." Unmarried applicants are imme-
diately suspect and are subjected to inappropriate questions 
about personal life activities, etc.439 
Inquiries are made of women applicants, but not of men, 
regarding child care arrangements.440 
I wish someone could convince [nominating commissions] 
that if they are going to ask anyone what they [do] with 
their kids when they're going to be a judge, they should 
ask everyone, not just women.441 
[Comments were made such as] "He has a wife and 
family. She has a husband. She doesn't need this job and 
he does."442 
Finally, the Committee learned that there is a widespread belief 
that a quota system applies to women judges. Once "enough" women 
have been appointed, no more need apply. 
[An appointment of one woman judge] may mean for 
those behind her, well, we've had a judge in the past year, 
we don't need another woman judge for two years. That 
kind of pervasive tokenism is gender bias.443 
Seems to be a tacit "quota" of women.444 
Appointments made because it was a woman's turn. 44S 
438. Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 143 (testimony of Albert Matricianni, 
Esquire); Survey Respondent. 
439. Survey Respondent. 
440. Survey Respondent. 
441. Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 76 (testimony of Anne Ogletree, 
Esquire). 
442. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note II, at 44 (testimony of Jo Benson 
Fogel, Esquire). 
443. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 86 (testimony of Roberta 
McCarthY, Esquire). 
444. Survey Respondent. 
445. Survey Respondent. 
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Everyone knows that women are sought to fill certain 
vacancies when it is politically advantageous.446 
Prior to meeting of judicial [nominating commission], the 
"word" is out whether it is a "woman's" turn.447 
101 
To the extent that the judicial nominating process is affected by 
discriminatory attitudes, stereotypes, and criteria such as those de-
scribed to the Committee, female candidates will not be given a fair 
opportunity to be appointed to the bench. In addition, limiting the 
numbers of women on the bench to a small quota reinforces the 
discriminatory environment women face. 
The Committee found evidence that potential female judicial 
candidates face discrimination from a source outside the nominating 
commission process: their fellow members of the bar. 448 Witnesses 
and survey respondents reported that women often find the bar 
hostile to the efforts of female lawyers to be elevated to the bench. 
The appointment of the Honorable Martha Wyatt, the first and only 
woman appointed to the bench in Anne Arundel County, was offered 
as a case in point. Judge Wyatt's appointment to the bench was 
accompanied by "hysteria," according to a witness before the Com-
mittee. Male lawyers declared her to be incompetent, and the lawyer 
members of the nominating commission reportedly voted against 
her.449 One survey respondent described the events as follows: 
Women's failure to be part of the network [of the private 
bar] has caused them to do poorly when "popularity" polls 
are circulated to the bar [about judicial candidates]. The 
furor surrounding the appointment of Martha Wyatt is a 
prime example. Totally unjustified remarks were made as 
to her qualifications. Letters to the editor were written and 
an editorial cartoon published-all because she wasn't one 
of the boys. She has been a superb judge and many of 
446. Survey Respondent. 
447. Survey Respondent. 
448. Evaluation of the experience and reputation of candidates by the nominating 
commissions also may be affected, to a degree not determined by the Com-
mittee, by the screening process which various bar associations use to evaluate 
or endorse candidates. Certain commissions, for example, meet with local bar 
association leaders to -discuss candidates, and many bar associations provide 
evaluations or endorsements of candidates to commissions. See, e.g., By-laws 
of Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Inc., art. 7, § 5 (1983); By-laws of Anne Arundel 
County Bar Ass'n, § 1 (1988); By-laws of Women's Bar Ass'n of Maryland, 
§ 6 (1986). If the evaluation of endorsement procedures of bar associations 
discount the qualifications of female candidates, an additional source of possible 
gender bias is introduced into the judicial selection process. 
449. Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-26 to -30 (testimony of 
Paula Peters, Esquire). 
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those originally questioning her ability have since apolo-
gized.4so 
A person who is considering whether to apply for a judgeship 
must keep in mind that he or she will continue to practice law in 
the same community if the attempt fails. An application process 
which harms one's professional reputation in that community is too 
great a risk for most practitioners. If potential women candidates 
believe that they will face hostility and vilification such as that which 
greeted Judge Wyatt's application, they will not apply for the bench. 
Therefore, many talented and capable women will be unavailable to 
serve the State, and the pool of those who will take the risk will be 
too small. 
The Committee's investigation shows that, unfortunately, antag-
onism toward women candidates appears to be quite strong among 
male lawyers. Open-ended responses of a number of male survey 
respondents are illustrative: 
Over the past 10 years, women with less qualifications 
picked over males far greater qualified. 
It happens all the time. Women are being selected because 
of their sex. 
[I] believe female judicial aspirants with no trial experience 
beyond administrative attorney-general type stuff have pref-
erence over other trial-trained candidates. 
Judicial selection has tended to favor females out of a 
misplaced sense of imbalance on the bench. 
Women are picked because they are women, not because 
they are qualified or unqualified.4s1 
The Committee's investigation does not substantiate the allegations 
made by these respondents that women are appointed frequently to 
the bench or that those appointments are made without regard to 
450. Survey Respondent. In an editorial that appeared after Judge Wyatt's death 
of cancer at 47, the Evening Capital described her as "remarkable," and "a 
judge who earned the respect of colleagues for blending legal judgment with 
compassion and understanding." Evening Capital, Dec. 16, 1987, at A14, col. 
I. The editorial concluded that: 
Coincidentally, a special panel has been studying sex discrimination 
in Maryland's judicial system. The most fitting memorial to Martha 
Wyatt would be reform action to erase such discrimination. 
Of course, male-dominated courts tend to be blind to sex bias, 
especially in its more subtle forms. That is why the Judicial Nomi-
nating Commission should seek qualified women candidates to fill the 
vacancy Judge Wyatt left, and recommend such women for appoint-
ment to Gov. William Donald Schaefer. 
[d. Judge Wyatt was not succeeded by a woman. 
451. Survey Respondents. 
1990] Gender Bias Report 103 
qualifications. If anything, the Committee's investigation indicates 
that the opposite is true: only three of thirty-six recent judicial 
appointments have gone to women,4S2 and women candidates have 
been subjected to intense scrutiny. In these circumstances, the antag-
onism evidenced in the survey responses is nothing short of aston-
ishing. Male lawyers must accept some of the responsibility for the 
small numbers of women on the bench because their attitudes have 
contributed to making the journey to the bench more difficult and 
more risky. 
FINDINGS 
1. Too few women lawyers have been elevated to the bench. 
2. Female candidates for judicial appointments are asked irrelevant 
questions about family responsibilities. 
3. Female candidates for judicial appointments often are subject to 
different standards than those applied to male candidates. 
4. Female candidates for judicial appointments often are subject to 
stereotyped expectations about appropriate professional experiences, 
stature, and demeanor which devalue their abilities and background. 
5. Some women lawyers have been denied equal opportunity for 
judicial appointments by judicial nominating commissions which 
subject them to biased, irrelevant, and stereotypical standards. 
6. Some women lawyers have been denied equal opportunity for 
judicial appointments by an informal quota system which results in 
token appointments. 
7. Some male lawyers have been antagonistic to the efforts of 
women candidates to be elevated to the bench. 
RECOMMENDA TIONS 
For Court Administration 
Review the confidential questionnaire which is filled out by 
applicants for judicial office to eliminate questions which elicit gen-
der-biased information including: 
a. marital status 
b. general questions relating to past medical leaves from work as 
they relate to child birth or maternity leaves. 
For Bar Associations (including State, Local, and Specialty Bar 
Associations) 
1. Review mechanisms by which judges are nominated and elected 
or appointed, identify impediments to achieving fair representation, 
452. Appointments made between July 1, 1986, and January 30, 1989. See supra 
note 424. 
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and develop means to assist qualified women In gaining judicial 
appointments. 
2. Review the process for selecting attorney members of the judicial 
nominating commissions to determine whether it ensures the selection 
of members from a broad cross-section of the bar, including women. 
3. Conduct a joint study to review the entire judicial selection 
process to determine whether and how the process can be improved, 
with specific attention to the following: 
a. Survey the members of the judicial nominating commissions 
to evaluate the mechanisms and procedures used and substantive 
criteria applied by the commissions in selecting nominees. 
b. Evaluate whether there is a need to develop and apply uniform 
standards and questions, keeping in mind geographic distinctions. 
c. Determine the effectiveness and impact of the candidate eval-
uations conducted by the bar associations and other interest groups. 
d. Determine the extent of influence on the decisions of commis-
sion members by individual judges, politicians, concerned citizens, 
and members of the bar. 
e. Determine what resources are and should be available to, and 
what resources are utilized by, the commissions. 
4. Review the selection committee and/or evaluation processes of 
each bar association to determine whether they ensure gender neu-
trality and, if not, determine what changes are required to achieve 
gender neutrality. 
For Judicial Nominating Commissions 
1. Circulate copies of this Report to all members of each commis-
sion and sensitize members to the subtlety and insidiousness of gender 
bias. 
2. Circulate proposed questions similar to those prepared by the 
National Association of Women Judges (Appendix, Exhibit F) as a 
guide to formulating questions designed to elicit the level of sensitivity 
to gender bias on the part of an applicant. 
3. Preclude questions to candidates concerning marital status and 
child care arrangements. 
4. Educate members about the common misperceptions that lack 
of experience in criminal cases or concentration in domestic relations 
or public service areas of the law render an attorney unqualified for 
the bench. 
5. Preclude sexist remarks and discussion of physical attributes of 
a candidate when evaluating applicants for the bench. 
CHAPTER 7: WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: TREATMENT 
OF WOMEN PARTIES, WITNESSES, JURORS, AND 
LAWYERS 
The Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias (the Committee) 
received abundant information indicating that women lawyers, par-
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ties, witnesses and jurors are treated differently in court solely because 
of their sex. Sometimes the biased or stereotyped treatment favors 
men and sometimes women. All of it is of concern to the Committee 
because biased treatment is unfair and unacceptable in a judicial 
system dedicated to the impartial administration of justice. 
The Committee investigated gender bias in the courtroom by 
surveying judges, lawyers and court personnel, by hearing testimony 
at hearings around the state, and by receiving information from 
people who wrote to the Committee. This chapter will first address 
the treatment of parties, witnesses and jurors, then the treatment of 
female lawyers. 
I. FEMALE PARTIES, WITNESSES, AND JURORS 
A. Parties 
The Committee asked judges and lawyers whether the gender of 
the parties had affected the litigation process or the outcome of 
particular cases. Of those expressing an opinion, 210,10 of male 
attorneys, 31 % of female attorneys,453 11 % of male judges, and 67% 
of female judges454 answered they were aware of such cases. In the 
open-ended supplements to the question, judges and male and female 
lawyers tended to agree that male litigants were advantaged in dis-
putes involving financial matters pertaining to divorce, such as child 
support, alimony, and property division, and in rape prosecutions.455 
None of these views were unanimous, however. Some female and 
male lawyers reported believing that male litigants are advantaged in 
child custody disputes, while others believed that female litigants 
have the advantage.456 Both male and female lawyers reported that 
women experience credibility problems,457 but they diverged on the 
subjects: female lawyers reported problems about women's testimony 
in child support, alimony, acquaintance rape, domestic violence, and 
sexual abuse cases (involving the witness or her child),458 while male 
lawyers reported problems about women's testimony in personal 
injury cases.459 No credibility problems were reported for male liti-
453. For survey results of question IV of Lawyers' Questionnaire, see infra exhibit 
E-3. 
454. For survey results of question V of Judges' Questionnaire, see infra exhibit E-
3. 
455. For illustrative comments accompanying question IV, Lawyers' Questionnaire, 
see infra exhibit E-3. For illustrative comments accompanying question V of 
Judges' Questionnaire, see infra exhibit E-3. 
456. For illustrative comments accompanying question IV, Lawyers' Questionnaire, 
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gants. Male and female lawyers reported believing that women are 
treated more leniently than men in criminal sentencing.460 
The perceptions of lawyers about the impact of gender bias were 
also sought in a series of questions asking whether the courts "apply, 
interpret and enforce laws [relating to a particular area] in a way 
that treats males more favorably than females, treats females more 
favorably than males, or treats individuals the same regardless of 
their gender. "461 Fami!y law was broken into five subdivisions: marital 
property, alimony, child support, custody of children, and visita-
tion. 462 In the area of the custody of children, more than a majority 
of male and female lawyers expressing an opinion said that both 
men and women are treated equally (69070 of female lawyers and 
77070 of male lawyers).463 On most other family law issues, more male 
lawyers than female lawyers reported that men and women are treated 
equally. For example, of those expressing an opinion, between two-
fifths and one-half of male lawyers believed men and women are 
treated equally with respect to the following: the amount of the 
monetary award (51 (70); alimony modification (49070), duration (44070) 
and enforcement (43070); and child support amount (48070) and mod-
ification (43070).464 Relatively few female lawyers with an opinion on 
the same questions agreed. A fifth or fewer reported believing that 
men and women receive equal treatment with respect to the amount 
of monetary award (20070), alimony modification (13070), duration 
(17070), and enforcement (15070), and child support amount (15070) 
and modification (13070).465 On each issue, further, over half of female 
attorneys report believing that male litigants receive more favorable 
treatment than female litigants.466 In each instance when male attor-
neys reported a belief that female litigants are advantaged over male 
litigants, fewer than two-fifths of male attorneys agree.467 
In the area of gender bias in domestic violence cases, both male 
and female lawyers reported believing that women and men are not 
treated equally in a variety of ways. For example, only a third of 
female lawyers (31070) and about half of male lawyers (51070) report 
that men and women are treated equally in securing a protective 
order. About a third of female lawyers think the advantage is held 
by men in these proceedings, while a third think the advantage is 
460. [d. 
461. See infra exhibit E-2(b) (Question I of Lawyers' Questionnaire). 
462. [d. 
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held by women. Only 9% of male lawyers think men have an 
advantage in these proceedings, while 4011,10 believe women do.468 
A widespread perception that gender bias affects the process or 
outcome of particular cases is important because such bias under-
mines the image of impartiality which is crucial to the system. Where 
that perception has a basis in fact, it is imperative that the judicial 
system eliminate it in order to protect the reputation of the judiciary 
for impartiality. In many instances, as this report documents, the 
reports of respondents about gender bias have a basis in fact: it is 
true that women suffer a disadvantage in many arenas of the legal 
system, in terms of both credibility and case outcome, and it is also 
true that men suffer a disadvantage in some custody disputes. 
It is important not only to understand and correct gender bias, 
but also to correct misperceptions about gender bias. The Committee 
found no evidence to support the perception of some respondents 
that women are sentenced more leniently than men. The Committee 
uncovered the perception of bias by way of two survey questions. 
The Committee's survey of judges asked whether "[j]udges give 
sentences, based solely on gender, to female defendants that are (less 
severe, about the same, more severe) than they give to male defen-
dants."469 Again, about two-fifths (4111,10) of all judges believe that 
women are sentenced less severely than men.470 Finally, the same 
question was asked on both surveys: "Women offenders are sentenced 
below the guidelines (less frequently than men, about the same as 
men, more frequently than men)."471 Of those with an opinion, 38% 
of judges,472 65% of male lawyers, and 70% of female lawyers believe 
468. [d. 
469. See infra exhibit E-2(a) (Question 44 of Judges' Questionnaire). About a 
quarter of the judges (27%) responded affirmatively to a survey question asking 
whether mitigating factors in sentencing would be different for a male than 
for a female. For survey results of questions 45 and 46 of Judges' Questionnaire, 
see infra exhibit E-3. The most frequently cited reasons for treating them 
differently are pregnancy and child care responsibilities, which female defen-
dants were said to bear more frequently than male defendants; the respondents 
did not want to leave the children without caretakers. [d. If, however, child 
care was such a common reason for treating women more leniently, one would 
expect to see a greater degree of difference between the percentage of men and 
women sentenced within the guidelines. What appears to be much more likely 
is that women with responsibilities for children qualify for lower sentences 
under the guidelines. For example, their criminal records may not be extensive 
or the crimes may not be as severe as those of their male counterparts. 
470. For survey results of question 44, Judges' Questionnaire, see infra exhibit E-
3. 
471. See infra exhibit E-2(a) (Question 43 of Judges' Questionnaire). See infra 
exhibit E-2(b) (Question III of Lawyers' Questionnaire). 
472. For survey results of question 43, Judges' Questionnaire, see infra exhibit E-
3. 
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that women are sentenced below the guidelines more frequently than 
men.473 
Despite the widespread perception of bias toward women in 
sentencing, according to the data collected by the Administrative 
Office of the Courts about the application of Maryland's Sentencing 
Guidelines between 1983 and 1986, women and men received similar 
treatment: 69.3% of men and 73.6070 of women were sentenced within 
the guidelines. 474 In terms of leniency, the claim can be made that 
men are treated better than women, because 25.4% of men and only 
22.9% of women were sentenced below the guidelines. At the same 
time, somewhat fewer women than men were sentenced above the 
guidelines: 3.5% versus 5.3%.475 
B. Witnesses 
Parties and witnesses have the right to believe that gender will 
play no role in determining how they are received in the courtroom. 
Their testimony should be heard with fairness and impartiality, 
whether they are male or female. The Committee obtained infor-
mation about whether these expectations are met from surveys of 
judges, lawyers, and courtroom personnel, testimony at hearings, 
and letters sent to the Committee. The Committee has found that 
expectations about fair and impartial treatment of female parties and 
473. For survey results of question III, Lawyers' Questionnaire, see infra exhibit E-
3. 
474. Compiled by Administrative Office of the Courts (on file with Committee). 
475. Id. The Committee was advised that greater severity in sentencing may be 
common for female defendants who are convicted of violent crimes against 
their husbands or partners, even in cases where the defendants may have been 
acting in self-defense. Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 99-100 
(testimony of Mary Joel Davis, Maryland New Directions); Baltimore County 
Hearing, supra note 12 (statement of Sheila Litzky, Coordinator, Baltimore 
County Family Violence Intervention Project). It was also said that male 
defendants who are convicted of violent crimes against their wives, partners, 
or other women with whom they had a relationship received lighter sentences 
than men with no relationship to their victims. Id. (statement of Sheila Litzky). 
In response to a survey question on this subject, over 50070 of all lawyers and 
20070 of judges with an opinion on the question said that it is often true that 
"[s]entences are shorter where the victim had a prior relationship with the 
defendant." For survey results of question 42, Judges' and Lawyers' Ques-
tionnaires, see infra exhibit E-3. 
The data collected about sentencing guidelines by the Courts' Administrative 
Office does not indicate the gender of the victim or the victim's relationship 
to the defendant, so the Committee cannot investigate whether gender bias is 
involved in sentencing in these circumstances. The allegations, however, are 
serious, and the Administrative Office should undertake to collect data from 
'both the district courts and the circuit courts about the victim's relationship 
to the defendant and the gender of the victim. 
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witnesses are not met. 476 The fact that parties and witnesses are 
female is noted in circumstances where sex is irrelevant. Often, female 
parties and witnesses are treated disparagingly and their credibility is 
undermined by trivializing or sexually oriented comments and forms 
of address. On some occasions, their testimony is given little weight 
solely because of gender. 
The Committee heard testimony that women parties and wit-
nesses too often have to hear judges talk about their gender when it 
has no pertinence to the proceedings. For example, one judge was 
reported to have used gender-focused comments to defuse a tense 
courtroom situation when the witness was an attractive woman. 477 
Although the judge apparently believed his comments to be innocent, 
or even flattering, a female party to the case was put in doubt about 
her chances because she was not as attractive as the witness. The 
Committee heard about many comments by judges referring to the 
sexuality Of the party or the witness, despite the irrelevance of the 
person's sexual conduct to the proceedings. A criminal defendant 
reported that a judge accused her of promiscuity when the issue 
before the court was whether to suspend the balance of her sentence 
because she had been found HIV-positive.478 The custodial parent in 
a child support case reported that the judge accused her of being 
unfit to have custody of her older children because she had given 
birth to an illegitimate child.479 In a divorce case not involving 
adultery, the wife was asked if she had been "chaste. "480 In a 
different divorce case, the judge noted the wife's physical appearance 
in detail, including describing her as "not what would be called a 
chesty individual," and the possessor of a "Mona Lisa smile. "481 
The appearance of the husband was the subject of only brief notice.482 
In rape prosecutions, the defense attorney may attempt to ad-
dress improper questions to the complaining witness about her sexual 
476. The Committee's surveys and announcements invited information about the 
experiences of the male and female participants in the judicial system. No 
information was received indicating that male parties and witnesses are treated 
in ways that undermine their credibility or raise concerns about whether their 
testimony is being given fair and impartial reception. It seems fair to conclude 
that, overall, women suffer the more significant harm in terms of issues 
affecting the credibility and treatment of parties and witnesses. 
477. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 11, at 43 (testimony of Jo Benson 
Fogel, Esquire). 
478. Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 6-7 (testimony of Ruth Lopez). 
479. [d. at 96 (testimony of Kathy Abey). 
480. Baltimore County Hearing, supra note 12, at 101-06 (testimony of Donna 
Richardson-Smith). 
481. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 149-50 (testimony of Janice 
Bova). 
482. [d. 
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activity and history. 483 The Committee surveyed judges and lawyers 
to determine whether "[j]udges control the court so as to protect the 
complaining witness from improper questioning. "484 Roughly a third 
of female attorneys (30%) and a third of male attorneys (34%) 
replied that the statement is only true sometimes. Less than a fifth 
of the judges (15%) agreed. Nearly a fifth of female attorneys (18070) 
and almost half of male attorneys (47%) reported that the statement 
is rarely or never true.485 Unless the court asserts control in such a 
situation, the complaining witness will be subjected to hearing the 
defense attorney make inappropriate comments about her sexuality. 
She may even be forced to provide irrelevant testimony about her 
sexual activity and history. 
The Committee asked judges, lawyers, and court personnel 
whether "[c]omments are made [by judges] about the personal ap-
pearance of women litigants or witnesses when no such comments 
are made about men. "486 Of those expressing an opinion, nearly half 
of female attorneys (46%) and a third of female court personnel 
(31 %) said the statement is always, often, or sometimes true. Nearly 
a fifth of the male attorneys (19%) and court personnel (17%) agreed 
that it always, often, or sometimes occurred. Nearly all judges (96%), 
on the other hand, reported that such comments are rarely or never 
made. 487 
Judges, lawyers, and court personnel were also asked whether 
lawyers made comments about the personal appearance of women 
litigants or witnesses.488 Female attorneys and court personnel were 
again the most likely to report such comments: 64070 of female 
lawyers and 38% of female court personnel reported such comments 
always, often, or sometimes occur. Nearly a third of male lawyers 
483. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1992) (evidence relating to a victim's 
reputation for chastity generally not admissible in prosecution for rape or 
sexual offense in the first or second degree). 
484. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 41, of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires) . 
485. For survey results of question 41, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (female attorneys: rarely-tO%, never-80J0; male attorneys: 
rarely-330J0, never-140J0). 
486. See infra exhibits E-2(a), (b), and (c) (Question 5 of Judges', Lawyers', and 
Court Employees' Questionnaires). 
487. For survey results of question 5, Judges', Lawyers', and Court Employees' 
Questionnaires, see infra exhibit E-3 (female attorneys: always-10J0, often-180J0, 
sometimes-270J0; female court personnel: always-20J0, often-lO%, sometimes-
19070; male attorneys: always-10J0, often-3%, sometimes-150J0; male court per-
sonnel: always-20J0, often-20J0, sometimes-l30J0; judges: always-OOJo, often-OOJo, 
sometimes-30J0, rarely-120J0, never-840J0). 
488. See infra exhibits E-2(a), (b), and (c) (Question 5 of Judges', Lawyers', and 
Court Employees' Questionnaires). 
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(33070) and a fifth of male court personnel (22%) agreed, along with 
almost a fifth (17%) of the judges.489 
When the appearance and sexual activity of a female party or 
witness becomes the focus of the court's attention, whether by. 
comments from the judge or the lawyer, the impartiality of the court 
must come into question. The woman can be made to feel like an 
object who is present in court solely to be examined and evaluated 
for her physical form and sexual performance. She may understand 
the court's message to be that what she has to say has little meaning 
in comparison to how she looks and behaves. 
Focusing inappropriate attention on a woman's body and sexu-
ality is only one way that women in the courtroom are treated 
differently from men. They also are addressed more informally, and, 
as a result, made to feel less important. "Young lady" is a term 
often applied to women parties and witnesses,490 as are "hon" and 
"sweety, "491 "pretty little lady"492 and "babe. "493 The informal names 
are similar in that they refer to women as young and small, not the 
type of person one would listen to with seriousness. 
The Committee's surveys asked judges, lawyers, and court per-
sonnel whether "[w]omen litigants or witnesses are addressed [by 
judges] by first names or terms of endearment when men are ad-
dressed by surnames or titles. "494 Of those with an opinion, 34% of 
women lawyers said such addresses are always, often or sometimes 
used. Their opinion was shared by 17% of female court personnel. 
Judges, male lawyers, and male court personnel did not report that 
such forms of address were used with any frequency. 495 The reports 
489. For survey results of question 5, Judges', Lawyers', and Court Employees' 
Questionnaires, see infra exhibit E-3 (female attorneys: always-207o, often-25%, 
sometimes-37%; female court personnel: always-3%, often-12%, sometimes-
23%; male attorneys: always-I %, often-9%, sometimes-23%; male court per-
sonnel: always-O%, often-5%, sometimes-17%; judges: always-O%, often-4%, 
sometimes-I 3 %). 
490. Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 17, at I-55 (testimony of Helen 
Tayman). Tayman v. Tayman, Equity No. DR 79-4466 (Prince George's 
County, Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21, 1980); Adams v. Leager, Civ. No. 850261 
(Cecil County, Md. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1987). 
491. Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 87 (testimony of Joan Bossman). 
492. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 118 (testimony of the Hon. 
Theresa Nolan). 
493. Survey Respondent. 
494. See infra exhibits E-2(a), (b), and (c) (Question 3 of Judges', Lawyers', and 
Court Employees' Questionnaires). 
495. For survey results of question 3, Judges', Lawyers', and Court Employees' 
Questionnaires, see infra exhibit E-3 (female attorneys: always-O%, often-9%, 
sometimes-25%; female court personnel: always-2%, often-4%, sometimes-
II %; male attorneys: always-I %, often-O%, sometimes-6%; male court per-
sonnel: always-O%, often-O%, sometimes-4%; judges: always-O%, often-O%. 
sometimes-O% ). 
112 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 20 
changed somewhat when the respondents were asked whether lawyers 
were the ones addressing litigants and witnesses. Over half of female 
lawyers (57070) and a quarter (25070) of female court personnel re-
ported that lawyers always, often, or sometimes use inappropriately 
informal forms of address. Their perception was shared by 19070 of 
judges, 13070 of male attorneys, and 12070 of male court personne1.496 
Witnesses told the Committee that they felt that the testimony 
of female witnesses and experts was not believed and that judges 
imposed a higher burden of proof on women than on men. Where 
these cases involve child custody and domestic violence, they are 
discussed at greater length in this report in chapters on those topics.497 
To determine whether there is a general perception of bias in this 
regard, the Committee asked judges, lawyers, and court personnel in 
its survey whether "[j]udges require more evidence for a female 
litigant to prove her case than for a male litigant. "498 Of those with 
an opinion on the question, more than two-fifths (43070) of female 
lawyers thought the statement is always, often, or sometimes true, 
an opinion shared by 22070 of female court personne1.499 Most male 
lawyers (82070) and male court personnel (81070) believed the statement 
is never true, but nearly a fifth (17070) of male lawyers and 19070 of 
male court personnel thought it is true sometimes or rarely true. 5OO 
All the judges who answered the question denied that the statement 
is ever true. 
Judges, lawyers, and court personnel also were asked whether 
"[j]udges appear to give less weight to the testimony of female 
496. [d. (female attorneys: always-107o, often-20%, sometimes-36%; female court 
personnel: always-I %, often 7%, sometimes-17%; judges: always-O%, of ten-
5%, sometimes-14%; male attorneys: always-I %, of ten-I %, sometimes-ll %; 
male court personnel: always-O%, often-O%, sometimes-12%). 
497. See supra chs. 1-2. The committee also sought information on the treatment 
of rape victims in its survey of judges and lawyers. Respondents were asked 
whether "[r]ape victims are accorded less credibility than victims of other types 
of assault." See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 40 of the Judges' and 
Lawyers' Questionnaires). Of those expressing an opinion, over half of female 
attorneys (51 %) believed the statement to be always or often true (9% always, 
42% often). Twenty percent of male attorneys agreed (l % always, 19% often), 
as did 9% of judges (2% always, 7% often). For survey results of question 
40, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see infra exhibit E-3. 
498. See infra exhibits E-2(a), (b), and (c) (Question 12 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires; question II of Court Employees' Questionnaire). 
499. For survey results of question 12, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, and 
question II, Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra exhibit E-3 (female 
attorneys: always-2%, often-II %, sometimes-30%; female court personnel: 
always-2%, often-4%, sometimes-16%). 
500. [d. (male attorneys: sometimes-I %, rarely-16%; male court personnel: some-
times-5%, rarely-14%). 
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experts than that of male experts. "SOl Of those expressing an opinion, 
43070 of female attorneys and 19070 of female court personnel thought 
the statement is sometimes true. S02 Male attorneys and male court 
personnel agreed that the phenomenon occurs, but with less fre-
quency: 9070 of male attorneys and 3070 of male court personnel 
thought the statement sometimes is true. All but 2070 of the judges, 
on the other hand, reported that this never happens. S03 
Despite the consistent denials by judges in response to the 
Committee's surveys, it is clear that many observers, both male and 
female, agree that women litigants and witnesses too often receive 
different and worse treatment thari men. This differential treatment 
does not go unnoticed; it undermines respect for the law and con-
vinces people that they can be deprived of a fair and impartial 
hearing solely because of their sex. 
Women litigants face an additional disadvantage in the court-
room: sometimes their circumstances require them to have children 
with them. This is particularly true in cases involving domestic 
violence, child support, juvenile proceedings, and landlord-tenant 
cases. It occurs when the mother is the primary or sole caretaker of 
the child and cannot afford to pay someone to care for the child 
during the court appearance, as well as in cases where the child's 
presence is required by the court. 
So far as the Committee is aware, no courthouse in this state 
has made provisions for assisting litigants to care for children who 
must accompany them to court. As a result, children must be brought 
into the courtroom while the parent, usually a mother, waits for the 
case to be called. Women have reported being criticized by judges 
for the behavior of these children, who naturally can get restless. S04 
Some women are put to the choice of waiting in the hall with their 
children and missing the call of their cases, leaving the children in 
the hall alone, or disciplining them inappropriately to compel the 
quiet behavior required in the courtroom.sos Some women have been 
required to testify with children in their laps.s06 Other women have 
501. See infra exhibits E-2(a), (b), and (c) (Question 11 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires; question 10 of Court Employees' Questionnaire). 
502. For survey results of question II, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, and 
question 10, Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra exhibit E-3. Of the 
female attorneys, another 2070 believed the statement is always true and 13% 
thought it is often true. 
503. [d. 
504. Observations of Committee Members; see Clarke, Maryland Courtroom Eti-
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been forced to abandon their cases and leave the courthouse because 
of the needs of their children. 507 
Courts can assist these litigants in many ways. Suggestions 
include scheduling hearings in cases where children are likely to be 
in court at specific times, rather than putting these cases on a general 
list. This will permit the parent to schedule a limited period of time 
for being in court, rather than the whole day. The parent may be 
able to afford to provide child care for that limited time. Second, 
courts could give priority to cases in which litigants have brought 
children, so the children need not wait so long. Third, courts could 
provide drop-in centers where the children are cared for in a safe 
and appropriately staffed facility. 508 Other soiutions can be devised 
for this troubling problem. Ignoring the problem, however, means 
maintaining the status quo, which places an unacceptable burden on 
women litigants. That is a form of gender bias which, in effect, 
deprives women of equal access to the courts. 
C. Jurors 
Although sex discrimination in jury service is explicitly prohibited 
by statute,509 the Committee found that the selection of the foreperson 
of a petit jury may be affected by gender bias. All other factors 
being equal, a selection system that pays no attention to gender 
should result in roughly half of the petit jury forepersons being 
female and about half male. To determine whether the system works 
in a gender neutral fashion, the Committee asked judges how many 
times in the last year they had selected a woman as jury foreperson. 510 
More than a quarter of judges (29070) reported that they selected 
women between 40% and 60% of the time.511 This group of judges, 
therefore, achieves the level of selecting women roughly half the 
time, which is what one would expect in a gender neutral system. It 
may be that these are the same judges who answered another survey 
question about selection criteria by saying that they choose, essen-
tially, by chance. Typically, these judges designated the person who 
sits in the first seat in the jury box to be the foreperson. S12 
507. [d. 
508. For example, the Superior Court for the District of Columbia opened a day 
care center in 1974. It is used by approximately 300 children each year while 
their parents are in the courthouse. The Washington Lawyer, Aug. 1988, at 
20. 
509. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 8-103 (1989). See Tolbert v. State, 315 
Md. 13, 23 n.7, 553 A.2d 228, 232 n.7 (1989). 
510. See infra exhibit E-2(a) (Question 48 of Judges' Questionnaire). 
511. For survey results of question 48, Judges' Questionnaire, see infra exhibit E-
3. The figure drops to 27ltJo when female judges are excluded from the sample. 
512. For survey results of question 49, Judges' Questionnaire, see infra exhibit E-
3. 
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In contrast to these judges, another 28070 of the judges reported 
that they selected women fewer than 40% of the time, while 10% 
reported that they selected women more than 60% of the time.S13 
These responses indicate that a selection system which takes gender 
into account may be at work. Judges did not indicate an awareness, 
however, that what some of them are doing may be influenced by 
gender bias. For example, another question on the Committee's 
survey asked judges if they "recall cases in which you felt it was 
advantageous to have a male jury foreperson."sI4 Only 15% of the 
judges answered yes.Sl5 
To the extent that gender bias affects the selection of the 
foreperson, it must come into play when judges apply subjective 
criteria. The most common subjective criteria reported to the Com-
mittee were, in order, "education" or "intelligence," "leadership," 
and "experience." None of these terms was defined, so it was 
impossible to tell with certainty how the criteria are gendered. The 
open-ended responses to another question suggest that sometimes 
these criteria may have gendered meanings, however.sl6 When asked 
whether a male foreperson might be advantageous, typical comments 
included: 
I do perceive some males as being more authoritative. 
[It is a] gut reaction - cannot be specific - have had 
more "hung" juries with female foreperson. 
At time[s] men assert more control over deliberation of 
jurors. 
[In] cases with press notoriety; it often takes the apparent 
physical force of a man to control the paparazzi. 
If these comments are typical of how judges feel when selecting a 
foreperson, stereotypical feelings about men having superior leader-
ship abilities may be influencing the selection process. In addition, 
some judges reported believing that a male foreperson is an advantage 
in cases involving technical and mechanical issues and complicated 
contractual or business disputes. These comments also suggest that 
stereotypical thinking about male superiority in one or more of the 
areas of innate abilities, intelligence, or education may be at work 
in the selection process. 
513. [d. A third of the judges did not respond to the question. 
514. See infra exhibit E-2(a) (Question 49 of Judges' Questionnaire). 
515. For survey results of question 49, Judges' Questionnaire, see infra exhibit E-
3. 
516. For illustrative comments of question 47, Judges' Questionnaire, see infra 
exhibit E-3. It is possible that these comments reflect characteristics of the 
particular jurors involved, and therefore, are not the product of gender-based 
stereotypes. 
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While gender bias in the selection of the jury foreperson does 
not appear to be a major issue, the cases in which biased selection 
occurs cannot be overlooked. Women as well as men are capable of 
providing leadership and understanding to the jury deliberation proc-
ess, and their abilities should not be devalued because they do not 
fit male stereotypes. When a judge selects a foreperson for reasons 
having to do with gendered expectations and stereotypical thinking, 
the judge is reinforcing outdated social norms and depriving men 
and women of opportunities to perform all the roles in the society 
for which they are qualified as individuals. Furthermore, by using 
gendered criteria, the judge sends the message to others in the 
courtroom, whether they are lawyers, parties, witnesses, or court 
personnel, that women and men are different as groups, and can 
and should be treated differently. 
II. Female Attorneys 
Women are entering the legal profession in large numbers. 
Twenty years ago, only three percent of lawyers were female; today, 
a fifth of the bar nationally is female. 517 Not only are the numbers 
growing; so are the opportunities. Rather than being hired primarily 
by public agencies or relegated to estates and trusts departments in 
private firms, women today are involved in every phase of legal 
practice. Litigation, long a heavily male specialty, is now engaged in 
by many women, both in the public and the private sectors. 
According to the Committee's information, women comprise 
approximately 140/0 of the lawyers in Maryland. The majority (520/0) 
have been in practice less than six years.SIS A third (35%) have 
practiced for between six and ten years, while a tenth have practiced 
between eleven and fifteen years. More than half (57%) are between 
the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four, 39% between the ages of 
thirty-five and forty-four, and 7% between the ages of forty-five and 
fifty-four.S19 Women lawyers are concentrated in two jurisdictions, 
Baltimore City with 40% and Montgomery County with 20%, but 
women lawyers can be found throughout the state. 520 Nearly all 
female lawyers are white (960/0), 3% are black, and 1 % reported 
their race as "other."521 
Nearly two-thirds of the Committee's female respondents re-
ported that litigation formed over 20% of their practices during the 
517. A.B.A. Comm'n on Women in the Profession, supra note 425, at 5 (June 
1988). 
518. For demographics information, see infra Table 3 of exhibit E-l. 
519. Id. 
520. For demographics information, see infra Table 4 of exhibit E-l. 
521. Id. 
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last two years. For the purposes of this survey, a lawyer was deemed 
to have a specialty if practice in that area constituted more than 
20% of her or his work. Nearly half the female lawyers (43070) 
reported a domestic relations specialty; 18% reported a specialty in 
personal injury work for plaintiffs; 15% personal injury work for 
defendants; 15% criminal defense work; and 13% criminal prose-
cution work. S22 
The Committee learned that, with their increasing numbers at 
the bar and presence in court, female lawyers are gaining in respect 
and effectiveness. It seems clear that, had this survey been conducted 
a decade ago, every woman lawyer who had appeared in court would 
have had a story about being treated differently and worse than her 
male counterpart. While still severe, the problems which exist now 
are not as universal. 
A recent survey conducted for the Maryland State Bar Associ-
ation confirms the Committee's research. When asked whether "there 
continues to be discrimination against some lawyers because of their 
sex, race, disability, religion or national origin," 63% of the lawyers 
surveyed responded affirmatively. Over half of the male lawyers 
(56%) and four-fifths (80%) of the female lawyers agreed with the 
statement. S23 Among the comments which respondents made were: 
Judges, lawyers, clerks, etc., definitely discriminate against 
women, particularly the older members of the [bar]. I've 
been treated like a child and called little girl in front of my 
clients by [certain] judges, and I resent it. But I'm in a 
position where I can't do anything without adversely af-
fecting my client's case. 
Blacks and females are treated differently in court by all 
court personnel. Black and white clients have more faith in 
white attorneys. Black attorneys always stick out. 
It's been an uphill struggle as a female trial attorney just 
to simply fight for equality, not for special treatment. Now, 
it's o.k., because they know who I am, [but being a female 
attorney is still an oddity]. 
I've personally experienced it in the court system more 
than in my firm. It has made me feel inadequate and non-
competitive. Judges should be chastised. There should be 
avenues for victims of this abuse. It's just abominable. S24 
522. For demographics information, see infra Table 3 of exhibit E-J. 
523. G. Hoffer & J. Macleod, A 1988 Pilot Research Study of How Attorneys in 
Law Firms in Maryland's Major Urban Areas View the Quality of Their 
Professional Lives and Issues Facing the Profession 45-48 (1988). 
524. [d. 
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The Committee's survey asked judges and lawyers whether "there 
had been a situation where you felt the litigation process or outcome 
of a case was affected (negatively or positively) by [the lawyer's] 
gender (male or female). "525 Of those expressing an opinion, 30070 
of female attorneys, 19% of female judges, 8% of male judges, and 
4% of male attorneys said yes.S26 In the open-ended supplemental 
answers to the question, female attorneys expressed concerns about 
being patronized, ignored, demeaned, harassed, stereotyped, and 
treated as outsiders. They reported that their arguments sometimes 
were given little weight and that they were treated on occasion as 
pretty objects in the courtroom rather than as professionals with 
jobs to perform. 
Judge lectured me in open court telling me I belong in 
the home and that overall the education will never hurt me. 
I was defending against a motion. . . . The judge, in 
chambers, repeatedly commented on my personal appear-
ance and offered to show me pictures of his "handsome" 
son. 
I was appointed to represent a child in a contested custody 
case. The judge in a chambers conference told the male 
attorneys representing the parents that he valued my view 
of the case because I am a mother. 
[I recall] in-chambers bantering between judge (white male) 
and other attorney (white male), while third attorney (black 
male) and I (white female) were conspicuously not able to 
participate in the conversation, because we didn't have the 
"history" they shared. [The] conversation [lasted] approxi-
mately ten minutes, not just a passing remark or two. (We 
won the case, however.) 
Male attorneys provided some similar examples: 
Judge makes sexist remarks during custody and criminal 
cases, "Honey," "Babe." 
At criminal trial (homicide by motor vehicle), state's 
attorney was female. Judge made remark to effect [that] 
"sometimes she forgets she's [an] attorney," in reference to 
what he perceived as [the] state's emotional appeal to the 
jury. Judge very favorable to me at sentencing. 
At its hearings and through its survey, the Committee heard 
about numerous incidents indicating that some judges still treat 
525. See infra exhibit E-2(a) and (b) (Question VI of Judges' Questionnaire; question 
V of Lawyers' Questionnaire). 
526. For survey results of question VI, Judges' Questionnaire and question V, 
Lawyers' Questionnaire. see infra exhibit E-3. 
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women lawyers differently from men, and that the differences make 
the job of representing their clients more difficult. Judges were 
reported to have demonstrated an attitude that female lawyers are 
less important, less entitled to respect, and less competent as a group 
than male lawyers. Complaints were common, for example, from 
female and male attorneys who believed that judges assume the 
women to be less competent than men and who accord female 
attorneys less credibility because of their sex. 
In a jury trial in a personal injury case, the judge virtually 
ignored me for at least the first half of the case until I had 
demonstrated my competence. He didn't listen to my ar-
guments on objections and carried on a lengthy personal 
conversation in chambers with opposing counsel. His atti-
tude improved after I produced authority for each of my 
evidentiary arguments and demonstrated that I knew what 
I was doing. 527 
Generally my experience is that judges are easier on 
women attorneys - the expectations are not as high.528 
It seems to me that at the district court level women are 
not accorded anywhere near the respect male attorneys are 
accorded. Judges constantly repeat and reexplain everything 
over that a woman has just explained, but never do this to 
male attorneys. The judges also tend to reprimand women 
attorneys for the slightest-and often imagined-breach of 
decorum while failing to comment on the most blatant 
breaches by male attorneys.529 
I have been practicing here long enough that everybody 
is kind of used to me. And the local bench, for example, 
will regularly report to me what some woman, that I don't 
even know, has done that they consider inappropriate. 
Somehow if something inappropriate has happened, we are 
all one and are all judged by that standard. But, if I do 
something correctly, I am different. We aren't judged by 
those of us who excel. Those of us who excel are exceptions. 
We are judged by the general incompetence of one person 
and that is projected out on to everyone.530 
In its survey of judges, lawyers, and court personnel, the Com-
mittee asked whether "[j]udges appear to give less weight to female 
527. Survey Respondent. 
528. Survey Respondent. 
529. Survey Respondent. 
530. Anne Arundel County Hearing, supra note 17, at 1-28 (testimony of Paula 
Peters, Esquire). 
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attorneys' arguments than to those of male attorneys."531 Of those 
who expressed an opinion, over half of the female attorneys (5711,10) 
answered affirmatively, as did 26% of female court personnel, 12% 
of male lawyers, and 11 % of male court personnel. Only 2% of 
judges acknowledged that a credibility gap could be perceived. 532 
Judges communicate a view that female and male lawyers are 
fundamentally different in a variety of ways. One way is to comment 
on the appearance, sexuality, or maternity of a woman lawyer rather 
than focusing on her lawyering, her argument, or her professional 
activity. A survey respondent recounted an incident involving one 
male and three female attorneys. During a chambers conference, the 
judge asked, "How's the rooster making out with all these hens?"533 
In a case where a female attorney was representing proposed adoptive 
parents, the judge looked her up and down and said, "They don't 
make the stork like they used to ... !"534 Another judge said to a 
pregnant attorney, "So I see you got knocked up. "535 
The Committee surveyed judges, lawyers, and court personnel 
about the frequency and extent of certain behaviors which create 
difficulties or indicate a lack of respect for female attorneys. Res-
pondents were asked whether "[w]omen attorneys are asked [by 
judges] if they are attorneys when men are not asked. "536 Of those 
expressing an opinion, over half of female attorneys (56%), 20% of 
male attorneys, 30% of female court personnel, and 10% of male 
court personnel reported that this always, often or sometimes hap-
pens. Only 2% of judges agreed.S37 Counsel were reported to have 
asked the question more often: always, often or sometimes, according 
to 13% of judges, 82% of female lawyers, 27% of male lawyers, 
531. See infra exhibits E-2(a), (b), and (c) (Question 10 of Judges' and Lawyers' 
Questionnaires; question 9 of Court Employees' Questionnaire). 
532. For survey results of question 10, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires and 
question 9, Court Employees' Questionnaire, see infra exhibit E-3 (female 
attorneys: always-O%, often-l2%, sometimes-45%; female court personnel: 
always-l %, often-5 %, sometimes-20%; male attorneys: always-O%, often-l %, 
sometimes-ll %; male court personnel: always-O%, often-2%, sometimes-9%; 
judges: always-O%, often-O%, sometimes-2%). 
533. Survey Respondent. 
534. Survey Respondent. 
535. Survey Respondent. 
536. See infra exhibits E-2(a), (b), and (c) (Question I of Judges', Lawyers', and 
Court Employees' Questionnaires). 
537. For survey results of question I, Judges', Lawyers', and Court Employees' 
Questionnaires, see infra exhibit E-3 (female attorneys: always-l%, often-l9%, 
sometimes-36%; male attorneys: always-l %, often-l %, sometimes-l8%; female 
court personnel: always-O%, often-7%, sometimes-23%; male court personnel: 
always-O%, often-O%, sometimes-lO%; judges: always-O%, often-O%, some-
times-2%). 
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37070 of female court personnel, and 15% of male court personnel. 538 
Female attorneys feel demeaned when they are addressed infor-
mally while others in the courtroom are addressed formally. They 
report being called by their first names as well as by diminutives 
such as "hon," "dear," "baby doll," "honey," and "sweetheart. "539 
One survey respondent said that having a judge call her by terms of 
endearment in front of opposing male counsel is "not only embar-
rassing and demeaning, but also undermines my position in the eyes 
of [the other] counsel who may not know me well enough to realize 
they are facing a competent adversary."540 A Committee witness 
reported the apprehension of a large male defendant in a criminal 
case about having a short female attorney, especially when the judge 
called her "little girl. "541 Another Committee witness described with 
irony an incident in which the opposing counsel objected when she 
addressed his expert witness by his first name after he had repeatedly 
called her "Pam" and "Pam dear." The judge told her not to worry 
about it; she was just being "oversensitive. "542 
The Committee's survey asked whether "[w]omen attorneys are 
addressed by first names or terms of endearment when male counsel 
are addressed by surnames or titles. "543 Of those expressing an 
opinion on whether judges did this, 45% of female attorneys re-
sponded affirmatively, as did 15% of male attorneys. Judges re-
sponded that this did not occur. 544 Even more respondents reported 
that counsel are inappropriately informal in addressing female attor-
neys: 73% of female lawyers responded affirmatively to this question, 
538. [d. (judges: always-OOJo, often-2Ofo, sometimes-ll %; female attorneys: always-
, 3%, often-28%, sometimes-51%; male attorneys: always-I%, often-4%, some-
times-2.2%; female court personnel: always-OOfo, often-90f0, sometimes-28%; 
male court personnel: always-O%, often-40f0, sometimes-Il %). 
539. Survey Respondents. Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 17 (testimony 
of Sheila Sachs, Esquire); Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 79 (testi-
mony of Laura Norris). 
540. Survey Respondent. Even when elevated to the bench, women are not immune 
from such comments. A witness advised the Committee about a male lawyer 
who refers to female judges as well as attorneys as "babes" and "broads." 
Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 4 (testimony of Pamela A. Bres-
nahan). 
541. Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 103-04 (testimony of Mary Joel 
Davis). 
542. [d. at 7 (testimony of Pamela A. Bresnahan). 
543. See infra exhibit E-2(a) and (b) (Question 2 of Judges' and Lawyers' Ques-
tionnaires) . 
544. For survey results of question 2, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (female attorneys: always-I %, often-l7%, sometimes-27%; 
male attorneys: always-I %, often-2%, sometimes-12%; judges: always-O%, 
often-OOfo, sometimes-OOfo). 
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as did 26070 of male lawyers. Nearly a fifth (18%) of judges agreed.545 
Paying attention to the appearance of a female attorney may 
seem to the judge like gentlemanly and even complimentary behavior, 
but often it is perceived by the female attorney as a diversion which 
converts her from a professional to an object to admire or criticize. 546 
One reason for this perception is that the appearance of male lawyers 
is rarely noted by the judge or male counsel, so the appearance of 
female lawyers is singled out for attention. The Committee's survey 
asked whether "[c]omments are made about the personal appearance 
of women attorneys [by judges] when no such comments are made 
about men. "547 Of those expressing an opinion, 54% of female 
attorneys gave an affirmative response, as did 48% of female court 
employees, 20% of male attorneys, and 16% of male court employ-
ees. Only 5% of judges answered affirmatively; the rest responded 
that such comments are rarely or never made.548 
The comments of other counsel about the appearance of a female 
attorney also can result in trivializing and demeaning the profession-
alism of the female attorney. Seventy-two percent of female attorneys, 
25% of judges, 35% of male attorneys, 48% of female court per-
sonnel and 23% of male court personnel reported such comments by 
counsel. 549 
Women lawyers have reported being made to feel like outsiders 
who do not belong in the courtroom or in chambers when judges 
and male counsel make sexist remarks or jokes in their presence.550 
The Committee's survey asked whether such remarks or jokes are 
545. [d. (female attorneys: always-40Jo, often-32%, sometimes-37%; male attorneys: 
always-l %, often-5%, sometimes-20Olo; judges: always-O%, often-4%, some-
times-14%). . 
546. A Committee witness reported, for example, that a judge explained that he 
"only hire[d] pretty women [for judicial cIerkships] because I have to look at 
them for a whole year." Eastern Shore Hearing, supra note 16, at 72 (testimony 
of Anne Ogletree, Esquire). 
547. See infra exhibits E-2(a), (b), and (c) (Question 4 of Judges', Lawyers' and 
Court Employees' Questionnaires). 
548. For survey results of question 4, Judges', Lawyers', and Court Employees' 
Questionnaires, see infra exhibit E-3 (female attorneys: always-2%, often-25%, 
sometimes-27%; female court personnel: always-6%, often-l3%, sometimes-
29070; male attorneys: always-l %, often-5%, sometimes-14%; male court per-
sonnel: always-O%, often-3%, sometimes-l3Olo; judges: always-OOlo, often-O%, 
sometimes-5%, rarely-9%, never-87%). 
549. Id. (female attorneys: always-2%, often-35%, sometimes-35%; judges: always-
0%, often-5%, sometimes-20%; male attorneys: always-O%, often-8%, some-
times-27%; female court personnel: always-5l1Jo, often-14%, sometimes-29%; 
male court personnel: always-O%, often-4%, sometimes-19I1Jo). 
550. Prince George's County Hearing, supra note 6, at 72-73 (testimony of Gail 
Bagaria, Esquire). 
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made by judges.55 ) Of those expressing an opinion, affirmative res-
ponses were received from 55070 of female attorneys, 24% of male 
attorneys, 35% of female court personnel, and 23% of male court 
personnel. Only 6% of judges responded affirmatively.5S2 Hearing 
such remarks and jokes from counsel is a more common experience, 
according to those expressing an opinion to the Committee's survey 
question on the subject. Over three-quarters (78%) of female attor-
neys responded affirmatively, as did 35% of male attorneys, 44% of 
female court personnel, 25% of male court personnel, and 23% of 
judges.5S3 
Attorneys reported to the Committee that some judges and 
lawyers do not stop with sexist remarks, jokes or general comments 
about the appearance of women lawyers; they make verbal or physical 
sexual advances in the course of the professional interaction. A 
survey respondent described the invitations for social events which 
she received from a judge and the personal questions he asked her. 
When she declined the invitations, he said, "I just asked you out to 
dinner, 1 didn't ask you to go to bed with me." The attorney 
continues to feel uncomfortable: 
1 wish that judges could be made aware of what a profound 
effect their behavior can have on the judicial system. If 
judges fail to respect female attorneys, no one else will 
respect them either. If judges use their positions to make 
advances toward female attorneys, we will never resolve the 
problems of sexual harassment and sexual discrimination.554 
Another respondent emphasized the no-win position of both the 
judicial system and the female attorney when a judge feels free to 
make sexual advances: 
[The] biggest worry is that your client will be at a disad-
vantage if you don't "flirt" back-or more .... [H]is be-
havior is obvious to witnesses and litigants (several clients 
551. See infra exhibits E·2(a), (b), and (c) (Question 6 of Judges', Lawyers', and 
Court Employees' Questionnaires). 
552. For survey results of question 6, Judges', Lawyers', and Court Employees', 
see infra exhibit E-3 (female attorneys: always-107o, often-19%, sometimes-
35%; male attorneys: always-l %, of ten-l %, sometimes-22OJo; female court 
personnel: always-2%, often-l 107o, sometimes-22%; male court personnel: al-
ways-2%, often-4%, sometimes-17%; judges: always-O%, often-O%, sometimes-
6%). 
553. [d. (female attorneys: always-3%, often-26%, sometimes-19%; male attorneys: 
always-l %, of ten-l %, sometimes-30%; female court personnel: always-2%, 
often-!O%, sometimes-32%; male court personnel: always-O%, often-6%, some-
times-19%; judges: always-O%, often-l %, sometimes-19%). 
554. Survey Respondent. 
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have made comments to me about how the judge obviously 
flirts with women in the hallways of the Courthouse and 
they hope this will give them an advantage).sss 
The Committee's survey asked whether "[w]omen attorneys are 
subjected [by judges] to verbal or physical sexual advances."ss6 Nearly 
a fifth (19070) of female attorneys answered affirmatively. Judges and 
male attorneys responded, on the whole, that such conduct rarely or 
never occurred.SS7 When asked whether other counsel make such 
advances, 47070 of female attorneys answered affirmatively, as did 
7070 of judges, and 8070 of male attorneys. SS8 
When female attorneys find themselves in a difficult, demeaning, 
or harassing situation, responding effectively is a challenge because 
of the power of the judge. If the response is perceived negatively, 
the judge has the power to retaliate against the lawyer and her client. 
While the lawyer may be willing to accept the retaliation, she will 
refuse to place the client's interests in jeopardy.SS9 At the same time, 
if she makes no response, the problem will only continue. 
If the source of the problem is another lawyer in a courtroom, 
the judge who is willing can be helpful in solving the problem. An 
unwilling judge, by saying nothing, helps to perpetuate the miscon-
duct, while a judge who is willing to intervene can have a long 
lasting impact. s60 The Committee's survey asked judges whether they 
555. Survey Respondent. 
556. See infra exhibits E-2(a) and (b) (Question 8 of Judges' and Lawyers' Ques-
tionnaires). 
557. For survey results of question 8, Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires, see 
infra exhibit E-3 (female attorneys: always-OOfo, often-3%, sometimes-16%; 
male attorneys: rarely-lI%, never-88%; judges: rarely-lillo, never-99%). 
558. [d. (female attorneys: always-OOfo, often-10%, sometimes-3707o; judges: always-
0%, often-lillo, sometimes-60f0; male attorneys: always-IOlo, often-lillo, some-
times-6%). 
559. Survey Respondents, Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 23-24 (testimony 
of Sheila Sachs, Esquire). 
560. The Committee was told about a number of aggravating incidents where the 
judge said nothing. These included a male attorney who kissed a female attorney 
at a bench conference saying, "That's such a good argument for a girl." 
Baltimore City Hearing, supra note 47, at 5 (testimony of Pamela A. Bres-
nahan). A female attorney repeatedly was interrupted by male opposing counsel. 
When she complained to the judge, he responded that "if she couldn't take 
it, she probably should get out of the courtroom." [d. at 19 (testimony of 
Sheila Sachs, Esquire). Another lawyer was told by opposing counsel that she 
should look for a missing exhibit in her pocketbook. The exhibit later showed 
up on the opposing counsel's table. Montgomery County Hearing, supra note 
11, at 43 (testimony of Jo Benson Fogel, Esquire). Finally, a male opposing 
counsel commented on the pregnancy of his female opponent to the jury and 
urged the jurors not to consider her client more favorably on that account. 
He concluded that she had "promised [her] water would not break in court." 
Survey Respondent. 
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"have ever intervened in a trial in your court because you observed 
gender bias in the proceedings."561 Nearly half of female judges 
(4411,10) and over a tenth of male judges (13%) answered yes. 562 In the 
open-ended supplemental responses, the judges provided examples: 
Male attorney addressed female attorney as "My dear 
lady." I told him, "She is not yours." 
In two cases, the defense attorney called the Assistant 
State's Attorney "hun." I interrupted and said, "You mean 
Miss _, the prosecutor, don't yo.u." 
Instructed attorney on other side to stop referring to 
counsel by first name. 
Opposing counsel made sexist comments concerning his 
opponent's motives and reasons why she was aggressively 
pursuing her client's case. ., . 
On an almost daily basis, it is necessary to advise male 
lawyers and witnesses not to refer to women as "girls;" not 
to address women lawyers, litigants, witnesses by their first 
names; and not to characterize domestic violence cases in 
both the civil and criminal contexts as only "little domestic 
matters. "563 
Changing courtroom practices so that women and men can 
represent clients effectively without the difference between their sexes 
making them unequal is a challenge that the courts must meet. To 
do less is to deny women equal opportunity in the profession. On a 
more general level, to do less is to ensure that unfairness and 
inequality will haunt courtrooms for decades to come. Now that 
women are making their mark in the legal profession, the courts 
should be in the vanguard to ensure that full opportunities are open 
to them and to all women who seek justice. 
FINDINGS 
1. Gender bias affects the outcome of cases where stereotyped 
expectations about proper conduct for men and women are applied 
to particular cases. 
2. Female parties can be disadvantaged by judges and masters who 
give their testimony less credibility solely because they are women. 
3. Female parties and witnesses sometimes are subjected by judges, 
masters, and court personnel to disrespectful and demeaning forms 
561. See infra exhibit E-2(a) (Question VIII of Judges' Questionnaire). 
562. For survey results of Question VIII, Judges' Questionnaire, see infra exhibit 
E-3. 
563. Survey Respondents. 
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of address and comments about their sex and personal appearance. 
4. Female parties can be disadvantaged by the absence of accom-
modations for the presence of children in the court. 
5. Selection of the foreperson of a jury can be affected by gender 
bias. 
6. Female attorneys sometimes are subjected to different and dis-
criminatory treatment in court by judges, masters, court personnel, 
and male attorneys. 
7. Female attorneys sometimes are subjected by judges, masters, 
court personnel, and male attorneys to disrespectful and demeaning 
forms of address and comments about their sex and personal ap-
pearance. 
8. Female attorneys sometimes are subjected to verbal and physical 
sexual advances by judges. 
9. Judicial intervention can assist a female attorney who is being 
treated inappropriately and disrespectfully by a male attorney. 
RECOMMENDA TIONS 
A. Courtroom Environment For Court Administration 
1. Develop and conduct regular training for sitting and newly elected 
and appointed judges, domestic relations masters, and court employ-
ees designed to make them aware of the subtle and overt manifes-
tations of gender bias directed against women attorneys, witnesses, 
and litigants and possible due process consequences. 
2. Review all court forms, manuals, and pattern jury instructions 
to ensure that they employ gender-neutral language. 
3. Establish, in conjunction with the appropriate bar associations, 
a confidential reporting and investigation process for those who feel 
they have a gender bias complaint involving a member of the judi-
ciary, master, courthouse employee, or attorney. 
4. Establish on-site day care for jurors, litigants, and witnesses. 
5. Educate court personnel not to treat male and female attorneys 
differently and not to assume all men are attorneys and that females 
must prove they are. 
6. Inform court employees not to refer to female attorneys, litigants, 
or witnesses by their first names, nicknames, or "terms of endear-
ment" in situations in which they would not so address men. 
For Judges 
1. Monitor behavior in courtrooms and chambers and swiftly in-
tervene to correct lawyers, witnesses, and court personnel who engage 
in gender-biased conduct. 
2. Ensure that official court correspondence, decisions, jury instruc-
tions, and oral communications employ gender-neutral language and 
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are no less formal when referring to women litigants, witnesses, and 
lawyers than to men litigants, witnesses, and lawyers. 
For Bar Associations (including State, Local, and Specialty Bar 
Associations) 
Develop and conduct informational campaigns designed to make 
members aware of the incidence and consequences of gender-biased 
conduct toward women litigants, lawyers, and witnesses on the part 
of judges, lawyers, and court personnel. 
Undertake a study of the extent to which gender bias adversely 
affects women in the practice of law outside of the courtroom. This 
topic was considered to be outside the scope of this Committee's 
mandate, but issues such as hiring and partnership considerations 
were raised and should be part of an in-depth study by the Bar. 
For Law Schools 
Include information and material in professional responsibility, 
constitutional law, clinical, and skills training courses to make stu-
dents aware of the subtle and overt manifestations of gender bias 
directed against litigants, lawyers, and witnesses. 
B. Professional Opportunities for Women Attorneys 
Judiciary 
Ensure that court appointments by judges are made without regard 
to the sex of the appointee. 
For Bar Associations (including State, Local and Specialty Bar 
Associations) 
1. Review the assigned counsel mechanisms in local jurisdictions in 
which members practice and develop means to ensure that appoint-
ments to fee-generating positions are not only fairly received by 
qualified male and female attorneys but are perceived to be fairly 
received. 
2. Encourage continuing legal education programs to utilize women 
as speakers and program chairs where qualified women are available. 
3. Examine the process for selection of officers, committee chairs, 
and section chairs to ensure that qualified women are considered and 
to identify the impediments that would prevent qualified women from 
attaining leadership positions within the bar association. 
CONCLUSION 
After two years of study, seven hearings, and review of thou-
sands of surveys and hundreds of documents, the Committee is 
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convinced that gender bias has a major and negative impact on the 
judicial system of this state. Decisions in cases involving domestic 
violence and family law, the selection of judges, the treatment of 
female court employees, and the environment of the courtroom all 
are affected by attitudes, practices, and policies which differentiate 
according to gender. Gender bias can be seen whenever a battered 
woman is denied protection from her batterer because the judge finds 
the testimony of any woman'less trustworthy than that of any man. 
It is demonstrated whenever a court employee is paid a lower salary 
or given fewer opportunities than her male counterpart. It is visible 
whenever a father or a mother is denied custody because he or she 
fails to meet the stereotype of a proper father or mother. It exists 
whenever the amount of alimony awarded a middle-aged homemaker 
wife is diminished because the judge believes that no husband should 
have to reduce his standard of living to support a former wife. It is 
articulated whenever a female candidate for a judgeship is interro-
gated about her child care responsibilities. It is shown whenever a 
lawyer is called "honey" and her argument demeaned because of her 
sex. 
In most situations, women are the ones who are harmed by 
gender bias. Whether it is men or women who experience the burden 
of bias, however, the public has an interest because the judicial 
system has failed to adhere to the highest standard of fairness and 
impartiality. Further, Maryland has committed itself to equality for 
all its citizens, irrespective of sex. As the Equal Rights AmendmentS64 
states, "Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or 
denied because of sex." Whenever citizens are treated unequally by 
the courts or the judicial system solely because of sex, the commit-
ment of Article 46 is undermined. Finally, respect for the law is 
crucial to the legitimacy of the judicial system. People lose respect 
for the law when they observe actions and decisions which deny 
people fair and individualized treatment, which stereotype them ac-
cording to their gender, or which burden or benefit them because of 
their sex. Whenever gender bias in any form affects the judicial 
system in any part, the entire system suffers. 
The Committee's recommendations include changes which should 
be undertaken by judges, court administrators, lawyers, law schools, 
public agencies, community organizations, and the legislature. Many 
of the recommendations involve actions which will take several years; 
others will require significant institutional changes. While the man-
date of this Committee has been fulfilled, it is clear that a successor 
committee is required in order to monitor, encourage, and evaluate 
the work which is undertaken in response to this Report. Accordingly, 
564. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS, ART. 46. 
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the Committee recommends that a permanent committee be estab-
lished as a joint project of the bench and the Bar. That committee 
should undertake to monitor, encourage, and evaluate efforts to 
implement the recommendations made by this Committee. It should 
also identify and investigate new allegations of gender bias as they 
occur. The committee should act as a liaison with the legislature and 
pertinent public agencies and community organizations, as well as 
with committees of the judicial conference and the state bar associ-
ations. Periodic reports on the work of the committee should be 
published in the Maryland Bar Journal. 
Many of the problems that the Committee identified as affecting 
women in the judicial system arise during controversies over intimate 
relationships involving husband and wife, nonmarried partners, and 
parents and child. The Committee's study shows that all the people 
affected by these disputes may have concerns about whether they are 
treated fairly. These concerns are particularly acute for those women 
with custody of children who are impoverished after a divorce. Both 
the parties and the public have an interest in ensuring that the laws 
and practices affecting these people are fair. Accordingly, the Com-
mittee believes that a study should be undertaken to assess and 
evaluate laws and practices affecting family and family-type relation-
ships to determine whether changes in law and procedure are required 
to ensure equity. 
This Committee is confident that the bench and the Bar will 
respond with dedication and vigor to eliminate the types of gender 
bias that have been identified by the Committee's investigation. 
Implementing the Committee's recommendations is vital for this 
effort. It should be understood that the purpose of each recommen-
dation is the elimination of gender bias. None of the recommenda-
tions calls for special treatment for women or for men, because 
special treatment is not what is needed. What is needed, instead, is 
sensitivity to the ways in which unexamined attitudes about men and 
women lead to the unintended result of biased decision making. Once 
the sensitivity is achieved, the credibility decisions which all judges, 
masters, and commissioners must make will be more accepted, be-
cause they will be made with less risk that biased assumptions affected 
the result. What is needed is curiosity about why the favored party 
in some types of disputes frequently is a member of one sex or the 
other. Once that curiosity is developed, many disputes involving 
domestic violence and family law can be judged differently because 
traditionally accepted outcomes no longer will seem inevitable. What 
is needed is openness to ways of looking at problems that include 
the experiences of all people. Once that openness becomes common-
place, litigants will be able to explain their circumstances to a court 
that is more willing to learn and to change. 
130 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 20 
The goal of gender neutrality in the judicial system is vital and 
important. Hard work will be needed for a long time to achieve the 
goal, but every effort in this direction is worthwhile. 
RECOMMENDA TIONS 
The Committee urges that the following recommendations be 
implemented as quickly as possible. 
1. A permanent joint committee of the bench and bar should be 
appointed to encourage, monitor, evaluate, and report on efforts 
undertaken to carry out the recommendations of this Report relating 
to litigants, witnesses, jurors, and lawyers. This committee should 
serve as an advisory body to the continuing education efforts rec-
ommended in this Report. This committee also should receive and 
investigate complaints when a judge or lawyer subverts the goal of 
gender neutrality. Separate bench and bar subcommittees of this 
subcommittee should focus on issues particularly pertinent to each 
group. 
2. A study commission on equity in family law should be appointed 
to conduct a study and report to the bench and bar on whether laws 
and practices pertaining to the family and family-type relationships 
result in fair and equitable treatment to all the people affected by 
the proceedings. 
3. The Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct (Rule 1231 of the 
Maryland Rules of Procedure) and the Code of Conduct for Masters, 
Examiners, Auditors, Referees, and District Court Commissioners 
(Rule 1232 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure) should be amended 
to provide explicit direction to all members of the bench and similar 
offices that gender bias is a form of partiality which is beneath the 
ethical standards appropriate for the judiciary. 
4. A permanent joint committee of judges and court personnel from 
all levels and geographic areas of court should be appointed to 
encourage, monitor, evaluate, and report on the efforts undertaken 
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To the Members of the Special Joint Committee on 
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President Ferretti of the Maryland State Bar Association and I 
are most appreciative of your willingness to serve as members of the 
Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts. 
President Ferretti has appointed as State Bar Association mem-
bers of the Committee the following individuals. 
Louise Scrivener 
Suite 320 
414 Hungerford Drive 
Rockville, MD 20850 
340-9090 
Read A. McCaffrey· 
3rd Floor-Sun Life Bldg. 
Charles Center 
Baltimore, MD 21201 
539-5541 
Marvin J. Garbis 
Suite 1001 
207 E. Redwood St. 
Baltimore, MD 21202 
837-4767 
Linda H. Lamone 
Legislative Services Bldg. 
90 State Circle-RM 104 
Annapolis, MD 21401 
841-3889 
On behalf of the Judiciary, I have appointed the following 
members, one from each level of Maryland's four-tiered Judicial 
System: 
William H. Adkins, II 
Courts of Appeal Bldg. 
Annapolis, MD 21401 
269-2295 
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Rosalyn B. Bell 
Suite 301 
50 Courthouse Square 
Rockville, MD 20850 
251-7210 
Hilary D. Caplan 
(Vol. 20 
Clarence M. Mitchell, Jr. Courthouse 
lOON. Calvert Street 
Baltimore, MD 21202 
396-5090 
William D. Missouri 
14757 Main St. 
P.O. Box 422 
Upper Marlboro, MD 20772 
952-4020 
We have asked Hilary Caplan to serve as Chairman· of the 
Special Committee and he has very graciously accepted. 
As you know, New York and New Jersey recently published 
extensive reports on "Women in the Courts." Other states, including 
California and Massachusetts, have ongoing studies concerning the 
matter of gender bias as it affects the courts. Needless to say, equal 
treatment for all who participate in the judicial system, and all who 
come into contact with it, is an absolute essential, regardless of race 
or gender. 
The mission of the Special Committee, as we see it, is as follows: 
1. To examine the extent to which gender bias, if it exists, 
affects decision making in the courts of Maryland. 
2. To examine the extent to which gender bias, if it exists, 
affects participants in the court system, e.g., judges, attorneys, 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, court employees and members of the 
public who come into contact with the courts of Maryland. 
3. If gender bias exists, to recommend means to elimiate its 
effect in the Maryland judicial system. 
In the course of your studies, you may wish to consider other 
matters closely associated with the Committee's mission and you, of 
course, should feel free to do so. 
Deborah Unitus, of the Administrative Office of the Courts, 
will act as staff to the Special Committee. Expense vouchers for 
travel of the members should be forwarded to Deborah. Meals and 
other expenses of the members will be paid from the Maryland 
Judicial Conference budget. 
Deborah's address is as follows: 
1990) Appendix 
Ms. Deborah Unit us 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
Post Office Box 431 
Annapolis, MD 21404 
974-2353 
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I would like to put one year sunset qualification on the Com-
mittee's existence, dating from the time of the Committee's organi-
zational meeting, which both President Ferretti and I would like to 
attend. 
Judge Caplan will determine the time and place of the first 
meeting and notify you as soon as possible. 
Gender bias behavior is indeed a sensitive and serious subject, 
and President Ferretti and I look forward to your study and to your 
recommendations. 
RCM: 1m 
cc: Ms. Deborah Unitus 
Robert C. Murphy 
Chief Judge 
Mr. James H. Norris, Jr. 
President Vincent E. Ferretti, Jr. 
• Committee Note: After this letter, M. Peter Moser, Esquire was appointed by 
the President of the Bar Association in Mr. McCaffrey's place. 
• Committee Note: After this letter, Professor Karen Czapanskiy was appointed 
to the Committee by the Chief Judge and the President of the Bar Assocation. 
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MEMBERS -
SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON 




Hon. Hilary D. Caplan, Chair 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Hon. William H. Adkins, II 
Court of Appeals 
Hon. Rosalyn B. Bell 
Court of Special Appeals 
Professor Karen Czapanskiy 
University of Maryland School of Law 
Marvin J. Garbis, Esquire 
Johnson and Swanson 
Linda H. Lamone, Esquire 
Office of the Lieutenant Governor 
Hon. William D. Missouri 
Circuit Court for Prince George's County 
M. Peter Moser, Esquire 
Frank, Bernstein, Conaway, and Goldman 
Master Louise Scrivener 
Domestic Relations Master 
137 
138 Baltimore Law Review 
Exhibit C 
PUBLIC HEARING SCHEDULE 
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1990] Appendix 
Public Hearing Schedule 
1. Montgomery County - Rockville 
Wednesday, September 16, 1987 
1 p.m. - 5:30 p.m. 
Stella B. Werner Council Office Building 
7th Floor Hearing Room 
100 Maryland A venue 
Rockville, Maryland 20850 
2. Eastern Shore - Easton 
Tuesday, September 22, 1987 
1 p.m.- 5:30 p.m. 
Council Chambers 
Mayor and Council Building 
14 South Harrison Street 
Easton, Maryland 
3. Prince George's County - Upper Marlboro 
Wednesday, September 30, 1987 
1 p.m. - 5:30 p.m. 
County Council Hearing Room 
County Administration Building 
Upper Marlboro, Maryland 20772 
4. Western Maryland - Hagerstown 
Wednesday, October 7, 1987 
I p.m. - 5:30 p.m. 
Courtroom Number One 
Washington County Courthouse 
Summit and Washington Streets 
Hagerstown, Maryland 
5. Baltimore City 
Tuesday, October 13, 1987 
I p.m. - 5:30 p.m. 
University of Maryland School of Law 
Moot Courtroom 
500 West Baltimore Street 
Baltimore, Maryland 21202 
6. Anne Arundel and Howard Counties 
Tuesday, October 30, 1987 
1 p.m. - 5:30 p.m. 
County Council Chambers 
Anne Arundel County 
Arundel Center 
Calvert and North West Streets 
Annapolis, Maryland 21401 
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7. Baltimore, Carroll, and Harford Counties 
Monday, October 26, 1987 
1 p.m. - 5:30 p.m. 
Perry Hall Library - Baltimore County 
9440 Belair Road 










The hypothetical problems were developed by members of the 
Committee who sought information on how judges and masters in 
domestic relations cases might decide highly sensitive cases in which 
gender bias could affect the outcome. The problems concern child 
custody, alimony, sentencing and jury instructions. Four versions of 
the problems on child custody, alimony and sentencing were devel-
oped. Respondents who were judges were asked to respond to one 
version of each problem and to the problem addressing jury instruc-
tions. Domestic relations masters, who do not hear cases outside of 
their specialized area of assignment, were asked to respond only to 
a problem relating to child custody and alimony. 
The hypothetical problems were presented to 51 judges who were 
attending programs presented by the Judicial Institute during March 
1988. Which version of each problem a judge saw was purely random. 
The response rate was between 67 and 69070. (Some judges responded 
to fewer than all four problems.) 
Domestic relations masters received the hypothetical problems 
by mail, with the particular version of the problems being selected 
randomly. 
The hypothetical problems were mailed to 41 people who were 
identified by the Administrative Office of the Courts as holding a 
position as master or examiner. Fourteen responded to the hypoth-
eticals, for a response rate of 34%. 
Respondents were not asked to identify themselves. 





Instructions: We are asking the following questions in order to gather 
information on judicial attitudes about a variety of situations. Please 
take a few minutes to fill in the blanks in the following problems. 
If you want to give further information about your answers, please 
use the back of the paper. Thank you. 
1. A woman is convicted of second degree murder in the death of 
her two month old child. She presented evidence that she got 
very drunk one day shortly after the birth of the child and that 
she lost control when the baby would not stop crying. The 
woman has no prior criminal record; no weapon was used in the 
crime. Under the sentencing guidelines, the typical sentence for 
such an offender would be imprisonment for 12-20 years. Should 
she be sentenced within the sentencing guidelines, above the 
guidelines, or below the guidelines? 
a. Please check your choice: 
Within the guidelines __ _ 
Above the guidelines __ _ 
Below the guidelines __ _ 
b. What sentence would you impose? __ _ 
2. In a divorce proceeding, both parents are seeking custody of the 
couple's child, a girl age 10. The child has been living with the 
mother since the separation, which occurred approximately six 
weeks before the pendente lite hearing. Prior to the separation, 
the mother was primarily responsible for the care of the child. 
Both parents have worked full-time throughout the marriage; the 
mother's net (after tax) income is approximately half that of the 
father. Under an informal agreement between the parties, until 
a pendente lite order is entered, the mother has custody, the 
child visits the father at the father's home on alternate weekends, 
and the father pays approximately 20 percent of his net salary 
to the mother in child support. The child is doing reasonably 
well both at home and at the day care center. 
a. Assuming that, under the law, custody could be awarded to 
either parent, would you award custody to: 
The father __ _ 
The mother __ _ 
Jointly to the mother and father __ _ 
b. Which of the following factors would influence you to award 
sole custody to the father (please rank each factor in order 
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of importance, beginning with 1 for the most important): 
Age of the child 
Amount of time each parent 
spends with the child 
Child's post-separation 
adjustment 
Father's full-time employment 
Gender of the child 
Gender of the parent 
awarded custody 
Mother's full-time employment 
Relative economic 
circumstances of parents 
c. Which of the following factors would influence you to award 
sole custody to the mother (please rank each factor in order 
of importance, beginning with 1 for the most important): 
Age of child 
Amount of time each parent 
spends with the child 
Child's post-separation 
adjustment 
Father's full-time employment 
Gender of the child 
Gender of the parent 
awarded custody 
Mother's full-time employment 
Relative economic 
circumstances of parents 
d. If the evidence showed that the father had beaten the mother 
several times before the separation, would that change your 
decision? 
Yes No __ _ 
e. If the evidence showed that the father had a paramour, 
would that change your decision? 
Yes No __ _ 
f. If the evidence showed that the mother had a paramour, 
would that change your decision? 
Yes No __ _ 
3. In a divorce proceeding, the husband is seeking indefinite ali-
mony. The court has found that the divorce can be granted on 
the ground of voluntary separation. During the marriage, which 
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lasted 22 years, he was employed intermittently on a part-time 
basis. He is 45 years old and suffers from lower back pain as 
the result of an injury suffered 20 years earlier; his primary 
occupation throughout the marriage was caring for the children 
and taking care of the home. He now is employed part-time; his 
net (after tax) income is $5,200 per year. The wife, who is also 
45 years old, was employed full-time in her occupation through-
out the marriage. She has a net income of $35,000 per year. 
a. Assuming that, under the law, the husband is entitled to 
alimony for some period of time, approximately what amount 
of alimony would you award? 
$ per month 
b. Would you make the award: (check your choice) 
For a limited number of years? __ _ 
For an indefinite period? __ _ 
4. You are presiding over a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff 
was initially hospitalized for a severe kidney infection and later 
contracted uremic poisoning. He alleges that the defendant, a 
urologist, breached the applicable standard of care by failing to 
diagnose and treat his condition at an earlier date. Dr. Angela 
Williams, a urologist, testified for the defense. Dr. Williams, a 
professor at The Johns Hopkins University, is a well-known 
expert in her field. She has published a number of articles 
concerning catheterization of kidney patients and has testified as 
an expert many times. It is her opinion that the patient's illness 
was caused by the negligence of the nurse who catheterized the 
patient. She testified that the defendant's health care provider 
did not breach the standard of care but, rather, acted in con-
formance with it. 
The following jury instructions have been proposed for use in 
the case. Please place an "x" next to the one you would use in 
this case. Rank the others 1 to 3 according to your preference 
for each beginning with 1 for the most important. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing her opinion you should consider her experience, 
training and skills, and her knowledge of the subject matter 
about which she is expressing an opinion. 
You should give her testimony the weight and value you 
believe it should have. You are not required to accept any 
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expert's opinion. You should consider her opinion together 
with all the other evidence. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing his opinion you should consider his experience, 
training and skills, and his knowledge of the subject matter 
about which he is expressing an opinion. 
You should give his testimony the weight and value you 
believe it should have. You are not required to accept any 
expert's opinion. You should consider his opinion together 
with all the other evidence. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing the opinions of an expert you should consider 
the expert's experience, training and skills, and the expert's 
knowledge of the subject matter about which an opinion has 
been expressed. 
You should give expert testimony the weight and value you 
believe it should have. You are not required to accept any 
expert's opinion. You should consider an expert's opinion 
together with all the other evidence. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing the opinions of an expert you should consider 
the expert's experience, training and skills, and the expert's 
knowledge of the subject matter about which an opinion has 
been expressed. 
You should give expert testimony the weight and value you 
believe it should have. Even if you were surprised by the 
fact the expert witness in this case is a woman, you should 
not let those feelings influence your decision in this case. 
Your personal biases are not relevant, and you should make 
a conscious effort to not let them playa part in the decision 
making process. You are not required to accept any expert's 
opinion. You should consider an expert's opinion together 





Instructions: We are asking the following questions in order to gather 
information on judicial attitudes about a variety of situations. Please 
take a few minutes to fill in the blanks in the following problems. 
If you want to give further information about your answers, please 
use the back of the paper. Thank you. 
1. A woman is convicted of second degree murder in the death of 
her two month old child. She presented evidence that she had 
been depressed after the birth of the child and that she lost 
control when the baby would not stop crying. The woman has 
no prior criminal record; no weapon was used in the crime. 
Under the sentencing guidelines, the typical sentence for such an 
offender would be imprisonment for 12-20 years. Should she be 
sentenced within the sentencing guidelines, above the guidelines, 
or below the guidelines? 
a. Please check your choice: 
Within the guidelines __ _ 
Above the guidelines __ _ 
Below the guidelines __ _ 
b. What sentence would you impose? years 
2. In a divorce pendente lite proceeding, both parents are seeking 
custody of the couple's child, a boy age 10. The child has been 
living with the mother since the separation, which occurred 
approximately six weeks before the pendente lite hearing. Prior 
to the separation, the mother was primarily responsible for the 
care of the child. Both parents have worked full-time throughout 
the marriage; the mother's net (after tax) income is approximately 
half that of the father. Under an informal agreement between 
the parties, until a pendente lite order is entered, the mother has 
custody, the child visits the father's home on alternate weekends, 
and the father pays approximately 20 percent of his net salary 
to the mother in child support. The child is doing reasonably 
well both at home and at the day care center. 
a. Assuming that, under the law, custody could be awarded to 
either parent, would you award custody to: 
The father __ _ 
The mother __ _ 
Jointly to the mother and father __ _ 
b. Which of the following factors would influence you to award 
sole custody to the father (please rank each factor in order 
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of importance, beginning with 1 for the most important): 
Age of the child 
Amount of time each parent 
spends with the child 
Child's post-separation 
adjustment 
Father's full-time employment 
Gender of the child 
Gender of the parent 
awarded custody 
Mother's full-time employment 
Relative economic 
circumstances of parents 
c. Which of the following factors would influence you to award 
sole custody to the mother (please rank each factor in order 
of importance, beginning with 1 for the most important): 
Age of the child 
Amount of time each parent 
spends with the child 
Child's post-separation 
adjustment 
Father's full-time employment 
Gender of the child 
Gender of the parent 
awarded custody 
Mother's full-time employment 
Relative economic 
circumstances of parents 
d. If the evidence showed that the father had beaten the mother 
several times before the separation, would that change your 
decision? 
Yes No __ _ 
e. If the evidence showed that the father had a paramour, 
would that change your decision? 
Yes No __ _ 
f. If the evidence showed that the mother had a paramour, 
would that change your decision? 
Yes No __ _ 
3. In a divorce proceeding, the wife is seeking indefinite alimony. 
The court has found that the divorce can be granted on the 
ground of voluntary separation. During the marriage, which 
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lasted 22 years, she was employed intermittently on a part-time 
basis. She is 45 years old and suffers from lower back pain as 
the result of an injury suffered 20 years earlier; her primary 
occupation throughout the marriage was caring for the children 
and taking care of the home. She now is employed part-time; 
her net (after tax) income is $5,200 per year. The husband, who 
is also 45 years old, was employed full-time in his occupation 
throughout the marriage. He has a net income of $35,000 per 
year. 
a. Assuming that, under the law, the wife is entitled to alimony 
for some period of time, . approximately what amount of 
alimony would you award? 
$ per month 
b. Would you make the award: (check your choice) 
For a limited number of years? __ _ 
For an indefinite period? __ _ 
4. You are presiding over a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff 
was initially hospitalized for a severe kidney infection and later 
contracted uremic poisoning. He alleges that the defendant, a 
urologist, breached the applicable standard of care by failing to 
diagnose and treat his condition at an earlier date. Dr. Angela 
Williams, a urologist, testified for the defense. Dr. Williams, a 
professor at The Johns Hopkins University, is a well-known 
expert in her field. She has published a number of articles 
concerning catheterization of kidney patients and has testified as 
an expert many times. It is her opinion that the patient's illness 
was caused by the negligence of the nurse who catheterized the 
patient. She testified that the defendant's health care provider 
did not breach the standard of care but, rather, acted in con-
formance with it. 
The following jury instructions have been proposed for use in 
the case. Please, place an "x" next to the one you would use in 
this case. Rank the others 1 - 3 according to your preference for 
each beginning with 1 for the most important. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing her opinion you should consider her experience, 
training and skills, and her knowledge of the subject matter 
about which she is expressing an opinion. 
You should give her testimony the weight and value you 
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believe it should have. You are not required to accept any 
expert's opinion. You should consider her opinion together 
with all the other evidence. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing his opinion you should consider his experience, 
training and skills, and his knowledge of the subject matter 
about which he is expressing an opinion. 
You should give his testimony the weight and value you 
believe it should have. You are not required to accept any 
expert's opinion. You should consider his opinion together 
with all the other evidence. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing the opinions of an expert you should consider 
the expert's experience, training and skills, and the expert's 
knowledge of the subject matter about which an opinion has 
been expressed. 
You should give expert testimony the weight and value you 
believe it should have. You are not required to accept any 
expert's opinion. You should consider an expert's opinion 
together with all the other evidence. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing the opinions of an expert you should consider 
the expert's experience, training and skills, and the expert's 
knowledge of the subject matter about which an opinion has 
been expressed. 
You should give expert testimony the weight and value you 
believe it should have. Even if you were surprised by the 
fact the expert witness in this case is a woman, you should 
not let those feelings influence your decision in this case. 
Your personal biases are not relevant, and you should make 
a conscious effort to not let them playa part in the decision 
making process. You are not required to accept any expert's 
opinion. You should consider an expert's opinion together 





Instructions: We are asking the following questions in order to gather 
information on judicial attitudes about a variety of situations. Please 
take a few minutes to fill in the blanks in the following problems. 
If you want to give further information about your answers, please 
use the back of the paper. Thank you. 
1. A man is convicted of second degree murder in the death of his 
two month old child. He presented evidence that he had been 
depressed after the birth of the child and lost control when the 
baby would not stop crying. The man has no prior criminal 
record; no weapon was used in the crime. Under the sentencing 
guidelines, the typical sentence for such an offender would be 
imprisonment for 12-20 years. Should he be sentenced within the 
guidelines, above the guidelines, or below the guidelines? 
a. Please check your choice: 
Within the guidelines __ _ 
Above the guidelines __ _ 
Below the guidelines __ _ 
b. What sentence would you impose? years 
2. In a divorce proceeding, both parents are seeking custody of the 
couple's child, a girl age 10. The child has been living with the 
father since the separation, which occurred approximately six 
weeks before the pendente lite hearing. Prior to the separation, 
the father was primarily responsible for the care of the child. 
Both parents have worked full-time throughout the marriage; the 
father's net (after tax) income is approximately half that of the 
mother. Under an informal agreement between the parties, until 
a pendente lite order is entered, the father has custody, the child 
visits the mother at the mother's home on alternate weekends, 
and the mother pays approximately 20 percent of her net salary 
to the father in child support. The child is doing reasonably well 
both at home and at the day care center. 
a. Assuming that, under the law, custody could be awarded to 
either parent, would you award custody to: 
The father __ _ 
The mother __ _ 
Jointly to the mother and father __ _ 
b. Which of the following factors would influence you to award 
sole custody to the father (please rank each factor in order 
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of importance, beginning with 1 for the most important): 
Age of the child 
Amount of time each parent 
spends with the child 
Child's post-separation 
adjustment .. 
Father's full-time employment 
Gender of the child 
Gender of the parent 
awarded custody 
Mother's full-time employment 
Relative economic 
circumstances of parents 
c. Which of the following factors would influence you to award 
sole custody to the mother (please rank each factor in order 
of importance, beginning with 1 for the most important): 
Age of the child 
Amount of time each parent 
spends with the child 
Child's post-separation 
adjustment 
Father's full-time employment 
Gender of the child 
Gender of the parent 
awarded custody 
Mother's full-time employment 
Relative economic 
circumstances of parents 
d. If the evidence showed that the father had beaten the mother 
several times before the separation, would that change your 
decision? 
Yes No __ _ 
e. If the evidence showed that the father had a paramour, 
would that change your decision? 
Yes No __ _ 
f. If the evidence showed that the mother had a paramour. 
would that change your decision? 
Yes No __ _ 
3. In a divorce proceeding, the wife is seeking indefinite alimony. 
The court has found that the divorce can be granted on the 
ground of the wife's adultery. During the marriage, which lasted 
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22 years, the wife was employed intermittently on a part-time 
basis. She is 45 years old and suffers from lower back pain as 
the result of an injury suffered 20 years earlier; her primary 
occupation throughout the marriage was caring for the children 
and taking care of the home. She now is employed part-time; 
her net (after tax) income is $5,200 per year. The husband, who 
is also 45 years old, was employed full-time in his occupation 
throughout the marriage. He has a net income of $35,000 per 
year. 
a. Assuming that, under the law, the wife is entitled to alimony 
for some period of time, approximately what amount of 
alimony would you award? 
$ per month 
b. Would you make the award: (check your choice) 
For a limited number of years? __ _ 
For an indefinite period? __ _ 
4. You are presiding over a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff 
was initially hospitalized for a severe kidney infection and later 
contracted uremic poisoning. He alleges that the defendant, a 
urologist, breached the applicable standard of care by failing to 
diagnose and treat his condition at an earlier date. Dr. Angela 
Williams, a urologist, testified for the defense. Dr. Williams, a 
professor at The Johns Hopkins University, is a well-known 
expert in her field. She has published a number of articles 
concerning catheterization of kidney patients and has testified as 
an expert many times. It is her opinion that the patient's illness 
was caused by the negligence of the nurse who catheterized the 
patient. She testified that the defendant's health care provider 
did not breach the standard of care but, rather, acted in con-
formance with it. 
The following jury instructions have been proposed for use in 
the case. Please place an "x" next to the one you would use in 
this case. Rank the others 1 to 3 according to your preference 
for each beginning with 1 for the most important. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing her opinion you should consider her experience, 
training and skills, and her knowledge of the subject matter 
about which she is expressing an opinion. 
You should give her testimony the weight and value you 
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believe it should have. You are not required to accept any 
expert's opinion. You should consider her opinion together 
with all the other evidence. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing his opinion you should consider his experience, 
training and skills, and his knowledge of the subject matter 
about which he is expressing an opinion. 
You should give his testimony the weight and value you 
believe it should have. You are not required to accept any 
expert's opinion. You should consider his opinion together 
with all the other evidence. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing the opinions of an expert you should consider 
the expert's experience, training and skills, and the expert's 
knowledge of the subject matter about which an opinion has 
been expressed. 
You should give expert testimony the weight and value you 
believe it should have. You are not required to accept any 
expert's opinion. You should consider an expert's opinion 
together with all the other evidence. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing the opinions of an expert you should consider 
the expert's experience, training and skills, and the expert's 
knowledge of the subject matter about which an opinion has 
been expressed. 
You should give expert testimony the weight and value you 
believe it should have. Even if you were surprised by the 
fact that the expert witness in this case is a woman, you 
should not let those feelings influence your decision in this 
case. Your personal biases are not relevant, and you should 
make a conscious effort to not let them play a part in the 
decision making process. You are not required to accept any 
expert's opinion. You should consider an expert's opinion 





Instructions: We are asking the following questions in order to gather 
information on judicial attitudes about a variety of situations. Please 
take a few minutes to fill in the blanks in the following problems. 
If you want to give further information about your answers, please 
use the back of the paper. Thank you. 
1. A man is convicted of second degree murder in the death of his 
two month old child. He presented evidence that he got very 
drunk one day shortly after the birth of the child and that he 
lost control when the baby would not stop crying. The man has 
no prior criminal record; no weapon was used in the crime. 
Under the sentencing guidelines, the typical sentence for such an 
offender would be imprisonment for 12-20 years. Should he be 
sentenced within the sentencing guidelines, above the guidelines, 
or below the guidelines? 
a. Please check your choice: 
Within the guidelines __ _ 
Above the guidelines __ _ 
Below the guidelines __ _ 
b. What sentence would you impose? years 
2. In a divorce proceeding, both parents are seeking custody of the 
couple's child, a boy age 10. The child has been living with the 
father since the separation, which occurred approximately six 
weeks before the pendente lite hearing. Prior to the separation, 
the father was primarily responsible for the care of the child. 
Both parents have worked full-time throughout the marriage; the 
father's net (after tax) income is approximately half that of the 
mother. Under an informal agreement between the parties, until 
a pendente lite order is entered, the father has custody, the child 
visits the mother at the mother's home on alternate weekends, 
and the mother pays approximately 20 percent of her net salary 
to the father in child support. The child is doing reasonably well 
both at home and at the day care center. 
a. Assuming that, under the law, custody could be awarded to 
either parent, would you award custody to: 
The father __ _ 
The mother __ _ 
Jointly to the mother and father __ _ 
b. Which of the following factors would influence you to award 
sole custody to the father (please rank each factor in order 
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of importance, beginning with 1 for the most important): 
Age of the child 
Amount of time each parent 
spends with the child 
Child's post-separation 
adjustment 
Father's full-time employment 
Gender of the child 
Gender of the parent 
awarded custody 
Mother's full-time employment 
Relative economic 
circumstances of parents 
c. Which of the following factors would influence you to award 
sole custody to the mother (please rank each factor in order 
of importance, beginning with 1 for the most important): 
Age of child 
Amount of time each parent 
spends with the child 
Child's post-separation 
adjustment 
Father's full-time employment 
Gender of the child 
Gender of the parent 
awarded custody 
Mother's full-time employment 
Relative economic 
circumstances of parents 
d. If the evidence showed that the father had beaten the mother 
several times before the separation, would that change your 
decision? . 
Yes No __ _ 
e. If the evidence showed that the father had a paramour, 
would that change your decision? 
Yes No __ _ 
f. If the evidence showed that the mother had a paramour, 
would that change your decision? 
Yes No __ _ 
3. In a divorce proceeding, the husband is seeking indefinite ali-
mony. The court has found that the divorce can be granted on 
the ground of the husband's adultery. During the marriage, which 
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lasted 22 years, the husband was employed intermittently on a 
part-time basis. He is 45 years old and suffers from lower back 
pain as the result of an injury suffered 20 years earlier; his 
primary occupation throughout the marriage was caring for the 
children and taking care of the home. He now is employed part-
time; his net (after tax) income is $5,200 per year. The wife, 
who is also 45 years old, was employed full-time in her occu-
pation throughout the marriage. She has a net income of $35,000 
per year. 
a. Assuming that, under the law, the husband is entitled to 
alimony for some period of time, approximately what amount 
of alimony would you award? 
$ per month 
b. Would you make the award: ,. 
For a limited number of years? __ _ 
For an indefinite period? __ _ 
4. You are presiding over a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff 
was initially hospitalized for a severe kidney infection and later 
contracted uremic poisoning. He alleges that the defendant, a 
urologist, breached the applicable standard of care by failing to 
diagnose and treat his condition at an earlier date. Dr. Angela 
Williams, a urologist, testified for the defense. Dr. Williams, a 
professor at The Johns Hopkins University, is a well-known 
expert in her field. She has published a number of articles 
concerning catheterization of kidney patients and has testified as 
an expert many times. It is her opinion that the patient's illness 
was caused by the negligence of the nurse who catheterized the 
patient. She testified that the defendant's health care provider 
did not breach the standard of care but, rather, acted in con-
formance with it. 
The following jury instructions have been proposed for use in 
the case. Please place an "x" next to the one you would use in 
this case. Rank the others 1 to 3 according to your preference 
for each beginning with 1 for the most important. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing her opinion you should consider her experience, 
training and skills, and her knowledge of the subject matter 
about which she is expressing an opinion. 
You should give her testimony the weight and value you 
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believe it should have. You are not required to accept any 
expert's opinion. You should consider her opinion together 
with all the other evidence. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing his opinion you should consider his experience, 
training and skills, and his knowledge of the subject matter 
about which he is expressing an opinion. 
You should give his testimony the weight and value you 
believe it should have. You are not required to accept any 
expert's opinion. You should consider his opinion together 
with all the other evidence. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing the opinions of an expert you should consider 
the expert's experience, training and skills, and the expert's 
knowledge of the subject matter about which an opinion has 
been expressed. 
You should give expert testimony the weight and value you 
believe it should have. You are not required to accept any 
expert's opinion. You should consider an expert's opinion 
together with all the other evidence. 
Rank __ _ 
A witness who has special training or experience in a given 
field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or 
assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in the case. 
In weighing the opinions of an expert you should consider 
the expert's experience, training and skills, and the expert's 
knowledge of the subject matter about which an opinion has 
been expressed. 
You should give expert testimony the weight and value you 
believe it should have. Even if you were surprised by the 
fact that the expert witness in this case is a woman, you 
should not let those feelings influence your decision in this 
case. Your personal biases are not relevant, and you should 
make a conscious effort to not let them play a part in the 
decision making process. You are not required to accept any 
expert's opinion. You should consider an expert's opinion 
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Characteristics of the Samples 
161 
In order to determine perceptions and evaluations of the occur-
rence, frequency, and type(s) of gender bias in the Maryland courts, 
the Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts surveyed 
judges, attorneys, and court personnel in the Maryland judicial 
system. Random samples of male and female attorneys lic~nsed to 
practice law in Maryland were selected, while all sitting judges to 
the Maryland judiciary and all Maryland court personnel were sur-
veyed. Identical questions were included in all versions of the ques-
tionnaire. Completed questionnaires were returned by 54% of the 
male attorney sample, 49070 of the female attorney sample, 80% of 
the judges, and 49% of the court personnel. 
Questionnaire Construction 
Each of the questionnaires used in this research project was a 
collaborative effort of the survey subcommittee and its consultants. 
The questionnaires were drafted using the New York Gender Bias 
questionnaire as a model, adapting the questions to specifics of 
Maryland law and other issues identified as germane to Maryland's 
situation. Subsequent redraftings reflect issues from the public hear-
ings which were ongoing at the latter stages of questionnaire con-
struction, and comments and suggestions made by pretest respondents. 
The intent of the survey subcommittee was to measure attitudes 
and perceptions as well as actual experiences dealing with specific 
areas of law and courtroom procedures. The questionnaire was 
designed to leave respondents sufficient opportunity to describe ex-
periences which might not be covered or fully explored in the 
questions. For example, the attorney questionnaire provided one 
entire page for "other experiences you would like to bring to the 
Committee's attention" as well as instructions on each of the ques-
tionnaire forms encouraging the submission of additional material(s). 
The questionnaires distributed to the samples of male and female 
attorneys were identical. This same questionnaire was later distributed 
to al/ female attorneys. Questions in this instrument included the 
following categories: courtroom interaction, credibility of female 
attorneys, litigants and witnesses, alimony, child support, custody, 
domestic violence, rape, sentencing, frequency and location of any 
experiences of gender bias, judicial selection, and demographics. The 
attorney questionnaire included one section on perceptions of appli-
cation of the law which was not included in the versions of the 
questionnaire sent to judges and court personnel. 
The questionnaire sent to judges in the state followed the same 
model, using identical question wording except changes in the credibility 
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section which reflect the same issue from the judges' viewpoint of their 
own behavior. In addition, judges were asked about jury selection and 
given an opportunity to describe behavior of male and female attorneys. 
Consistent with the questionnaires sent to attorneys and judges, 
those distributed to the court personnel asked about court interactions 
and credibility of female attorneys, litigants and witnesses. Since most 
court personnel do not have direct involvement with the courtroom, 
respondents in this sample as in the Questionnaires distributed to the 
other samples, were given a "don't know" option in response cate-
gories. As a further control in analysis, a question about the amount 
of time "usually" spent in the courtroom was asked of court personnel. 
Most of the court personnel questionnaire focused around the 
job duties and responsibilities which might be affected by perceptions 
or actual experiences of gender bias. Respondents were asked to 
describe their own experiences as well as perceptions of experiences 
of others in this personnel category. Topics of questions included 
sexual harassment, job opportunities, promotion and training oppor-
tunities, and child care needs. 
Questionnaire Distribution, Sampling and Response Rates 
Questionnaires were mailed to all judges from the Administrative 
Office of the Courts in late January, 1988. Postage paid return 
envelopes were included. For all of the questionnaires distributed 
(including attorneys and court personnel), the return envelopes were 
addressed to the University of Maryland Survey Research Center 
where data entry and tabulation were performed.· 
Two weeks after the original mailing, a reminder notice was sent 
to all judges; no attempt was made to follow up individually. 
However, the response rate from this group was 800/0, the highest 
of any of the groups surveyed. At the time the questionnaire was 
distributed, four vacancies existed in the judicial system, leaving a 
total of 216 sitting judges. Of this number, 173 completed and 
returned the questionnaire. Table 1 compares some characteristics of 
the group who returned the questionnaire to the total population. 
The distribution of the respondents' gender and race closely approx-
imates that of the total population. The percentage of whites re-
sponding is slightly lower (88%) than the actual number (91 %), as 
is the percentage of males (88% responding compared to the actual 
91 %). No answer as to gender or race was received from two percent 
of the respondents. 
I. All results are reported as aggregate data; no individuals are identified through-
out this report. The individual questionnaires remain under the supervision of 
the University of Maryland Survey Research Center and the Project Director 
of this research. 
1990] Appendix 163 
The distribution of respondents from the various courts was also 
remarkably close to the actual population. In only one category, the 
Circuit Court, was a different percentage received from the actual 
distribution (470/0 responded as compared to 50% in the population). 
Three percent of the respondents did not indicate their court. 
Table 1 
Judges 
Distribution of Respondents Compared to Population 
Respondents Total Number 
to Questionnaire in Maryland 
(n = 173) (n=216)* 
Sex 
Male 88% 91070 
Female 9% 9% 
No Answer 3% 
100% 100% 
Race 
White 89% 92% 
Black 8% 8% 
Other 1% 
No Answer 2% 
100070 100% 
Court 
Appellate 9% 9% 
Circuit 47% 50% 
District 41% 41% 
No Answer 3% 
100% 100% 
*Based on information available February 26, 1988 from the Administrative Office 
of the Courts. 
Attorney Sample and Characteristics 
The second group of interest to the survey subcommittee were 
attorneys, male and female, practicing in the State of Maryland. The 
Committee felt a mailed, self-administered questionnaire would be the 
most appropriate method of data collection given the length of the 
questionnaire and the sensitive nature of some of the topics. However, 
as with most mailed questionnaires, the issue of a complete mailing 
list was problematic. The most complete list available was that of the 
Client Security Trust Fund, which maintains a list of all attorneys 
licensed to practice in the State. This listing does not mean, however, 
that the attorneys either live in Maryland or practice in the Maryland 
courts, nor does the list provide any demographic data other than 
county or residence (from the address) and sex. Given the proximity 
to the District of Columbia, the usual number of federal courts in any 
state, and the usual number of attorneys whose practice does not 
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involve courtroom appearances, the actual number of attorneys who 
fit the definition of the study was considerably reduced. 
Independent random samples were drawn for male and female 
attorneys: 750 males and 750 females by selecting every nth name 
from each strata, male and female. This allows approximately equal 
sample sizes when comparing the two groups. However, when the 
total sample results for all attorneys-male and female-are com-
puted, the sample has been statistically weighted to represent females 
as 14070 of the attorney sample. This corresponds with the information 
available, that males constitute 86% of practicing attorneys in Mary-
land and females constitute 14%. 
Questionnaires were mailed to the sample of attorneys early in 
November 1987. Enclosed with the questionnaires was a return, 
postage paid envelope addressed to the University of Maryland Survey 
Research Center. Each questionnaire was coded for follow-up pur-
poses. As a questionnaire was returned and checked in by the Project 
Director, that name and address were deleted from the master list. 
Early in December, a second mailing was made to those who had 
not returned the questionnaire. Since the response rate was still below 
50% for both the male and female samples, telephone follow-ups 
were initiated in January 1988. These follow-ups were primarily 
designed to ascertain if the listed addresses were adequate, whether 
selected respondents had received the first two mailings, to mail a 
questionnaire to those requesting it, and to ascertain some demo-
graphics of the non-respondents. 
The following table shows the response categories for these two 
samples. After the follow-up procedures, contact had been made 
with 540 male attorneys and 505 female attorneys. Among the males, 
28% were determined "out of sample"; 34% of the females. 
Table 2 
Categories of Responses from Males and Females 
Questionnaires sent 
Determined Out of Sample 
Total Sample 
Refused (on telephone contact) 
No response (unable to contact 
to verify address, etc.) 
Questionnaires Completed 
Response Rate 
(Questionnaire Completed divided 
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Out of sample was defined as those not practicing in Maryland 
courts, deceased, or retired from practice. The response rate for the 
males was 54070, that for females 52%. This lower response rate for 
female attorneys differs from the experience of other states in gender 
bias research. Other studies have consistently found the female re-
sponse rate higher than that of male attorneys.2 Consistent with the 
response rate of the female attorney sample, when the questionnaire 
was distributed to all female attorneys in the state, the total response 
rate from this group was approximately 44%. 
The resulting samples of males (n = 292) and females (n = 236) 
are profiled in Tables 3 and 4. As expected, female attorneys are 
younger (57% are between the ages of 25 and 34 compared to 30% 
of the males in this age category), have been admitted to the bar 
-more recently (44% since 1983), and have been practicing law a 
shorter period of time (51 % less than six years) than their male 
counterparts. 
Number of years practicing law: 
Less than 6 years 
6 to 10 years 
11 to 15 years 
16 to 20 years 
21 to 25 years 
26 to 30 years 






















During the past two years, has litigation formed over 200/0 of your practice? 
Males Females 
(n = 292) (n = 236) 
y~ ~% M% 
No 32% 36% 
100% 100% 
2. For example, Arizona's Pima County study of gender bias received a 48% 
response rate from male attorneys and a 64% response rate from female 
attorneys. In New Jersey's study, female attorneys accounted for one-third of 
the returned questionnaires, whereas they are only 13% of all attorneys in the 
State. 
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Check if any of these areas constitute 200/0 or more of your practice: 
Personal Injury (Plaintiff) 





25 to 34 
35 to 44 
45 to 54 
55 to 64 
65 to 74 





Percent Indicating Yes 
Males Females 





















·Less than one percent . 
"Some totals are other than 100% because the figures were rounded-off. 
·"Although no precise figures could be obtained about the racial composition 
of the bar, figures compiled by the Monumental Bar Association show that ap-
proximately 700 black lawyers have been admitted to practice and that approximately 
half are female and half male. Black lawyers comprise, therefore, approximately 
4% of all attorneys licensed to practice, 3% of all the male attorneys and 8% of 
all the female attorneys. 
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Table 4 
Attorneys 
Distribution of Respondents Compared to Population 
Respondents Total Number 
to Questionnaire in M~land 
Males Females Males Females 
(n=292) (n=236) (n = 14928) (n =4136)· 
Date Admitted to Bar 
1983-1987 271110 44% 24% 61% 
1978-1982 18% 38% 18% 27% 
1973-1977 19% 13% 18% 11% 
1968-1972 13% 3% 12% 1% 
1963-1%7 8% 1% 8% •• 
1958-1962 4% 1% 5% •• 
1953-1957 4% 1% 4% •• 
1952 or before 6% •• 11% 1% 
99%··· 101% 100% 101% 
Primary County (practice law): 
Males Females Males Females 
(n=292) (n =236) (n= 11827) (n=3110)···· 
Baltimore City 33% 39% 30% 33% 
Baltimore County 8070 8070 16070 11070 
Montgomery 22% 20070 25070 29070 
Prince George's 11% 13070 9070 9070 
Anne Arundel/ 
Howard 8% 10% 10% 13070 
Eastern/Southern 4% 4% 5% 2% 
Western 7% 4% 2% 1070 
Other 7070 3070 4% 3% 
100% 101070 101% 101% 
·These figures represent the total numbetof male and female attorneys licensed to practice 
as of March 27, 1989, according to the Client Security Trust Fund. 
"Less than one percent. 
·"Some totals are other than 100% because the figures were rounded-off. 
····These figures represent the total number of male and female attorneys practicing or 
residing in Maryland as of March 27, 1989, according to the Client Security Trust Fund. 
168 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 20 
Concerning other characteristics examined by this survey, the 
male and female samples are remarkably similar. The samples are 
the same in racial distribution: 96010 of the male and female samples 
are white, 3% are black. The different geographic regions of Mar-
yland are represented in almost equal proportions in the male and 
female samples. Thirty-three percent of the males practice in Balti-
more City, and 39% of the females practice in the City; similar 
proportions (22% and 20%) list Montgomery County as their primary 
county of practice. Other regions of the State are represented by 
almost equal proportions of males and females, the exception being 
the rural counties (defined in the categories as "Western" and 
"Eastern and Southern" counties) where the number of male attor-
neys responding (14%) is double that of female attorneys responding 
(7%). 
Of those responding to this survey, males are only slightly more 
likely (68%) than females (64%) to report that litigation has formed 
over 20% of their practice in the last two years. The majority of 
both samples have experience in the courtroom. However, the type 
of law practiced (of those listed on the questionnaire) is different 
for each sample. Males report more participation in personal injury 
(plaintiff and defendant) and criminal defense, whereas females in-
dicate more participation in criminal prosecution and slightly more 
in domestic law. 
The distribution of the respondents with respect to race, number 
of years since admission to practice, and location of practice (see 
Tables 3 and 4) approximates that of the total population of lawyers. 
Somewhat over-represented among the respondents are female attor-
neys admitted to practice between 1978 and 1982 and male and 
female attorneys who practice in Baltimore City. Somewhat under-
represented among the respondents are black female attorneys, female 
attorneys admitted to practice between 1982 and 1987, male attorneys 
admitted to practice before 1952, and male and female attorneys 
practicing or residing in Montgomery and Baltimore Counties. 
Court Personnel 
Questionnaires were distributed to each of the 2,411 court per-
sonnel in late December 1987 through the biweekly payroll disburse-
ment. Each questionnaire was stapled to a postage paid envelope 
addressed to the Survey Research Center at the University of Mary-
land College Park. The envelopes were not precoded as no list was 
available for follow-up. A reminder notice was distributed in the 
following payroll cycle (January 1988). A total of 1,187 court per-
sonnel returned completed questionnaires, a response rate of 49%. 
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Table 5 


























Characteristics of this group of respondents are shown in Tables 6 and 7. 
Unfortunately, aggregate data about the total group of court personnel are not 
available so the representativeness of those returning questionnaires is difficult to 
determine. Almost three-quarters (74'10) of respondents are female, SO'lo are white. 
Personnel in the district court system are more represented in the sample (50'10) 
than in the total population (43'10), reflecting the higher response rate shown above. 
Table 6 
Place of Employment in Court System 





18 to 24 
25 to 34 
35 to 44 
45 to 54 
55 to 64 
65 to 74 . 

















































Type of Position 
Percent 















Two methodological considerations must be evaluated as part of 
the discussion of results from the data. The first is evident in the 
response rate from the male and female attorney samples and that 
from the universe of court personnel. The average response rate for 
these three groups is 50.6010, which, according to E.R. Babbie, is an 
adequate response rate for analysis and reporting. 3 Although no 
follow-up was attempted with the court personnel, the attorney 
samples did receive a telephone call and, in some cases, a second 
mailing. 
Studies of gender bias in other states have experienced a higher 
response rate from female attorneys than from males. The experience 
in Maryland has been just the opposite: 54% of the male attorneys 
responded compared to 49% of the female attorneys. 
The scope of this study does not include a non-response analysis, 
although several suggestions have been made as to why the response 
rate was not higher. Issues of confidentiality have been mentioned. 
Some attorneys felt they would be professionally harmed for criticiz-
ing colleagues or judges and that somehow questionnaire responses 
3. Babbie, E.R., Survey Research Methods, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
Inc., 165, (1973). 
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would not be confidential. Others suggested that whether confidential 
or not, professional ethics prevented them from making what might 
seem like criticism of the system or participants in the system.4 
The second consideration is the number of "don't know" res-
ponses to the majority of questions on the respective questionnaires 
for each of the samples. In a self-administered questionnaire, the 
"don't know" option is more readily available than in a telephone 
survey so that an increase in this response category can be expected. 
However, the results show the "don't know" response in pluralities 
of each sample. Analysis of the data indicates that this is not a 
"response set" bias, that is, where the same group of respondents 
tend to answer all questions by marking the same category. Rather, 
the "don't know" responses are spread throughout the sample, 
occurring in some topics of the questionnaire for some respondents 
and in other areas for other groups of respondents. 
A possible explanation for the "don't know" responses, accord-
ing to this author, is the lack of common professional experience 
among attorneys and court personnel. This is not unexpected given 
the trend toward specialization in law and the number of distinct 
positions in the court system. It underscores one of the problems 
involved in studying the judicial system. Each area of the law and 
its application, interpretation, and enforcement should be considered 
separately and in more depth. 
Whatever the reasons for non-response, the methodological ques-
tion is how representative the sample(s) might be of the particular 
populations surveyed. There are some parameters available for the 
populations of judges (e.g., race, sex, court). Very little is available 
for the court personnel (e.g., place of employment), although the 
district court and the administrative office of the courts did provide 
aggregate information regarding sex and race. Other than an estimate 
of the male-female proportions (866,10-14%), there are no data avail-
able for the attorney population. 
For the attorney samples, responses from appropriate subsamples 
- female and male litigators, female and male domestic relations 
attorneys, and male and female criminal attorneys - are also shown. 
These subsamples are based on answers given by respondents in the 
questionnaire as to type of practice, and amount of their practice 
involving litigation. The sample size and the sampling error associated 
with that size are shown in the table below. 
4. Subcommittee Report on Gender Bias in the Court, The Women's Law Center, 
Inc., 1-14, Prepared January, 1988. 
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Table 8 




























Sampling error cannot be given for the judges or for the court personnel since 
these are not random samples, but rather, canvasses of both populations. The sample 
of judges is not broken out by responses from males and females in order to 
preserve the anonymity of respondents. 
The results are given as percentages; row totals may sometimes equal 99% or 
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Robert C. Murphy 
Chief Judge 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
Courts of Appeal Building 
Annapolis, Maryland 21401 
December 16, 1987 
Maryland's Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the 
Courts is seeking to ascertain the attitudes, perceptions, and actual 
experiences of State judges concerning the treatment of individuals 
within the State judicial system. To this end, the attached question-
naire is of extreme importance in assisting the Committee with its 
work. 
It would be greatly appreciated if you would complete the 
questionnaire and return it in the enclosed envelope by January 18, 
1988. Individuals completing the questionnaire will not be identified. 
The results of the survey will appear in the form of group data and 
be tabulated by the University of Maryland Survey Research Center, 
with the aggregated results made available to the Committee. 
I most earnestly enlist your support and cooperation. Should 
you have questions or need additional information about the Com-
mittee, please contact Deborah A. Unitus, Administrative Office of 
the Courts, at (301) 974-2353. 
Sincerely, 
Robert C. Murphy 
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I. The following questions ask about specific behaviors and the frequency of their 
occurrence in your experience: Circle the response which best describes your 
perceptions of the court system in Maryland. Responses are (1) Always (2) Often 
(3) Sometimes (4) Rarely or (5) Never. (CIRCLE RESPONSE; IF YOU HAVE 
NO EXPERIENCE IN A PARTICULAR AREA, CIRCLE "DON'T KNOW" 
COLUMN.) 
Court Interactions: 
1. Women attorneys are asked if' 
they are attorneys when men at-
torneys are not asked. 
_by you 
_ by counsel 
_ by court personnel 
2. Women attorneys are addressed 
by first names or terms of en-
dearment when men attorneys 




_ by court personnel 
3, Women litigants or witnesses are 
addressed by first names or terms 
of endearment when men are 
addressed by surnames or titles. 
_by you 
_ by counsel 
_ by court personnel 
4, Comments are made about the 
personal appearance of women 
attorneys when no such com-
ments are made about men. 
_by you 
_by counsel 
_ by court personnel 
5. Comments are made about the 
personal appearance of women 
litigants or witnesses when no 
such comments are made about 
men, 
_by you 
_ by counsel 
_ by court personnel 
6. Sexist remarks or jokes are made 
in courts or in chambers. 
_by you 
SOME· DON'T 

















































































1990] Appendix 177 
_ by counsel I 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel I 2 3 4 5 8 
7. Women litigants are subjected 
to verbal or physical sexual ad-
vances. 
_by you 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
8. Women attorneys are subjected 
to verbal or physical sexual ad-
vances. 
_by you 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
9. Women attorneys are appointed 
to important fee generating cases 
on an equal basis with male at-
torneys. 2 3 4 5 8 
Credibility 
10. Do you give less weight to fe-
male attorneys' arguments than 
to those of male attorneys. 2 3 4 5 8 
II. Do you give less weight to the 
testimony of female experts than 
that of male experts. 2 3 4 5 8 
12. Do you require more evidence 
for a female litigant to prove 
her case than for a male litigant. 2 3 4 5 8 
Marital Property 
13. Where a wife's primary contri-
bution is as a homemaker, the 
monetary award reflects a judi-
cial attitude that the husband's 
income producing contribution 
entitles him to a larger share of 
the marital estate. 2 3 4 5 8 
14. Courts award counsel and ex-
pert fees to the economically de-
pendent spouse sufficient to 
allow that spouse to effectively 
pursue the litigation. 2 3 4 5 8 
15. Effective injunctive relief is 
granted where necessary to 
maintain the status quo until 
monetary awards are made. 2 3 4 5 8 
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16. Judges impose meaningful sanc-
tions, including civil contempt, 
when injunctions are violated. 2 3 4 5 8 
Alimony 
17. A wife's alimony award is based 
on how much the husband can 
give her without diminishing his 
current life style. 2 3 4 5 8 
18. Older, displaced homemakers are 
awarded indefinite alimony after 
long term marriages. 2 3 4 5 8 
19. The courts effectively enforce 
alimony awards. 2 3 4 5 8 
20. Alimony awards at the time of 
divorce are close to or the same 
as pendente lite awards. 2 3 4 5 8 
Child Support 
21. Child support awards reflect a 
realistic understanding of the lo-
cal costs of child raising. 2 3 4 5 8 
22. Child support awards reflect a 
realistic understanding of a par-
ticular child's needs. 2 3 4 5 8 
23. Child support awards ade-
quately reflect the earning ca-
pacity of the 
a. non-custodial parent. 2 3 4 5 8 
b. custodial parent. 2 3 4 5 8 
24. Enforcement of child support 
awards is denied because of al-
leged visitation problems. 2 3 4 5 8 
25. Enforcement of child support 
awards is delayed because of 
counter claims for custody. 2 3 4 5 8 
26. Pendente lite awards of child 
support are made within 60 days 
of filing the motion. 2 3 4 5 8 
27. Earnings withholding orders are 
entered as soon as the obligor 
is 30 days behind in paying child 
support. 2 3 4 5 8 
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Custody 
. 28. Custody awards to mothers are 
apparently based on the as-
sumption that children belong 
with their mothers. 2 3 4 5 8 
29. The courts give fair and serious 
consideration to fathers who ac-
tively seek custody. 2 3 4 5 8 
30. The courts favor the parent in 
the stronger financial position 
when awarding custody. 2 3 4 5 8 
31. Child custody awards disregard 
father's violence against mother. 2 3 4 5 8 
32. Mothers are denied custody be-
cause of employment outside the 
home. 2 3 4 5 8 
33. Joint custody is ordered over the 
objections of one or both par-
ents. 2 3 4 5 8 
Domestic Violence 
34. Civil orders of protection, di-
recting respondents to stay away 
from the home, are granted 
when petitioners are in fear of 
serious bodily harm. 2 3 4 5 8 
35. When granting civil orders of 
protection, the courts issue sup-
port awards for dependents. 2 3 4 5 8 
36. Petitions for civil orders of pro-
tection are rejected where do-
mestic relations cases are 
pending. 2 3 4 5 8 
37. Circuit court judges order emer-
gency injunctive relief to protect 
victims of domestic violence. 2 3 4 5 8 
38. The courts do not treat domestic 
violence as a crime. 2 3 4 5 8 
39. Assault charges are not treated 
seriously when domestic rela-
tions cases are pending. 2 3 4 5 8 
Rape 
40. Rape victims are accorded less 
credibility than victims of other 
types of assault. 2 3 4 5 8 
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41. Judges control the court so as 
to protect the complaining wit-
ness from improper questioning. 2 3 4 5 
42. Sentences are shorter where the 
victim had a prior relationship 
with the defendant. 2 3 4 5 
II. Sentencing 
43. Women offenders are sentenced below the guidelines: (CIRCLE ONE:) 
I. Less frequently than men 
2. About the same as men 
3. More frequently than men 
8. Don't know 
8 
8 
44. Judges give sentences, based solely on gender, to female defendants that are 
(less severe, about the same, or more severe) than they give to male defendants. 
1. Less severe 
2. About the same 
3. More severe 
45. List what you would consider to be mitigating factors in sentencing a female? 
46. Would these mitigating factors be different for a male? 
o. No 
1. Yes - In what ways? ________________ _ 
III. Jury Selection 
47. What are the criteria you use to select jury forepeople? 
48. In the last year, how many times have you selected women as jury forepersons? 
49. Can you recall cases in which you felt it was advantageous to have a male jury 
foreperson? 
O. No. 
1. Yes - Why was that? _______________ _ 
IV. General 
50. Is there a behavior that is often displayed by female attorneys which you find 
especially offensive? 
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51. Is there a behavior that is often displayed by male attorneys which you find 
especially offensive? 
V. In your experience, have you observed or been informed of a case(s) in 
which you felt the litigation process or outcome was affected (either 
negatively or positively) by the gender (male or female) of one of the 
parties? (Please circle your response.) 
O. No - GO TO NEXT QUESTION. 
1. Yes 
a. How many times in the past five years has this occurred? __ 
b. Briefly describe the most recent case in which you felt this 
occurred - in what way do you feel gender affected the case? 
(You may include a separate sheet of paper if you feel you need 
more room.) 
In which year did this occur? ____ _ 
In which County (or Baltimore City)? ____ _ 
VI. In your experience, has there been a situation where you felt the litigation 
process or outcome of a case was affected (negatively or positively) by the 
gender (male or female) of counsel (Circle response.) 
O. No - GO TO NEXT PAGE 
1. Yes 
a. How many times in the past five years has this occurred? __ 
b. Briefly describe these circumstances of the most recent case where 
you felt this occurred? 
In which year did this occur? ____ _ 
In which County (or Baltimore City)? ____ _ 
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VII. Are you aware of any instances of gender bias in the judicial selection 
process? 
O. No. 
1. Yes - Briefly describe: _____________ _ 
VIII. During your tenure as a judge, have you ever intervened in a trial in your 
court because you observed gender bias in the proceedings? 
O. No 
1. Yes - Briefly describe the circumstances? _______ _ 
IX. The following questions are to provide general background information 
about the judges answering the survey. Results will be given as group data 
so that no individuals will be identified in the survey. 
1. Number of years on the bench (years) 
Year Admitted to the Maryland Bar: 19_ (year) 
2. Jurisdiction: 
___ Baltimore City 
___ Baltimore County 
___ Anne Arundel County 
___ Montgomery County 
___ Prince George's County 
___ Other 
3. Court: District 
___ Circuit 
___ Appellate 
4. In what year were you born? 19_ 
5. Sex: Male Female 





___ Other-Please specify: _________ _ 
PLEASE DO NOT SIGN YOUR NAME; ALL QUESTIONNAIRES ARE CON· 
FIDENTIAL. 
X. This space is provided for any information of gender bias or discrimination 
in the courts, including attitudes, in addition to those just described which 
have occurred in the last five years that you would like to bring to the 
Committee's attention. Be as specific as possible. 
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION. PLEASE RETURN 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN THE ENCLOSED ENVE-
LOPE OR RETURN IT TO: 
SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER 
ROOM 1103 ART/SOCIOLOGY 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND 20742 





Robert C. Murphy 
Chief Judge 
Appendix 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
Courts of Appeal Building 
Annapolis, Maryland 21401 
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Maryland's Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the 
Courts is seeking to ascertain the attitudes, perceptions, and actual 
experiences of attorneys with respect to the treatment of individuals 
within the State judicial system. To this end, the attached question-
naire is of extreme importance in assisting the Committee with its 
work. 
It would be greatly appreciated if you would complete the 
questionnaire and return it in the enclosed envelope by November 
30. Individuals completing the questionnaire will not be identified. 
The results of the survey will appear in the form of group data and 
be tabulated by the University of Maryland Survey Research Center, 
with the aggregated results made available to the Committee. 
I most earnestly enlist your support and cooperation. Should 
you have questions or need additional information about the Com-
mittee, please contact Deborah A. Unitus, Administrative Office of 
the Courts, at (301) 974-2353. 
Sincerely, 
Robert C. Murphy 
NOTE FROM THE COMMITTEE: The Committee has tried, within 
space limitations, to include as many specifics as possible in the 
questionnaire. It focuses on areas of the law most frequently aired 
at the Committee's public hearings. Please feel free to provide 
additional information about any other personal experiences with 
gender bias in the courts which you feel should be brought to the 
Committee's attention. 
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I. In the following areas of law, have you found that the courts in Maryland apply, 
interpret and enforce laws in a way that treats males more favorably than females, 
treats females more favorably than males, or treats individuals the same regardless 
of their gender: (CIRCLE RESPONSE.) 
Treats Treats Treats No 
Males Females Both Opinion 
More More Equally 
Favorably Favorably 
I. Family Law 
a. Marital property 
__ Amount of monetary award 3 2 8 
_ Enforcement of judgment 3 2 8 
b. Alimony 
__ Amount of award 3 2 8 
_ Modification of award 3 2 8 
__ Duration of award 3 2 8 
__ Enforcement of award 3 2 8 
c. Child support 
__ Amount of award 3 2 8 
__ Modification of award 3 2 8 
__ Enforcement of award 3 2 8 
d. Custody of children 3 2 8 
e. Visitation with children 3 2 8 
II. Domestic Violence 
a. Civil order of protection 
__ Securing ex parte order 3 2 8 
__ Securing protective order 3 2 8 
__ Enforcement of order 3 2 8 
b. Criminal proceedings 
__ Commissioner's decision to is-
sue a warrant 3 2 8 
__ Commissioner's decision to is-
sue a summons 3 2 8 
_ Length of Sentence 3 2 8 
III. Juvenile Courts 
a. Delinquency cases 3 2 8 
b. Status offense cases 3 2 8 
c. Treatment of adults in cases involv-
ing abuse/neglect 3 2 8 
IV. Negligence 
a. Liability Finding 3 2 8 
b. Amount of Judgment 
__ General 3 2 8 











PLEASE FEEL FREE TO INCLUDE DETAILS (ON A SEPARATE SHEET 
OF PAPER) IF YOU HAVE SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES IN THE APPLI-
CATION OF THE LAW WHICH COULD CORRECT ANY AREAS OF UN· 
EQUAL TREATMENT REFLECTED ABOVE, OR IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO 
GO INTO MORE DETAIL ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCES. 
II. The following questions ask about specific behaviors and the frequency of 
their occurrence in your experience: Circle the response which best describes 
your experience. Responses are (1) Always (2) Often (3) Sometimes (4) Rarely 
or (5) Never. (CIRCLE RESPONSE; IF YOU HAVE NO EXPERIENCE IN 
A PARTICULAR AREA, CIRCLE "DON'T KNOW" COLUMN.) 
SOME- DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN TIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
Court Interactions: 
1. Women attorneys are asked if 
they are attorneys when men at· 
torneys are not asked. 
_ by judges 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
2. Women attorneys are addressed 
by first names or terms ·of en-
dearment when men attorneys 
are addressed by surnames or 
titles. 
_ by judges 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
3. Women litigants or witnesses are 
addressed by first names or terms 
of endearment when men are 
addressed by surnames or titles. 
_ by judges I 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by counsel I 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel I 2 3 4 5 8 
4, Comments are made about the 
personal appearance of women 
attorneys when no such com· 
ments are made about men. 
_ by judges 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
188 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 20 
5. Comments are made about the 
personal appearance of women 
litigants or witnesses when no 
such comments are made about 
men. 
_by judges 1 2 3 4 5 8 
_by counsel 1 '2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 1 2 3 4 5 8 
6. Sexist remarks or jokes are made 
in court or in chambers. 
_by judges 1 2 3 4 5 8 
_by counsel 1 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 1 2 3 4 5 8 
7. Women litigants are subjected 
to verbal or physical sexual ad-
vances. 
_by judges 1 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by counsel 1 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 1 2 3 4 5 8 
8. Women attorneys are subjected 
to verbal or physical sexual ad-
vances. 
_by judges 2 3 4 5 8 
_by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
9. Women attorneys are appointed 
to important fee generating cases 
on an equal basis with male at-
torneys. 2 3 4 5 8 
Credibility 
10. Judges appear to give less weight 
to female attorneys' arguments 
than to those of male attorneys. 2 3 4 5 8 
11. Judges appear to give less weight 
to the testimony of female ex-
perts than to that of male ex-
perts. 2 3 4 5 8 
12. Judges require more evidence for 
a female litigant to prove her 
case than for a male litigant. 2 3 4 5 8 
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Marital Property 
13. Where a wife's primary contri-
bution is as a homemaker, the 
monetary award reflects a judi-
cial attitude that the husband's 
income producing contribution 
entitles him to a larger share of 
the marital estate. 2 3 4 5 8 
14. Courts award counsel and ex-
pert fees to the economically de-
pendent spouse sufficient to 
allow that spouse to effectively 
pursue the litigation. 2 3 4 5 8 
15. Effective injunctive relief is 
granted where necessary to 
maintain the status quo until 
monetary awards are made. 2 3 4 5 8 
16. Judges impose meaningful sanc- ,> 
tions, including civil contempt, 
when injunctions are violated. 2 3 4 5 8 
Alimony 
17. A wife's alimony award is based 
on how much the husband can 
give her without diminishing his 
current life style. 2 3 4 5 8 
18. Older, displaced homemakers are 
awarded indefinite alimony after 
long term marriages. 2 3 4 5 8 
19. The courts effectively enforce 
alimony awards. 2 3 4 5 8 
20. Alimony awards at the time of 
divorce are close to or the same 
as pendente lite awards. 2 3 4 5 8 
Child Support 
21. Child support awards reflect a 
realistic understanding of the lo-
cal costs of child raising. 2 3 4 5 8 
22. Child support awards reflect a 
realistic understanding of a par-
ticular child's needs. 2 3 4 5 8 
23. Child support awards ade-
quately reflect the earning ca-
pacity of the 
a. non-custodial parent. 2 3 4 5 8 
b. custodial parent. 2 3 4 5 8 
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24. Enforcement of child support 
awards is denied because of al-
leged visitation problems. 2 3 4 5 8 
25. Enforcement of child support 
awards is delayed because of 
counter claims for custody. 2 3 4 5 8 
26. Pendente lite awards of child 
support are made within 60 days 
of filing the motion. 2 3 4 5 8 
27. Earnings withholding orders are 
entered as soon as the obligor 
is 30 days behind in paying child 
support. 2 3 4 5 8 
Custody 
28. Custody awards to mothers are 
apparently based on the as-
sumption that children belong 
with their mothers.') 2 3 4 5 8 
29 .. Judges give fair and serious con-
sideration to fathers who ac-
tively seek custody. 2 3 4 5 8 
30. Judges favor the parent in the 
stronger financial position when 
awarding custody. 2 3 4 5 8 
31. Child custody awards disregard 
father's violence against mother. 2 3 4 5 8 
32. Mothers are denied custody be-
cause of employment outside the 
home. 2 3 4 5 8 
33. Joint custody is ordered over the 
objection of one or both par-
ents. 2 3 4 5 8 
Domestic Violence 
34. Civil orders of protection, di-
recting respondents to stay away 
from the home, are granted 
when petitioners are in fear of 
serious bodily harm. 2 3 4 5 8 
35. When granting civil orders of 
protection, judges issue support 
awards for dependents. 2 3 4 5 8 
36. Petitions for civil orders of pro-
tection are rejected where do-
mestic relations cases are 
pending. 2 3 4 5 8 
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37. Circuit court judges order emer-
gency injunctive relief to protect 
victims of domestic violence. 2 3 4 5 8 
38. Judges appear to believe that 
domestic violence is not a crime. 2 3 4 5 8 
39. Assault charges are not treated 
seriously when domestic rela-
tions cases are pending. 2 3 4 5 8 
Rape 
40. Rape victims are accorded less 
credibility than victims of other 
types of assault. 2 3 4 5 8 
41. Judges control the court so as 
to protect the complaining wit-
ness from improper questioning. 2 3 4 5 8 
42. Sentences are shorter whepe the 
victim had a prior relationship 
with the defendant. 2 3 4 5 8 
III. Women offenders are sentenced below the guidelines: (CIRCLE ONE:) 
1. Less frequently than men 
2. About the same as men 
3. More frequently than men 
8. Don't know 
IV. In your experience as an attorney, have you been involved with a case(s) 
in which you felt the litigation process or outcome was affected (either 
negatively or positively) by the gender (male or female) of one of the 
parties? (Please circle your response.) 
O. No - GO TO QUESTION V. 
1. Yes 
a. How many times in the past five years has this occurred? __ 
b. Briefly describe the most recent case in which you felt this 
occurred - in what way do you feel gender affected the case? 
(You may include a separate sheet of paper if you feel you need 
more room.) 
In which year did this occur? ____ _ 
In which County (or Baltimore City)? ____ _ 
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V. In your experience as an attorney, has there been a situation where you 
felt the litigation process or outcome of a case was affected (negatively or 
positively) by your gender (male or female)? (Circle response.) 
O. No - GO TO NEXT PAGE 
1. Yes 
a. How many times in the past five years has this occurred? __ 
b. Briefly describe these circumstances of the most recent case where 
you felt this occurred? 
In which year did this occur? ____ _ 
In which County (or Baltimore City)? ____ _ 
VI. This space is provided for any cases, instances or examples of gender bias 
or discrimination in the Courts in addition to those just described which 
have occurred in the last five years that you would like to bring to the 
Committee's attention. Be as specific as possible. 
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The Committee is especially interested in obtaining transcripts, sections 
of transcripts or relevant opinions, reported and unreported. Please include 
these documents, if you have them, along with this survey. (Additional 
postage will be necessary.) The Committee will consider purchasing tran-
scripts in appropriate cases when all information necessary to identify the 
case is provided. (Provide the information you have available - Case 
name, case number, county, year, court - on the next lines.) 
VII. Are you aware of any instances of gender bias in the judicial selection 
process? 
O. No. 
1. Yes - Briefly describe: _____________ _ 
The following questions are to provide general background information 
about the attorneys answering the survey. Results will be given as group 
data so that no individuals will be identified in the survey. 
1. Number of years practicing law (years) 
Year Admitted to the Maryland Bar: 19_ (year) 
2. Primary County (including Baltimore City) where you practice in the 
State of Maryland: ____ _ 
3. During the past two years, has litigation formed over 20070 of your 
practice? __ No __ Yes 
4. Check if any of these areas constitute 20% or more of your current 
practice: 
_____ Personal Injury (Plaintiff) 
_____ Personal Injury (Defendant) 
_____ Criminal (Defense) 
_____ Criminal (Prosecutor) 
_____ Domestic 
5. In what year were you born? 19_ 
6. Sex: Male Female 
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___ Other-Please specify: ________ _ 
PLEASE DO NOT SIGN YOUR NAME; ALL QUESTIONNAIRES ARE 
CONFIDENTIAL. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION. PLEASE RETURN 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN THE ENCLOSED ENVE-
LOPE OR RETURN IT TO: 
SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER 
ROOM 1103 ART/SOCIOLOGY 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND 20742 
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Exbibit E·2(c) 
COURT EMPLOYEES' QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Robert C. Murphy 
Chief Judge 
Baltimore Law Review 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
Courts of Appeal Building 
Annapolis, Maryland 21401 
[Vol. 20 
Maryland's Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the 
Courts is seeking to ascertain the attitudes, perceptions, and actual 
experiences of employees of the Maryland court system concerning 
the treatment of individuals within the State judicial system. To this 
end, the attached questionnaire is of extreme importance in assisting 
the Committee with its work. 
It would be greatly appreciated if you would complete the 
questionnaire and return it in the enclosed envelope by December 
23. Individuals completing the questionnaire will not be identified. 
The results of the survey will appear in the form of group data and 
be tabulated by the University of Maryland Survey Research Center, 
with the aggregated results made available to the Committee. 
I most earnestly enlist your support and cooperation. Should 
you have questions or need additional information about the Com-
mittee, please contact Deborah A. Unitus, Administrative Office of 
the Courts, at (301) 974-2353. 
Sincerely, 
Robert C. Murphy 
NOTE FROM THE COMMITTEE: The Committee has tried, within 
space limitations, to include as many specifics as possible in the 
questionnaire. It focuses on areas of the law most frequently aired 
at the Committee's public hearings. Please feel free to provide 
additional information about any other personal experiences with 
gender bias in the courts which you feel should be brought to the 
Committee's attention. 
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I. The following questions ask about specific behaviors and the frequency of 
their occurrence in your experience: Circle the response which best describes 
your experience. Responses are (I) Always (2) Often (3) Sometimes (4) 
Rarely or (5) Never. (CIRCLE RESPONSE; IF YOU HAVE NO EXPER-
IENCE IN A PARTICULAR AREA, CIRCLE "DON'T KNOW" 
COLUMN.) 
SOME- DON·T 
ALWAYS OFTEN TIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
Court Interactions: 
I. Women attorneys are asked if 
they are attorneys when men are 
not asked. 
_by judges 2 3 4 5 8 
__ by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
__ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
2. Women employees in the court 
system are addressed by first 
names or terms of endearment 
when men employees are ad-
dressed by surnames or titles. 
_by judges 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
__ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
3. Women litigants or witnesses are 
addressed by first names or terms 
of endearment when men are 
addressed by surnames or titles. 
_by judges 2 3 4 5 8 
__ by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
4. Comments are made about the 
personal appearance of women 
employees in the court system 
when no such comments are 
made about men. 
_by judges 2 3 4 5 8 
_by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
__ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
5. Comments are made about the 
personal appearance of women 
litigants or witnesses when no such 
comments are made about men. 
_by judges 2 3 4 5 8 
_by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
6. Sexist remarks or jokes are made 
in courts or in chambers. 
_by judges 2 3 4 5 8 
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_by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
7. Women litigants are subjected 
to verbal or physical sexual ad-
vances. 
_ by judges 2 3 4 5 8 
_by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
8. Women employees in the court 
system are subjected to verbal 
or physical sexual advances. 
_ by judges 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by counsel 2 3 4 5 8 
_ by court personnel 2 3 4 5 8 
Credibility 
9. Judges appear to give less weight 
to female attorneys arguments 
than to those of male attorneys. 2 3 4 5 8 
to. Judges appear to give less weight 
to the testimony of female ex-
perts than that of male experts. 2 3 4 5 8 
11. Judges appear to require more 
evidence for a female litigant to 
prove her case than for a male 
litigant. 2 3 4 5 8 
12. Judges give different sentences 
to female defendants than they 
give to male defendants, based 
solely on gender. 2 3 4 5 8 
II. In the first column, please check those behaviors that you personally have 
experienced while working in the court system. In the second column, 
please check those behaviors that you have heard have occurred to another 
employee. 
Experienced Heard About 
13. Sexual advances in exchange for an employ-
ment security/opportunity: 
_ from a judge 
_ from an attorney 
_ from a co-worker 
(including subordinates) 
_ from a supervisor 
14. Requests for sexual activity 
_ from a judge 
_ from an attorney 
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_ from co-worker 
(including subordinates) 
_ from a supervisor 
_ from public 
15. Physical touching of a sexual nature 
_ from a judge 
_ from an attorney 
_ from co-worker 
(including subordinates) 
_ from a supervisor 
_ from public 
16. Verbal behavior such as sexist jokes or com-
ments 
_ from a judge 
_ from an attorney 
_ from co-workers 
(including subordinates) 
_ from a supervisor 
_ from public 
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III. The following questions are directed at job responsibilities and opportunities 
in the court system. All information is confidential; no individuals will be 
identified. All results will be reported as group data. Additional information 
or experiences which you would like to bring to the Committee's attention 
may be included on a separate sheet of paper. (Circle your response or fill 
in the blanks) 
17. What is your job title? ________________ _ 
Briefly describe your job duties: ______________ _ 
18. Does your position have a written job description? 
O. No 1. Yes 8. Don't Know 
19. Number of years you have been employed in the Maryland court system? _ 
20. Number of years employed in your current position? .,.---______ _ 
21. Before your employment with the court system, did you have prior work 
experience or was this your first job? 
O. No, first job 
1. Yes _ How many years? _ 
22. Level of education when first hired in the court system? 
1. Less than high school 
2. High School graduate 
3. Some college 
4. College graduate 
5. Post graduate credits or degree 
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23. Current level of education: 
I. Less than high school 
2. High School graduate 
3. Some college 
4. College graduate 
5. Post graduate credits or degree 
24. Yearly salary level when first hired: (approximate) 
25. Current yearly salary: (approximate) 
26. How much of your time is usually spent in the court room while performing 
your job responsibilities and duties? 
I. ()'240J0 2. 25070-49070 3. 50%-74% 4. 75070-100070 
IV. Please circle the response (Always, Often, Sometimes, Rarely, Never, or 
Don't Know) which best describes your experiences while employed in the 
court system. 
SOME- DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN TIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
27. My job duties and responsibili-
ties have been reduced because 
of my gender. 2 3 4 5 8 
28. My job duties and responsibili-
ties have been increased because 
of my gender. 2 3 4 5 8 
29. My opinions in job related si-
tuations are given different 
weight or importance than a 
person of the opposite gender. 2 3 4 5 8 
30. I feel I am asked to perform 
duties that would not be asked 
of a person of the opposite sex. 2 3 4 5 8 
31. I feel that there are job duties 
I am not allowed to perform 
because of my gender. 2 3 4 5 8 
32. Choice job assignments are given 
to employees on the basis of 
gender. 2 3 4 5 8 
33. I get all the support/informa-
tion I need to do my job. 2 3 4 5 8 
34. I am permitted to go to job 
training programs which are 
available to my position. 2 3 4 5 8 
35. Opportunities for job advance-
ment in the court system are 
limited because of my gender. 2 3 4 5 8 
36. When promotional opportuni-
ties are available in the court 
system, I am informed of the 
opening. 2 3 4 5 8 
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37. I am encouraged to apply for 
promotional opportunities. 2 3 4 5 8 
38. In my area, it appears that 
members of one gender are given 
preferential appointments to su-
pervisory positions. 2 3 4 5 8 
39. If there is a problem or com-
plaint about my job, there is a 
person or agency that would deal 
with the problem or complaint. 2 3 4 5 8 
IF YOU INDICATED THAT YOUR JOB DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
HAVE BEEN INCREASED OR AFFECTED BECAUSE OF YOUR GENDER 
(QUESTIONS 28 AND 30 ABOVE), BRIEFLY DESCRIBE HOW: 
40. In the past two years, have you filed a complaint involving gender bias on the 
job? 
O. No 
1. Yes _ Was it resolved to your satisfaction? _ No _Yes 
41. In the past two years, have you attended any job training programs? 
O. No Why not? ______________ _ 
1. Yes __ _ 
Were you given: 
Administrative leave to attend: __ No __ Yes 
___ Paid Unpaid 
Expenses: mileage reimbursement: __ No __ Yes 
registration (if any) __ No __ Yes 
42. Do you feel that the salary for most court employees in your area is too high, 
too low or about right for the work that you do? 
1. Too High 
2. About right 
3. Too low 
8. Don't know 
43. Are persons of the opposite sex paid more, paid less or about the same for 
performing the same job duties and responsibilities that you perform? 
1. Paid more 
2. Paid same 
3. Paid less 
8. Don't know 
44. Do you feel that you have been denied a promotion while employed in the 
court system because of your gender? 
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o. No 
1. Yes Briefly describe the circumstances: ________ _ 
45. If you were ever denied a promotion, were you given a reason for the denial? 
O. No 
1. Yes 
8. Have not been denied a promotion 
46. Do you feel that someone else has been granted or denied a promotion while 
employed in the court system because of his/her gender? 
O. No 
1. Yes Briefly describe the circumstances: ________ _ 
47. How much job advancement opportunity do you feel is available to you in the 
court system in Maryland? 
1. No opportunity 
2. Little opportunity 
3. Some opportunity 
4. A lot of opportunity 
8. Don't know, not sure 
48. Have you ever requested maternity leave? 
O. No 
1. Yes ___ Was the leave granted? No 
___ Paid Unpaid 
___ Yes 
What amount of time was requested? _______ _ 
What amount of time was granted? ________ _ 
49. Have you ever requested leave, other than maternity leave, to provide care for 
an infant or adopted child? 
O. No 
1. Yes ___ Was the leave granted? No ___ Yes 
___ Paid Unpaid 
What amount of time was requested _______ _ 
What amount of time was granted? ________ _ 
50. Have you ever requested any leave beyond that described in questions 48 and 
49 to provide care for dependent children? 
O. No 
1. Yes Was the leave granted? No Yes 
51. Have you ever requested leave to provide care for elderly relatives? 
O. No 
L Yes Was the leave granted? No ___ Yes 
52. Do you have children under 12 for whom day care is needed? 
O. No 
1. Yes __ Infant __ Preschool __ After School 
53. Is day care currently available at your work place? 
O. No Would you use it if it were available? 
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O. No 
1. Yes __ Infant __ Preschool __ After School 
1. Yes __ Infant _' _ Preschool __ After School 
V. The following questions are to provide general background information 
about the people answering the survey. Results will only be given as grouped 
numbers; no individual information will be released from the questionnaires. 
54. Currently employed at: 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
includes Maryland Law Library 
Attorney Grievance Commission 





55. In what year were you born? 19_ 
56. Gender: Male Female 
57. Race/Ethnicity: (optional) White Hispanic 
___ Black Oriental 
___ Other-Please specify: _____ _ 
58. Is your position? 
___ permanent permanent contractual or contractual 
Is it fulltime or parttime 
59. If your position is contractual, do you receive benefits (medical, sick leave, 
annual leave)? 
___ yes ___ no 
Please include any additional comments and experiences that you would like to 
bring to the attention of the Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION. THE COMPLETED 
QUESTIONNAIRE SHOULD BE MAILED IN THE ATTACHED ENVELOPE 
TO: 
SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER 
1103 ART/SOCIOLOGY BUILDING 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND 20742 
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Exhibit E(3) 
Explanatory Note 
The results of the Committee's surveys are reported in this 
section. The data are reported in tabular form with respect to each 
question. 
Each table in this section identifies the question number and the 
questionnaire on which the question appeared (judges, lawyers or 
court employees). The text of the question precedes the response 
data. Where appropriate, one table indicates the responses of all the 
respondents on the particular question, and another table indicates 
the responses of those who expressed an opinion on the question. 
Where open-ended answers were given, illustrative examples of these 
answers follow the tables. 
Many questions appeared on more than one questionnaire. For 
example, both judges and lawyers were asked whether "[c]ircuit court 
judges order emergency injunctive relief to protect victims of domestic 
violence." (Question 37.) Where this occurs, the data are reported 
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Question I - Lawyers' Questionnaire 
In the following areas of law, have you found that the courts in Maryland apply, 
interpret and enforce laws in a way that treats males more favorably than females, 
treats females more favorably than males, or treats individuals the same regardless 
of their gender: 
TREATS TREATS TREATS NO 
MALES FEMALES BOTH OPINION 
MORE MORE EQUALLY 
FAVORABLY FAVORABLY 
I. Family Law 
a. Marital property 
-Amount of monetary award 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 23070 I0070 12070 55070 
LITIGATORS: 22070 14070 11070 5307. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 26070 7070 14070 53070 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 6070 28070 21070 46070 
LITIGA TORS: 7070 21070 30070 43070 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 52070 28070 20070 
LITIGATORS: 47070 29070 24070 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 55070 15070 30070 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 11070 38070 51070 
LITIGATORS: 11070 36070 52070 
- Enforcement of judgment 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 20070 4070 19070 5707, 
LITIGATORS: 20070 20070 5070 55070 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 23070 4070 18070 55070 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 7070 21070 26070 46070 
LITIGATORS: 9070 24070 24070 4307. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4107, 5007, 10070 
LITIGA TORS: 44070 4407, 11070 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 5007. 907, 4107, 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1307, 4907, 3907, 
LITIGA TORS: 1507, 42070 4207. 
b. Alimony 
- Amount of award 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2207, 15070 7070 56070 
LITIGATORS: 2707, 9070 1407, 5007, 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2707, 1107, 807, 5407, 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 707, 3407, 13070 4607, 
LITIGA TORS: 8070 12070 3807, 42070 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 5407, 1507, 31070 
LITIGATORS: 5407, 1707, 29070 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 58070 25070 1707, 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1307, 2407, 6307, 
LITIGATORS: 1307, 32070 66070 
- Modification of award 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2307, 607, 12070 5907. 
LITIGA TORS: 2607, 1407, 7070 53070 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2407, 5070 12070 5907. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 807, 25070 1907, 4907. 
LITIGATORS: 907, 1907, 2807, 4507, 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 54070 3407, 1307, 
LITIGATORS: 55070 31070 1407, 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 57070 13070 3007, 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 15070 36070 49070 
LITIGATORS: 16070 33070 51070 
- Duration of award 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 24070 7070 11070 58'1. 
LITIGA TORS: 27070 12070 907, 52'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 26070 707. I0070 5707, 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 7070 2207, 22070 49070 
LITIGATORS: 8070 2107. 25070 4607. 
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THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 57"1. 26"10 17"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 57"10 24"1. 19"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 61"10 ISo;. 24"10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 130;. 43"1. 44"1. 
L1T1GATORS: IS"I. 3S"I. 47"1. 
- Enforcement of award 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 25"1. 7"1. 13"1. 56"1. 
L1T1GATORS: 25"1. 16"1. 7"1. 52"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 24"1. 6"1. 13"1. 57"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 9"1. 22"10 20"1. 49"1. 
L1T1GATORS: 11"10 IS"Io 25"1. 46"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 530;. 33"10 15"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 52"10 33"1. 15"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 56"10 13"10 30"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 17"1. 40"1. 43"10 
L1TIGATORS: 20"1. 34"1. 46"1. 
c. Child suppon 
- Amount of award 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 32"10 9"1. 12"1. 47"10 
L1TIGATORS: 35"10 140;. 10"1. 42"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 31"10 7"1. 14"1. 48"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 11"1. 27"10 IS"I. 44"1. 
L1T1GATORS: 110;. 20"10 29"1. 41"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 61"10 23"1. 15"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 60"1. 23"1. 17"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 59"10 14"10 27"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 19"1. 33"1. 48"1. 
L1T1GATORS: ISo;. 34"1. 48"1. 
- Modification of award 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 27"1. 7"10 16"1. 50"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 300;. IS"I. 9"1. 43"10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 27"10 6"1. 16"1. 52"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 10"10 23"1. 21"10 46"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 11"1. 23"10 25"10 42"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 54"10 32"1. 13"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 53"10 31"1. 16"10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 56"1. 11"1. 33"10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: IS"Io 39"1. 43"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 19"10 39"1. 43"1. 
- Enforcement of award 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2S"Io 6"10 19"1. 47"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 2S"Io 230;. 9"10 41"10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 270;. 6"1. IS"Io 50"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 12"10 IS"Io 24"1. 45"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 15"10 24"10 20"1. 42"10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 49'1. 39"1. 12"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 47"1. 39"1. 15"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 54"1. 11"10 35"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 23"1. 44"1. 34"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 250;. 41"1. 34"1. 
d. Custody of children 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2"10 40"1. 15"1. 43"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 3"1. IS"I. 39"10 40"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4"10 34"10 16"10 46"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1"1. 46"10 13"10 41"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 1"10 13"1. 48"1. 39"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 5"10 26"10 69"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 5"1. 30"1. 66"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: S"Io 64"10 29"10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1"10 22"1. 77"1. 
L1T1GATORS: 20;. 21"1. 77"1. 
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e. Visitation with children 
FEMALE ATrORNEYS: 9 .... I'''' 2''1, 4'% 
L1TIGA TORS: lOOT. 2S'" 18'" 44"1. 
ALL FEMALE A TrORNEYS: 9 .... 16'" 2S% 48% 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3'10 24'" 32'" 42% 
L1TIGATORS: 2'10 32'" 2'% 39% 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I'''' 51'" 32% 
L1TIGATORS: IS'" SO"l. 32% 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 16'10 30'1, 530;, 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 50;, 54'" 41% 
L1T1GATORS: 4'10 52'10 44% 
II. Domestic Violence 
a. Civil order or protection 
- Sccurins ex pane order 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 15'10 20'" 11% 55% 
L1T1GATORS: 14'10 13'" 23% 50"1. 
ALL FEMALE A TrORNEYS: 1S'Io 14'10 12% 58"1. 
MALE ATrORNEYS: 3'10 26'" 18'1. 54% 
L1T1GATORS: 3'10 I'''' 31% 49"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE A TrORNEYS: 29'" 29'1, 41% 
L1T1GATORS: 28'10 26'10 46'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATrORNEYS: 36'10 34'" 30% 
MALE ATrORNEYS: 6'" 3S'" 56'1, 
L1TIGATORS: ''10 33 .... 600;, 
- Sccurins protective order 
FEMALE ATrORNEYS: 17'10 14'" 14'10 55"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 16'" I'''' 18'1. 50"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATrORNEYS: 16'10 II'" 13'1'. 60"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 4'10 23'" 18'1'. 55"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 5'1, 1'''It 28% 50% 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 34'" 35'10 31'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 32'" 33'10 35% 
ALL FEMALE A TrORNEYS: 41'10 2S'Io 32'1'. 
MALE A TrORNEYS: 9'1, 40'1, 51% 
L1TIGATORS: lOOT. 34'" 56% 
- Enrorcement or order 
FEMALE ATrORNEYS: 18'10 10'10 14'1'. 59"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 1''10 16% 13% 55"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 20'10 ''10 13% 61"1. 
MALE ATrORNEYS: 5'" 20'10 19"1. 56"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 6'10 20'10 24"1. 51"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATrORNEYS: 39'" 39"1, 22% 
L1TIGATORS: 3'''' 35'" 28% 
ALL FEMALE ATrORNEYS: 50'10 1'% 33"1. 
MALE A TrORNEYS: 12'" 45'10 43"1. 
L1TIGATORS: II'" 40'" 48"1. 
b. Criminal proceedinss 
- Comissioner's decision to iss~ a warrant 
FEMALE A TrORNEYS: 14'1, 10% 13% 64"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 15'" 16'" 13% 57% 
ALL FEMALE ATrORNEYS: 12'10 10% 13"1. 66"1. 
MALE ATrORNEYS: 4'" IS% 20'1'. 5S% 
L1TIGATORS: 4"1t 23% 21% 51% 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATrORNEYS: 34'1. 39"1t 2''1. 
L1T1GATORS: 34'" 3'% 29% 
ALL FEMALE ATrORNEYS: 34'" 29% 37% 
MALE ATrORNEYS: 10'1, 48'10 42% 
L1TIGATORS: 9'10 4''10 44"1. 
- Commissioner's decision to issut a summons 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 11'10 10'10 15% 65% 
L1T1GATORS: 11'10 18'lo 12% 59% 
ALL FEMALE A TrORNEYS: 10'10 S'1. 15'1. 67'1. 
MALE A TrORNEYS: 3'10 16'lo 23% 5S'I. 
L1TIGATORS: 4'1, 25'10 20% 52"1. 
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THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 291\'0 461\'0 25'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 271\'0 441\'0 291\'0 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 311\'0 251\'0 451\'0 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 71\'0 551\'0 381\'0 
L1TIGATORS: 81\'0 511\'0 411\'0 
- Lensth of sentence 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 11'1. 14'1. 6'10 69'10 
L1T1GATORS: 12'1. 9'10 18'1. 61"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 121\'0 ISI\'o 8'10 661\'0 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 41\'0 251\'0 141\'0 57'10 
L1TIGATORS: 41\'0 151\'0 311\'0 501\'0 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 301\'0 261\'0 44'10 
L1T1GATORS: 3OI\'t 231\'0 46"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 351\'0 421\'0 231\'0 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 9'10 321\'0 59'10 
L1TIGATORS: 91\'0 30'1. 62'1. 
III. Juvenile Couns 
a. Delinquency cases 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 11\'0 111\'0 17'10 71'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 11\'0 221\'0 12'10 66'10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 21\'0 91\'0 16'10 73'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) lOt;. 24"1. 67'1. 
L1T1GATORS: (0) 271\'0 11'10 63'1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 21\'0 611\'0 381\'0 
L1TIGATORS: 21\'0 641\'0 34'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 71\'0 341\'0 60'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 71 .... 29'10 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 72'10 28'1. 
b. Status offense cases 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 21\'0 51\'0 191\'0 74'10 
L1TIGATORS: 31\'0 24'10 6'1. 68'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 41\'0 41\'0 16'10 77'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 51\'0 23'10 72'10 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 271\'0 6'1. 67"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 71\'0 73'10 20'1. 
L1T1GATORS: 9'10 741\'0 17'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 161\'0 191\'0 661\'0 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 81 .... 19"1. 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 831\'0 171\'0 
c. Treatment of adults in cases involving abusel 
neglect 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 61\'0 71\'0 15'10 72'10 
L1TIGATORS: Sl\'o 19 .... S"l. 65'10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 51\'0 6'1. 17'10 72'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 21\'0 71\'0 24'10 67'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 21\'0 271\'0 8'10 64"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2OI\'t 591\'0 211\'0 
L1TIGATORS: 221\'0 561\'0 22"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 171\'0 221\'0 60'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 51\'0 741\'0 22'10 
L1TIGATORS: 51\'0 741\'0 21'10 
IV. Negligence 
a. Liability finding 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 61\'0 51\'0 24'10 66'10 
L1T1GATORS: 71\'0 3OI\'t 4"1. 59"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 61\'0 3'10 29"1. 63'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 21\'0 5t;. 53'10 41"1. 
L1T1GATORS: 21\'0 581\'0 61\'0 34'10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 141\'0 761\'0 111\'0 
L1TIGATORS: 161\'0 731\'0 11'10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 151\'0 91\'0 761\'0 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 31\'0 891\'0 8'10 
L1TIGATORS: 31\'0 891\'0 9"1. 
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b. Amount or judgment 
-General 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 8~ 2~ 241Jo 66.,. 
L1TIGATORS: 9'10 301Jo 1% 59.,. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 9~ 3~ 261Jo 62'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 31Jo 7'1. 49'1. 41'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 41Jo HIJo 9'1. 34'1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 18'1. 761Jo 11'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 23~ 74~ 41Jo 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 231Jo 7'1. 70'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 61Jo 821Jo 12"10 
L1T1GATORS: 6~ 80'1. 14'1. 
- Pain and surrering 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 71Jo 4~ 23'1. 65'1. 
L1T1GATORS: 81Jo 29'1. 4'1. 59'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 81Jo 4'1. 26'1. 63'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3'1. 12'1. 44'1. 42'10 
L1T1GATORS: 3'1. 481Jo 14'1. 36'1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 17~ 731Jo 10.,. 
L1T1GATORS: 19'10 7~ 11"10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: ~ 11'1. 69'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 5'10 751Jo 20'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 4'10 74'1. 22.,. 
- Disability 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 161Jo 21Jo 17'10 65'1. 
L1T1GATORS: 18"10 21'10 3'1. 59"10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 141Jo 3'10 21'1. 63'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 8~ 8'1. 42'1. 42'1. 
L1T1GATORS: 8~ 46'1. 9'1. 36"10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 40'1. 53~ 7'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 43'1. 50'1. 7'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 38'10 7'10 55'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 141Jo 731Jo I3IJo 
L1T1GATORS: I3IJo 73'1. 15'1. 
- Scarring/disfigurement 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 31Jo 17"10 13." 67'1, 
L1T1GA TORS: 4'1. 19'1. 16'10 61'1, 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3'1. 161Jo IS'I. 63'1, 
MALE ATTORNEYS: IIJo 301Jo 30.,. 39'1, 
L1TIGATORS: 1'1. 33'1. 33'1, 32'1, 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 71Jo 49~ 44'1. 
L1T1GA TORS: 91Jo 491Jo 42'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 8'1. 42'10 50'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 2'10 49'10 49'1. 
L1TIGA TORS: 21Jo 491Jo 49'1. 
Question III - Lawyers' Questionnaire, and Question 43 - Judges' Questionnaire 
Sentencing 
Women offenders are sentenced below the guidelines: 
Less About More 
Frequently tM Same Frequently Don't 
Than Men as Men Than Men Know 
ALL RESPONSES 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: IIJo 7'10 23'10 69'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 21Jo 71Jo 26"10 65.,. 
CRIMINAL PRACTITIONERS: (0) 221Jo 511Jo 27'1, 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 8'1. 81Jo 30'1. 54'1. 
L1T1GA TORS: 71Jo 81Jo 37'1. 4S'I. 
CRIMINAL PRACTITIONERS: 141Jo 81Jo 57'1. 21'1. 
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All JUDGES: 2'" 35'" 
MALE JUDGES: 2'" 35'" 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 7'" 23'" 
lITiGATORS: 6'" 19'" 
CRIMINAL PRACTITIONERS: (0) 30'" 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 18'" 17'" 
lITIGA TORS: 13'" 14'" 
CRIMINAL PRACTITIONERS: 18'" 10'l0 
All JUDGES: 4'" S8'" 
MALE JUDGES: 3'" S8'" 
Question 44 - Judges' Questionnaire 












Judges give sentences, based solely on gender, to female defendants that are (less 
severe, about the same, more severe) than they give to male defendants. 
Less severe 









Question IV - Lawyers' Questionnaire 
Parties' Gender 
In your experience as an attorney, has there been a situation where you felt the 
litigation process or outcome of a case was affected (negatively or positively) by 









THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION: 
MALES: 21'" 79.,. 
FEMALES: 31'" 69'70 
a. How many times in the past five years has this occurred? 
MALE 
I 10 3 27 
4106 6 
7109 2 
More Ihan 9 
Several, many 6 
No answer 8 
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Prince Georgets County 
Anne Arundel/Howard Counties 
Eastern/Southern 
Western 




















In a CINA proceeding, a father was not required to be drug free to visit with child 
- mothers are regularly required to have three clean urines before visiting. 
There isn't one particular case. Overall, I have the feeling judges don't believe 
women who say their children are being sexually abused by an ex-husband. Also, 
in order to obtain contempt for non-payment of child support requires several times 
in court before you get the judge's attention. 
Panel Chairman in Health Claims excluded economist's testimony on value of 
woman's services in the home because testimony on her employment outside the 
home was "enough;" i.e., panel refused to admit evidence that showed women who 
work outside the home still substantially work in the home as well. 
Panel found it preposterous to suggest that plaintiff/decedent worked 4-6 hours per 
day in the home while working 8 hours per day as a nurse, even though the testimony 
was unrebutted. 
As a prosecutor, I've tried many domestic abuse and sex offense cases where the 
female complainant is regarded with less credibility because she was at some point 
with the defendant voluntarily. 
I believe there is a lot of gender bias in my area of practice - child support - both 
towards males and females. Welfare mothers are not encouraged or expected to 
meet their earning potential and males are often allowed to avoid their support 
obligations. 
Custody case - boy, 10, who was being physically and verbally abused by his father, 
was placed in his father's custody. Girl, 13, was placed in her mother's custody. 
Sons "belong" with their fathers. Master'S decision. 
I feel that men are given special consideration if they assume any responsibility for 
their children. Women are expected to be satisfied with any help that they received, 
especially regarding child visitation/support, and are often advised that this is better 
than what many fathers do. 
Wife's infidelity viewed by judge as more serious offense than husband's brutality 
and alcoholism where alcoholism had caused parties' joint debts to soar. 
1990] Appendix 217 
In domestic violence cases, Judge [ ] assumes the woman is lying or did something 
to provoke the violence. 
Judge ordered an expedited trial date because the plaintiff was a former model and 
he wanted to .try the case "if she's as pretty as her picture" (he was reviewing an 
exhibit, her picture, when he made this decision). The plaintiff (our client) won. 
Docket control really should not be a function of physical characteristics of the 
litigants. 
Female plaintiff seeking custody obtained it in spite of testimony of violence, 
promiscuity and instability. Had she been the father, custody would have been 
denied her. 
Although the father was clearly proven to be a fit and proper parent and an 
established alternating week custody arrangement had been in place (and successful) 
many months, and only evidence showed mother had threatened child, mother was 
awarded custody and father's visitation greatly reduced. 
Male Attorneys 
Former husband asked for child support for children now living with him and 
reduce alimony payments. Alimony was not reduced and ex-husband was given no 
child support; former wife was working. 
Court awarded wife amount which would enable her to maintain current lifestyle 
without considering her potential earning power. 
Retired elderly lady not given due consideration of the jury partially because she 
was "old" and had a "retirement income." 
Men just don't win custody cases unless the mother is a female Attila the Hun. 
Women don't get protection from violence. It's uniform unfairness on both issues. 
Women uniformly get lesser sentences in criminal cases and are favored in domestic 
cases with respect to custody, support, and alimony. In a recent multiple offender 
D.W.1. case, an attractive young woman was sentenced to one weekend in jail -
a similar offense by a male defendant would have gotten five weekends in jailor 
thirty days. 
Violation of domestic violence order. Wife had attorney assigned by House of Ruth, 
plus other "supporters." I represented husband and feel judge was intimidated, and 
ruled unfairly against husband. 
The judge was clearly biased against the mother, refused to give credence to her 
claims for support though the husband was well able to pay, and awarded woefully 
inadequate child support payments. 
The judge (a male) allowed an older male attorney to present patently inadmissible 
evidence of the complaining witness' sexual history over the repeated objection of 
a female prosecutor. The case is on appeal. 
Custody awarded to father living with a woman without benefit of marriage when 
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the most damning testimony was mother's sexual activity (not around children), her 
temper, and her job requirements. This was subsequently reversed by judge. 
Question V - Judges' Questionnaire 
Party Gender 
In your experience, have you observed or been informed of a case(s) in which you 
felt the litigation process or outcome was affected (either negatively or positively) 













My bias is toward the mother of young children in custody disputes. This is a 
natural bias, also strengthened by common sense and experience as a parent (father). 
I recognize this and constantly try to eliminate it or at least reduce its influence. 
I feel failure to award indefinite alimony to women over 50 who have spent most 
of their adult life outside the labor market to be such a case. 
(1) A widow received a disproportionately high award in a condemnation case. (2) 
In a similar case, two businessmen received only a little more than the original offer 
from State Roads. 
Low verdict for destitute women; sometimes jury less than sympathetic. 
Female attorney representing male defendant in a rape case. Verdict - not guilty. 
Women on jury did not believe victim and defendant's attorney presented good 
closing argument to jury (7 women, 5 men). 
Question V - Lawyers' Questionnaire 
Counsel Gender 
In your experience as an attorney, has there been a situation where you felt the 
litigation process or outcome of a case was affected (negatively or positively) by 
your gender (male or female)? 
Yes No No Answer 
MALES: 4'7. 86'7. 10'7. 
FEMALES: 20'7. 47'7. 32'7. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION: 
MALES: 4'7. 96'7. 
FEMALES: 30'7. 70'7. 
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Usually the court doesn't lend my arguments as much credibility as a male attorney 
if the judge is swayed by gender at all. But the most recent time was a custody 
case in which I represented a father and obtained joint custody with physical custody 
alternating weekends for my client. I'm not sure, but it seemed as though my gender 
as my client's advocate may have given him more credibility. 
In the case set forth above, opposing counsel requested numerous continuances, all 
of which were granted. My request was denied; opposing counsel called me names. 
Two female attorneys with a discovery dispute on motion. Male judge lectured us 
and refused to rule on issue. Treated us like children. 
Most of the time it is a "type" of treatment more than a specific incident. It is 
overtly male-oriented and self-protective of its "good ole boy" networking and 
females are outsiders. 
At motions hearing in [ ] County in large cases, the single or few females present 
often are targeted to be the first to address pending motions even when such motions 
are not advanced by their parties or motion-opposition is led by other parties. The 
judges are prone simply to suggest: "ladies first." 
Three male attorneys involved in a deposition attempted to "gang up" on me to 
try to get me to agree to certain concessions. I felt they did this and went to the 
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lengths they did because I was a young woman. 
Representing children in CINA proceedings, my assertions of appropriate placement 
and services were given more weight simply by virtue of judge's attitude that as a 
female, my instincts about child rearing are sounder than those of a male. 
I was chastised by a male judge for not standing when I addressed the court 
(although I was in the process of standing). A male attorney - opposing counsel -
addressed the court five consecutive times without standing following my rebuke 
and was not rebuked by the judge. Outcome favorable to opposing counsel. 
This is a difficult question to answer because it is often difficult to determine 
whether a judge's decision is influenced by factors such as gender. However, I have 
often felt that judges give more weight to arguments made by attorneys that the 
judges know - and these attorneys tend to be male. I believe a female attorney has 
to overcome a certain amount of skepticism on the part of some judges. 
During the course of a dispute in a domestic case, the judge (male) was making 
favorable rulings for my client, and at the end in the chambers, complimented my 
outfit. 
The case was a request by defense counsel for reduction in child support. I believe 
that had I been one of the male friends (buddies) of the judge, the case would have 
been dismissed instead of continued indefinitely - twice for the judge's friend (defense 
counsel). 
During civil suit in court, the judge kept smiling at me at my table, let me talk at 
length while telling opposing counsel (male) to keep quiet, and that he didn't want 
to hear him. Even my client commented about it after the trial. 
In chambers, bantering between judge (white male) and other attorney (white male), 
while third attorney (black male) and I (white female) were conspicuously not able 
to participate in the conversation - because we didn't have the "history" they 
shared. Conversation approximately ten minutes, not just a passing remark or two. 
(We won the case, however.) 
"Good ole boy" syndrome of defense attorney litigating in what was probably 
calculated to be a patronizing way. Ultimately probably did not affect outcome, but 
made process unpleasant and probably confusing to panel. 
I was appointed to represent a child in a contested custody case. The judge, in a 
conference in chambers, told the male attorneys representing the parents that he 
valued my view of the case because I am a mother. 
Complex mechanic's lien case - petitioner was represented by older, established male 
counsel (I am female). Court did not even listen to my arguments, which were very 
sophisticated and technical. Clearly, the "old boy" network was at work. 
In a jury trial in a personal injury case, the judge virtually ignored me for at least 
the first half of the case until my arguments on objections and carried on a lengthy 
personal conversation in chambers with opposing counsel, etc. His attitude improved 
after I produced authority for each of my evidentiary arguments and demonstrated 




I followed a woman attorney with a OWl client in the District Court for [ ] County. 
Our respective clients were arrested under virtually identical facts and presented 
equally compelling reasons for the. entry of a probation before judgment. The 
woman's client received a PBJ, my client was found guilty of OWl and placed on 
18 months' probation. This particular judge is known for a rather paternalistic 
attitude towards women attorneys. 
A particular female judge is quite apparently biased against male attorneys when 
they are opposed by a female attorney. 
Court refused to impose sanctions against female opposing counsel who had been 
shown, through sworn testimony, to have engaged in undue influence of opposing 
client before legal representation commenced. Court refused to hear balance of case 
on second trial date for procedural reasons, earlier ruling which brought about 
hearing in first instance. 
Judge makes sexist remarks during custody and criminal cases, "Honey," "Babe." 
Hearing before Domestic Relations Master. I had the distinct impression that as 
male, I was treated with disrespect by female Master. 
Question VI - Judges' Questionnaire 
Counsel Gender 
In your experience, have you observed or been informed of a case(s) in which you 
felt the litigation process or outcome was affected (either negatively or positively) 












During a court deposition a local male attorney referred to (female attorney) as, 
"Honey, why don't you go shopping while we (men) take care of this." (Female 
attorney), who is by the wayan excellent attorney, spent the next six months making 
life miserable for the male attorney by making him respond to numerous pleadings 
and by extremely aggressive (but appropriate) tactics. In other words, (female 
attorney) does her own fighting and is well able to take care of herself and is highly 
respected for it as well as for her competence. 
When I was an attorney, there were several instances where I was given the impression 
that my gender helped my side - particularly when I was representing young people. 
An angelic, pregnant state's attorney prosecuted a male day-care provider for child 
molestation. The man didn't have a chance. 
Informed by male attorney that young female attorneys reject negotiation attempts. 
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The male attorney, therefore, no longer attempts to negotiate settlements when other 
litigant is represented by female attorney. 
As an attorney in a number of cases the attitude of jurors varies greatly. Frankly, 
a good looking woman will fare better than a heavy, non-attractive female attorney. 
As a judge I have not seen that happen in my presence. 
Question VII - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Judicial Selection 
Are you aware of any instances of gender bias in the judicial selection process? 
ALL RESPONSES 
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There seems to be a definite trend to appoint by gender and race - presumably to 
overcome past appointments. Appointment of judges should be blind as the statute 
of justice. 
Just in a general sense that there seems to be a special effort made to appoint 
women and other minorities - but that's not necessarily wrong. 
Appointments made because it was a woman's turn. 
Members of the commission ask women applicants about their children, their 
husband's activities, their opinion on abortion and whether their spouse will be 
"sharing in the decision-making process." Unmarried applicants are immediately 
suspect and are subjected to inappropriate questions about personal life activities, 
etc. Male applicants are not asked such questions. I would also like to see more 
women judges in administrative roles and important committee chairs. Female judges 
should have an opportunity to attend training for administrative assignments. 
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Women and blacks are not treated as favorably by nominating commissions. 
Women are under-represented on the nominating commissions. Inquiries are made 
of women applicants, but not of men, regarding child care arrangements. Comments 
are made that women may not be able to control courtrooms because of diminutive 
size/stature. 
My opinion, some female lawyers have not been endorsed when they are qualified. 
Female Attorneys 
Judging by the number of female judges on the district and circuit benches, it seems 
apparent that there is a gender biased discrimination. 
I understand that women applicants are asked questions re: family life, etc., that 
males are not. General comments are made. I've served on judicial administrative 
committees for the city bar and those comments are routine. 
Harder for women to get leadership roles in bar association, which can be stepping 
stone to judicial appointment. Women who are active in women's rights organizations 
viewed with skepticism by bar members and judges. 
Certain seats are designated as "women" seats or "men" seats. 
The Judicial Nominating Commission for [ ] consistently favors female applicants, 
irrespective of their abilities or experience. -
It is impossible for women to compete in the "good ole boy" network. 
I believe a recent circuit court judgeship in [ ] County was filled by a female (very 
qualified) in part to get another female on the bench. 
Male Attorneys 
Women, especially in [ ] are given judgeships over more qualified male applicants. 
Yes, in some seats, a gender bias exists for women, i.e., the "female seat." 
Given the percentage of attorneys with 10 years or more experience who are white 
males, it appears clear that in [ ] there is discrimination in favor of women and 
blacks. 
Women are picked because they are women, not because they are qualified or 
unqualified. 
Sat on judicial selection committee for bar association, have heard sexist remarks 
re: candidates. 
Everyone knows that women are sought to fill certain vacancies when it is politically 
advantageous. 
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Judicial selection has tended to favor females out of a misplaced sense of imbalance 
on the bench. 
The lists submitted by the judicial selection committees generally have not had 
female lawyers. While I recognize that their numbers are smaller than the males 
with the experience required, we must be sensitive to this matter. 
Question VIII - Judges' Questionnaire 
Intervention 
During your tenure as a judge, have you ever intervened in a trial in your court 
















In domestic cases, I usually said something when the wife was asked, "Do you 
work?" Of course, they mean "for pay" but it was clearly biased. 
(1) Rape trials - dismissing of witness 
(2) Lack of respect for female attorneys by male attorneys. 
Defendant was woman physician; plaintiff's attorney constantly referred to her as 
Miss, not Dr. 
Defendant's attorney referred to female officer as "she" - I told him he would call 
her officer because she was a police officer. 
Male attorney addressed female attorney as "My dear lady" - told him, "she is not 
yours." . 
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Question I - Judges', Lawyers', and Court Employees' Questionnaire 
Court Interactions 
Women attorneys are asked if they are attorneys when men are not asked. 
SOME- DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN TIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
By judges 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): I.,. 3% 16% 26% 34% 20% 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1% 17% 32% 19% 19% 12% 
L1TIGATORS: 1% 15% 36% 20% 22% 6% 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2% 17% 30% 22% 15% 15% 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1% 1% 14% 26% 27% 21% 
L1TIGATORS: 1% 1% 14% 30% 42% 12% 
JUDGES: (0) (0) 2% 12% 87% (0) 
COURT PERSONNEL: (0) 2% 10% 26% 38% 24% 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1% 4% 20% 32% 42% 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1% 19% 36% 22% 22% 
L1TIGATORS: 2% 16% 38% 21% 23% 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2% 19.,. 35% 26% 17% 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1% 1% IS% 33% 47% 
L1TIGATORS: 1% 1% 16% 34% 4S% 
JUDGES: (0) (0) 2% 12% S7% 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: (0) 3% 13% 34% 50% 
MALE: 10% 28% 60% 
FEMALE: 7% 23% 29% 40% 
By counsel 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1% 6% 22% 28% 24% 20% 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3% 24% 46% 9% 10% 8% 
L1T1GATORS: 2% 26% 50% 9% 9% 4% 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2% 26% 43% 12% 6% 12% 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3% 17% 31% 27% 21% 
L1T1GATORS: (0) 2% 19% 35% 31% 14% 
JUDGES: (0) 2% S% 15% 50% 24% 
COURT PERSONNEL (N): (0) 2% 12% 25% 35% 27% 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1% S% 27% 34% 30% 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3% 28% 51% 10% 9% 
L1T1GATORS: 2'7. 27% 53% 9% 9% 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2% 29% 48% 14% 7% 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1% 4% 22% 39% 34% 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 3% 22% 40% 36% 
JUDGES: (0) 2% 11% 20% 67% 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: (0) 3% 16% 34% 47% 
MALE: (0) 4% 11% 35% 50% 
FEMALE: 9% 2S% 27% 36% 
By court personnel 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1% S% 22% 22% 21% 26% 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4% 36% 32% 13% 6% 9% 
L1T1GATORS: 4% 35% 35% 14% 6% 6% 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3% 33% 36% 11% 5% 12% 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3% 20% 24% 25% 28% 
L1T1GATORS: (0) 3% 19% 29% 28% 21% 
JUDGES: (0) 3% 12% 13% 44% 29% 
COURT PERSONNEL (N): 1% 6% 18070 28% 27% 20% 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1% 11% 29% 30% 29% 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4% 39% 37% 14% 6% 
L1TIGATORS: 4% 37% 37% 15% 7% 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4% 37% 41% 13% 6% 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1% 5% 27% 34% 34% 
L1T1GATORS: (0) 3% 24% 37% 36% 
JUDGES: (0) 4% 17% IS% 61% 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 1% S% 22% 35% 34% 
MALE: 5% 20% 35% 41% 
FEMALE: 11% 34% 24% 30% 
# The 5ubsample of coun personnel reponed here are those who spend 50070 or more of their time in the courtroom in the 
performance of job duties or responsibilities (n = 18S) . 
• Less than one percent 
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Question 2 - Court Employees' Questionnaire 
Court Interactions 
Women employees in the court system are addressed by first names or terms of 
endearment when men employees are addressed by surnames or titles_ 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
By judge. 
MALE: (0) 4"1. 19"1. 27"lo 48'10 
FEMALE: 7"1. 15"lo 21"1. 22"1. 36"lo 
By counsel 
MALE: (0) 7"lo 20"lo 30"lo 43"lo 
FEMALE: 5"1. 18"1. 27"1. 18"1. 31"lo 
By court personnel 
MALE: 3"1. 7"1. 20"lo 27"1. 44"lo 
FEMALE: 9"1. 18"1. 22"1. 20"1. 30"lo 
Question 2 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Court Interactions 
Women attorneys are addressed by first names or terms of endearment when men 
attorneys are addressed by surnames or titles_ 
SOME- DON-T 
ALWAYS OFTEN TIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
By judges 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): l"lo 4"lo 12"1. 26"lo 42'10 16"lo 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"1. 18"lo 25"1. 26"lo 19"1. 1I"lo 
LlTIGATORS: 1'10 19"1. 26"1. 27"1. 21"1. 6'10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"1. 14'10 27"lo 26"1. 20"1. 12"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 2"1. 10"1. 26"1. 45'10 16"lo 
LlTIGATORS: 1"1. 2"1. 11"1. 28"1. 51"1. 8"lo 
JUDGES: (0) (0) (0) 3"1. 95"1. 2"lo 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1"1. 4"1. 14"1. 31"1. 49"1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"1. 17"1. 27"1. 32"1. 24"1. 
LlTIGATORS: 2"1. 20"1. 28"1. 29"1. 22"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 16"1. 31"lo 29"1. 22"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1"1. 2"1. 12"1. 31"1. 54"1. 
LlTIGATORS: 1"1. 2"1. 12"1. 31"1. 55"1. 
JUDGES: (0) (0) (0) 4"1. 97"1. 
By counsel 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1"1. 8"1. 19"1. 26"1. 30"lo 16"lo 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3"1. 33"1. 32"1. 16"1. 8"1. 8"lo 
LlTIGATORS: 4"lo 33"1. 35"lo 18"1. 7"1. 3"lo 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3"1. 32"lo 33"lo 14"lo 9"1. 9"lo 
MALE ATTORNEYS: l"lo 4"lo 17"1. 28"1. 34"lo 16"lo 
LlTiGATORS: 1"1. 4"1. IS"I. 32"1. 39"1. 9"lo 
JUDGES: (0) 3"1. 1I"lo 19"lo 49"1. 18"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1"1. 10"1. 23"1. 31"1. 35"1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4"1. 32"lo 37"1. 19"1. 9"1. 
LlTiGATORS: 4"1. 34"1. 26"lo 19"1. 7"lo 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4"lo 35"1. 36"1. 16"1. 10"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1"1. 5"1. 20"1. 34"lo 40"1. 
LlTiGATORS: 1"1. 5"1. 17"1. 35"1. 43"1. 
JUDGES: (0) 4"1. 14"1. 23"1. 69"1. 
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By court personnel 
ALL A TIORNEYS (weighted): 1'7. 4'7. 14% 26% 35% 21'7. 
FEMALE ATIORNEYS: 2% 21% 30% 24.,. 13'7. 10'7. 
LlTiGATORS: 2'7. 22% 29'7, 28% 13% 7'7. 
ALL FEMALE ATIORNEYS: 2% 21'7. 30'7. 24.,. 12'7. 11'7. 
MALE ATIORNEYS: 1'7. 1% 11'10 26.,. 39'To 23'7. 
LlTIGATORS: 1'7. 1'7. 8'7. 29% 4S'To I 7 'To 
JUDGES: (0) 3'7. 4'7. 11'7. 58'7. 24'7. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATIORNEYS (weighted): 1'7. 5'7. 17'To 32'7. 45'7. 
FEMALE ATIORNEYS: 2'7. 22'7, 32'7. 29'To 15'7. 
LlTiGATORS: 2'7. 23'7. 31'7. 30'7. 13'7. 
ALL FEMALE ATIORNEYS: 2'7. 24'7. 33% 27'7. 13'7. 
MALE ATIORNEYS: 1'7. 1'7. 14'7. 33'7. 51'7. 
LlTIGATORS: 1'7. 1'7. 1O'To 35% 54'7. 
JUDGES: (0) 4'7. 5'7. 15'7, 77'To 
Question 3 - Judges', Lawyers', and Court Employees' Questionnaires 
Court Interactions 
Women attorneys are addressed by first names or terms of endearment when men 
are addressed by surnames or titles. 
SOME· DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN TIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
By judges 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'7. 1'7. 7'7. 26.,. 45'7. 21'7. 
FEMALE ATIORNEYS: (0) 9'7. 20'To 33% 23% 15'7. 
LlTiGATORS: (0) 10'7. 21% 35'7. 24'7 •. 1O'To 
ALL FEMALE ATIORNEYS: I 'To 8'7. 22'7. 31'7. 21'7. I 8 'To 
MALE ATIORNEYS: 1'7. (0) 5% 25'7. 49% 21'To 
LlTIGATORS: 1'7. (0) 4'7. 29% 55'7. 12'7. 
JUDGES: (0) (0) (0) 4'7. 95'7. 1'7. 
COURT PERSONNEL (N): 1'7. 2'7. 2.,. 21'7. 61'7. 13'7. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATIORNEYS (weighted): 1'7. 1'7. 9'7. 32'7. 57'7. 
FEMALE ATIORNEYS: (0) 9% 25'7. 38'7, 28'7. 
LlTIGATORS: (0) 11'7. 24'70 39'To 27'7. 
ALL FEMALE ATIORNEYS: 1'7, 10'7. 27'7. 37'7. 26% 
MALE ATIORNEYS: I 'To (0) 6'10 31'7. 62'To 
LlTIGATORS: 1% (0) 5.,. 33'To 62'To 
JUDGES: (0) (0) (0) 4% 97'7. 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 1'7. 3'7. 3'7. 24% 70'7. 
MALE: 4'7. 24'7. 70'7. 
FEMALE: 2 4'7. II 'To 24'7. 60'7. 
By counsel 
ALL ATIORNEYS (weighted): 1'7. 3% 12'To 28% 36'70 2O'To 
FEMALE ATIORNEYS: 1'7. 18% 28'10 25'7. 12'1'. 16'7. 
LlTIGATORS: 1'70 19'7. 29'To 30'7. 10'7, 11'70 
ALL FEMALE ATIORNEYS: I 'To 20'7. 30'To 22% 11% 17'1', 
MALE ATIORNEYS: 1'7. 1'7. 9'To 29'7. 41% 20'To 
LlTiGATORS: 1% (0) 8'7. 32'7. 49'7. II 'To 
JUDGES: (0) 4'7. 12'7. 21'10 49% 14'To 
COURT PERSONNEL (N): 1'7. 3'7. 13'7. 22'To 48'7. 13'To 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATIORNEYS (weighted): 1 'To 4'7. 15% 36'10 45% 
FEMALE ATIORNEYS: 1% 20'1'. 36'7. 29'To 14'7. 
LITIGATORS: 2'7. 22'7. 33'1'. 33% 11'7. 
ALL FEMALE ATIORNEYS: 2% 23'7. 37'1'. 26% 13'7. 
MALE ATIORNEYS: 1'7. 1'7. 11'7. 36% 51'7. 
LlTIGATORS: 1% (0) 9'7. 36'7. 54'7. 
JUDGES: (0) 5'7. 14'7. 2S'7. S7'7, 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 1'7. 4'7. IS'7. 26'7. 5S'7. 
MALE: (0) (0) 12'7. 26% 62'7. 
FEMALE: 1'7. 7'7. 17'7. 2S% SO'7. 
By court personnel 
ALL ATIORNEYS (weighted): 1'7. 2'7. 9'To 2S'7. 38'7. 26'70 
FEMALE A TIORNEYS: (0) 120J0 22'7. 27'1'. 170J0 22'7. 
LlTiGATORS: (0) 12'7. 19'7. 300J0 20'1. 19'7. 
ALL FEMALE ATIORNEYS: 1'7. 10'7. 22'1'. 27'7. 17'7. 24'7. 
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MALE ATTORNEYS: 7'10 25'10 42'1. 26'10 
LITIGATORS: 1'10 1'10 5'10 27'10 50'10 17'10 
JUDGES: (0) 4'10 10'10 64'10 22'10 
COURT PERSONNEL (#): 1'10 1'10 6'10 22'10 59'10 11'10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'10 3'10 12'10 34'10 51'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 15'10 27'10 35'10 24'10 
LITIGATORS: (0) 15'10 24'10 36'10 25'10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 14'10 28'10 35'10 22'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 1'10 9'10 34'10 56'10 
LITIGATORS: 1'10 1'10 6'10 32'10 61'10 
JUDGES: (0) 1'10 5'10 13'10 82'10 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 1'10 1'10 6'10 25'10 67'10 
MALE: (0) (0) 6'10 29'10 65'10 
FEMALE: 6'10 11'10 24'10 58'10 
# The subsample of court personnel reported here are those who spend 50070 or more of their time in the courtroom in the 
performance of job duties or responsibilities (n = 18S) . 
• Less than one percent 
Question 4 - Court Employees' Questionnaire 
Court Interactions 
Comments are made about the personal appearance of women 
court system when no such comments are made about men. 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
By judges 
MALE: 3'10 13'10 
FEMALE: 6'10 13'10 29'10 
By counsel 
MALE: (0) 4'10 19'10 
FEMALE: 5'10 14'10 29'10 
By court personnel 
MALE: 1'10 5'10 26'10 
FEMALE: 8'10 23'10 33'10 



















Comments are made about the personal appearance of women attorneys when no 
such comments are made about men. 
SOME· DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN TIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
By judges 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'10 6'10 12'10 19'10 41'10 19'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'10 25'10 23'10 16'10 19'10 15'10 
LITIGATORS: 2'10 26'10 28'10 17'10 20'10 8'10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'10 18'10 27'10 16'10 17'10 20'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 4'10 11'10 19'10 46'10 19'10 
LITIGATORS: 1'10 3'10 13'10 22'10 52'10 10'10 
JUDGES: (0) (0) 5'10 9'10 85'10 1'10 
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THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
All ATTORNEYS (weighted): I"" S"" 16"" 24', ''', FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'10 2,0). 27'. 23'" 23.,. 
lITIGATORS: 2'. 2S% 30." IS% 22.,. 
All FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2"" 23"" 34.,. 20.,. 22'" 
MALE ATTORNEYS: ", ''''' 14"" 24.,. '7." lIT1GATORS: ", 4"" 14"" 2''''' '7', 
JUDGES: (0) (0) ''''' 9"" S7"" 
By counsel 
All ATTORNEYS (weishted): I"" 10.,. 23"" 20"" 29'. 17"" 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2"" 3", 30"" 12"" 9.,. 12"" 
lIT1GATORS: 2"" 36'10 34"" 12" 10"" 6"" 
All FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3', 310), 30.,. II.,. 9." 17." 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 7"" 22"" 21.,. 33" 17"" 
lITIGATORS: I"" ". 23', 25.,. 39.,. S"" 
JUDGES: (0) 4"" 16.,. 10"" 48.,. 22"" 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
All ATTORNEYS (weighted): I"" 12.,. 28"" 24"" 3". 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2"" 35"" 35"" 16', 12"" 
lITIGATORS: 2"" 3S', 36"" 13'. """ All FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3"" 37"" 36"" 13"" """ MALE ATTORNEYS: S"" 27"" 25"" 40', 
lITIGATORS: ", '"~ 25'" 27', 42." 
JUDGES: (0) 50), 20"" 13"" 62"" 
By coun personnel 
All ATTORNEYS (weighted): ''''' IS"" 19"" 34"" 28"" FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I"" 20'10 23"" 21"" 13'7. 22"" 
lITIGATORS: I"" 22"" 25.,. 22', IS', IS"" 
All FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2"" IS"" 26"" 20'7, 14"" 23." 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3"" 14"" IS"" 37"" 2S"" 
lITIGATORS: I"" I"" 14.,. 21'1, 43.,. 20"" 
JUDGES: (0) 3'7, """ 12"" 49'. 2''''' 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
All ATTORNEYS (weighted): I"" 7', 21"" 26', 46"" 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: ", 23'10 32', 27'. IS"" 
lITIGATORS: I"" 26.,. 30"" 2''7, IS', 
All FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3"" 20'10 33"" 26"" IS." 
MALE ATTORNEYS: I"" 4', 19'7, 25"" """ lITIGATORS: I"" I'. S"" 26"" 54"" 
JUDGES: (0) 4'. 14'7. 16'1, 66"" 
*Less than one percent 
Question 5 - Judges', Lawyers', and Court Employees' Questionnaires 
Court Interactions 
Comments are made about the personal appearance of women litigants or witnesses 
when no such comments are made about men" 
SOME- DON"T 
ALWAYS OFTEN TIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
By judges 
All ATTORNEYS (weighted): 4"" 13', 21'7. 3S'7. 24"" 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I'. 14"" 23"" 22"" 16'7. 24"" 
lIT1GATORS: I"" IS.,. 26'7. 22'7. 17"" IS'7. 
All FEMALE ATTORNEYS: ", """ 23'10 21." IS", 30', MALE ATTORNEYS: 20). 12'1. 21'7, 42'7. 23"" 
lITIGATORS: I"" 1'7, 14'7, 22'1. 49'. 14"" 
JUDGES: (0) (0) 3"" 12"" 84'7. I"" 
COURT PERSONNEL (I) 2"" 11'7, 23'. 41." 23"" 
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THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1"1, 5"10 17"10 28"10 49"10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"10 18"10 27"10 31"10 23"10 
L1TIGATORS: 2"10 18"10 32"10 27"10 21"10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"10 15"10 33"10 30"10 21"10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1"10 3"10 15"10 27"10 55"10 
L1TIGATORS: 1"10 1"10 16"10 26"10 56"10 
JUDGES: (0) (0) 3"10 12"10 85"10 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 1"10 2"10 14"10 30"10 53"10 
MALE: 2"10 2"10 13"10 27"10 56"10 
FEMALE: 2"10 10"10 19"10 29"10 40"10 
By counsel 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 9"10 20"10 20"10 29"10 22"10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2"10 20"10 31"10 18"10 9"10 20"10 
L1T1GATORS: 1'''10 22"10 35"10 17"10 11"10 14"10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2"10 22"10 28"10 14"10 9"10 25"10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 7"10 19"10 20"10 33"10 21"10 
L1TIGATORS: 1"10 6"10 22"10 22"10 38"10 12"10 
JUDGES: (0) 3"10 10"10 17"10 50"10 20"10 
COURT PERSONNEL (N): 2"10 17"10 21"10 37"10 23"10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1"1, 11"10 25"10 26"10 37"10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2"10 25"10 37"10 24"10 12"10 
L1TIGATORS: 2"10 26"10 40"10 19"10 13"10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2"10 29"10 37"10 19"10 13"10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1"10 9"10 23"10 26"10 42"10 
L1T1GA TORS: 1"10 7"10 25"10 25"10 43"10 
JUDGES: (0) 4"10 13"10 21"10 63"10 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 1"10 2"10 22"10 27"10 48"10 
MALE: (0) 5"10 17"10 28"10 50"10 
FEMALE: 3"10 12"10 23"10 25"10 37"10 
By court personnel 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 5"10 14"10 19"10 32"10 30"10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"10 14"10 24"10 21"10 12"10 28"10 
L1TIGATORS: 1"10 15"10 27"10 20"10 14"10 23"10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"10 13"10 23"10 20"10 12"10 32"10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3"10 13"10 18"10 36"10 30"10 
L1T1GA TORS: 1"10 2"10 15"10 20"10 42"10 21"10 
JUDGES: (0) 2"10 7"10 18"10 49"10 24"10 
COURT PERSONNEL (N) 1"10 3"10 16"10 27"10 36"10 17"10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1"10 7"10 20"10 27"10 46"10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"10 19"10 32"10 32"10 16"10 
L1TIGA TORS: 1"10 20"10 35"10 26"10 18"10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"10 19"10 34"10 29"10 17"10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1"10 4"10 18"10 26"10 52"10 
L1TIGATORS: 1"10 2"10 19"10 25"10 53"10 
JUDGES: (0) 3"10 9"10 23"10 65"10 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 1"10 4"10 19"10 32"10 44"10 
MALE: (0) 6"10 16"10 28"10 50"10 
FEMALE: 6"10 12"10 23"10 26"10 33"10 
# The subsample of coun personnel reported here are those who spend SOOJo or more their time in the counroom in the 
performance of job duties or responsibilities (n = 185) . 
• Less than onc percent 
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Question 6 - Judges', Lawyers', and Court Employees' Questionnaires 
Court Interactions 
Sexist remarks or jokes are made in court or in chambers. 
SOME· DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN TIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
By judges 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 3'1'0 19'Vo 21'1. 35'1'0 21'1'0 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1'0 17'1'0 29'1'0 22'1'0 14'70 17'1'0 
L1TIGATORS: 1'1'0 18'1'0 31'1'0 22'1'0 15'1'0 13'1'0 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'1'0 14'1'0 30'70 19'1. 16'1'0 20'1'0 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1'0 17'1'0 21'Vo 39'1'0 21'1. 
L1T1GATORS: 1'Vo 1'1'0 19'1. 22'1'0 45'1'0 13'1'0 
JUDGES: (0) (0) 6'1'0 17'Vo 76'1'0 1'1'0 
COURT PERSONNEL (I): I"" 5"" 19'1'0 14'1. 40"'. 21'Vo 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'1. 4'1'0 24'1'0 27'Vo 44'70 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I"" 19'1'0 35"'. 26'70 19'Vo 
L1TIGATORS: 1'1'0 21'1. 36'1'0 25"" IS'I'o 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'1'0 IS'I'o 37'1'0 24"" 20'1'0 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1'0 1'1'0 22'1'0 27'1'0 49'1'0 
L1TIGATORS: I"" I"" 22"" 25"" 51"" 
JUDGES: (0) (0) 6'1'0 17'Vo 77'1'0 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 1'1'0 6'1. 24'1'0 IS"" 51'1'0 
MALE: 2"" 4'1'0 17'1. 24"" 53'1. 
FEMALE: 2"'. 11'1. 22'1'0 22'1'0 43'1'0 
By counsel 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): I"" 6'Vo 27'1. 21"" 27"" 19'Vo 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'1. 24'1. 42'1. 11'1. 5"" IS'I. 
L1TIGATORS: 3'1'0 27'1'0 44'1'0 12"" 6'1'0 9'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'1'0 22"" 3S'I'o 11'1. S'I'o 16'1'0 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3'1'0 25'1. 23"'. 31"'. IS'I'o 
L1TIGATORS: 1'1'0 1'1'0 29'1'0 24'1'0 35'1'0 11'1'0 
JUDGES: (0) 3'1'0 17'1'0 24'1'0 42'1'0 14'1'0 
COURT PERSONNEL (I): 2'1'0 6'1'0 22'1'0 19'1'0 33'1'0 19'1'0 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'1'0 7'1'0 33"" 26'1'0 33'1'0 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3'1'0 26'1'0 49'1'0 14'1'0 S'I'o 
L1TIGATORS: 3'1. 30'1. 49"" 13'Vo 6'70 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'1. 29'1. 46'1'0 13"" 10'1'0 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1'0 4'70 30'1'0 28"" 3S"" 
L1TIGATORS: I"'. I"'. 32'1'0 27'Vo 39'70 
JUDGES: (0) 4'1. 19'1'0 28"" 49'1'0 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 2'1. 7'1'0 27'1'0 24'1'0 40'1'0 
MALE: 6'1'0 19'1'0 34'1'0 41'1. 
FEMALE: 2'1'0 10'1'0 32"" 19"" 37"" 
By coun personnel 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 3'1'0 14'1'0 20'1'0 30'1'0 32'1'0 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I"'. 9'70 23'1'0 22'1. 16'1'0 28'1'0 
L1TIGA TORS: I"" 9'1'0 24'1'0 24'1. 19'1'0 24'1'0 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1'0 9'1'0 24'1. 22'1'0 16'1'0 29"" 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 2'1. 13'1'0 20'70 33'1'0 32'1'0 
L1TIGATORS: I' 2'1'0 14'1'0 21"'. 37"" 26'1. 
JUDGES: (0) 2'1'0 11'1'0 18'1'0 47'1'0 22'1'0 
COURT PERSONNEL (I): 3'1'0 5'1'0 25'1. 19'1'0 37'1'0 12'1'0 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'1'0 5"" 20'1. 30"" 45"" 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1'0 13'1'0 31'1'0 30'70 24'1'0 
L1TIGATORS: 1'1. 12'1'0 32'1'0 31'1'0 25'1'0 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'1'0 12'1'0 33'1. 31'1. 22'1'0 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1'0 3'1'0 IS"" 30'1'0 49'1'0 
L1T1GATORS: 1'1'0 2'1'0 19'1'0 28'1'0 50'1. 
JUDGES: (0) 2.,. 14'Vo 24"" 60.,. 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 3'1'0 6'1'0 28"" 22'1'0 42'1. 
MALE: 1'1'0 5.,. 23'1'0 27'1'0 43'1'0 
FEMALE: 4'1. 10.,. 32"" 19'1'0 36'1'0 
# The subsample of coun personnel reponed here are those who spend 50'70 or more of their time in the counroom in the 
performance of job duties or responsibilities (n = 185) . 
• Less than one percent 
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Question 7 - Judges', Lawyers', and Court Employees' Questionnaires 
Court Interactions 
Women litigants are subjected to verbal or physical sexual advances. 
SOME- DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN TIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
By judge. 
All ATTORNEYS (weighted): I OJ, 7OJ, 58 OJ. 33'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) IOJ. 4'10 15OJ, 36OJ. 44OJ. 
LlTIGATORS: (0) IOJ. 3OJ. 14OJ. 39OJ. 42'10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 4OJ. 14OJ. 35 OJ. 46OJ. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: I OJ. 1'10 6OJ. 63 OJ. 30'10 
LlTIGATORS: 2"1t (0) (0) 6'10 71OJ. 22OJ. 
JUDGES: (0) (0) (0) 99'10 
COURT PERSONNEL (I) I.,. IOJ. 3"1t 7'!'. 61'10 27'10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'10 2OJ. 11'7. 87OJ. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 3OJ, 6OJ. 24OJ. 67OJ, 
LlTlGATORS: (0) 2'lo 6'10 24'10 68OJ, 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2OJ. 7'7. 26'7. 65'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: I.,. (0) 1'10 8'10 90'10 
LlTlGATORS: I.,. (0) (0) 8'10 91'10 
JUDGES: (0) (0) (0) 1'7. 99'10 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: I "It 2"1t SOJ, 9'10 84OJ. 
MALE: 2.,. 4OJ. 7'10 87OJ. 
FEMALE: I "It 3'lo IOOJ. 11'7. 7SOJ, 
By counsel 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): I.,. I OJ. 4OJ, 12OJ, 51'10 32OJ. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 2'7. 16'lo 15'10 22'10 45OJ. 
LlTlGATORS: (0) 1'10 17'7. 15'10 23'7. 43'7. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'7. 14'10 15'7. 24'7. 45'7. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: I "It 2'10 II OJ. 57'7. 29'10 
LlTIGATORS: I OJ. (0) 1'10 11'7, 66'7. 21'10 
JUDGES: (0) (0) 4'10 4'7. 63'10 29'7, 
COURT PERSONNEL (I): 2'7, 3"1t 10'7. 56'10 29'7, 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): I "It 1'10 6'10 17'10 75'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 4OJ, 29'10 27OJ. 41'7. 
LlTlGATORS: (0) 2OJ, 30'10 27OJ. 41'7. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4OJ. 26'10 26'7. 44'7. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: I "It I.,. 3'10 15'7, SOOJ. 
LlTlGA TORS: I "It (0) 1'7. 14'7, 83'10 
JUDGES: (0) (0) 6'7, 5'7, 89'10 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 1'7. 2'7. 4"1t 14'10 79'7. 
MALE: (0) (0) 7'10 10'10 83'7. 
FEMALE: SOJ. 12'7, 15OJ. 68'7. 
By coun personnel 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2'7. IOOJ. 51OJ. 38OJ. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 1'10 7OJ. 16OJ. 28'7. 48'7. 
LlTIGATORS: 1'10 I OJ, 6'7. 15OJ. 32'7. 46'7. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2OJ, 5"1t 15OJ, 30'7. 49'7. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'7. 1'7. 8'1. 55'10 35'1. 
LITIGATORS: I "It (0) (0) 7'10 65'10 27'10 
JUDGES: (0) 1'10 3'10 70'10 25'10 
COURT PERSONNEL (I): (0) 6'10 10'10 61'10 23'10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): I "It 2'10 15'10 81'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1, 2OJ. 12OJ. 30OJ. 55OJ. 
LlTIGA TORS: I "It 1'10 10'10 28OJ, 59'10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3'10 10'10 29'10 58'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: I "It (0) 1'10 13'10 85'10 
LlTIGATORS: IOJ. (0) (0) 10'10 89'10 
JUDGES: (0) 1'10 2'10 4'10 94'10 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 1'1. (0) 7'7. 13'10 79'10 
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MALE: 
FEMALE: 2.,. (0) 3.,. 8'" 16.,. 12.,. 13.,. 79.,. 66% 
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# The subsample of coun personnel reponed here are those who spend '0.,. or more their time in the courtroom in the 
performance of job duties or responsibilities (n ~ 18') . 
• Less than one percent 
Question 8 - Court Employees' Questionnaire 
Court Interactions 
Women employees in the court system are subjected to verbal or physical sexual 
advances. 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
By judge 
MALE: 8% 1407. 77.,. 
FEMALE: 107. 3'" 18.,. 1207. 66.,. 
By counsel 
MALE: 3'1. 9'1. 17% 7007. 
FEMALE: I." 3% 22% 2207. nOJ. 
By coun personnel 
MALE: I.,. 4.,. U.,. 19.,. 62'" 
FEMALE: 2.,. 607. 27.,. 16." 49.,. 
-Less than one percent 
Question 8 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Court Interactions 
Women attorneys are subjected to verbal or physical sexual advances. 
SOME· DON·T 
ALWAYS OFTEN TIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
By judges 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 207. 9% 58% 3107. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 2.,. 13.,. 1907. 4007, 2607. 
LlTiGATORS: (0) 2.,. IS.,. 18.,. 42.,. 2307, 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 207. II." 17.,. 38.,. 32." 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 8.,. 62'" 3007. 
LlTIGA TORS: 1'1. (0) (0) 7OJ, 7007. 2207. 
JUDGES: I.,. (0) (0) (0) 98'" I." 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 3.,. 13'" 83." 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 3'" 16'" 2507. 57." 
LlTiGATORS: (0) 3'" 20"1. 2307. 5407. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3." 1607. 24% 5607. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: I.,. (0) I.,. II.,. 8807. 
LlTIGA TORS: 1% (0) (0) 10'" 90'" 
JUDGES: 1% (0) (0) I'" 99.,. 
By counsel 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2.,. 807. 12.,. 51.,. 2807, 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 9% 29'" 1907, 24.,. 2007, 
LlTIGA TORS: (0) 8." 34.,. 2007. 23'" 1507, 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 607. 27." 1807. 24." 26'" 
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MALE ATTORNEYS: 107. 407, 1107, 5607, 2807, 
L1T1GA TORS: 1"10 (0) 307, 1207. 6407, 2107, 
JUDGES: (0) 107. 407, SOl. 6207. 2807, 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 207. 1107. 1607. 7007. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 1007. 3707, 2407. 2907. 
L1T1GATORS: (0) 1007. 4007, 2407. 2707. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 807. 3607. 2507. 3207. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 107, 107. 607. 1507. 7807. 
L1TIGA TORS: 107. (0) 407. 1507, 8007, 
JUDGES: (0) 107. 607. 707. 8707, 
By court personnel 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 107. 307, 907, 5207. 3607, 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 107. 1507, 2107. 3707. 2707. 
L1T1GATORS: (0) 107. 1307, 2107. 4007. 2407, 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 207. 1107, 1907. 3507. 3307, 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 107, 707. 5507. 3607, 
L1T1GATORS: 107. (0) 107, 707. 6307. 2907, 
JUDGES: (0) (0) 107. SOl. 69'7. 2507. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 107. 107. SOl, 14'7. SOOI. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 207. I SOl. 29'7. 5107. 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 207. 1707. 2S'7. 5307. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 207. 1607. 2907. 5307. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 107, 107. 107. 1007. 8907, 
L1TIGA TORS: 107. (0) 107. 1007. S901. 
JUDGES: (0) (0) 107. 607. 9307. 
·less than one percent 
Question 9 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Court Interactions 
Women attorneys are appointed to important fee generating cases on an equal basis 
with male attorneys, 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 907. 907. 707. 707. 207. 6607. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 307. SOl. 1107. 2207. 407, 5607. 
L1TIGATORS: SOl, SOl. 1207. 2307. SOl. 5107. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 307, SOl. 1107, 2407. SOl. 5307. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1007. 907. 607. 5'7. 207. 6807. 
L1TIGA TORS: 1107. 1007. 607. 607, 207. 6507, 
JUDGES: 2707. gOi. SOl. 107. 707. 5207. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2607. 2507, 2107. 2107. 707, 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 807. 1107. 2707. 4607, 807. 
L1TIGA TORS: 10'1. 1007. 2407. 4707, 1007. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 607. 1007. 2307. 5107. 1007. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3107. 2807. 2007. 1507. 707. 
L1TIGA TORS: 32'10 2907. 1707. 1707. 607. 
JUDGES: 5707. 1707. 1107. 107. 1407. 
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Question 9 - Court Employees' Questionnaire and 
Question 10 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Credibility 
Judges appear to give less weight to female attorneys' arguments than to those of 
male attorneys, 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): (0) 2'1, 13'1. 21'1. 41'1. 23'1, 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 12.,. 40'1, 23.,. 12.,. 13'1. 
LlTIGATORS: (0) 11'1, 45.,. 25'1, 13.,. 7'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1. 11'1. 35'1, 22.,. 14.,. 17'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) I.,. 9'1, 21'1. 46'1. 23'1. 
LlTlGATORS: (0) 1'1. S'I. 23.,. 55'1. 13'1. 
JUDGES: ( •• ) (0) (0) 2'1, (0) 9S'1. 1'1. 
COURT PERSONNEL (N) 1'1. 7'1. IS'I. SI'I, 23.,. 
THOSE EXPRESSING A~ OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): (0) 3'1, 17'1, 2S.,. 53'1, 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 12'1, 45.,. 26'1, 17'1, 
LlTIGATORS: (0) 12'1, 48.,. 27'1, 14.,. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I.,. 14.,. 42.,. 26.,. 17.,. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 1'1, 11'1. 2S.,. 60'1, 
LlTIGATORS: (0) I.,. 10'1. 26.,. 63'1. 
JUDGES: (0) (0) 2.,. (0) 9S'I, 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 1'1. 1'1, 9'1, 23'1. 76'1, 
MALE: 2'1, 9'1, 13'1, 75'1. 
FEMALE: 1'1, 5'1. 20'1. 22'1. S2.,. 
# The subsample of court personnel reported here are those who spend 50.,. or more of their time in the courtroom in 
the performance of job duties or responsibilities (n = IS5) • 
• Less than one percent 
•• The question wording in the judges' questionnaire was changed to measure the judges' evaluation of their own 
behavior. Thus, Question #10 on the judges' questionnaire reads: "Do you give less weight to female anorneys' 
arguments than to those of male anorneys?" 
Question 10 - Court Employees' Questionnaire and 
Question II - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaire 
Credibility 
Judges appear to give less weight to the testimony of female 
experts than that of male experts, 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2'1, S.,. 16.,. 30.,. 44'1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1, 9.,. 25'1. 12.,. 12'1. 41'1. 
LlTIGATORS: I.,. 9'1, 2S'l. 14'1, U'I. 3S'I. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: S'I, 22'1. 14.,. 11'1, 44'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 1'1, 5.,. 170,0. 34'1. 43'1. 
LlTlGA TORS: (0) 1'1, 4.,. IS.,. 41'1. 36'1. 
JUDGES: ( .. ) (0) (0) 1'1. 1'1. 9S'I. 1'1. 
COURT PERSONNEL (N): 1'1. 4'1. IS'I. 55'1. 24'1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 4'1. 14.,. 2S'I, 54'1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'1, 13'1. 43'1. 21'1. 21'1. 
LlTIGA TORS: 2'1, 14'1. 41'1. 22'1. 21'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I.,. 15'1. 40'1, 25'1, 20'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 3'1. 9'1, 29'1, 60.,. 
LlTIGA TORS: (0) 2'1. 7'1, 2S.,. 64.,. 
JUDGES: (0) (0) 1'1, 1'1. 98'1. 
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ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 
MALE: 
FEMALE: 













N The 5ubsample of court personnel reported here are those who spend 50'70 or more of their time in the courtroom in 
the performance of job duties or responsibilities (n = ISS) . 
• Less than one percent 
•• The question wording in the judges' questionnaire was changed to measure the judges' evaluation of their own 
behavior. Thus. Question #10 on the judges' questionnaire reads: "Do you give less weight to female attorneys' 
arguments than to those of male attorneys?" 
Question 11 Court Employees' Questionnaire and 
Question 12 Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Credibility 
Judges require more evidence for a female litigant to 
prove her case than for a male litigant. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2"1. 3"10 12"1. 51"10 32"1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"1. S"I. 19"1. 16"1. 19"10 37"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 1"1. S'lo 21"1. 16"1. 21"1. 33"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"1. S'lo IS"I. IS"I. 16"1. 39"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 1"1. 11"1. 57"1. 30"1. 
L1T1GATORS: (0) 1"1. 1"1. 11"1. 67"1. 21"1. 
JUDGES: (00) (0) (0) (0) (0) 99"1. 1"1. 
COURT PERSONNEL (N): 1"1. 1"1. 4"1. 14"1. 59"1. 21"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 3"1. 4"1. IS"I. 75"1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2"1. 11"1. 30"1. 26"1. 32"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 2"1. 12"1. 31"1. 24"1. 31"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"1. 1307. 30"1. 30"1. 26"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 2"1. 1"1. 16"1. S2"1. 
L1T1GATORS: (0) 1"1. 1"1. 14"1. 84"1. 
JUDGES: (0) (0) (0) (0) 100"1. 
ALL COURT PERSONNEL: 1"1. 1"10 6'70 17"1. 75"1. 
MALE: (0) 5"1. 14"1. SI"1. 
FEMALE: 2"1. 4"1. 16"1. IS"I. 60"1. 
# The subsampie of court personnel reponed here are those who spend 50070 or morc of their time in the courtroom in 
the performance of job duties or responsibilities (n = ISS) . 
• Less than one percent 
•• The Question wording in the judges' questionnaire was changed to measure the judges' evaluation of their own 
behavior. Thus, Question #10 on the judges' Questionnaire reads: liDo you give less weight to female attorneys' 
arguments than to those of male attorneys?" 
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Question 13 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Marital Property 
Where a wife's primary contribution is as a homemaker, the monetary award reflects 
a judicial attitude that the husband's income producing contribution entitles him to 
a larger share of the marital estate" 
DON"T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): I.,. g.,. 14.,. II.,. IS~. 52.,. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4.,. 19.,. 12.,. ,.,. 2~. 56.,. 
LlTIGATORS: 4'1. 19~. 12.,. 9.,. 3.,. 54.,. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 9.,. 36.,. 24.,. 15.,. 3~. 13.,. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3.,. 19.,. 14.,. ,.,. 2.,. 55.,. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 6.,. 14.,. 12'1. 16.,. 51.,. 
LlTIGATORS: (0) ,.,. IS.,. 13.,. IS~. 4'~. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 13.,. 23.,. 23.,. 33.,. ,~. 
JUDGES: I~. 4~. 6.,. II.,. 44~. 34.,. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2.,. I'''' 29.,. 23.,. 30~. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: ''I. 41.,. 29~. I'''' ,.,. 
LlTlGATORS: 9~. 40.,. 25.,. 19.,. 6~. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 10'10 41.,. 28~. I'''' 3.,. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: ,~. 42.,. 30"lo 16.,. 5.,. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1. 13~. 29.,. 24.,. 34'1. 
LlTIGATORS: (0) 13~. 2S.,. 24"lo 34". 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 14"lo 25~. 25". 36.,. 
JUDGES: I.,. 6"lo 9.,. 1''1. 67'1. 
Question 14 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Marital Property 
Courts award counsel and expert fees to the economically dependent spouse sufficient 
to allow that spouse to effectively pursue the litigation" 
DON"T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): I.,. 9'1. IS.,. 14~. 3.,. 55~. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 3'1. 11'1. 20.,. 6.,. 60'1. 
LlTlGATORS: (0) 4'1. 9.,. 23'" 7". 57'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 5.,. 13'1. 51.,. 16'1. 15'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4~. 10.,. 25'1. 5". 57'" 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1. 9"lo 19.,. 13". 3.,. 34.,. 
LlTIGA TORS: I.,. 11'1. n.,. lSI{. 3'1. 48.,. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 191{. 32.,. 33.,. 71{. 9.,. 
JUDGES: 19.,. IS.,. 19.,. 3.,. 2.,. 39'lo 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 3.,. 2O'lo 39.,. 32.,. 7.,. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) g.,. 26.,. 53.,. 13.,. 
LlTIGATORS: (0) 10.,. 21.,. 341{. 16.,. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 5.,. 16.,. 60.,. 19.,. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: l"lo gl{. 22.,. 571{. 12.,. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 21{. 20.,. 42'1. 29.,. 6.,. 
LlTIGATORS: II{. 21.,. 43'1. 3Of{. 51{. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 21.,. 351{. 3'''lo SI{. 
JUDGES: 321{. 30". 31'1. 5'1 • 3.,. 
• Less than one percent 
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Question IS - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Marital Property 
Effective injunctive relief is granted where necessary to maintain the status quo until 
monetary awards are made. 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2'1. 11'1. 16'10 11'1. 
fEMALE ATTORNEYS: S'lo 11'1. 1S'Io 
LlTiGA TORS: 1'1. 6'10 10'1. 16'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'1. 6'1. 21'1. 37'10 
ALL fEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1. 4'10 13'1. 19'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 2'1. 12'1. 18'1. 10'1. 
LlTIGA TORS: 1'1. 13'1. 18'1. 13'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'1. 28'10 26'10 23'1. 
JUDGES: 22'10 18'10 17'10 2'1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 4'10 26'1. 39'1. 27'1. 
fEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1. 16'1. 31'10 42'10 
LlTIGATORS: 2'1. 16'1. 27'1. 42'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'10 8'1. 27'1. 48'10 
ALL fEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1. 11'1. 34'1. 48'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 4'10 27'10 41'1. 24'1. 
LlTIGA TORS: 2'1. 2g'l. 39'1. 28'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'10 33'10 32'10 28'10 
JUDGES: 34'10 28'10 26'10 4'1. 































Judges impose meaningful sanctions, including civil contempt, when injunctions are 
violated, 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'10 8'1. IS'I. 19'10 1'10 S6'1. 
fEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 3'10 9'10 22'10 4'1. 61'1. 
LlTiGA TORS: 1'1. 6'1. 7'10 22'10 6'1. S9'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'1. 6'1. 13'10 46'10 12'10 21'10 
ALL fEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3'1. 10'10 25'10 3'10 60'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 8'10 15'10 20'1. 1'1. 55'1. 
LlTIGA TORS: 1'10 9'1. 14'10 24'1. 1'1. 51'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 1'10 12'10 25'1. 46'10 1'1. 15'1. 
JUDGES: 19'1. 26'1. 17'1. 6'10 1'10 32'10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2'10 17'1. 33'10 44'1. 3'1. 
fEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 Il'l. 25'10 51'1. 10'1. 
LlTIGA TORS: 2'1. 14'10 17'10 54'1. 14'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2070 8'10 17070 59'1. 15'10 
ALL fEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 8'1. 2407. 61'1. 7'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3'1. 18'1. 34'10 44'1. 2'10 
LlTIGA TORS: 1'1. 19'1. 29'10 49'10 2'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'1. 14'1. 29'10 S4'1o 2'1. 
JUDGES: 27'10 38'1. 25'10 8'1. 2'1. 
-Less than one percent 
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Question 17 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Alimony 
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A wife's alimony award is based on how much the husband can give her without 
diminishing his current life style. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'1. 11'1. Il'l. 18'1. 7.,. '1'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4'10 U'lo 16'1. 6'10 4'10 '4'10 
L1T1GATORS: 4'10 18'1. 17.,. 8'10 ''10 48'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 10'1. 34'10 31'10 10'10 ''10 9'10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3'1. 19'1. 16'10 6'10 2'10 "'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 10'10 Il'lo 20'1. 7'1. '0'10 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 10'1. 16'10 23'10 8'1. 44'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 22'10 26'1. 39'10 12'10 1'10 
JUDGES: 2'1. 6'10 12'10 16'10 31'10 33'10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2'10 22'10 27'10 36'10 14'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 7'10 37'1. 33'10 16'10 7'10 
L1TIGATORS: 8'10 3''1. 32'10 16'10 9'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 12'10 38'10 34'10 12'10 ''10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 7'10 41'1. H'Io 13'10 4'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 19'1. 26'10 39'10 U'lo 
L1T1GATORS: (0) 17'10 28'10 41'10 14'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 22'1. 27'10 40'10 12'10 
JUDGES: 3'1. 10'1. 17'1. 24'1. 46'1. 
Question 18 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Alimony 
Older, displaced homemakers are awarded indefinite alimony 
after long-term marriages. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'10 21'10 U'lo ''10 1'10 '7'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 8'10 17'10 9'10 1'10 64'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 1'10 10'10 20'10 8'10 1'10 '9'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'10 18'10 33'10 22'10 3.,. 22'10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 8'10 18'10 13'10 1'10 '9'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 23'10 1''10 ''10 1'10 "'10 
L1TIGATORS: 2'1. 29'10 14'10 4'10 1'10 '0'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3'10 '2'10 22'10 9'10 1'10 Il'lo 
JUDGES: 6'10 32'10 19'10 3'10 2'1. 38'10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 3'10 49'1. 34'10 13'10 2'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'10 27'10 44'10 24'10 2'10 
L1TIGATORS: 3'10 24'10 49'10 20'10 3'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'10 23'1. 42'1. 29'1. 4'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 21'10 4''10 32'1. 2'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3'10 '2'10 33'10 11'10 2'10 
L1TIGATORS: 3'1. '8'10 28'10 9'10 2'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3'10 60'10 2''10 10'10 2'1. 
JUDGES: 11'1. '2'10 31'10 4'10 3'10 
·Less than one percent 
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Question 19 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Alimony 
The courts effectively enforce alimony awards. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATIORNEYS (weighted): 311. 1611. 18'" II.,. 1"1. 52"1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I'" 3'" lOll. 16"1. 2"1. 58"1. 
lITiGATORS: 1"1. 4.,. 22'" IS"I. 1"1. 57"1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 211. 811. 42"1. 22"1. 5"1. 22"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I'" 711. 17"1. 1811. 2"1. 56.,. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 211. 1911. Ig.,. 10.,. 50"1. 
lITIGATORS: 411. 1911. 1911. 12"1. (0) 46"1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 9'" 2311. 3911. 23"1. (0) 6"1. 
JUDGES: 13'" 34'" 16'" 2"1. 2"1. 33"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 5'" 34'" 3711. 23.,. 1"1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I'" 1311. 4511. 37"1. 4"1. 
lITiGA TORS: 2'" 100J0 5111. 35"1. 3"1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 211. 100J0 54'" 2911. 6"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATIORNEYS: 2'" 15'" 3911. 40.,. 4.,. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 6'" 3811. 35'" 20.,. I.,. 
lITiGATORS: 7'" 3611. 36'" 22.,. (0) 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 9'" 25'" 42'" 25.,. (0) 
JUDGES: 19"1. 5111. 24.,. 4.,. 3"1. 
Question 20 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Alimony 
Alimony awards at the time of divorce are close to or the same as pendente lite 
awards. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1"1. 25'" 15.,. 2"1. (0) 56"1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3"1. 16"1. 13'" 4"1. (0) 64"1. 
lITiGATORS: 3'" 17'" 1511. 3"1. (0) 62"1. 
DOMESTIC RElATIONS: 811. 4011. 19.,. 9"1. (0) 24"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 211. 19'" 13.,. 2"1. 64"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 27.,. 1611. 2.,. (0) 55"1. 
lITIGA TORS: III. 3211. 17"1. 2"1. (0) 48"1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3'" 59'" 30.,. 1"1. (0) 6"1. 
JUDGES: 28.,. 26.,. 3"1. 43"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 3"1. 5711. HII. 5"1. (0) 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 7.,. 43"1. 39.,. 12"1. (0) 
lITiGATORS: 9.,. 44.,. 38.,. 9"1. (0) 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 100J0 5311. 26.,. 12"1. (0) 
ALL FEMALE ATIORNEYS: 6'" 52'" 36.,. 6.,. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 2.,. 60'" 35.,. 4"1. (0) 
lITiGATORS: 2'" 6111. 33.,. 4"1. (0) 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3'" 63'" 32.,. 2.,. (0) 
JUDGES: III. 4811. 45.,. 5.,. I.,. 
·Less than one percent 
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Question 21 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Child Support 
Child support awards adequately reflect a realistic understanding of the local costs 
of child raising. 
OON·T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2'7. .,.,. 20.,. 17.,. 3.,. 44.,. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I.,. 3'7. 17.,. 27.,. 5'7. 47.,. 
LlTiGATORS: (0) 4.,. 18'7. 28.,. 6'7. 44.,. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 8.,. 25.,. 45.,. 13.,. -ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I.,. 5.,. 16'7. 27.,. 6.,. 46.,. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 2'7. 17'7. 21.,. 16.,. 2'7. 43'7. 
LlTIGATORS: I.,. 19'7. 25'7. 14.,. 2.,. 40'70 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3'7. 28.,. 35.,. 26.,. 6.,. 3.,. 
JUDGES: 19.,. 32.,. II.,. 8.,. 2.,. 2g'7. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 3'70 27'7. 26.,. 30'7. 4.,. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I.,. 8.,. 34.,. 48.,. -LlTiGATORS: (0) 7'7. 32.,. 51.,. 10'70 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 8.,. 28.,. 49.,. "'7. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I.,. 9'7. 31.,. SO.,. 10.,. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3'7. 29.,. 37.,. 28.,. 3.,. 
LlTIGATORS: 2.,. 31.,. 42.,. 23.,. 3.,. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3'7. 28.,. 36.,. 27.,. 6.,. 
JUDGES: 27.,. 44'70 16'7. .. .,. 3.,. 
Question 22 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Child Support 
Child support awards reflect a realistic understanding of a particular child's needs. 
OON·T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2'7. 14.,. 24.,. 15.,. 2'7. 43'7. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 3'7. 22.,. 24.,. 4.,. 47.,. 
LlTiGATORS: (0) 5'7. 21.,. 25.,. 6.,. 44.,. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 6'7. 33.,. 42.,. 10'70 9.,. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 5.,. 18'7. 27.,. 3.,. 46'7. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 2'7. .,.,. 25'7 • 14.,. I.,. 42.,. 
LlTiGATORS: I.,. 17'7. 30'70 12.,. 2.,. 3_ 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3.,. 28.,. 42.,. 22'" 4.,. I.,. 
JUDGES: IS.,. 31'7. .,.,. 7.,. 2.,. 27.,. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 3'7. 25.,. 43'7. 27'7. 3.,. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 9'7. 40'70 42.,. S.,. 
LlTIGATORS: (0) 9.,. 37'7. 44.,. 10'70 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 7'7. 36'7. 46.,. 12.,. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'7. 10.,. 34.,. SO'7o 6'7. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3.,. 27'7. 44.,. 25'7. 2.,. 
LlTIGATORS: 2.,. 27.,. 48.,. 20'7. 3.,. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3.,. 28'7. 43.,. 22.,. 4.,. 
JUDGES: 25'7. 43.,. 20'70 10'7. 3.,. 
• Less than one percent 
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Question 12 - Court Employees' Questionnaire 
Credibility 
[Vol. 20 
Judges give different sentences to female defendants than they give to male defen-
dants, based solely on gender. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARelY NEVER KNOW 
By court personnel 
All RESPONSES: I.,. 6.,. 16.,. 13.,. 40.,. 23.,. 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION: 3'" 8"10 20"10 17.,. S2.,. 
MALE: 3'1. 7'1. 31'1. 13'1. 46'1. 
FEMALE: 3'1. 10'1. 29'1. 18'1. 40'1. 
Question 13 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Court Employees) 
Sexual advances in exhange for an employment security/opportunity 
EXPERIENCED HEARD ABOUT 
No Yes No Yes 
From judges 
MALE: 96.,. 4'7. 72'1. 28'1. 
FEMALE: 95"10 S.,. 49'1. 50'1. 
From attorneys 
MALE: 96'" 4.,. 71'1. 29.,. 
FEMALE: 94'1. 6'7. 64'1. 36'1. 
From co·workers 
MALE: 93'1. 7.,. 67'" 33'" 
FEMALE: 92'1. 8.,. 51'1. 49'1. 
From supervisors 
MALE: 96'7. 4'7. 59'1. 41.,. 
FEMALE: 93'1. 7'7. 54'1. 46'1. 
Question 14 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Court Employees) 
Requests for sexual activity 
EXPERIENCED HEARD ABOUT 
No Yes No Yes 
From judges 
MALE: 94'1. 6'" 71"1. 29"1. 
FEMALE: 92'1. 8'" 61"1. 39"1. 
From attorneys 
MALE: 96'1. 4'1. 75"1. 25.,. 
FEMALE: 89"1. 11'1. 68'7. 32"1. 
From co-workers 
MALE: 89"1. 11'1. 65.,. 35'" 
FEMALE: 85"1. 15"1. 59"1. 41"1. 
From supervisors 
MALE: 95'1. 5'1. 68"1. 32'1. 
FEMALE: 94"1. 6"1. 67"1. 33"1. 
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Question 15 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Court Employees) 
Physical touching of a sexual nature 
EXPERIENCED HEARD ABOUT 
No Yes No Yes 
From judges 
MALE: 95'7. 5'10 78"10 22"10 
fEMALE: 88'7. 12'7. 64'7. 36'7. 
From attorneys 
MALE: 92'7. 8"" 76"10 24'7. 
fEMALE: 89'7. 11"10 73'7. 27'7. 
From co-workers 
MALE: 84'10 16'10 68"10 32'7. 
fEMALE: 82'10 18'7. 60"10 40'7. 
From supervisors 
MALE: 95"10 5'10 72"7. 28"7. 
FEMALE: 92"" 8'10 70'7. 30"10 
From the public 
MALE: 90"10 10"" 79.,. 21"7. 
fEMALE: 91"10 9'7. 76"7. 24"7. 
Question 16 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Court Employees) 
Verbal behavior such as sexist jokes or comments. 
EXPERIENCED HEARD ABOUT 
No Yes No Yes 
from judges 
MALE: 79"10 21"7. 79.,. 21"7. 
FEMALE: 75"" 25"7. 74.,. 26"7. 
From attorneys 
MALE: 72"7. 28"7. 72"7. 28"7. 
FEMALE: 68"10 32"10 72.,. 28"7. 
From c()o.workcrs 
MALE: S6'1o 44'10 63"10 37"10 
FEMALE: 55'7. 45'10 64"7. 36"7. 
From supervisors 
MALE: 75'7. 25"10 73"10 27"7. 
FEMALE: 74"7. 26"10 72"10 28"7. 
From the public 
MALE: 67.,. 33"" 77'7. 23"7. 
FEMALE: 66'7. 34"" 70'7. 30.,. 
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Question 18 - Coun Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time) 
Employment 










Question 19 - Coun Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time Court Employees) 
Number of years you have been employed in the Maryland court system? 
FULL-TIME MALE: FULL-TIME FEMALE: 
Years Percent Years Percent 
I ISOJo I 15% 
2 S% 2 8% 
3 4% 3 8% 
4 S% 4 7% 
S 4% 5 5% 
6 6% 6 4% 
7 S% 7 6% 
8 4% 8 5% 
9 S% 9 4% 
to 6% 10 5% 
II 2% II 5% 
13 4% 12 3% 
14 3% 13 4% 
IS S% 14 4% 
16 S% 15 4% 
17 3% 16 4% 
18 • 17 3% 
19 1% 18 .. 
20 3% 19 .. 
21 .. 20 2% 
22 2% 22 .. 
23 1% 23 .. 
24 2% 24 .. 
25 2% 25 .. 
26 1% 26 .. 
27 1% 27 .. 
28 • 28 .. 
31 2% 30 .. 
33 1% 31 .. 
32 .. 
41 .. 
-less than OM sxrccnl 
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Question 20 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time) 
Number of years employed in your current position? 
FULL-TIME MALE: FULL-TIME FEMALE: 
Years Percent Years Percent 
I 21070 1 32% 
2 7% 2 16% 
3 6% 3 10070 
4 6% 4 9% 
5 8% 5 4% 
6 8% 6 4% 
7 5% 7 4% 
8 5% 8 4% 
9 4% 9 4% 
10 6% 10 3% 
11 3% 11 1% 
12 2% 12 2% 
13 3% 13 2% 
14 1% 14 • 
15 4% 15 2% 
16 5% 16 • 
17 3% 17 • 
18 1% 18 • 
19 • 19 • 
22 • 20 • 
24 2% 22 • 
25 • 23 • 
31 • 26 • 
41 • 
·Less than one percent 
Question 21 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time) 
Before your employment with the court system, did you have prior work experience 
or was this your first job? 
Yes 
FULL-TIME MALE: 87% 
FULL-TIME FEMALE: 83% 
A. Yes, how many years? 
FULL-TIME MALE: FULL-TIME FEMALE: 
Years Percent Years Percent 
1 8% 1 5% 
2 10% 2 7% 
3 13% 3 7% 
4 9% 4 7% 
5 9% 5 7% 
6 6% 6 4% 
7 4% 7 7% 
8 4% 8 2% 
9 2% 9 3% 
10 9% 10 8% 
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11 2010 11 2070 
12 4070 12 SOlo 
13 2010 14 • 
14 1010 IS 2% 
IS 3010 16 2% 
16 1% 17 • 
17 • 18 • 
18 2010 19 2% 
19 1010 20 7% 
20 3010 21 • 
21 2010 22 2% 
22 • 23 • 
23 • 24 2% 
24 • 25 3% 
25 1010 26 • 
26 • ·27 2% 
28 • 30 7% 
30 • 31 • 
32 • 32 • 
35 • 33 • 
36 • 34 • 
39 • 35 2% 
40 • 37 • 
SO • 42 • 
·Less than one percent 
Question 22 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time) 


















Question 23 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time) 



























Question 24 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time) 




















2"1. FULL-TIME FEMALE: 
Question 25 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time) 





SSK 10 SIOK 10 S20K 10 S25K 10 S30K 10 S3SK 10 S40K 10 545K 10 SSSK 10 S60K 
FULL-TIME MALE: SIOK 519,999 S24,999 S29,999 S34,999 S39,999 $44,999 549,999 SS9,999 or more 
2'10 35"1. 24"1. 23"1. 6"1.. I "I. 4'10 3"1. I "I. 
SIK 10 S5K 10 SIOK 10 SlOK 10 S2SK 10 S30K 10 53SK to S40K to 
FULL-TIME FEMALE: S5K SIOK S19,999 S24,999 S29,OOO· S34,999 S39,999 $44,999 
2"1. 64'10 21'10 8'10 2"1. 2'10 
*Less than one percent 
Question 23 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Child Support 
Child support awards adequately reflect the earning capacity of the: 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OfTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
a) non..custodial parent 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2"1. 21"1. 20"1. 12"1. 1"1. 44"1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"1. 7'1. 19"1. 23"1. 2'10 48"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 2'10 9'10 19'10 25"1. 2"1. 45"1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'1. 16.,. 31'1. 27'10 5"1. 9"1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"1. 8"1. 23"1. 20"1. 2"1. 47"1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 2'1. 23"1. 21'1. 10'1. 1'10 43'10 
L1TIGATORS: 3'10 23'10 25.,. 11'10 (0) 38'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 7'1. 35'10 35'10 19"1. 1'10 3'10 
JUDGES: 23'1. 33'10 11'10 3"1. 2'10 28"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 4'10 37'10 36'10 21'10 2'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 18'10 38'1. 40"1. 4"1. 
L1TIGATORS: 1'10 16"1. 34'1. 45"1. 4'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'10 18'10 34'10 41'10 5'10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'10 15'10 43"1. 37'10 3'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 4'1. 41'10 36'1. 18'10 1'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 4'10 38.,. 40'1. 17'1. (0) 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 8'10 36.,. 36'1. 19'10 2'10 
JUDGES: 32'10 46'10 16"1. 4'10 3'10 
b) Cuslodial parent 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighled): 1'1. 1S'Io 23'10 IS"I. 2'10 44"1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 8'10 19'10 22'10 2"1. 48'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 1'10 7.,. 19"1. 2S'Io 2"1. 46"1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3'1. 14"1. 32"1. -38'1. S'lo 9'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"1. 8.,. 22'1. 20'1. 2"10 48'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1"10 16"1. 24'1. 14"10 2'1. 43'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 1'1. 18'10 26"1. 15'1. 2"1. 39"1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3"1. 26"1. 42"1. 22"1. 4"10 3"1. 
JUDGES: 22"1. 29"1. 15"1. 4'10 2"1. 28"1. 
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THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weiShlcd): 2'" 27'" 41'" 27'" 3'1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'" 17'" 37'" 41'" 4'1. 
LlTIGATORS: 3'" 13'" H'" 46'" 4'" 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3'" IS'" H'" 42'" S'" 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'" IS'" 42'" 38'" 3'" 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 2'" 29'" 42'" 24'" 3'" 
LlTIGATORS: 2'" 30'" 42'" 24'" 3'" 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3'" 27'1. 43'" 22'" S'" 
JUDGES: 31'" 42'" 20'10 S'" 3'" 
Question 24 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Child Support 
Enforcement of child support awards is denied because of alleged visitation problems. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weiShlcd): (0) 3'" 8'" 20'10 18'" SI'" 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 3'" 16'" 16'" 11'" S4'" 
LlTIGATORS: (0) 3'" 19'" 17'" 12'1. 49'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) S'" 2S'" 31'1. 22'1. 16'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4'1. IS'" 17'1. 10'" S5'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 3'" 7'" 20'" 20'" 50'" 
LlTlGATORS: (0) 3'" 7", 24'" 21.,. 45.,. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0). 3'" 8'" 45'" 40'1. S.,. 
JUDGES: (0) I'" 9"10 26'" 33'1. 30'1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weiShlcd): (0) 7'" 16'" 4'" 37'1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 7'" 32'" 39'" 22.,. 
LlTIGATORS: (0) 5.,. 37"10 34'1. 24.,. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) S'" 3O'1t 38'" 27'" 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 8'" 32'" 27'" 22'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 6'1. 14'" 41'" 39'" 
LlTIGATORS: (0) 6'1. 12'" 45'1. 38'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 3'" 8'" 47'1. 42'1. 
JUDGES: (0) 2'" 14'" 38'" 47'" 
Question 2S - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Child Support 
Enforcement of child support is delayed because of counter claims for custody. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weishlcd): I'" 6'" S'" 16'" 9'1. 53.,. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 10'1. 17'" 11'" 4'" S8'1' 
LlTIGATORS: (0) 10'" 18'" 12'" 4'" 56'" 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 18'" 33'" 19'" 8'" 22'" 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I'" 10'" 17.,. 11"10 4'1. S8.,. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 6'1. IS'" 17'1. 10'" 52'1. 
LlTIGATORS: I'" 6'1. 14.,. 17.,. 12.,. 49'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3'" 13'" 23'" 33'1. 20'1. 7.,. 
JUDGES: (0) 4'" 16'" 21'" 28'" 32'1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weiShlcd): 1'1. 13'" 32'" 34'" 20.,. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 22'" 42'" 27'" 9'1. 
LlTIGATORS: (0) 22'" 41'" 28'" 9'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 23'1. 42'1. 25'" 10'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I.,. 24'" 41'1. 26'1, 9"10 
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MALE AITORNEYS: 20/0 12'1. 310/0 350/0 210/0 
lITIGA TORS: 20/0 130/0 280/0 330/0 240/0 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 30/0 140/0 250/0 360/0 220/0 
JUDGES: (0) 60/0 230/0 310/0 410/0 
• Less than one percent 
Question 26 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Child Support 
Pendente lite awards of child support are made within 60 days of filing the motion. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS orrEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 10/0 130/0 160/0 80/0 20/0 590/0 
fEMALE ATTORNEYS: 10/0 50/0 16'10 12'10 2'10 63'10 
lITIGATORS: 1'10 4'10 17'10 13'10 4'10 61'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 20/0 10'10 36'10 27'10 6'10 19'10 
ALL fEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 8'10 14'10 13'10 2'10 63'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 14'10 16'10 8'10 2'10 59'10 
LITIGATORS: 2'10 16'10 19'10 10'10 1'10 53'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 40/0 23'10 39'10 200/0 4'10 9'10 
JUDGES: 70/0 30'10 10'10 6'10 (0) 47'10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 3'10 33'10 40'10 20'10 4'10 
fEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 17'10 460/0 290/0 7'10 
LITIGATORS: 2'10 110/0 45'10 34'10 9'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'10 13'10 44'10 33'10 7'10 
ALL fEMALE AITORNEYS: 2'10 21'10 39'10 34'10 5'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 4'10 34'10 40'10 19'10 4'10 
lIT1GATORS: 3'10 34'10 40'10 21'10 2'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 5'10 25'10 43'10 22'10 5'10 
JUDGES: 13'10 57'10 19'10 11'10 (0) 
Question 27 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Child Support 
Earnings withholding orders are entered as soon as the obligor is 30 days behind in 
paying child support. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS orrEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
0 
ALL AITORNEYS (weighted): 1'10 4'10 12'10 19'10 4'10 60'10 
fEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 2'10 11'10 21'10 7'10 59'10 
lIT1GATORS: (0) 4'10 11'10 22'10 7'10 57'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 8'10 28'10 34'10 13'10 16'10 
ALL fEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 4'10 9'10 21'10 6'10 60'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 4'10 12'10 19'10 4'10 60'10 
lITIGATORS: 1'10 6'10 13'10 21'10 4'10 55'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3'10 12'10 22'10 35'10 10'10 19'10 
JUDGES: 4'10 23'10 18'10 6'10 2'10 47'10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2'10 11'10 30'10 47'10 11'10 
fEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 9'10 29'10 480/0 14'10 
lITIGA TORS: (0) 8'10 26'10 50'10 16'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 9'10 34'10 41'10 16'10 
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ALL FEMALE ATTORNEVS: I.,. 9.,. 21.,. 53.,. 16'7. 
MALE A TTORNEVS: 2.,. II.,. 30.,. 47'10 9'10 
L1TIGATORS: 2'7. 13.,. 29.,. 46'1. 10.,. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 4'7. 14.,. 27.,. 43'1. 13'10 
JUDGES: 7'7. 44'7. 34.,. II.,. 4.,. 
Question 27 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Court Employees) 









Question 28 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 









Question 29 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
My opinions in job related situations are given different weight or importance than 









Question 30 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
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Question 31 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 









Question 28 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Custody 
Custody awards to mothers are apparently based on the assumption that children 
belong with their mothers. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OfTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 3'10 30'l0 19'10 3'10 I.,. 43'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 IS.,. 24'10 10'10 2'10 45'10 
lIT1GATORS: 1'10 17'10 27'10 11'10 3'1. 42'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 24'10 48'10 16'10 6'10 6'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1, 17.,. 25'10 9'10 I." 47.,. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3'7. 32'10 19'10 2'10 1'10 43'10 
lITIGATORS: 3'10 34'1. 22'10 2'10 1'10 39'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 7'10 46'10 3S'Io 3'10 3'10 3'10 
JUDGES: 10'10 27'10 14'10 26'10 23'10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 5'10 53'10 34'10 6'10 2'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'7. 33'10 46'10 16'10 4'10 
lITIGATORS: 1'10 29'10 46'10 19'10 5'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 25'7. 51'10 IS'Io 6'10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'7. 32.,. 46'10 17'10 3'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 5'10 57'10 33'10 4'10 2'" 
lIT1GATORS: 5'10 55'" 36'1. 3'" 2'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: S'lo 480;. 39'" 3'10 3'10 
JUDGES: 1'10 130;. 35'" IS'Io 34'" 
Question 29 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Custody 
The courts give fair and serious consideration to fathers who actively seek custody. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OfTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 3'10 14'10 24'10 15'10 1'10 44'10 
fEMALE ATTORNEYS: 50;. 20'l0 19'10 9'10 (0) 47'10 
lIT1GATORS: 6'10 22'10 21'10 S'" (0) 43.,. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 12'7. 43'10 24'10 16'10 (0) 5'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 5'10 20'7. 20'10 S'lo 47'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 3.,. 12'10 26'10 15'10 1'10 43'10 
.1IT1GATORS: 3'10 12.,. 27'10 IS'1. 2'10 39'7. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 6'10 22'1. 45'10 20'10 4'10 3'10 
JUDGES: 34'10 27'10 10'10 4'10 1'10 24'10 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 5'1. 24'10 43'10 26'10 2'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: S'lo 41'10 34'10 IS'Io (0) 
lITIGATORS: 11'1, 39'10 37'10 13'10 (0) 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 13'1, 45'10 25'10 17'10 (0) 
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ALL FEMALE AlTORNEYS: 901. 37~ 3S~ 16~ I~ 
MALE AlTORNEYS: 5~ 220;. 45~ 270;. 2'1. 
L1TIGATORS: 4~ 20'10 44~ 30~ 30;. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 60;. 22~ 46~ 21~ 5~ 
JUDGES: 45~ 36~ 14~ ,0;. I~ 
• Less than one perc:cnt 
Question 30 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Custody 
The courts favor the parent in the stronger financial position when awarding custody, 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL AlTORNEYS (weighted): 4~ 21~ 240;. 50;. 45"10 
FEMALE AlTORNEYS: 1'10 8'10 210;. 200;. I~ 49.,. 
L1TIGA TORS: (0) 8'10 24'10 22'10 1'1. 44"10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 16~ 40'10 36'10 (0) 8"10 
ALL FEMALE AlTORNEYS: 1'10 S~ 22'10 18"10 1"10 51.,. 
MALE AlTORNEYS: (0) 4'10 21'10 250;. 6"10 44.,. 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 4~ 23~ 260;. 6'10 40"10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 9'10 35'10 420;. 12~ 3"10 
JUDGES: (0) 3~ 24'10 30'10 14'1. 29.,. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL AlTORNEYS (weighted): S~ 39'10 44'10 9.,. 
FEMALE AlTORNEYS: 1'10 14'10 42'10 44'10 2'1. 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 1S'Io 440;. 39'10 3~ 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) IS'Io 44'10 39'10 (0) 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 16'10 45~ 36'10 2'1. 
MALE AlTORNEYS: (0) 7'10 3So;. 45'10 11'1. 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 7'1. 38'10 44'10 11.,. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 9~ 36'10 43'10 12'10 
JUDGES: (0) 4~ 35'10 420;. 20"10 
Question 31 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Custody 
Child custody awards disregard father's violence against mother, 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL AlTORNEYS (weighted): 1'10 6'10 12'10 23'10 6"10 53.,. 
FEMALE AlTORNEYS: 2'10 9'10 17'10 12~ 3'10 51.,. 
L1TIGATORS: 2'10 10"10 20'10 12'10 4'10 53"10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: ,0;. 19'10 34'10 22'10 3"10 16"10 
ALL FEMALE AlTORNEYS: 1'10 10"10 17'10 12'10 3'10 51"10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 6'10 11'10 24'10 7~ 51"10 
L1TIGATORS: 1'10 7'10 1\'10 27'10 8"10 47'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 13'10 21'10 41'10 12'10 (0) 13"10 
JUDGES: (0) 60;. 21'10 21'10 25"10 27.,. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL AlTORNEYS (weighted): 2'10 12'10 24'10 48'10 13'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3~ 19'10 39~ 32'10 8.,. 
L1TIGATORS: 4'10 21'10 43'10 25'10 7~ 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 5'10 23'10 41'1. 27'10 4'10 
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ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3"" 23"" 39"" 29"" 6.,. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 2"" 12"" 23"" '0"" 14.,. 
L1TIGATORS: I"" 12"" 21"" 'I"" 14'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 1$'1. 24"" 48"" 14"" 
JUDGES: (0) 9"" 28"" 28"" 35'1. 
·Less than one percent 
Question 32 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 










Question 33 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 








Question 34 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
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Question 35 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
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Question 36 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
When promotional opportunities are available in the court system. I am informed 









Question 32 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Custody 
Mothers are denied custody because of employment outside the home. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): (0) 1'1. 7.,. 29.,. 13'1. 50'1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 2'1. 12"" 23'1. 6'1. 57'1. 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 2'" 13'" 23'" S'" 55'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 5'1. 24'1. 41'1. 12'1. IS'" 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4'1. 14'1. 22'1. 6'1. 55'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) I'" 6'1. 31'" 14'1. 4S'1. 
L1TIGATORS: (0) I'" 6'" 35'1. 150;. 44'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 2'1. 6'" 5S'" 30'" 5Ofo 
JUDGES: 1'1. (0) II'" 2S'" 33'1. 27'" 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): (0) 2'" 14'1. 59'" 25'1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 6'1. 29'1. 51'1. 15'1. 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 5'" 2S'1. 51'1. 17'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 6'1. 30'1. 50'1. 15'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: S'1. 31'" 48'1. 13'" 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 2'1. 12'" 61'1. 26'1. 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 2'1. 11'1. 62'1. 26'" 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 2'" 6'" 61'1. 31'" 
JUDGES: 2'1. (0) 15'" 3S'1. 45'" 
Question 33 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Custody 
Joint custody is ordered over the objections of one or both parents 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1% 4'" 16% 14'1. 11'1. 55'1. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 4'1. 17'1. 12'1. 6'1. 61'" 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 4'1. IS'" 13'1. 7'1. 5S'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 9'1. 34% 22'" 13'1. 21'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 5'1. 17'1. 14'1. 6'1. 59'1. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 4'1. 16'1. 15'1. 12'1. 54'1. 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 3'1. 15% IS'" 14'1. 51'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 7'1. 26% 29'1. 29'1. 9'1. 
JUDGES: 1'1. 4'1. 24% 25.,. 15'1. 31'1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'1. S'" 36'1. 31'" 24'" 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: (0) II'" 45'1. 27"" 17'" 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 10.,. 43'1. 2S% 17'1. 
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 11'1. 43'1. 28'1. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 12'10 40'1. 34'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1. 8'10 34'10 32'10 
L1T1GATORS: (0) 5'10 30'10 36'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 8'10 29'10 32'10 
JUDGES: 1'1. 6'10 35'10 36'1. 
·Less than one percent 









Civil orders of protection, directing respondents to stay away from home, are 
granted when petitioners are in fear of serious bodily harm, 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER 









THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 














































































































When granting civil orders of protection, the courts issue support awards for 
dependents, 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'10 5'1. 12'10 13'10 4'10 65'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'1. 1'10 5'10 19'10 8'10 66'10 
L1TIGA TORS: 1'10 1'10 6'1. 20'10 10'10 63'10 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 1'10 1'10 8'1. 38'10 20'10 32'10 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'10 7'10 16'10 7'10 67'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'10 4'10 13'10 13'10 4'1. 65'10 
L1TIGATORS: 2'10 6'1. 22'10 36'10 9'10 25'1. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 1'10 9'1. 22'10 14'10 28'10 26'10 
JUDGES: 
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THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2"" 13'7. 34'7, 39'lo 12'lo 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I"" 7'7. Ig'7, 53"" 21'7. 
L1T1GATORS: 2"" 4"" 15'7. 54'7, 26'7. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'7. 2'7, 11'7. 56'7. 29'7, 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 7"" 22'7. 49'lo 22'7, 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 2'7. 13'7, 38'7. 37'7. 11'7. 
L1T1GATORS: 1'7. 10'7, 37"" 39"" 13'7, 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'7. S'7. 30'lo 48'7. 12'7. 
JUDGES: 2'7. 11'7. 29'7, 19'7, 39'7. 
·Less than one percent 
Question 36 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Domestic Violence 
Petitions for civil orders of protection are rejected where domestic relations cases 
are pending. 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 4'7. 15'7. 11'7, 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3'lo 6'7. 14"" 8"" 
L1TIGATORS: 3'lo 7'7. 14'7, 11'7. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 8.,. 13'lo 24"" 16'7. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'7. 6'7. 12'lo 8'7, 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 4'lo 15"" 11'7. 
L1TIGATORS: (0) 11'7. 26'7, 27'lo 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'lo 5'7. 24'lo 27'lo 
JUDGES: 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'7. 11'7. 41"" 30'7, 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 9'7. 17'7. 41'lo 28'7. 
L1T1GATORS: 9'70 IS'7. 36"" 29'7. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: II"" 20'70 36"" 24'7, 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 5'7. 19'1o 42'7. 28'7, 
MALE ATTORNEYS: (0) 10'7. 41'lo 30'7, 
L1T1GATORS: (0) 1I'lo 39"" 32'7, 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: (0) 14'7. 33'lo 35'7. 
JUDGES: 3'7. 7'7. 30"" 33'7. 





























Circuit court judges order emergency injunctive relief to protect victims of domestic 
violerice. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2'7. 16'7. 14"" 8'lo 2'lo 59'7. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'7. 8'7. 14"" II"" 2'lo 64'7. 
L1TIGATORS: 1'7. 8'7. 19'1o 12'lo 2'lo 58'7. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 3'7. 12'7. 30'7, 15'7. Solo 36'7. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1'7. 8'7. 18'1, 10'7. 2'lo 62'7. 
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MALE ATTORNEYS: 2.,. 16.,. 14'1'. S.,. 2.,. 
L1TIGATORS: 2.,. 20.,. 14.,. S'I'. 2'1'. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 6.,. 28.,. 2''1'. 19'10 3.,. 
JUDGES: ''1'. 20'10 30'1'. 9'1'. 4.,. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weiShtcd): ,.,. 3S.,. 34.,. 19.,. 4.,. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3'1'> 2''1'> 39'1'> 29'1'> ''1'. 
L1TIGATORS: 3'1'. 18'1'> 44'1'> 30'1'. ''I'> 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: ,.,. 19.,. 47.,. 23.,. 7'1'. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3'1'> 20'10 46.,. 26.,. ,.,. 
MALE ATTORNEYS: ,.,. 19'10 47'1'> 23'1'. 7.,. 
L1TIGA TORS: ''1'. 44.,. 3O'I't 17'1'. ''I'> 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 7.,. 35'1'> 31'1'. 24.,. 4.,. 
JUDGES: S.,. 29'1'. 44'1' • 14'" ''I'> 
• Less than onc percent 
Question 37 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 












In my area, it appears that members of one gender are given preferential appoint-









Question 39 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
If there is a problem or complaint about my job, there is a person or agency that 
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Question 40 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 


















Question 38 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Domestic Violence 
The courts do not treat domestic violence as a crime. 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARelY NEVER 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'7. 6"7. 13'7. 16"70 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4"70 15"7. 16"70 9"70 
lITIGA TORS: 3'7. 16"70 IS"7. 13"70 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 6'7. 24'7. 22"70 16"70 
All FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 1"70 15"7. 17"70 10"70 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 5"7. 13"70 17"70 
lITiGA TORS: 5'1. 15"70 21"70 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'7. 15"7. 29"70 21"70 
JUDGES: S"70 13"7. 22"70 22"7. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2"70 13"7. 27"70 33"70 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 6"70 27'" 32"70 23"70 
lITIGA TORS: 6'7. 2S'" 32"70 23"70 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 8'7. 31"70 29"70 21"70 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3"70 31'10 36"70 20"70 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 1'7. 11'10 26"70 34"70 
lITiGA TORS: 1'7. 9"70 27'7. 37"70 
DOMESTIC RelATIONS: 2'70 17"70 32"70 24"70 
JUDGES: 9'7. 14"7. 25"70 26"70 































Assault charges are not treated seriously when domestic relations cases are pending. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARelY NEVER KNOW 
All ATTORNEYS (weighted): 1'7. 13'10 IS'7. 13"70 4"70 52'7. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4'7. 22'" 13070 7"70 1"70 53'7. 
lITIGA TORS: 6'7. 22"7. 16070 10"70 2"70 4507. 
DOMESTIC RelATIONS: 9'70 34"70 IS07. 1007. 3"70 25'7. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 3'7. 20"70 16'7. 6"70 2"70 54"70 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 12"7. IS"70 15"70 4'1. 51"7. 
lITIGA TORS: 1"70 14'10 22"70 16"70 307. 44"70 
DOMESTIC RelATIONS: 2"7. 34'1. 28"70 18'1. 8"70 10"70 
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JUDGES: I'" 9'" 26'" 2". 29'" ". 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2'" 26'" 3'''' 28'. ,'" 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 8'" 40'" 32'" 18'" 3'" 
L1TIGATORS: 10'" 40'10 29'" 14'1'. 4'. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 12'" 46'" 24'" 14'" 4'" 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: ,'" 43'" 34'" 13'" 4'" 
MALE ATTORNEYS: I'. 24'" 3'''' 30'10 8'" 
L1TIGATORS: I'" 24'" 40'10 29'" 6'" 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 2'" 38'" 32'" 20'" 8'" 
JUDGES: I'" 9'" 28'" 3M. 32'" 
"Less than one percent 
Question 40 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Rape 
Rape victims are accorded less credibility than victims of other types of assault" 
ALWAYS OfTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): I'" 11'. 16'" 14'" 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 5'" 22'" 12'" 5'" 
LITIGATORS: 5'" 24'" 14'" 6'" 
CRIMINAL: 8'" 28110 28'" 13'. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 4'" 20" 14'" 5'" 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 9'" 16"1. 16'" 
L1TIGATORS: 8'. 19'" 20'. 
CRIMINAL: I'" 10'. 23'" 32"1. 
JUDGES: I'" 6'" 12'" 15"1. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 2'" 22'" 33'" 30'" 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 9'10 42'" 30'" 10'" 
L1TIGATORS: 9'" 46'" 26'" 10"1. 
CRIMINAL: 10"1. 33'" 33"1. 15'" 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 10'10 44'" 30'" II'" 
MALE ATTORNEYS: I'" 19'" 34'" 33'" 
L1T1GATORS: I'" IS'" 34'" 36'" 
CRIMINAL: 2'" 13'. 28'" 39'10 
JUDGES: 2'" ,'" IS'" 19'" 






























Judges control the court so as tc;> protect the complaining witness from improper 
questioning" 
DON"T 
ALWAYS OfTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 8'" 19'" 16.,. 4"1. I'" 53'" 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: I'" 12'" 22'" 8'" 1"1. 56'" 
L1TIGATORS: 2'" IS'" 24'. 8'" I'" 51'" 
CRIMINAL: 6'" 21'" 38'" 15'" (0) 19'" 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 2'" 12'" 21'" '''I. 51"1. 
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MALE AlTORNEYS: 9'10 19'10 IS'I. 4'1. 1'10 52'10 
L1T1GATORS: 10'10 22'1. 18'1. 4'10 1'1. 46'1. 
CRIMINAL: 21'10 30'1. 25'10 4'10 (0) 21'1. 
JUDGES: 38'10 25'10 1S'Io 1'10 2'1. 19'1. 





ALL AlTORNEYS (weighted): 2'10 22'1. 33'10 30'10 13'1. 
FEMALE A lTORNEYS: 9'10 42'10 30'10 10'10 8'10 
L1TIGATORS: 9'10 46'10 26'10 10'10 9'1. 
CRIMINAL: 10'10 33'1. 33'1. 15'10 8'1. 
ALL FEMALE AlTORNEYS: 10'10 44'10 30'1. 11'10 5'10 
MALE A lTORNEYS: 1'10 19'10 34'10 33'10 14'10 
L1T1GA TORS: 1'10 15'10 34'10 36'1. 14'10 
CRIMINAL: 2'10 13'10 28'1. 39'1. 19'10 
JUDGES: 2'1. 7'1. 15'10 19'10 58'10 
-Less than one percent 
Question 41 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
In the past two years, have you attended any job training program? 
Yes No 
ALL MALE: 51'1. 49'1. 
ALL FEMALE: 36'10 64'1. 
Were you given administrative leave to attend? 
Yes No 
ALL MALE: 87'1. 13'1. 
ALL FEMALE: 93'10 7'10 
Were you given paid leave to attend? 
ALL MALE: 2'1. 98'1. 
ALL FEMALE: 2'1. 98'10 
Were you given expenses; mileage reimbursement 
ALL MALE: 91'10 9'10 
ALL FEMALE: 83'10 17'10 
Registration 
ALL MALE: 89'10 11'10 
ALL FEMALE: 82'10 18'10 
Question 42 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
Do you feel that the salary for most court employees in your area is too high, too 
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Question 43 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
Are persons of the opposite sex paid more, paid less or about the same for performing 
the same job duties and responsibilities that you perform? 
ALL MALE: 
ALL FEMALE: 









Question 42 - Judges' and Lawyers' Questionnaires 
Rape 
Sentences are shorter where the victim had a prior relationship with the defendant. 
DON'T 
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER KNOW 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 3'10 21.,. 15'7. 2'70 60'10 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 8'11 21.,. 8.,. 1.,. (0) 61.,. 
L1TIGATORS: 8'10 25.,. 10.,. 1.,. (0) 57'10 
CRIMINAL: 15'10 36.,. 17.,. 2.,. (0) 30.,. 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 5'" 22.,. 9.,. 1.,. 63'10 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 2'10 20.,. 16.,. 2.,. 59'10 
L1TIGATORS: 2.,. 24.,. 18'10 2.,. (0) 54'10 
CRIMINAL: 1.,. 36.,. 29'10 (0) (0) 34'10 
JUDGES: 2.,. 14.,. 38'10 8.,. 9.,. 29.,. 
THOSE EXPRESSING AN OPINION 
ALL ATTORNEYS (weighted): 7.,. 51.,. 37'10 4.,. 1.,. 
FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 18.,. 55.,. 23'7. 3.,. 1.,. 
L1T1GATORS: 19.,. 57.,. 22'10 3.,. (0) 
CRIMINAL: 21.,. 51.,. 24.,. 3.,. (0) 
ALL FEMALE ATTORNEYS: 15'70 58.,. 24.,. 3'70 1'70 
MALE ATTORNEYS: 6.,. 50.,. 39.,. 5'7. 1'70 
L1T1GATORS: 5.,. 52.,. 40'70 4'70 (0) 
CRIMINAL: 2.,. 55.,. 43.,. (0) (0) 
JUDGES: 4.,. 20.,. 53'70 10'70 13'70 
-Less than onc percent 
Question 44 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
Do you feel that you have been denied a promotion while employed in the court 
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Question 45 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 









Question 46 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
Do you feel that someone else has been granted or denied a promotion while 









Question 47 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
How much job advancement opportunity do you feel is available to you in the 




















List what you would consider to be mitigating factors in sentencing a female: 
Faclors not discussed: 23'1. 
Factors discussed: 78'1. 
Illustrative Comments 
Prior record; age and custody of children; nature of offense. 
Usually, a past history of criminal behavior is less than that of a male. 
Sole responsibility for young children. 
I like to think I would consider equally the same factors for men and women: 
motive, background of defendant, effect on defendant's family. 
Pregnancy; child care responsibilities when no other person is available. 
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Dependent children for which mother is sole or primary supporter. 
Same as any defendant. 
Custody of children - single parent or husband to be incarcerated; actual dominating 
influence by male. 
No differences between male and female. 
Lack of prior record, no violence, family situation. 
Pregnancy 
Same as male - 1) type of offense; 2) age; 3) relationship to victim; 4) educational 
background; 5) prior record; 6) dependent children. 
Same factors as those considered for a man - except if she has dependent children, 
I want to know what happens to them. 
Lack of prior record; genuine remorse; rehabilitation in drug cases (including 
alcohol). 
Lack of paternal financial support; need to care for children - usually non-violent 
offense. 
Pregnancy, family responsibilities and other considerations which are also applied 
in sentencing a male (wife's pregnancy may affect male's sentencing) 
Basically same factors for males; would inquire as to inoney, children highly 
dependent on female. 
The main factor, not common to both sexes, is the fact that females, more frequently 
than males, may be custodians of children who would be adversely affected by a 
parent's incarceration. 
Stable employment history, family responsibilities, contrition, some reasonable basis 
for criminal action, sensible plan for future 
Question 46 - Judges' Questionnaire 
Sentencing 
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Illustrative Comments 
Dependent children with female unless dependent children living with the male (in 
truth, therefore, there is no distinction since the living arrangements of the children 
are a mitigating factor for either; the general perception and assumption is that 
children are living with the mother). 
I hold men to a greater degree of accountability. 
Family responsibilities; if father has physical custody. 
Men can't get pregnant. 
No pregnancy, although his wife's pregnancy might if she has to go on welfare. 
Many male defendants don't live with their families. 
Males often tend to be less remorseful and amenable to help or self-help. 
Prior sentences imposed if any record; age, education, drug addiction, etc. 
Women, more often, take responsibility for their children and the children suffer 
and the female defendant suffers additional consequences thereby for her crime. 
Too many men take the rap when both are equally involved. 
A physical condition or illness that would likely result in jeopardy to the individual's 
life or health if incarceration were imposed, may be considered for both men and 
women. 
Not if he was the custodian and "sometimes" shorter sentences will accomplish 
desired effect on females. 
Question 47 - Judges' Questionnaire 
Jury Selection 
What are the criteria you use to select jury forepeople? 









Education and knowledge of the jury person. 
None - the occupant of the first chair is always designated as foreperson. 
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Education and sophistication of person. 
Education, experience, try to alternate foreperson between the sexes and races. 
Position on jury list - gender plays no part. 
Minimal intelligence; dependent upon complexity of case; juror seated #1 is usually 
foreperson unless based on complexity of case requires minimal intelligence on part 
of foreperson. 
I alternate - select a male, next time that panel is in select female, then male. I 
keep record of selected forepersons and never appoint same person twice. 
Age, occupation, education, experience, appearance, numerical position on panel. 
Senior status (but not retired), good background Gob status), social vocations. 
Education, business experience, how they've responded to voir dire. 
Some indication of leadership ability. 
Employed in a supervisory or leadership position; assertive body language on the 
way to the box. 
What little is known about education, employment as bearing on "leadership." 
I generally select a different foreperson for each case in order to give everyone -
whites, blacks, males and females, an equal opportunity to serve. 
Question 48 - Judges' Questionnaire 
Jury Selection 
In the last year, how many times have you selected women as jury forepersons? 
Percentage of 
times selecting 
a woman All Judges Male Judges 
0"1. 2O"lo 18"lo 
l"lo to 9"lo 4"lo 4"lo 
1O"lo to 19"lo l"lo l"lo 
20"lo to 29"lo 3"lo l"lo 
30"lo to 39% (0) (0) 
40% to 49"lo 1% 1% 
50% to 59% 28% 26% 
60% to 69"lo l"lo l"lo 
70% to 79% 5% 6% 
SO"lo to 95% l"lo l"lo 
over 95070 3% 3"lo 
No answer/don't know 33% 38"lo 
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Question 48 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time Employees) 
Have you ever requested maternity leave? 
Yes No 
FUll-TIME MALE: 2'" 98'" 
FUll-TIME FEMALE: 18'" 82'" 
A. Was the leave granted? 
FUll-TIME MALE: 20"" 8O'lI 
FULL-TIME FEMALE 93"" ,'" 
B. Was leave paid or unpaid? 
Paid Unpaid 
FULL-TIME MALE: missina 
FULL-TIME FEMALE: 88"" II"" 
C. What amount of time was requested? 
<I I to 3 4 to 6 , to 9 10 to 12 
month months months months months 
FULL-TIME MALE: 100.,. 
FULL-TIME FEMALE: 9'" 82"" ,'" I"" 1"10 
D. What amount of time was granted? 
<I I to 3 4to 6 , to 9 10 to 12 
month months months months months 
FULL-TIME MALE: missing 
FULL-TIME FEMALE: II'" '8"" 8'" 1"" 1"10 
Question 49 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time Employees) 
Have you ever requested leave. other than maternity leave. to provide care for an 
infant or adopted child? 
Yes No 
FULL-TIME MALE: 10'" 90'" 
FULL-TIME FEMALE: 9"10 91.,. 
A. Was the leave granted? 
FULL-TIME MALE: 81'" 19'" 
FULL-TIME FEMALE: 96'" 4'" 
1990] 























I to 3 
months 
3"1, 
I to 3 
months 
3"1, 
Question 50 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time Employees) 
267 
Have you ever requested any leave beyond that described in questions 48 and 49 to 
provide care for dependent children? 
Yes No 
FULL-TIME MALE: 8"1, 92"1, 
FULL-TIME FEMALE: "1"1, 93"1, 
A. Was the leave granted? 
FULL-TIME MALE: 79"1, 21"1, 
FULL-TIME FEMALE: 95"1, 5"1, 
Question 50 - Judges' Questionnaire 
Behavior of Female Attorneys 
Is there a behavior that is often displayed by female attorneys which you find 
especially offensive? 
Behavior Not Discussed 
80"1, 
Illustrative Comments 
I only want the person to act as a professional. 
Behavior Discussed 
20"1, 
Generally, the conduct of female attorneys is more decorous than male. 
Over-aggressiveness by some, need to win. 
Yes, when they are shrill. 
Failure to speak up and assert themselves, inappropriate attire (short skirts, etc.) 
Not offensive, but sometimes female attorneys get too emotional - not often. 
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Yes, have had women attorneys cry after a ruling adverse to their client. 
Hairstyle that requires frequent "adjustment." 
At times female attorneys either scream or speak too softly, also show anger when 
ruled against. 
Yes, when they try to act like men (or at least the offensive, brusque, macho men), 
but I find the same characteristics offensive in men. 
Frequently can't hear them. 
Female attorneys, especially assistant state's attorneys are overly aggressive, appear-
ing to feel any accommodation or compromise is a sign of weakness on their part. 
Paranoid they're being discriminated against by reason of being female (proverbial 
"chip" on the shoulder). 
Question 51 - Judges' Questionnaire 
Behavior of Male Attorneys 
Is there a behavior that is often displayed by male attorneys which you find especially 
offensive? 
Behavior Not Discussed 
75"', 
Illustrative Comments 
Poor courtroom demeanor, argumentative. 
Behavior Discussed 
25% 
Playing with loose change and/or keys in pants or jacket pocket. 
Lack of preparation. 
Over-ego and self importance at trial litigation. 
Yes, when they are shrill. 
Remarks that are belittling in nature to opposing counsel who are women. 
Failure to accept a ruling of the court without extensive rebuttal reasons. 
Yes, flipping their shoes on and off. 
Yes, male attorneys often argue with the court after a ruling has been made. 
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They are more prone to interrupt another lawyer or witness. 
Male attorneys wink at me often. Sometimes they are unprofessional with female 
law clerks, flirting with them and inquiring into personal matters. 
Not often, but sometimes, too argumentative with opposing counsel. 
Sometimes male attorneys are less respectful in the courtroom to the court such as 
being tardy, not standing to address the court; these things rarely occur with female 
attorneys. 
Condescending attitudes toward other counsel, litigants, witnesses, court personnel. 
Question 51 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time Employees) 
Have you ever requested leave to provide care for elderly relatives? 
Yes No 
FULL-TIME MALE: 11'10 89"1. 
FULL-TIME FEMALE: 8'10 92'10 
A. Was the leave granted? 
FULL-TIME MALE: 84'10 16'10 
FULL-TIME FEMALE: 90'10 10'10 
Question 52 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time Employees) 
Do you have children under 12 for whom day care is needed? 
Yes No 
FULL-TIME MALE: 16'10 84'10 
FULL-TIME FEMALE: 23'10 77'10 
A. Infant? 
FULL-TIME MALE: 31'10 
FULL-TIME FEMALE: 28'10 
B. Preschool? 
FULL-TIME MALE: 30'10 
C. After School? 
FULL-TIME MALE: 46'10 
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Question 53 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (Full-Time Employees) 











After School 12'70 
Type of care offered at work_ 
Infant 










Question 54 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 















3'70 ALL FEMALE: 5'70 
Question 55 - Court Employeees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
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1932 2070 1070 
1933 2070 1070 
1934 2070 1070 
1935 3070 1070 
1936 4070 2070 
1937 2070 2070 
1938 2070 2070 
1939 1070 3070 
1940 * 3070 
1941 3070 3070 
1942 3070 2070 
1943 2070 2070 
1944 * 2070 
1945 3070 2070 
1946 2070 4070 
1947 3070 2070 
1948 2070 2070 
1949 2070 3070 
1950 3070 3070 
1951 1070 3070 
1952 2070 2070 
1953 3070 4070 
1954 2070 2070 
1955 * 4070 
1956 2070 2070 
1957 3070 2070 
1958 2070 4070 
1959 1070 3070 
1960 3070 2070 
1961 3070 4070 
1962 1070 4070 
1963 1070 3070 
1964 * 2070 
1965 * 3070 
1966 1070 2070 
1967 * 1070 
1968 * 2070 
1969 * * 
1970 * 
• Less than one percent 
Question 56 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
Gender: 
MALE: 26"10 FEMALE: 74"70 
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Question 58 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
Is your position 
Other 
2"10 
Permanent Permanent/Contractual Contractual 
A. 
ALL MALE: 77"10 5"10 18"10 
ALL FEMALE: 89"10 6"10 5"10 
Is it: 
Full·Time Part-Time 
ALL MALE: 84% 16"10 
ALL FEMALE: 97"10 3"10 
Question 59 - Court Employees' Questionnaire (All Employees) 
If your position is contractual, do you receive benefits? 
ALL MALE: 
ALL FEMALE: 
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Please answer the following questions. Feel free to comment as you deem 
appropriate. 
I. Membership in Discriminatory Clubs: 
a. Do you belong to any club or organization (other than a bona fide religious 
organization) which discriminates or otherwise excludes members on the 
basis of sex, race, national origin, or religion? 
b. Have you belonged to any such clubs or organizations in the past? When? 
Under what circumstances did you cease to be a member? Please explain. 
Do you think the canons of judicial ethics should include a provision that 
it is unethical for a judge to belong to a discriminatory club or organization? 
Please explain why or why not. ________________ _ 
2. Perception of Bias in the Community: 
a. Do you believe that discrimination against women still exists in our society 
today? In your community? __________________ _ 
b. (For the purposes of this question and those that follow, the term "minor-
ities" will refer to members of racial, ethnic, or religious minority groups.) 
Do you believe that discrimination against other minorities still exists in 
our soecity today? In your community? _____________ _ 
c. Do you believe that any of the following pose a problem for women in our 
society? 
(1) Wage discrimination? Yes __ No __ 
(2) Hostile attitudes? Yes __ No __ 
(3) Patronizing attitudes? Yes __ No __ 
(4) Sexual harassment? Yes __ No __ 
d. Do you believe that any of the following pose a problem for other minorities 
in our society? 
(1) Wage discrimination? Yes __ No __ 
(2) Hostile attitudes? Yes __ No __ 
(3) Patronizing attitudes? Yes __ No __ 
(4) Harassment? Yes __ No __ 
e. Can you think of a woman you know personally who has been discriminated 
against or otherwise treated unfairly because of her sex? _______ _ 
Please explain. _______________________ _ 
f. Can you think of a minority you know personally who has been discriminated 
against or otherwise treated unfairly because he or she is a member of a 
minority group? _______________________ _ 
Please explain. _______________________ _ 
g. Have you witnessed such incidents (as described in questions e. and f. 
above) in law school, in the workplace, or in the courtroom? ____ _ 
Please explain. _______________________ _ 
h. Do you believe that a judge has an obligation to intervene if he or she 
witnesses such incidents (as described in e. and f. above) in the courtroom? 
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In chambers? ________________________ _ 
Please explain. _______________________ _ 
3. Efforts to Overcome or Eliminate Bias: 
a. Have you participated in or promoted any efforts to broaden diversity, 
eliminate bias or advance the status of women or minorities in any organ-
ization, school, or workplace? _________________ _ 
If so, what did you do? __________________ _ 
4. Policies of Concern to Women and Minorities in the Workplace: 
a. Does your firm, court, faculty or agency have a policy regarding maternity 
leave or childcare leave (for legal, judicial, academic and/or lay employees)? 
b. Do you know what these policies are? ______________ _ 
If you know, please explain the policies. _____________ _ 
c. Did you participate in formulating those policies? _________ _ 
d. What is your opinion of your firm, court, faculty or agency's policies in 
that regard? ________________________ __ 
e. Does your firm, court, faculty, or agency have an articulated policy regarding 
sexual or minority harassment? _________________ _ 
f. Has your firm, court, faculty, or agency established a particular procedure 
for dealing with complaints of sexual or minority harassment? ____ _ 
g. What is your opinion of your firm, court, faculty, or agency's policy and 
procedures in that regard? ___________________ _ 
5. Employment Experience with Women and Minorities: 
a. For Members of a Law Firm or Governmental Agency: 
(1) How large is your firm or agency? 
Number of lawyers? __________________ _ 
Number of non-lawyer employees? ______________ _ 
(2) What percentage of the attorneys in your firm or agency are women? 
Minorities? _____ _ 
(3) What percentage of the partners in your firm are women? 
Minorities? _____ _ 
(4) Have you, your firm or agency ever been reluctant to employ or promote 
a woman or a minority to a particular position because of concerns 
regarding the reactions of clients? _____ _ 
Did you share that concern? _____ _ 
Please explain. ______________________ _ 
Do you still have that concern? _______________ _ 
Please explain. _______________________ _ 
b. For a judge: 
(1) Have you ever had a woman as a courtroom bailiff? _______ _ 
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(2) Would you be reluctant to have a woman as a courtroom bailiff? __ 
Please explain. ______________________ _ 
(3) Have you ever employed a woman as your law clerk? ______ _ 
(4) Would you be reluctant to hire a woman as your law clerk in the 
future? ___________________________ _ 
Please explain. __________________________ _ 
(5) How large is your court (number of judges)? ___________ _ 
(6) How many women judges are there on your court? _________ _ 
c. For faculty members: 
(I) How large is the faculty on which you serve? ___________ _ 
(2) How many of the faculty members are women? __________ _ 
(3) How many of the faculty members have tenured positions? ___ _ 
(4) How many of the women faculty members have tenured positions? _ 
d. For all respondents: 
(I) Have you, your firm, agency, court or faculty ever been reluctant to 
employ or promote a woman to a particular position because of concerns 
relating to the impact on your firm, agency, court or faculty of her 
child-bearing or child-rearing responsibilities? __________ _ 
Please explain. _______________________ _ 
Do you still have that concern? _________________ _ 
Please explain. __________________________ _ 
(2) Have you, your firm, agency, court or faculty ever discharged or 
expressed disapproval to a female or male colleague, associate or em-
ployee for what you, your firm, agency, court or faculty considered to 
be sexual misbehavior? ______________________ _ 
Please explain. _____________________________ _ 
(3) Have you, your firm, agency, court or faculty ever discharged or 
expressed your disapproval to a female colleague, associate or employee 
for becoming pregnant? _____________________ _ 
Please explain. ________________________ _ 
(4) Have you, your firm, agency, court or faculty ever discharged or 
expressed disapproval to a colleague, associate or employee for what 
you, your firm, agency, court or faculty considered to be inappropriate 
behavior directed at members of any minority group? _______ _ 
Please explain. ________________________ _ 
6. General Questions: 
a. In what year did you graduate from law school? ___________ _ 
b. What percentage of your law school classmates were women? _____ _ 
c. Are you aware of the approximate percentage of women in the senior class 
of your law school today? _____________________ _ 
d. What do you think has been the impact, if any, of the increase in the 
number of women in the legal community? 
